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Abstract 
This thesis examines the development and mechanics of the political system of Iraqi 
Kurdistan (northern Iraq). Since 1991, a de facto state system has been in existence in 
this region, a situation exists which has few precedents and no present-day 
comparison. The political system of Iraqi Kurdistan is identified as possessing 
political parties, electoral procedures, a national assembly, and organs of governance 
and administration. To understand this political system, the structures, decision- 
making processes and political history of the major political parties are analysed. 
Historically, the Kurds have never possessed a state. However, following the Gulf 
War of 1990-1991 and the withdrawal of the Government. of Iraq (GOI) from Iraqi 
Kurdistan, an indigenous emergency administration was established by the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Front (IKF), followed by multi-party elections in 1992. The administrative 
vacuum forced the militia-style political parties into governing the territory. Such a 
task brought parties supposedly representing different strata of Kurdish society 
together in a volatile coalition resulting in a equal sharing of power. However, 
interfactional fighting in 1994 resulting in the Kurdish region being divided between 
the two most powerful political parties (the KDP and PUK), with the system being 
further complicated by a multitude of smaller political parties and groupings. 
A theme which is developed throughout the thesis is that the successful peaceful 
political development of the Iraqi Kurdish region may be achieved by employing a 
variant of a consociational system of governance. It is argued that a major component 
of a peaceful political settlement has to include elite accommodation within the 
governmental structure which is acceptable to the geopolitical thinking of 
neighbouring states and influencing powers, as well as being able to administer the 
Iraqi Kurdish region in this difficult period for the whole of Iraq. A modified power- 
sharing system may possibly allow for such political development to take place, later 
allowing the KDP and PUK to once again unify the political system of Iraqi 
Kurdistan. 
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Notes 
In the course of researching this thesis, I have had the privilege of working with the 
political parties of Iraqi Kurdistan, and a range of political characters. As Iraqi 
Kurdish politics is dominated by the presence of these characters, I have referred to 
them often in the text. As such, it is necessary to provide a brief note as to how they 
are referred to. I have chosen, wherever possible, to refer to characters by the name 
which they are commonly referred to in the region. Many are referred to by their first 
names, for example Sami (Sarni Abdel Rahman) and Nawshirwan (Nawshirwan 
Mustafa Amin) and I have similarly chosen to do the same. For members of the 
Barzani family, to assist in clarity, Mulla Mustafa Barzani is referred to as `Barzani', 
with the current leader and other Barzanis being referred to by their first names, again 
a common practice in Iraqi Kurdistan (for example, `Massoud', `Nechervan'). With 
regard to Jalal Talabani, for reasons of clarity, I refer to him throughout the text as 
`Talabani'. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Iraqi Kurdistan is at a momentous crossroads in terms of its political development. At 
the time of writing, political parties of Iraqi Kurdistan have governed and 
administered the region under their territorial control since 1991 when the 
administration and military forces of the Government of Iraq (GOI) withdrew from 
the north of the country. The intervening decade has not been an easy period for the 
Iraqi Kurdish de facto state and its people. For the first five years of the 1990s, the 
political system of the region exhibited widespread instability, with internecine 
fighting being common, and the involvement of foreign national governments in the 
affairs of the fledgling de facto state seemingly being a constant feature of political 
life. 
Fundamentally affecting the Kurdish political system in Iraq, United Nations (UN) 
imposed sanctions against Iraq resulted in widespread hardships for the Iraqi people 
as a whole, yet, conversely, gave Iraqi Kurdistan a modicum of security against the 
GOI with the presence of international observers and a separated political and 
economic system. The benefits of the sanctions regime were further enhanced in 1996 
with Security Council Resolution (SCR) 986 allowing significant amounts of oil to be 
sold by Iraq in order to purchase humanitarian supplies. 13 percent of the revenues 
were guaranteed for the northern governorates under Kurdish control, administered by 
the agencies of the UN, with the assistance of the Kurdish local authorities. 
The political system of Iraqi Kurdistan has therefore developed under conditions 
which may be considered anomalous, both for the Kurds and for Iraq. Faced with the 
necessity of having to form an administration in the aftermath of the withdrawal of 
Kurdish forces, the political parties of the region struggled to come to terms with their 
new found territorial authority. The problems were enhanced further by imperious 
neighbouring powers promoting tensions within the de facto state for their own 
domestic reasons. 
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Such instability and problems has led academics, journalists and politicians alike to 
denigrate the attempts of the Kurdish political leaders to establish a government 
charged with regulating the domestic affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan and promoting security 
with the establishment of a civil society. The government of Turkey in particular has 
referred to the Iraqi Kurdish region as being a power vacuum with no effective 
government and therefore characterised by lawlessness. Bulent Ecevit, the Prime 
Minister of Turkey, referred to the existence of an "authority vacuum" as a member of 
the opposition in 1996.1 His views have not changed since and, as Prime Minister in 
1999, he referred to a "lack of authority in northern Iraq". The President of Turkey, 
Suleiman Demirel, noted that "the territory of northern Iraq is a political vacuum: 
there is no government, " clearly supporting the position of his Prime Minister. 
3 
Prominent academics also mirror these criticisms. When analysing Iraq since 1990, 
and particularly with relation to the continued survival of the regime of Saddam 
Hussein, Perthes forwards that "the Kurdish parties .... 
have not been able to put in 
place even the slightest element of any structure designed 'to create a better, 
democratic Iraq in the northern part of the country. "4 Gunter, currently one of the 
most prolific writers on Iraqi Kurdish politics, is a regular exponent of the argument 
of the "power vacuum". The power vacuum scenario is one of political instability 
creating a vacuum of power into which neighbouring states and the United States 
(US) have been drawn. 5 It is a problematic concept to deal with, both in terms of 
semantics and actualities in Iraqi Kurdistan itself. Indeed, the term is often banded 
around as a joke between different Kurdish politicians, with the claim that there is not 
a lack of power in the region, instead there are too many groupings exercising it. 
Sa'adi Pira, the prominent Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) politician, suggested 
that Iraqi Kurdistan could not be identified as a power vacuum as the activities of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), particularly since 1996, have become 
progressively institutionalised within the territory. A term he identified as being more 
Republic of Turkey, Regional Security Plan, 15 April 1996. 
2 Ibid., 27 January 1999. 
3 Quoted in Gunter (1999a) "Developments in Iraqi Kurdistan: Their Influence on Neighbouring States 
and the Kurdish Movements in Surrounding States", in Irakisch-Kurdistan: Status und Perspektiven. 
Ergebnisse einer internationalen tagung 1999 in Berlin, pp. 65-80. Berlin: Awadani e. V.: p. 80- 
4 Perthes (1998) Iraq Under Sanctions: A Regime Defiant. Middle East Programme Briefing No. 40 
cFebruary). London: Chatham House, p. 1. 
Gunter (1999a) op. cit., pp. 66-68, for example. 
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appropriate was a `defence vacuum', as the KRG and the political parties do not have 
the means to prevent foreign incursions, either by political or military means. 6 
Within Erbil, the Deputy Prime Minister of the fourth cabinet of the KRG, Sami 
Abdul Rahman, similarly disagreed with the concept of the power vacuum, suggesting 
that the city of Erbil was one that enjoyed high standards of law and order. He further 
identified the international context of the power vacuum, which was apparent at the 
time due to the military forces of Turkey attacking Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) 
bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. These incursions have often been cited as evidence of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) lack of control of borders. However, Sami 
argued that the incursions of the military forces of the government of Turkey were, in 
effect, joint operations between KDP peshmerga (militia) and Turkish forces against 
the PKK, stating that no foreign national government military activity occurs in Iraqi 
Kurdistan without the permission of the KDP, within its own territory.? In a domestic 
sense, Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, the unofficial deputy-leader of the PUK, claimed 
that the streets of Suleimaniyah are safer than those of Diyarbekir in Turkey, again 
dispelling the concept of the power vacuum-8 
However, this ability to administer adequately the domestic affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan 
has still not been accepted by the majority of commentators. Pellietiere, writing in 
1991, even argued that the supposed aggressive nature of the Kurds pre-empts the 
ability of them to self-govern an independent Kurdish entity, describing such a 
situation as "patently unworkable" and that: 
".... such an entity would have to be administered by Kurds, which is 
an impossibility. The very qualities that have enabled the Kurds to 
survive for centuries make it virtually certain that they cannot rule 
themselves. The Kurds, as a group, are ungovernable, even by leaders 
they themselves have chosen. Thus all of this current agitation for 
Kurdish "statehood" must be seen to be misguided. " 9 
The continuing existence of an independent Kurdish entity for the last decade has 
gone a considerable way to disproving Pelletiere's claims and academic and 
6 Interview with Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 1998. 
Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 8 September 1999. 
Interview with Nawshirwan Mustafa, Suleimaniyah, 29 June 1999. 9 Pelletiere, 1991, The Kurds and their Agas: An Assessment Q, the Situation in Northern Iraq. 
September 1991, Philadelphia: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, p. 1. 
23 
journalistic articles have started to hint at the good as well as the bad aspects of the de 
facto administration. 10 An important indicator of this change may be seen in the 
letters sent by various United States (US) politicians to the PUK, congratulating the 
party on its twenty-fifth anniversary. " Congressman Filner stated in his letter that "I 
feel strongly that the United States must support and protect the democratic 
institutions that are emerging in Iraqi Kurdistan. " 12 Similarly, Senator Richard G 
Lugar noted that the `fledgling democratic institutions must be protected from the 
tyranny of the Iraqi regime. " 13 Perhaps even more complementary are the words of 
Senator J Robert Kerrey. In his letter, again to the PUK, he stated that: 
"There are some who say that democracy is an alien concept to Iraqis. 
But the democratic civil society which is being built in Iraqi Kurdistan 
shows that Iraqis, like all people, have both the desire and the talent to 
govern themselves. " 4 
However, opinions at the end of the decade remained, on the whole, negative due to 
the animosity which exists between the KDP and PUK. For example, Natali 
commenced her 1999 analysis of the Kurdish issue in Iraq after the Gulf War by 
stating that the internal conflict between the KDP and PUK in 1994 dissipated the 
KRG. '5 In a similar vein, Sheikhmous identified this conflict as weakening and 
undermining the indigenous Kurdish administration. 16 
It is undeniable that conflict in 1994 and 1996 resulted in the division of the 
administration into two separate entities based in Erbil and Suleimaniyah, dominated 
by the KDP and PUK respectively. However, rather than viewing it as a `dissipation' 
or `weakening' caused maybe by the ungovernable nature of the Kurdish people, it is 
perhaps more correct to see it as a function of the level of maturity of the Iraqi 
10 For examples of such articles, see Prince (1993) "A Kurdish. State in Iraq? " Current History, Vol. 92, 
No. 570, pp. 17-22; Lawrence (2000) "Iraqi Kurds Enjoy a De Facto State, " Christian Science Monitor, 
3 May 2000; Stansfield (2000a) "Iraq: Kurdish Divisions" Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 14 April, V, 
pp. 14-16. 
The twenty-fifth anniversary of the PUK was on 1 June 2000. Celebrations were held in the PUK 
Political bureau complex at Kalarcholan, at which I attended. 
2 Letter from Congressman Bob Filner to Dr Barham Salih, PUK Representative to Washington DC, 
26 May 2000. 
" Letter from Senator Richard G Lugar to Dr Barham Salih, PUK Representative to Washington DC, 
30 May 2000. 
14 Letter from Senator J Robert Kerrey to Jalal Talabani, Secretary General of the PUK, 2 June 2000. 
's Natali (1999) International Aid, Regional Politics and the Kurdish Issue in Iraq After the Gulf War. 
Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, p. 1, p. 27. 
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Kurdish political system and parties. It could be argued that the weakness in the 
political system stems from the rivalry which exists, for whatever reasons, between 
the KDP, PUK, and other parties. At the current stage of development, neither party 
has the ability to manage these rivalries in, a peaceful manner and resort to the military 
option, often with the assistance of foreign national governments, making any joint 
government an extremely unstable entity. To have them separated in a divided 
political system may, paradoxically, result in its strengthening by allowing the 
increased efficiency of the activities of the de facto governmental institutions. 
Furthermore, to have a unified administration presents a regional geopolitical 
instability, which neighbouring countries and interested powers will attempt to 
resolve with their own national interests in mind. '7 
Still, the dominant opinion continues to be one of describing the political parties of 
Iraqi Kurdistan, and particularly the KDP and PUK, as squandering the best 
opportunity the Iraqi Kurds have ever had to establish an official autonomous region 
by continuing to act in a divided manner, with party interests put before those of the 
Kurdish people, and with government resources being plundered for the benefit of the 
dominant party. When I attended a conference in Berlin in 1999 regarding the status 
of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Deputy Prime Minister of the KRG based in Suleimaniyah, Dr 
Kamal Fu'ad, and the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Sa'adi Pira, both described to 
the audience the activities of the KRG in great detail. Their presentations may be 
characterised as forward-looking. '8 However, the participants and the audience chose 
to focus once again on the reasons of the internecine divisions and the fighting of the 
previous 30 years rather than on the steps taken by the Iraqi Kurdish parties to 
administer the territory. It is with these inconsistencies in mind that I developed the 
hypothesis to be addressed in this thesis. 
16 Sheikhmous (1999) "Intra-Kurdish Relations of Kurds of Iraq with Kurds of Other Parts of 
Kurdistan", in Irakisch-Kurdistan: Status und Perspektiven, pp. 53-64. Berlin: Awadani e. V., p. 63. ' 
1' For an analysis of the relationship between geopolitical realities and domestic necessities in Iraqi 
Kurdsitan, see Stansfield (2000b) "Iraq: Kurdish Chessboard, " Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 2 August, 
III, pp. 8-10 
Is The conference was entitled Irakisch-Kurdistan: Status und Perspektiven. Ergebnisse einer 
internationalen tagung 1999 in Berlin and was held. on 9-10 April 1999 in Berlin, Germany. 
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1.1 Statement of Hypothesis 
My hypothesis is that the current divided political and administrative system is a 
direct manifestation of the historical development and characteristics of the political 
system of Iraqi Kurdistan. The current division of Iraqi Kurdistan between two 
separate administrations dominated by the KDP and PUK is, in effect, a function of 
party dynamics. Attempts at unifying the system allows for instability to develop 
between the KDP and PUK as such actions force the parties into a position which they 
do not have the capacity to embrace. In domestic terms, the divided system is not 
necessarily a weak system. The ability of the two regional administrations to govern 
their territories has increased due to the stability generated by separation, combined 
with the effects of the UN oil-for-food programme (SCR 986). However, the role of 
the political parties within the administration has remained paramount and the 
identification of party with government is a feature of Iraqi Kurdish politics. 
The future political development of Iraqi Kurdistan is dependent upon a range of 
factors but, within the realm of the political and administrative system, the issue of a 
unified government as called for by the Washington Agreement of 1998, is of 
paramount importance. I argue that it is dangerous to attempt to develop the political 
and administrative system too quickly due to the existence of fundamental problems 
between the two major parties which need to be resolved. It is therefore forwarded in 
this thesis that a possible interim solution would be a variant of a consociation-type 
model of multi-party elite accommodation within a divided political system. 
Such a system is already apparent to some degree within the region and exhibits 
political stability. One government in Erbil dominated by the KDP, and one 
government in Suleimaniyah dominated by the PUK allows elite accommodation to 
take place within a political atmosphere not fissured with interfactional rivalry. It can 
also be seen as a geopolitical safety valve, as the ability of each party to interact with 
neighbouring countries is enhanced without overtly threatening the status of the other 
party. Similarly, the division favours the immediate geopolitical concerns of these 
states which view Iraqi Kurdish political unity with some trepidation. A divided 
political system therefore has some benefits in the interim period, with intervention 
from neighbouring states being less destructive, and internal stability conversely 
enhanced. 
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
In order to address this extensive hypothesis, it is necessary to place the Iraqi Kurdish 
situation within a comprehensive analytical framework, as well as providing a 
detailed account of its political development. Chapter 2 is the main theoretical and 
methodological chapter of the work. Within this chapter, I aim to provide a analysis of 
those aspects of political science theory which can be seen as being applicable to the 
study of Kurdish politics in Iraq. In studying the political and administrative system of 
the de facto state, it is a necessary and useful task to deconstruct definitions of `The 
State' within the theoretical literature, developing a possible continuum of 
characteristics in which Iraqi Kurdistan may be identified and thereby analysed. 
Political science theories of consociational political systems are identified as a 
particular theoretical focus. This body of theory, and the issues generated by the 
potential analytical and prescriptive application to Iraqi Kurdistan, provides the 
running analytical theme throughout the thesis. The chapter concludes with an 
assessment of possible methodological approaches to the study of political and 
administrative systems, the identification of an appropriate field methodology, and 
description of the fieldwork undertaken which underlies this thesis. 
Chapter 3 addresses the physical and human geography and the economy of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, and may be viewed as a contextual chapter. The problems of defining the 
Iraqi Kurdish region are addressed and then a detailed appraisal of the physical 
geography of the region is provided including an analysis of natural resources and the 
relationship between the Kurds and the GOI. The human geography of Iraqi Kurdistan 
is then discussed mainly from the normative viewpoint of political geography, 
emphasising population figures, changing distributions, and administrative divisions. 
More anthropological issues are then addressed with an assessment of the linguistic, 
ethnic, and confessional characteristics of the northern regions of Iraq. 
Building on this analysis, the economic characteristics of the region are then analysed. 
Aware of the role of agriculture in the traditional Kurdish economy, I commence with 
an exposition of theories which relate the development of political structures to the 
traditional mode of economic production. Such theories are inherently deterministic, 
and. view the physical environment as a major control on the development of societies 
and the activities which are undertaken, particularly when the environment is as 
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rugged as that of Iraqi Kurdistan. Therefore, the progression in this chapter from 
physical geography, to human geography, and then to economic activity, with the 
overall aim of providing a sound basis for the analysis of the political and 
administrative system, may be seen to be a logical progression from the normative 
viewpoint of these theories. The predominance of agriculture within Iraqi Kurdistan is 
acknowledged, as is the impact of oil revenue. The deterioration of the agriculture 
sector due to the Anfal Campaigns and the susbsequent impact of UN SCR 986 is 
identified, and the chapter concludes with an assessment of the workings of the 
contemporary economy. 
Chapter 4 charts and analyses the development of the party political system in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. It is intended that this chapter is more than an account of Kurdish political 
history, which has been undertaken many times before by other authors. Instead, this 
chapter analyses the development of the party political system as one that was 
dominated by political groupings which may be termed as guerrilla movements to one 
which has modem political parties controlling sophisticated governmental apparatus. 
The chapter commences with an evaluation of the relevant theory, and particularly 
prescriptive theories of revolutions which originated with such revolutionary leaders 
as Mao-Tse Tung and Ernesto Che Guevara. The chapter is then structured 
chronologically and focuses primarily on those incidents which impacted upon the 
development of the party political system. This means that this chapter may be 
somewhat different to conventional accounts of Kurdish politics as, at times, issues 
are developed which are ignored in other works. The intention of this approach is that 
an assessment and analysis is created which allows the reader to appreciate fully the 
complexity of the internal political system that existed in Iraqi Kurdistan on the eve of 
the Rapareen of 1991.19 
Chapter 5 builds on the analysis presented in the previous chapters. The focus of this 
chapter is the contemporary party political system of Iraqi Kurdistan. The chapter 
commences with a chronological analysis of the political history of Iraqi Kurdistan 
through the 1990s, again focusing on those incidents and moments which were 
important in the development of the political and administrative system. The major 
19 Rapareen is the Kurdish term for Uprising. 
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political parties are then assessed and analysed. Ii analysing the parties, the KDP and 
PUK are assessed individually, with their structure, organization, decision-making 
process, and the role of specific individuals and groupings being appraised, allowing 
both institutional and character based approaches to be utilised. Each analysis also 
investigates the relations between parties, the ties with foreign national governments, 
and the likely future development of the political party in question. 
Along with Chapter 5, Chapters 6 and 7 form the core of the thesis. Chapter 6 focuses 
on the institutions of government which have developed in Iraqi Kurdistan since the 
Rapareen of 1991. The chapter commences with a chronological analysis of the 
1990s, focusing on those incidents and moments which impacted upon the 
development of the system of governance and administration. The main body of the 
chapter then presents an analysis and assessment of the development of the 
constituent parts of the governmental system, focusing on the constitutional 
arguments and problems surrounding the establishment of institutions of government 
and administration, the creation of a regional legislature, the formation of a regional 
executive and ministerial portfolios, and the ratifying of a judicial system. This 
chapter can be seen as undertaking the first part of a modelling process, and presents a 
morphological assessment and analysis of the Iraqi Kurdish administrative system in 
the 1990s. 
Chapter 7 builds on this morphological analysis. It commences again with a 
chronological analysis, this time focusing on the interrelationship between party 
political characters and the development of the administration. The chapter then has 
as its focus an analysis and assessment of the third cabinets of the KRGs, from 1996- 
1999. These cabinets formed after the invasion of the city of Erbil by the military 
forces of the GOI and the KDP in August 1996 and 'are a manifestation of the divided 
system which has characterised the de facto state to the present day. Being dominated 
by the KDP and PUK in Erbil and Suleimaniyah respectively, the analysis of the 
structures and mechanisms of these cabinets not only provides insights into the 
dynamics of the regional administrations, but also into the relationship between party 
and government, allowing a comparison to take place between the political decision- 
making process of the KDP and PUK. Therefore, this chapter can be seen to be 
following on logically from Chapter 5 as well as Chapter 6. 
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The chapter. concludes firstly with a comparative assessment of the political and 
administrative system of KDP and PUK controlled territory, and an analysis of the 
subsequent development of the fourth cabinet which has been in existence in Erbil 
since October 1999, and the modified third cabinet which has been in existence in 
Suleimaniyah since the same date. 
Throughout these chapters, theories of consociational political systems are forwarded 
where appropriate as an approach which would allow for peaceful political 
development within the constraints of the current situation. Similarly, throughout the 
final chapters focusing on the 1990s, the initiatives of foreign national governments, 
and particularly the US, aimed at resolving the problems of division currently 
apparent in the de facto state are developed. As the arguments develop, a more 
prescriptive tone is adopted in order to identify a possible solution to the problems 
faced by the de facto state, and the dangers of progressing too quickly with unification 
of the two constituent parts, as called for the by the Washington Agreement, for 
example. 
The detailed analysis of the previous chapters culminates with a conclusion which 
suggests that the greatest challenge the Kurdish parties face in the short and medium 
term is to be found in balancing internal and external needs. Internally, there is a need 
to develop a strong, democratic, political and administrative system. Externally, the 
Kurds have to be careful that their administration, and their de facto state, is not 
perceived as becoming too strong and institutionalised. The failure to achieve the first 
need would result in internal chaos and political instability. The failure to achieve the 
latter need would result in neighbouring and influential states being forced to become 
increasingly politically and militarily involved in the affairs of the de facto state, 
encouraging its rapid demise. Within the current environment of international 
relations, the Kurds of Iraq have to walk a very narrow path between achieving these 
two aims. As a conclusion, I forward a. variant of a consociational system of* 
governance which would seek to resolve these immediate problems. 
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Chapter 2 
Theory and Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
The political situation of Iraqi Kurdistan is often said'to be unique. Some aspects of it 
are, but others have corollaries elsewhere, and it is possibly more correct to say that 
the situation is anomalous. Iraqi Kurdistan is not a state recognised by the 
international community, for example, yet a domestic political system has emerged 
which displays highly developed and increasingly sophisticated state-like institutions, 
attributes and characteristics. The aim of this chapter is therefore two-fold. First, it is 
necessary to place this anomalous situation within the corpus of literature regarding 
state characteristics, formation and operation and, second, to develop a theoretical and 
methodological approach which is most applicable to the study of its political system. 
The Kurdish issue is most commonly discussed in terms of the impact Kurdish 
groupings have on the relations between states in the Middle East in particular. 
However, by only employing international relations (IR) theories which have an 
inherent dependency upon the concept of `the state', it is an impossible task to 
provide a truly insightful analysis of the Iraqi Kurdish predicament. This problem is 
common to non-state nations in general, and not only to the Kurds. In emphasising 
this, Ferguson & Mansbach note that IR theory describes humanity as "liv[ing] within 
states, not in the interstices between them .... analyses of international relations 
[can] be no more than logical extensions of the study of the state. " 
Since the establishment of the state system in the Middle East, the Kurds have 
effectively been located geographically in the delicate boundary regions of Syria, 
Iraq, Iran and Turkey, which has resulted in them being pawns in the geopolitical 
arena which is home to a multitude of other states' interests. As such, analyses of 
Kurdish politics have often focused upon the relation of Kurds as a minority people 
Ferguson & Mansbach (1988) The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics. Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, p. 111. Gottlieb furthers the analysis of this problem and calls for a 
'states plus nations' approach to resolving the problem of ethnic conflicts caused by state boundaries 
(Gottlieb (1994) "Nations without States. " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73 No. 3, May-June, pp. 100-112. 
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with state/external involvement in their political development. 2 The reasons for Kurds 
occupying such a prominent position in the foreign policies of various states can be 
traced to several inter-related reasons such as the Kurdish region being resource-rich, 
particularly in oil; in being located in an area of immense geo-economic significance; 
and for effectively being conveniently placed mercenaries. IR theories therefore have 3 
a crucial role in the developing an understanding of the Iraqi Kurdish predicament. 4 
However, since 1991, geopolitical realities have promoted a further development of 
the Iraqi Kurdish situation, which is now dominated by the issue of self-governance. 5 
The change in the global and regional geopolitical system at the end of the 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s presented an unprecedented opportunity for the Iraqi Kurds to 
seize the initiative. As Jalal Talabani stated, "Saddam Husayn's aggression against 
Kuwait .... led to the emergence of a situation in Iraq which we exploited to 
establish a free local administration. " 6 
The existence of this situation in Iraqi Kurdistan has created hew opportunities for the 
study of the Iraqi Kurdish political system. The development of the political system 
into one which exhibits domestic structures of states, even if not enjoying 
international legitimacy, has allowed for the application of political science theories, 
` For analyses of the relationship between secessionist minorities and external involvement, see: 
Heraclides (1990) "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement, " International Organization, 
Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 341.378; Heraclides (1991) The Self-Determination of Minorities in International 
Politics, London: Frank Cass. 
For an analysis of the importance of oil in the formation of Iraq and the inclusion of the southern 
Kurdish territories, see Nash (1976) "The Effect of International Oil Interests Upon the Fate of an 
Autonomous Kurdish Territory: A Perspective on the Conference at Sevres, August 20,1920. " 
International Problems (Tel Aviv), Vol. 15, Nos. 1-2, pp. 119-133. For analyses of the impact of 
geopolitics and geostrategy on the Kurds, see Olson (1994b) "The Kurdish Question and Geopolitical 
and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East after the Gulf War. " Journal of South Asian and Middle 
East Studies 17 (4), pp. 44-67; Olson (1994c) "The Kurdish Question and the Kurdish Problem: Some 
Geopolitic and Geostrategic Comparisons, " Peuples Mediterraneens, Nos. 68-69, pp. 77-94; Khashan 
(1995) "The Labyrinth of Kurdish Self-Determination, " International Journal of Kurdish Studies, Vol. 
8, Nos. 1-2, pp. 5-32. 
` For an assessment of the role of ethnic actors in international politics see Esman (1995) "Ethnic 
Actors in International Politics, " Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 1, No. I (Spring), pp. 111-125. 
Also see Shuhrke & Noble (1977) Ethnic Conflict in International Relations. New York: Praeger; 
Schechterman & Slann (1993) The Ethnic Dimension in International Relations. Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger. 
s See Freedman & Boren (1992) "Safe Havens for Kurds in Post-War Iraq, " in Rodley (ed. ), To Loose 
the Bands of Wickedness. London: Brassey's / David Davies Memorial Institute of International 
Studies, pp 43-92; Gunter (1993a) The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope. New York: St. Martin's 
Press; Gunter (1999b) The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis. New York: St Martin's 
Press; Freedman (1993) "The War and the New World Order, " in Gow (ed. ) Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and 
the World Community. London: Brassey's, pp. 183-200. 
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commonly grouped under the label of `comparative politics', to Iraqi Kurdistan. It is 
argued in this thesis that this approach allows for a thorough understanding of the 
development and operation of the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan, and also allows 
for realistic solutions to the non-state predicament faced by the Kurds to be 
forwarded. 
2.1.1 Aims 
It is first necessary to present theories of `the state'. Related to this, the impact of 
globalization on state characteristics and formation is also developed in an attempt to 
demonstrate how variable both theoretical conceptions and practical realities of the 
state are particularly since the demise of the USSR. A framework is forwarded in 
which it is possible to place the characteristics of states and non-states alike, and the 
position of Iraqi Kurdistan identified within it. 
The most important use of the concept of `the state' in this chapter is to identify those 
methods and techniques employed in the study of state entities, with Iraqi Kurdistan 
being identified as possessing some attributes of states. Theories of comparative 
politics are assessed which are of relevance to analysing the Iraqi Kurdish political 
system with reference to other real-world situations. With these theoretical 
considerations in place, effectively allowing an analysis and assessment of the 
development and operation of the political system, theories of consociational political 
systems are identified at this point as a possible interim solution to the current 
problems and stresses which are affecting the political system. 
2.2 Theories of 'The State' 
The concept of the state has rightly been part of the primary discourse in the study of 
the Kurdish predicament. As an approach, it has obvious applications. The Kurdish 
situation in Iraq is borne out of the hectic state-building which occurred in the Middle 
East at the beginning of the twentieth century, and it's historical development has to 
focus on the concept of state as an entity which, paradoxically, the Kurds have been 
oppressed by, yet aspire to. 
6 Jalal Talabani, 14 June 1992, quoted in Gunter (1993) op. cit., p. 87. 
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To define the state in theory uncovers a continuum, with no one definition of the state 
being accepted by all, but what may be termed as a resemblance of definitions.? The 
study of the state in practice similarly illustrates that, while a non-state may possess 
the required criteria and characteristics, it may still not possess statehood. Again, with 
recognition of states, one may employ a continuum. Even when a state is said to exist, 
it may not possess the required criteria or characteristics. With regard to this issue, 
Krasner notes that "recognition has been accorded to entities that lack either formal 
juridical autonomy or territory, and it has been denied to states that possess these 
attributes. "8 
It should be noted that these arguments are not being deployed to support the idea that 
there is a state in Iraqi Kurdistan, rather that our conception of what is a state is, in 
theory and practice, may be seen to be mercurial. The recognition of states is highly 
dependent upon the specifics of time and place, and therefore dependent upon 
geopolitical realities. However, Iraqi Kurdistan can be. seen to possess certain 
attributes of states, if still not enjoying recognition. As this thesis intends to analyse 
and assess the development and operation of the de facto state, it is necessary to 
develop a working definition of the theoretical concept of the state in which to place 
the political and administrative system of the region. Once this location-in-theory has 
been achieved, it is then possible to identify a relevant line of enquiry and 
methodology. 
2.2.1 Defining `The State' 
It has proved to be an insurmountable task for political science theoreticians to 
provide a working definition of what is effectively the primary unit of analysis of the 
discipline. 9 Easton, for example; when noting the' usage of the term `state' highlighted 
See Krasner (1984) "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics, " 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 223-246; Krasner (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 4. Also see Banks and Shaw (1991) State and Society in 
International Relations. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
a Krasner (1999) op. cit., p. 220. 
9 For a concise assessment of the development of "the State" and of concepts of sovereignty, see: 
Philpott (1997) "Ideas and the Evolution of Sovereignty, " in Hashmi, (ed. ), State Sovereignty: Change 
and Persistence in International Relations. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 17- 
47. For a succinct appraisal of theories of international relations, see Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1990) 
Contending Theories of International Relations. New York: Harper and Row; Dunleavy & O'Leary 
(1987) Theories of the State. Basingstoke: Macmillan; Hannum (1990) Autonomy, Sovereignty, and 
Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights.. Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. For an appraisal of the state-centric nature of academic approaches, see Taylor 
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the existence of 140 or more definitions, varying ideological bias, the added 
complexities caused by extensive lay usage, and the difficulties of operationalizing it 
for empirical research. 10 
The classic definition of a state is found in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States. The convention identifies the state as possessing the 
following: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and 
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other States. " However, this definition suffers 
from sovereignty itself being an attribute of statehood, making it legally problematic 
to create new states. 12 Furthermore, we have to recognise that there is a difference 
between the criteria which have to be met before a state can exist, and criteria which 
may be deemed as reasons as to why a state should exist. Knight identifies an 
important inconsistency between criteria which must be met, and reasons of state 
existence when he states "some common criteria must be met before a State can be 
said to exist, although the particular reasons why States exist vary quite markedly. " 
13 
2.2.1.1 The State in Theory 
Theories of the state are characterised by a composite of different approaches with the 
result that definitions of the states define everything, yet still seem to be missing some 
elusive points. Ferguson & Mansbach blame this problem of multiple-nebulous 
definitions on the phenomenon being studied changing at a rapid rate, making the 
subject inherently non-objective. 14 Mann defines the `messiness' of the state as being 
a problem of mixing two different levels of analysis: the institutional and the 
functional. '5 However, Mann stays with this combination and forwards a mixed but 
mainly institutional definition which originated. with Max Weber. In this definition, 
(1996) "The Modern Multiplicity of States" in Kofman & Youngs, (eds. ), Globalization: Theory and 
Practice. London: Pinter. 
10 Easton (1981) "The Political System Besieged by the State, " Political Theory, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 303- 
326, p. 307. 
" Hannum (1990) op. cit., pp. 15-16. 
12 Ibid, p. 15. 
13 Knight (1994) "People Together, Yet Apart: Rethinking Territory, Sovereignty, and Identities, " in 
Demko & Wood, (eds. ), Reordering the World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 72. 
1" Ferguson & Mansbach (1988) op. cit., p. 142. 
15 Mann (1984) "The Autonomous Power of the State, " European. Journal of Sociology, Vol. 25, pp. 
185-213, p. 60. 
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which encapsulates the majority of elements of most state theories, the state contains 
four main elements, those being: 16 
I. A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying 
2. centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a 
centre to cover 
3. a territorially-demdrcated area, over which it exercises 
4. a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a 
monopoly of the means of physical violence. 
The definition of the monopoly of rule making and physical violence is a focal point 
for defining theories of the state. Gross, for example defines the state as "a coercive 
institution (organization) that has supreme power over a definite territory and its 
inhabitants and is vested with monopoly of the use of physical power. " 17 
Possibly the most defining characteristic of the state is the control of territory as a 
state cannot exist without a recognisable geographical area of which to govern, 
administrate, defend, conduct decision-making and demand the allegiance of its 
subjects. With this in mind, Buzan describes the state as: 
". ... represent[ing] human collectivities in which governing institutions and societies are interwoven within a bounded territory. 
For many, though not all, of the major purposes of interaction within 
this nexus of territory, government and society is what constitutes the 
state. " 18 
Such an approach grounded in the importance of territory may be described as 
geopolitical, and the relationship between state and territory is firmly supported by the 
fields of political geography and geopolitics, which believe that power is firmly 
rooted in the physical nature of the world itself. 19 Parker describes in vivid terms this 
relationship when he poetically says that ".... just as the giant Antaeus .... drew 
his 
mighty strength from contact with the ground on which he stood, so the power of the 
modern state is derived from the territory which it occupies. " 20 
161bid, pp. 60-61. 
17 Gross (1998) The Civic and the Tribal State: The State, Ethnicity, and the Multiethnic State. New 
York: Greenwood Press, p. 8. 18 Buzan (1991) People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post- 
Cold War Era. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 60. 
19 Parker (1985) Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century. London: Croom Helm, p. I. 
20 Ibid. 
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It is a necessary exercise to address how such definitions relate to the Iraqi Kurdish 
situation in 1990s. It is the case that the political and administrative system of Iraqi 
Kurdistan does indeed possess many of the key requirements by which political 
scientists use to identify states. If we consider the official prerequisites of the 
Montevideo Convention, or of the theoretical precepts mentioned above, it is possible 
to argue that the Iraqi Kurdish region possesses a permanent population, defined 
territory; government and a capacity to enter into international relations, if at an 
informal level . 
21 However, it does not officially possess a standing army, does not 
enjoy international recognition by the UN, and does not collect taxes. 22 Therefore, 
when looking at the political and administrative system as a discrete entity, it is 
possible to say that Iraqi Kurdistan, in domestic terms has several stately attributes. 
However, in international terms, it possesses few. 
2.2.1.2 The State in Practice 
How, then, is one to make sense of this set of nebulous and often ambiguous 
definitions of the state? On one level, it is not too difficult to identify that `the state' 
can be defined by reference to control of territory, provision of government 
institutions, and/or the use of coercion against its own population. However, the 
problem is complicated depending on the normative viewpoint from which it is 
studied. 23 
Each approach gives more understanding without fully defining the entity of the state, 
in theoretical terms. These problems of theory are compounded rather than alleviated 
by the confusion generated when the state is studied in reality. What may be defined 
in the theoretical literature in conceptually vague terms manifests as an entity with a 
variety of often contradictory characteristics. 
It should be accepted that many of these attributes, including defined territory and government, are 
themselves de facto. 
22 However, the peshmerga forces are increasingly organized in the form of a standing army, and 
attempts are being made to allow the KRG more control over the actions of party militias. 2' Buzan, focusing on security at a variety of levels, chooses to identify the territorial element; 
Benjamin'& Duvall, studying institutions of government and administration identify the state by what it 
does, rather than what it is in physical terms, by employing a structural-functional approach; and Gross, 
in his study of the Palestinians, focuses on the state as a coercive force, perhaps understandably within 
his case study. 
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Combined with the identification of different normative approaches, the temporal 
development of the state should also be considered when seeking a theoretical 
definition. With an analysis grounded in the writings of Max Weber, Waldner 
analyses the late development of state institutions in Syria and Turkey. He analyses 
the transition of states from mediated entities, in which power is exercised directly by 
elites through alliances with local notables, to unmediated entities in which state 
institutions have supplanted elites to form links between state economy and society. 
Logically, therefore, this temporal development of the state would therefore suggest 
that states existing at different transitional stages may display different characteristics. 
Waldner goes on to advocate that "states range along a continuum, and no states 
occupy the extremes of fully mediated or fully unmediated rule. "24 
Keeping these temporal and normative issues in mind, it would make considerable 
sense to employ a definition of the state which would allow entities to share some 
desired characteristics, even though not all will share the same. A state entity could 
then be defined by a preponderance of defining characteristics, and not by one 
defining attribute. 25 Such a feature could then be described by recognition of various, 
but not necessarily all, features deemed to be criteria of state formation. Figure 2.1 
displays the idea, showing `states' 1 and 4 having no attributes in common, yet being 
classified as states because of the shared features of the group. 
26 
Figure 2.1: Schematic Representation of State Characteristics 
Criteria 
I.. A B C 
2. B C D 
R 
vi 3. C D E 
4. D E F 
24 Waldner (1999) State Building and late Development. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 19; Weber 
(1946) "Politics as a Vocation, " in Gerth & Wright Mills (eds. ) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. 
New York: Oxford University Press, p. 82. 
Zs Krasner chooses to call the set of criteria a "bundle of properties". (Krasner (1999) op. cit., p. 220). 
26 This approach is developed from the work of Needham (1981) Circumstantial Deliveries. Berkelely: 
University of California Press. 
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Similarly, each example of a non-state nation seeking statehood is not governed by 
the same set of required criteria. It is my opinion that the prescribed tenets for Kurdish 
statehood are strict, compared tö, for example, those of Taiwan. Furthermore, if we 
accept that the criteria for statehood proves to be variable for real-world examples, 
then surely there must be an equally variable catalyst, one which suits different 
examples more than others. The mechanism for such creation of states and the 
encouragement of criteria has to be the geopolitical specifics of time and space. 
Iraqi Kurdistan, it will be argued, goes some way to proving this construct of theory. 
The current state-ly position of Iraqi Kurdistan can be seen to have been borne from a 
geopolitical and historical anomaly, and matured in the aftermath of the collapse of 
the bipolar geopolitical system. The route to its current position (as extemporised in 
Chapters 5,6 and 7) is to be found in the characteristics of its geography and 
population (Chapter 3); its political development (Chapter 4), and; the immediate 
result of changes in the regional geopolitical balance of *the Middle East after the 
Second Gulf War combined with internal political developments (Chapter 5). 
However, to commence with, it is necessary to provide a theoretical appraisal of the 
development of an insurgent political system, theories of administration and 
governance, as extemporized in the comparative politics literature, and theories of 
consociational political systems. 
2.3 The Development of the Political System 
The development of a political grouping from that of a guerrilla movement to a 
political party is one that is not often addressed in the political science literature. One 
has to look towards actual revolutionary theoreticians addressing the geopolitics of 
revolution in the spirit of such characters as Ernesto Che Guvera and Mao Tse-Tung, 
and as extemporised in the academic literature by few writers but most notably by 
McColl and Sanger. 27 
27 McColl (1969) "The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of Revolution. " Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 613-63 1; O'Sullivan (1983) "A Geographical Analysis of 
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2.3.1 The Insurgent State 
In his insightful analysis of the territoiial bases of revolution, McColl develops the 
theory of the `insurgent state', which, I will argue, is a close relative of the de facto 
state of Iraqi Kurdistan. 28 McColl sees the nature of a revolution changing with the 
increasing coalescence of territory under its control, the effect being that a revolution 
has a "territorial imperative". 29 He notes that; 
" .... modern national revolutions 
have accepted as a basic tactic the 
creation of a territorially based anti-state (insurgent state) within the 
state. ... The mechanism 
is the creation of territorial units compete 
with all the attributes of any legitimate state, namely a raison d'etre, 
control of territory and population and, particularly, the creation of its 
own core area and administrative units as well as a power base in its 
guerrilla army. ... it is useful to view contemporary national 
revolutions as a process of the evolution of a territorially based 
political unit within a politically hostile territory. " 30 
McColl argues that the "territorial imperative", the drive to create an insurgent state, 
31 has the following benefits for a revolutionary movement: 
1. It acts as a physical haven for the security of its leaders and 
continued development of the movement; 
2. It demonstrates the weakness and ineffectiveness of the 
government to control and protect its own territory and 
population; 
3. Such bases provide necessary human and material resources; 
4. Finally, the insurgent state and its political administrative 
organizations provide at least an aura of legitimacy to the 
movement. 
Interestingly, the theory of the insurgent state does not specify a process of state 
breakdown, rather it envisages an effort to gradually replace state government through 
the geopolitical tactic of the attrition of government control over a specific territorial 
area. 
Guerrilla Warfare, " Political Geography Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 139-150; Glassner (1996) 
Political Geography. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
28 McColl (1969) op. cit.; Mao Tse-Tung (1954) Selected Works, Vol. II. New 
York: International 
Publishers; Guevara (1961) Guerrilla Warfare. University of Nebraska Press. 
29 McColl (1969), op. cit., p. 614. Also see Miller & Aya (1971) National 
Liberation: Revolution in the 
Third World. London: Collier/Macmillan. 
30 Ibid. 
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The origins of the territorial imperative approach is central to the writings of the 
Chinese revolutionary leader Mao Tse-Tung. 32 The three stages of revolution as 
discussed by Mao' Tse-Tung are a period of mobile war, followed by guerrilla war, 
and regular war (equilibrium). McColl discusses these phases in geographical terms as 
"each stage represent[ing] the evolution of an insurgent state and its ability to 
increase the area under its political and military control. "33 
Such an approach allows the reality of a national revolution, the aim of controlling 
territory, to become a part of the theoretical considerations. However, theories of 
insurgency, of which the above are classic examples, tend to focus on the aims of the 
insurgents. Little has been written about the impact the achievement of the aims has 
on the successful political grouping. 
2.3.2 Application to Iraqi Kurdistan 
The de facto state in Iraqi Kurdistan may therefore be discussed as being at, least a 
close relative of the insurgent state. The insurgent state is described as being able to 
force the government troops to concentrate in larger cities and to protect the insurgent 
areas from government attack. The de facto element may be seen as being a variant of 
this. In a de facto insurgent state, the revolutionary movement is closely aligned with 
the three-stage development of the territorial imperative. However, changes in the 
geopolitical balance previously governing the characteristics of the insurgency result 
in either a rapid aggregation or de-aggregation of territory, and, therefore, the 
relationship between geopolitics and state entity formation is readily apparent. 
34 
McColl goes further to note the development of a shadow administration in the 
insurgent state. He describes 'such an organiiation developing from the need to 
coordinate the national revolution when it had been divided amongst different areas. 
The development of an administration within an insurgency structure was also 
discussed by Che Guevara and has some parallels in Iraqi Kurdistan with the Kurdish 
3' Ibid. 
32 Mao Tse-Tung (1954) op. cit., pp. 183-184. 
33 McColl (1969) op. cit., p. 616, 
34 Such a de-aggregation in Iraqi Kurdistan could be seen in 1975 with the changing regional 
geopolitical characteristics caused by the Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran. An aggregation 
can be seen to have taken place in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War in 1991, creating a regional 
geopolitical imbalance. 
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political parties operating an administrative type organization for their mountain- 
based peshmerga. 35 However, the overall target is to establish a state system, 
particularly as the increased size of area and the population within the boundaries of 
the insurgent state creates a need to establish an administration to provide for the 
civilian population. 36 
All the main revolutionary writers, including Mao Tse-Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and 
Che Guevara continually stressed the importance of establishing base areas to the path 
of revolutionary success. 37 In addition to internal advantages, the insurgent situation 
also benefits from external recognition from the development of an administration. 
However, in the Kurdish case, changing geopolitics has meant that the revolutionary 
movement has had to exercise extreme caution in not showing the weakness of central 
government authority in Iraqi Kurdistan, and certainly not showing a willingness to 
further the insurgency to a level of appearing to seek true independence. 
2.3.3 Conclusion 
This corpus of theory has significant relevance for assisting in the understanding of 
the development of the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan. Particularly in the PUK, 
revolutionary leaders were close followers of the writings of combatants in similar 
struggles, and the impact of Mao Tse-Tung on the development of the political system 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s is difficult to underestimate. This means that the 
application of the insurgent state theory to the Iraqi Kurdish situation is valid, both in 
descriptive analytical terms, as well as being understood as a prescriptive theory. 38 
's Interviews with Jabar Farman, Suleimaniyah, 18 June 1998; Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 27 
June 1998; Shwan Qliasani, Suleimaniyah, 4 August 1999; Hackara Khadr Hama Jan, Suleimaniyah 6 
September 2000. 
36 McColl (1969) op. cit., p. 626. 
37 Ibid, p. 628. 
ý8 The most dominant faction of the PUK, the Komala, was previously known as Marxist-Leninist 
Komala, and then later described itself as a Maoist organization. Its teachings throughout the 1980s 
were based mainly on the writings of Mao Tse-Tung, and the majority of the current leadership of the 
PUK were originally members of the Komala, including Nawshirwan Mustafa. Even though the PUK 
has now grown away from Maoist-dominated theories of revolution, the imperative is still strong. 
Shwan Qliasani, for example, a- previous Komala peshmerga and now member of the PUK Foreign 
Relations Bureau, described to me perfectly the different stages of the Iraqi Kurdish struggle with 
reference and according to the three stages of the insurgent state, for example. Interviews with Shwan 
Qliäsani, Suleimaniyah, 18 June 1998,4 August 1999; Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 29 
July 1999; Jalal Talabani, Suleimaniyah, 11 September 2000.. 
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2.4 Comparative Political Theories 
If we consider that forces of geopolitics and internal insurgency have resulted in the 
establishment of a de facto state, and, in conceptual terms, it is acceptable to position 
this entity on a continuum of state-characteristics, the next stage of analysis would be 
to study the political system of the de facto state entity. 
The methodology I am choosing to employ in the analysis of the Kurdish situation in 
Iraqi Kurdistan is best described as an eclectic political science approach. In effect, I 
am choosing to employ theories and methodology grouped under the term of 
`comparative politics'. However, rather than taking a political or state system which is 
well-established, recognised and accepted, I am applying the tenets of the theory 
group to assist in the provision of an understanding of the character and dynamics of 
the Kurdish party political system and de facto governance apparatus. 
This is a difficult task and requires the development of the relevant theories alongside 
a detailed appraisal of the internal politics of Iraqi Kurdistan to achieve a coherent 
analysis. While it is relatively straightforward to produce a political history of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, it is considerably more demanding to produce an analysis of the mechanics 
of Iraqi Kurdish politics. It is only with a full armoury of theoretical and 
methodological approaches and extensive fieldwork producing detailed knowledge of 
Kurdish politics in action that the aims of this thesis can be realised. 
2.4.1 Aims 
The approach has to be multi-tooled to reflect the many different areas of an holistic 
political system, which include the internal workings of the Iraqi Kurdish politics, 
from party and factional activities, legislature and judiciary, to cabinet, executive and 
bureaucracy. This section will therefore discuss; 
1. The general framework to be employed, and; 
2. The potential strengths and weaknesses of the aforementioned theories both 
in general and in the application of them to Iraqi Kurdistan. 
To commence with, I will undertake an appraisal of the general framework of this 
section, focusing on the development of the theories which are part of the comparative 
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politics approach, and the applicability of this body of thought to the Iraqi Kurdistan 
region. 
2.4.2 Methodological Framework 
Throughout this section, I intend to promote simultaneously the validity of the 
approach and the potential for developing new theoretical dimensions to the study of 
scenarios akin to the Iraqi Kurdish situation. To achieve these aims, the section is 
divided into an assessment of the political system as the overall unit of study, the 
development of relevant theoretical approaches, and the applicability and problems 
presented by the application of such theories to such a region. 
2.4.2.1 State, Non-State, or De Facto State? The Study of the Political System 
Theories of politics and governance which exist under the umbrella of comparative 
politics are founded in the analysis of established, and often state, systems and the 
disciple of comparative politics originates in the study of nation-states and mainly the 
liberal-democratic polities. However, this should not preclude these theories from 
being applied to other related areas of study; this type of theoretical approach is not 
solely the domain of nation-state analyses. 
The theories and methodology of comparative politics can similarly be applied to de 
facto states, non-state regions, and territory best described as being under the control 
of irregular authorities. Comparative politics provides a framework of analysis and a 
collection of theories aimed at facilitating the systematic analysis of the landscape of 
politics and governance. 39 The fact that it has primarily been developed and used to 
investigate the governance and politics of nation-states does not preclude it from 
being applied to Iraqi Kurdistan. While many of the theories of this discipline have 
been developed by studying nation-states, they originated and were conceived by 
analysing structures of a much smaller scale, of varying complexities, and of varying 
locations and levels of development. 
0 Furthermore, many of the constituent theories 
of comparative politics were initially developed in other fields rather than in political 
science, and most notably in sociology with the study of organizations, and 
39 See Kriek (1995) "David Easton and the Analysis of Political Structure, " Journal of Theoretical 
Politics, Vol. 8. 
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anthropology. with the study of indigenous political systems. The provision of a 
recognized state entity should therefore not be regarded as a pre-requisite for the 
application of theories of comparative politics. 
Furthermore, most comparative political research is designed specifically not to 
promote the conceptualization of the nation-state in the analysis, so as to allow a truly 
comparative perspective to take place in understanding politics and governance in 
different systems under different conditions .41 It is for this reason that I intend to use 
the term `political system' rather than `state system' as the encompassing unit of 
analysis. 42 In support of this point, Blondel states that: 
".... the concept of the state is not truly universal. It can be used only 
with respect to those polities which have organized administrative 
arrangements. Admittedly, in the contemporary world, polities tend 
normally to take the form of states, but this is not universal, as for 
instance during a pre-independence process or. when a guerrilla 
movement occupies a portion of territory which. it claims to be 
liberating. " 43 1 
The grouping of theories commonly included under the umbrella of comparative 
politics is therefore of great use in being used to analyse the situation of politics and 
governance in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly since 1991. 
2.4.2.2 Comparative Political Theory 
The study of governance and politics is encompassed by a wealth of theoretical 
material ranging from general theories attempting to explain the behaviour of entire 
systems and institutions, to highly specific ones relating to the behaviour of 
individuals. " For the purposes of this thesis, a, combination of different aspects of 
these theories is necessary to produce an understanding of the political dynamics, 
particularly of a region such as Iraqi Kurdistan which has inherited administrative 
structures and procedures from the GOT, and decision-making dynamics characteristic 
40 Almond (1968) "Comparative Politics, " in Sills, (ed. ), International. Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, vol. 13. New York: Macmillan, pp. 331-336. 
41 Blondel (1995) Comparative Government: An Introduction. London: Prentice HAVHarvester 
Wheatsheaf, p. 17. 
42 For an assessment of the applicability of the concepts of the 'political system' and 'the state', see 
Easton (1981) op. cit. 
43 Blondel (1995) op. cit. p. 17. 
44 Peters (1998) Comparative Government: An Introduction. 
" 
London: Prentice Hall/Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, p. 109. 
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of indigenous tribal groupings and political parties borne out of armed rebellion. 
However, 'an eclectic methodology is perhaps not overly radical as political science 
theoreticians in general promote the benefits of such a multi-tooled approach. Peters 
favours such an approach, as shown in his following statement: 
"Despite the claims of generality of several of these theoretical 
approaches .... none of the theories provides a sufficient explanation for all political outcomes and political behaviour. Researchers should 
therefore look at a variety of explanations in order to gain that more 
complete explanation. " 45 
In describing the application of these sets of theories to this thesis, I will undertake a 
division based upon the differing levels of analysis, rather than focusing on- the 
chronological aspects of the development of the theories, which would tend to 
discredit the older approaches of structural-functionalism. In this section, I present a 
brief overview of the thrust of the theoretical approaches, the historical development 
and key papers, and the potential benefits and pitfalls of applying such theories to 
Iraqi Kurdistan. 
2.4.2.2.1 The Holistic Approach 
The evolution of theoretical approaches in political science has a complex history, 
which is similarly mirrored in the social sciences in general. Within political science, 
the development of theoretical approaches to understanding political structures and 
activities has commenced from what may be described as the study of institutions and 
constitutions, developing into structural functionalism and looking at holistic systems. 
This grouping of theories can commonly be divided into systems theory and a 
structural-functionalist theoretical approach. 
The development of systems theory is associated with the work of Easton and formed 
the foundation of comparative approaches in political science 
46 In the 1960s and 70s, 
Easton developed the idea that political activities and governance could be 
characterised as a system of inputs and outputs existing in an environment of demands 
and supports from the populace. 47 The outputs of the system were policies, with in- 
as Ibid. 
a6 Hague, et. al., (1998) Comparative Government and Politics: An introduction. Basingstoke, Hants: 
Macmillan, p. 33. 
47 Easton (1953) The Political System. New York: Knopf Press, pp. 96-100. 
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built feedback loops in operation. 8 The government was essentially positioned in the 
centre of this system, translating `inputs' into `outputs' in what became known as the 
`Black Box'. The `Black Box' became to be identified as the depository of 
unimaginable mysteries of government, 49 but it is here that the controllers of the 
decision-making process reside, and effectively where the. tenets of systems analysis 
needs assistance from more behavioural type theories to account for the 
characteristics of leaders and the political elite. 
As was the case with defining the concept of `The State', definitions of the political 
system are equally nebulous. Almond's 1960 definition describes "systems of 
interactions .... which performs the 
functions of integration and adaptation". 50 
Deutsch sees the system as being equipped to collect information and to transmit this 
information into the decision-making process. 5' Critics of systems theory focus on the 
lack of importance given to personalities. Hoffman, for example, derides systems 
theory in international relations and politics for combining the ideal of a deductive 
science with the desire to achieve predictability, ultimately producing a tautological 
body of theory and theoretical approaches. 52 Furthermore, Hoffman contends that 
systems theory does not "capture the stuff of politics", emphasising that the approach 
reduces individuals and societies to little more than communication systems. 
53 
I agree with these criticisms, but feel that the application of a systems theory approach 
has much to offer a study of the Iraqi Kurdish situation. Within Iraqi Kurdistan, the 
criticism of the administration and political parties has often been at a systems level, 
for example in questioning the ability of the local administration to perform their 
tasks due to supposed poor organization. Similarly, with the study of Kurdish political 
parties, there has been no real attempt to understand political dynamics beyond the 
analysis of the motives of a handful of key players. I argue that tenets of systems 
ag Peters (1998) op. cit., p 112. 
Calvert (1983) Politics, Power and Revolution: An Introduction to Comparative Politics. London: 
Wheatsheaf Books, p. 117. 
so Almond (1960) "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics, " in Almond & 
Colman, (eds. ), The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 7. 
" Deutsch (1963) The Nerves of Government. New York: Free Press, pp. 250-254. 
52 Quoted in Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1990) op. cit., pp. 172-173. 
53 Ibid. 
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theory, combined with the study of individual characters, will provide a detailed 
picture of the arena in which politics and administration in Iraqi Kurdistan exist. 
As the contemporary of systems theory, structural-functionalism assumed that all 
political systems would have certain functions that they would have to perform. 
Almond & Colman, and subsequently Almond & Powell, developed structural 
functionalism in political science theory further by arguing that governments had the 
requisite functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule-making, rule- 
application, rule adjudication, political communication and socialisation and 
recruitment. 54 The first four of these groups relate to the process by which decisions 
are made and implemented, the last three to the maintenance of the political system. 55 
The underlying assumption of the structural functionalists was that political systems, 
no matter at what stage of development or typology, would have to perform these 
functions. The task of the political scientist was then to analyse similarities and 
differences in attempting to achieve these tasks. 56 It therefore shares a similar positive 
attribute with systems theory in that it had applications beyond Western political 
systems. The benefits of the structural-functionalist approach in political science are 
emphasised by Peters: 
".... the structure of a public organization in the United Kingdom is 
not a great deal different from that of one performing a similar 
function in Uganda. This relative similarity allows us to assess the 
possible effects of small organizational differences. Further, it allows 
us to assess the effects of a number of cultural and environmental 
factors on the behaviour of administrators. " 
57 
Structural-functionalism therefore leaves many points of analytical direction 
available. The functionalism was left to the theory itself - it was assumed that such 
activities of political dynamics were universal - and the analysis was one of studying 
the role of different structures and institutions in achieving these aims, often with a 
54 Almond (1960) op. cit., pp. 26-58; Almond & Powell (1966) Comparative Politics: A Developmental 
Approach. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., pp. 13-16; Peters (1998) op. cit., p. 114. 
s Hague, et. al., (1998) op. cit., p. 33. 
56 Almond (1960) op. cit., p. 11; Almond & Powell (1966) op. cit., pp. 27-34. Also see Lane (1994) 
"Structural-Functionalism Reconsidered: A Proposed Research Model, " Comparative Politics, vol. 26, 
no. 4, pp. 461-478; Hay (1995) "Structure and Agency, " in Marsh & Stoker, (eds. ), Theory and Method 
in Political Science. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
57 Peters (1995) The Politics of Bureaucracy. New York: Longman Publishers, p. 6. 
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comparative perspective. 58 This position has been developed upon recently by Lane 
who argues that a structural-functionalist approach can be blended with individual 
motivational theories and the employment of a structural-functionalist approach at a 
micro-analytical level rather than as a whole system theory. 59 This would go some 
way to alleviating the impersonality of the structural-functionalist approach. Peters 
supports such a synthesis and notes that; 
"Given that all government decision-making ultimately comes down to 
decisions made by individuals or groups of individuals, the failure to 
build in more realistic assumptions about how humans influence 
system behaviour is an almost fatal flaw for these [structural- 
functional] theories. " 60 
2.4.2.2.2 The Behavioural Approach 
A backlash against systems and structural-functionalist theories ensured particularly 
from the mid-1960s, resulting in a focus of the behaviour of individuals. This 
approach was based upon the recognition that what was stated formally, and identified 
by institutional analysis, was not as important in the understanding of comparative 
politics as what took place in reality. 61 
"[The behavioural] view was a reaction against an analysis of 
institutions that was based primarily on the formal examination of 
their powers, instead of encompassing what actually happened in the 
institutions - that is the behaviour of the actors within them. 
" 62 
The key exponent of this approach is Dahl. 
63 It. is between these two poles that 
political science, and the fledging umbrella approach of comparative politics, found 
itself with exponents focusing on what increasingly became to be seen as one of two 
mutually exclusive positions. However,. both sets of theories have a role to play in 
understanding political dynamics within parties and government, and should be seen 
as complementary directions rather than developments superseding each other. 
64 
58 Hague, et. al., (1998) op. cit., p. 35. 
39 Lane (1994) op. cit., p. 466. 
60 Peters (1998) op. cit., p. 116. 
61 Almond (1968) op. cit., pp., 331-336; Blondel (1995) op. cit., p. 9. 
62 Blondel (1995) op. cit., p. 10. 
63 Dahl (1963) Polyarchy. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
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2.4.2.2.3 
. 
The Neo-Institutional Approach 
The synthesis of these groups occurred from the mid-1980s onwards with the 
promotion of what was termed neo-institutional theory within political science, taking 
in the different approaches of behaviourial and institutional theories, by such 
academics as March & Olsen, Apter, and Badie. 65 The amalgamation of these two 
bodies of theory allowed a balanced view to emerge which takes into account both the 
importance of institutions and the behaviour of political actors. 66 It is this synthesis 
which is utilised as the basis of the theoretical approach of this thesis. It provides a 
malleable framework allowing the complexities of the Iraqi Kurdish situation to be 
addressed, including the unique development of the structure of the parties and the 
government, and the inter-personal relationships occurring within the structures. This 
approach is supported by Peters who, when referring to comparative political theory 
and applications to the study of administrations, states that "what is needed .... is a 
realization that .... institutional analysis, albeit combined with more 
behavioural 
analyses, is important for the development of comparative political theory. " 67 
2.4.2.2.3 Conclusion 
The framework established by the holistic institutional theories has made it possible to 
study the spectrum of regimes and governance not only in order to justify different 
systems, but also in order to analyze their mechanisms. 68 The framework elaborated 
by Easton allowed for the combined study of the elements in any society which form 
a political system. The elements of the political system such as presidencies, cabinets 
and legislatures can be generically described as `structures' or `institutions', and the 
analysis of the activities and characteristics of such structures is the basis of the 
structural-functionalist theories. 
However, it would not be beneficial to analyse the Iraqi Kurdish situation solely with 
the application of systems and structural-functionalist theories. It is an important 
64 Peters (1995) op. cit., p. 5. 
65 March & Olsen (1984) "The New Institutionalism, " American Political Science Review; (1989) 
Rediscovering Institutions. New York: Free Press; Apter (1991) "Institutionalism Reconsidered, " 
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 129, pp. 463-481; Badie (1989) "Comparative Analysis in 
Political Science: Requiem or Resurrection? " Political Studies Vol. 37, No. 3. 
66 Blondel (1995) op. cit., p. 10; Peters (1999) Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New 
Institutionalism. London: Pinter Press, p. 142. 
67 Peters (1995) op. cit., p. 5. 68 Blondel (1995) op. cit., p. 8. 
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approach as it allows an identification to take place of what the Kurdish political 
system looks like from the outside and how, in institutional terms, it compares with 
other systems of politics and governance. These theories are a considerable assistance 
in identifying the existence of a state-type structure in Iraqi Kurdistan, but there is a 
predominance of individual rule in the region which they simply cannot account for. 
The formal examination of institutional existence and powers does not give an idea of 
what actually happens inside the institution in question of the political structure as a 
whole. An idealised, official, version of the activities of the political system is 
developed, but there is little understanding of the dynamics and processes which 
occur in reality. Systems analysis is therefore a useful tool to bring out a little known 
aspect of the Iraqi Kurdish region, but has to be combined with an approach which 
allows for the analysis of political actors. This combination of different theoretical 
approaches to the study of political systems is essentially the direction promoted by 
the neo-institutionalist school of comparative political theory. 
2.4.2.3 Application 
In discussing the applicability of such theories, it is possible to identify two main 
points of concern. Firstly, how correct is it to apply theories to such an area as 
Kurdistan which were developed primarily by studying western political systems? 
Secondly, how is it possible to employ theories of comparative government when the 
study is concerned with one region, which, while possibly displaying state 
characteristics, is not actually recognised as a state? 
2.4.2.3.1 First World Statist Theories for a Third World Non-State? 
A problem with applying these theories to Iraqi. Kurdistan is that most of them have 
been developed by studying the developed world, with little reference to the 
developing world or the Middle East. Similarly, there are a number of theories of 
political party operation, but again most of these are centred on the study of 
developed world systems. There are a few exceptions. Blondel studies the political 
executives of developing countries, and LaPalombara & Weiner study third world 
political development. 69 However, there is admittedly a gap both in application of the 
present theory and subsequent development of theories to study non-western and non- 
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state situations. The defence of the usage (. f this set of theories is that the framework 
of systems analysis and neo-institutionalism allows for the application of relevant 
theories to new political scenarios and, if correctly applied, could result in the 
establishment of further theoretical perspectives. This defence is developed further in 
the response to the second problem. 
2.4.2.3.2 " The Comparative Aspect 
Problems may arise in defending the `comparative' portion of the analysis - after all, 
no other place shares the characteristics and history of Iraqi Kurdistan. However, if 
we accept that the literature of this group of theories provides a detailed 
understanding of governance and political activities and structures, thereby providing 
an historical catalogue of theoretical. thinking regarding structure, characteristics and 
dynamics of politics and governance, we are, in effect, interestingly supported in a 
single case-study approach by the theoretical aspects themselves. If what is being 
investigated by the study in question is reasonably uncommon, and possibly unique, 
then the possible number of comparative cases is obviously reduced. For example, in 
examining the governance and politics of non-state regions, the choice appears to be 
limited to a handful of cases, and then if the relationship between political parties and 
a de facto government administration is introduced, the choice narrows down 
dramatically. 70 
Peters forwards two compelling arguments as to why comparative theory can be 
employed on singular case studies. First, he states that the primary reason is to utilise 
a very particular case to characterise a phenomenon that appears to be especially 
apparent in that one case. The study of the individual case is therefore best seen as an 
exercise leading, hopefully, to a statement about the phenomenon to add to the body 
of theory. 7' Rose named this approach as being the "extroverted case study", noting 
that a study of a single country may become so if it employs concepts that make it 
69 LaPalombara & Weiner (1966) Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; Blondel (1985) Government Ministers in the Contemporary World. London: Sage. 
70 See Peters (1998) op. cit., p. 61. 71 Peters (1998) op. cit., p. 62. 
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possible to derive generalizations that can be tested elsewhere. 72 In defence of the 
singular case-study approach, Peters states that: 
"The researcher has identified .... an important exception to the 
prevailing theory, or a case which demonstrates a phenomenon that 
previously had been excluded from the literature .... the purpose of the extroverted case-study then becomes to explore fully this one case 
with the existing theory in mind, with the expectation of elaborating or 
expanding that body of theory with the resulting data. " 73 
2.4.2.3.3 Consociational Political Systems 
A focus of this thesis is to first identify a typology for the type of political system 
which has existed in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991, and, second, to identify a possible 
model for the continued peaceful development of the political system, at least in this 
current period of political uncertainty in Iraq as a whole. It is argued that theories of 
consociational political systems can be employed to analyse the reasons behind 
political instability in Iraqi Kurdistan in the first half of the 1990s, and the subsequent 
stability which has been apparent particularly toward the erid of the 1990s. Further, 
consociational political theories are also forwarded in a prescriptive manner as a 
possible model for the continued peaceful political development of the Iraqi Kurdish 
region at this uncertain period for Iraq. 
Iraqi Kurdish society conforms to the conditions of a "deeply divided society" defined 
by Lustick as follows; 
"[a society is deeply divided] if ascriptive ties generate an antagonistic 
segmentation of society, based on terminal identities with high political 
salience, sustained over a substantial period of time and a wide variety 
of political issues. s 74 
Kurdish society may therefore be described as segmented (with cleavages of either a 
tribal, social, party political or geographic nature), with political direction being 
seemingly controlled by small groupings of often-antagonistic political elites. It is 
72 Rose (1991) "Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis, " Political Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 
446-462, p. 454. 
" Peters (1998) op. cit., p. 62. " Lustick (1979) "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control, " World 
Politics, Vol. 31, pp. 325-344, p. 325. 
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therefore argued that the development of the Iraqi Kurdish political system requires 
the successful management of societal cleavages alongside elite accommodation. 
In discussing the problem of the segmented society of Northern Ireland, O'Leary 
identifies that such societies are unsuited to the Westminster model of government of 
single-party governments imposing its will within a unitary state. 75 Similarly, in 
discussing the future political development of South Africa, McGarry & Noel identify 
that the Westminster model has a disastrous record in divided societies. 76 The model 
which is identified as being applicable to promoting stability within divided societies 
is the consociational model of Arend Lijphart. 77 Lijphart's theory of consociational 
democratic systems combines the analysis of the institutions of state with the 
importance of managing political elites in a segmented society, in effect combining a 
structural approach with the need to include behavioural aspects. Theories of 
consociational political systems can be considered to be a leitmotif of this thesis. The 
main analysis builds toward a conclusion which suggests a possible consociational 
solution to the immediate problems of the Iraqi Kurdish political and administrative 
system. As such, the theories are developed towards the end of the thesis once the 
evidence has been presented by analysing the political and administrative system with 
the aid of the mentioned bodies of theory. 
The model of consociational political systems was developed by Lijphart in the 1960s 
who was researching how deeply segregated societies managed their latent conflicts. 
78 
He focused primarily on plural societies home to different segmental groupings, and 
in particular the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland, and posed that these countries 
in particular possessed subculturally segmented societies, but entertained stable 
democracy as easily as states with less potential detrimental societal cleavages. 79 He 
" O'Leary (1989) "The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland, " Political Studies, 
XXXVII, pp. 562-588, p. 562. 
76 McGarry & Noel (1989) "The Prospects for Consociational Democracy in South Africa, " Journal of 
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Politics, Vol. 9, pp. 181-197, p. 182; Najem (1998) Collapse and Reconstruction of Lebanon, 
University of Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Middle East Papers, No. 59, p. 3. 
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defined his model as "government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a 
fragmented political culture into a stable democracy, "80 The role of leaders of rival 
groups is therefore of paramount importance in societies where political culture is 
deeply fragmented 
.81 Lijphart identified, that the 
following factors deemed to be 
conducive in the development of a consociational system: 82 
1. The elites must possess the ability to accommodate divergent 
interests which exist within the society; 
2. The elites must have the ability to transcend cleavages; 
3. There has to a commitment from the elites to maintain the 
consociational system; 
4. All of the above factors are based upon the assumption that the 
elites understand the perils of political fragmentation. 
It is argued that the future peaceful development of the political system in Iraqi 
Kurdistan could be achieved by the adoption of a consociational model. However, 
such an application has to be carefully designed. Consociational theory is often 
regarded as problematic to apply, and, in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan itself, can be seen 
to have failed during the power-sharing period of 1991-1996. But, since 1996, the 
political system has displayed increasing stability due to the presence of a political 
system which is managing a segmented society with elite accommodation in a variant 
of a consociational system. 
A traditional consociational system would involve the existence of political elites in 
some form of coalition government with confidence-building measures being actively 
enforced. This was in effect from 1991-1996 but, due to a badly designed electoral 
system and political immaturity of the principal political parties, the political system 
and democratic process failed and fighting ensued. After geopolitical pressures 
resulted in the geographic division of the Iraqi Kurdish region between the KDP and 
PUK, with each dominating its strongholds (Dohuk-Erbil, and Suleimaniyah-Kirkuk 
respectively), the political system is again reasonably stable, under what may be 
described as a geographic variant of a consociational political system, with the 
80 Lijphart(1969) "Consociational Democracy, " World Politics, Vol. 21, p. 216. 
' Ibid, p. 208. Also see Lustick (1997) "Lijphart, Lakatos and Consociationalism, " World Politics, 
Vol. 50, pp. 88-117, pp. 91-92. 
82 Lijphart (1969) op. cit., p. 216. Also see Najem (1998) op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
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political elites also divided, although with limited meetings occurring, and 
coordination of public service governmental functions taking place. 
Within Iraqi Kurdistan, where traditional tribal and geographical political cleavages 
have been deepened through the antagonistic development of the party political 
system, the current situation displays separation of sub-cultures to an extreme degree 
led by political elites. Therefore, for understanding the current situation of an 
administration and territory divided according to party-factional geographical areas, I 
forward a geographical variant of the consociational model, where the sub-groupings 
are, in the first stage, wholly divided. Such a model still has elite interaction occurring 
at the highest levels of the political parties, but may be characterised as being separate 
in administrative terms, thereby ensuring elite accommodation in a volatile political 
environment. Theories of consociational political systems are forwarded in the 
conclusion as a possible interim solution to the future problems of developing a more 
efficient system of governance. For example, the further development of the political 
system may see the appearance of the more conventional characteristics identified by 
Lijphart, which would be, in effect, a unified governmental system with the restraints 
a consociational system of government provides. 
2.4.2.3.4 Conclusion 
The framework established by the holistic institutional theories made it possible to 
study the whole spectrum of regimes and governance not only in order to justify 
different systems, but also in order to analyze their mechanisms. 83 The framework 
elaborated by Easton allowed for the combined study of the elements in any society 
which form a political system. The elements of the political system such as 
presidencies, cabinets and legislatures can be generically described as `structures' or 
`institutions', and the analysis of the activities and characteristics of such structures is 
the basis of the structural-functionalist theories. 
However, it would not be beneficial to analyse the Iraqi Kurdish situation solely with 
the application of systems and structural-functionalist theories. It is an important 
approach as it allows an identification to take place of what the Kurdish political 
83 Blondel (1995) op, cit., p. 8. 
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system looks like from the outside and how, in institutional terms, it compares with 
other systems of politics and governance. These theories are a considerable assistance 
in identifying the existence of a state-type structure in northern Iraq, but there is a 
predominance of individual rule in the region which they simply cannot account for. 
The formal examination of institutional existence and powers does not give an idea of 
what actually happens inside the institution in question of the political structure as a 
whole. An idealised, official, version of the activities of the political system is 
developed, but there is little understanding of the dynamics and processes which 
occur in reality. Systems analysis is therefore a useful tool to bring out a little known 
aspect of the Iraqi Kurdish region, but has to be combined with an approach which 
allows for the analysis of political actors. This combination of different theoretical 
approaches to the study of political systems is essentially the direction promoted by 
the neo-institutionalist school of comparative political theory. 
The consociational model underlies the analysis of the contemporary political system 
of Iraqi Kurdistan. With its clearly divided society and political structure, between the 
factional areas of the KDP and PUK, as well as older tribal and linguistic divisions, a 
model attempting to analyse the political structures of deeply divided societies, with a 
prescriptive element for future sustainable political development, obviously 
has 
significant potential value. 
2.5 Field Methodology 
The importance of this thesis, in theoretical as well as practical terms, is that a 
situation is studied and analysed which has developed through a unique combination 
of anthropological, historical, geographical and geopolitical factors. The situation of 
de facto-ism is therefore one which is not readily addressed in the literature, and as a 
result of living and undertaking participatory research in Iraqi Kurdistan for over a 
year, I feel that I am in a position to discuss this phenomenon in some detail. 
There is therefore an opportunity to add to the theoretical literature about such 
situations but there is also a danger that the stringent application of established theory 
could cloud the necessary consideration needed to be employed in such a virgin study. 
It is for this reason why I chose not to follow one particular vein of political theory, 
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but present an amalgam of ideas from a range of disciplines to be employed in a fluid 
manner. 
Of course, there is a continuum ranging from the dominance of the theoretical 
approach through to the individualisation of case-studies, where theory is seldom 
used, and then often inadequately. As stated previously, the weakness of much 
academic literature focusing on Kurdish politics is precisely the fact that it is often 
treated as a political-historical case-study, with little attempt to expand the wider 
bodies of theory. I therefore choose to adopt a position in the study of the Kurds 
"from the inside" lying somewhat in the midst of this continuum, and intend to focus 
on the Iraqi Kurdish situation with, as Kohli describes, relevant theoretical 
approaches, through diverse conceptual lenses, and utilizing a variety of data. 84 
2.5.1 Pilot Study 
The initial impetus for studying the Iraqi Kurdish political system came after a three- 
month pilot study period spent in the region, mainly in the cities of Erbil and 
Suleimaniyah, in the summer of 1997. During this time, I developed close 
interpersonal links with members of the political parties and the administration. 
Equipped with the knowledge endowed by my academic training with regard to 
politics in the Middle East, I identified numerous problems with the portrayal of Iraqi 
Kurds in the literature. 
After numerous discussions with Kurds from a variety of backgrounds, and with 
observers in the field, it became apparent that there was a huge gap in available 
knowledge of the characteristics of the KRG, how it works, and how it operates 
within the political system. Similarly, when in Iraqi Kurdistan, it is apparent that the 
political party system is hugely complex and Kurdish politics in Iraq has changed 
remarkably from the late 1970s, the date of the research underwriting the last book of 
considerable worth in understanding internal political processes of the Kurds, 
Bruinessen's Agha, Sheikh and State. 85 
84 Kohli (1995) "Conclusion" in "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium, " World 
Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 1-49, p. 49. 
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2.5.2 Political Parties 
The field methodology employed reflects the constantly changing environment of 
Iraqi Kurdistan. This study has benefited from an amalgamation of a variety of 
approaches. With regard to the study of political parties, I spent most of 1998 
developing very close links with selected cadres of various political parties who were 
kind enough to entertain my questioning and offered to help in a variety of ways. 
These links were then developed further during a three-month stay in 1999, and 
during 2000 when I was present in Iraqi Kurdistan for most of the year. Such an 
extended amount of time paid dividends as many of the questions I intended to ask 
had rarely been asked by an academic before, and questions regarding internal 
political dynamics and power groupings are understandably delicate issues. I then 
managed to interview party members from different offices and levels of different 
parties, and was allowed to gather data from the organizations of the KDP in Erbil and 
the PUK in Suleimaniyah. 
An approach I found most useful was to discuss my questions with the highest 
members of the parties, including Nawshirwan Mustafa, Kosrat Rasoul, Dr Kamal 
Fu'ad and Jalal Talabani of the PUK, and Sami Abdul Rahman, Hoshyar Zebari, and 
Massoud Barzani of the KDP, and identify perceptions, directions, and policy 
initiatives at this level. I would then seek, and obtain, permission to investigate these 
questions at lower levels in the hierarchy, for example within the liq and melbend of 
the KDP and PUK respectively, allowing to get a range of findings, from different 
levels, and controlled by different issues of relevance allowing me to study one issue 
from several normative viewpoints. 86 
Perhaps the main methodological problem faced when studying the internal politics of 
Iraqi Kurdistan is that of bias. Due to the highly politically charged atmosphere, and 
the potential value of influencing work undertaken for a higher degree, it is 
understandable that the problem of bias and influencing of judgement was endemic 
throughout the duration of my fieldwork. This is to be expected and certainly does not 
detract from the sincerity of those helping me. However, there is no quick solution to 
85 Bruinessen (1992a) Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan. 
London: Zed Books. 
86 For a complete list of interviews undertaken during the period of fieldwork, see Reference List 2. 
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this problem apart from being able to spend a long enough time in the field, gaining 
more experience in judging the evidence presented. 
2.5.3 Kurdistan Regional Government 
The study of the administration may seem to be somewhat easier, however, with such 
a tortured history, and with the KRGs in Erbil and Suleimaniyah doubling each other, 
the task to investigate their structures, decision-making processes and procedures was 
a difficult one. I followed a similar set of procedures as I had developed with the 
political parties, and constructed models, from interviews at many levels, of the 
governmental decision-making process. ; Similarly, I assembled a morphological 
structure of the organs of governance. 
To then develop a more targeted understanding of the processes involved, the 
Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs in each region allowed me access to their 
archives in order to assemble documentation regarding the recent implementation of 
policies and programmes of public service ministries. In conjunction with several 
General Directors of Planning, I assembled a series of programmes and policies. From 
these I identified the procedures taken from the initial design of a programme, through 
to final implementation, and interviewed civil servants from all levels, as well as 
beneficiaries when appropriate. It is hoped that, by such a methodological approach, 
my study represents something more than -a representative sample, particularly as it 
benefits from me witnessing the operating of parties and government over a three-year 
period. 
A further important methodological approach which has benefited the research of this 
thesis may be identified as a form of `participatory research'. From mid-1999 and 
throughout 2000, I had the privilege to work closer with the KRG as an adviser in 
assisting in the establishment of an information-based planning mechanism within the 
KRGs of Erbil and Suleimaniyah. 87 It was during this period that I came face-to-face 
87 The organization of which I was a member, the Iraqi Kurdistan Research Programme, was tasked 
with promoting the use of statistics within the decision-making process of the KRGs, particularly with 
regard to the UN oil-for-food deal. Later, the organization was requested by both Prime Ministers (Nechervan Barzani in Erbil and Kosrat Rasoul Ali in Suleimaniyah) to advise on the establishment of 
a Regional Statistics Office and Planning Organization. 
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with the Kurdish decision-making process, the relationship between the two 
administrative areas, and the main dynamics which characterise the system. 
2.5.4 Analytical Procedures 
The method by which I am choosing to present this wide-ranging data varies 
considerably. With regard to political parties and organs of governance, I am choosing 
to employ modelling techniques extensively. Already by employing the notion of the 
political system, we are referring to a selected part of the real world. A model serves 
to present this system with a view to simplifying the processes involved within the 
system in order to enhance comprehension and facilitate predictions. 88 
The typology of modelling procedure employed within this thesis is based upon that 
formulated by Anderson in his study of the structure and dynamics of US policy 
making with regard to strategic minerals. 89 My study of Iraqi Kurdistan employs the 
3-stage design of morphological, data cascade (information flows), and process- 
response modelling developed by Anderson as a basis for the study of the Iraqi 
Kurdish political system. 
This approach has at its origin hydrological models of physical geography. Such an 
application may initially appear to be somewhat out of place, particularly with 
attempting to apply physical science techniques and methods to more subjective 
political science. However, by commencing with an approach grounded in a more 
pure science basis, it is then possible to build modifications addressing the more 
subjective issues into it, rather than attempting to commence with a subjective type 
method and making it more scientific -a very difficult task indeed. Furthermore, 
other academic practitioners have identified the benefits of employing methods and 
terminologies of the physical sciences, with Krasner applying the geological concepts 
of punctuated equilibria to the study of institutional change, and Waldner offering a 
`big bang' approach to the origins of institutions. 90 
88 Anderson (1988) Strategic Minerals: The Geopolitical Problem for the United States. New York: 
Praeger, p. 5. 
89 Ibid. 
90 See Krasner (1984) op. cit., pp. 223-246; Waldner (1999) op. cit., p. 19. 
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However, alterations have been made as, rather than studying a small part of an 
extremely large system, I am studying virtually the entirety of a small system, which 
is not particularly open to in-depth research. Therefore, I attempt to provide a 
morphological model of the major components of the political system. This allows 
some form of institutional analysis to take place with regard to comparative aspects of 
political science theories. The second stage I undertook was to investigate how 
Kurdish politicians and civil servants at a variety of levels perceived their system to 
work. Finally, I investigated the decision-making process of the system through a 
range of approaches, all discussed in the relevant sections, but, in brief, ranging from 
participatory observation, through to programme analysis and interviews. . 
It should be noted that the entire thesis is inherently difficult to undertake due to Iraqi 
Kurdistan being somewhat inaccessible, but has been facilitated by my living in the 
region for a considerable amount of time, carefully developing interpersonal 
relationships with government officials and party cadres, and witnessing first-hand the 
operating procedures of the KRG and political parties. 91 
91 Jalal Talabani noted with some disdain that the majority of academics and reporters currently writing 
about Iraqi Kurdistan have rarely been to the region. In a similar vein, the influential KDP cadre and 
Acting Prime Minister, Shawkat Sheikh Yazdeen, noted that the weakness of many analyses of Kurdish 
politics could be traced to the lack of a balanced approach which assesses the many different facets of 
the Kurdish situation in Iraq. Interviews with Shawkat Sheikh Yazdeen, Erbil, 11 July 2000; Jalal 
Talabani, Suleimaniyah, 29 August 2000. 
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Chapter 3 
Contextual Analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
An analysis of the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan requires a comprehensive 
contextual analysis of factors which influence, or have influenced, the region. 
Located at a crossroads of cultures, nations, states, and political activity at a variety 
of scales, the list of applicable subjects to address in a contextual analysis of Iraqi 
Kurdistan would be extensive. For the purposes of this thesis, I am choosing to 
address those areas which have an immediate impact upon the contemporary political 
and administrative system, namely the physical and human geographic characteristics 
of the region, and the economic features which have developed in the 1990s. 
3.1.1 Aims and Structure 
It is first necessary to develop an understanding of the geography of the region. In a 
land-locked area such as Iraqi Kurdistan, physical geographical influences and 
geopolitical considerations are omnipresent within political actions. Aspects of 
physical geography have been responsible for both negative aspects of Kurdish 
history, with constituent states coveting the Kurdish regions for natural resources and 
security of their respective states, and positive aspects, providing the Kurdish people 
with sanctuary in times of need. 
The human geography of the region is addressed with an appraisal of population and 
political geography. A vital. aspect of identity for Kurds is their linguistic 
characteristics. Often cited as a reason of national unity, but perhaps more an 
indicator of disunity, the issues surrounding Kurdish dialects are later studied. 
Similarly, the diversity of religious faiths apparent in the region is a necessary 
component of the political system to understand, particularly with minority religious 
and ethnic communities currently enjoying notable political status. 
This chapter concludes with an analysis of the Iraqi Kurdish economy. It is apparent 
that social and tribal relationships promulgated by traditional modes of production 
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have had a considerable impact upon the development of the contemporary political 
system. The impact of these economic transformations has resulted in a fundamental 
alteration of social and tribal relations within Kurdish society. These changes were 
further compounded by severe upheavals caused by the belligerent attitude of the 
Iraqi state in the 1980s towards external opponents, and to the Iraqi Kurds 
themselves. An assessment of the impact upon the economy of the oil-for-food deal 
(the 986 series of Security Council Resolutions), in effect since 1997, concludes this 
section. 
3.2 Geo2raphical Context 
Iraqi Kurdistan is a region which suffers from being in an almost constant state of 
flux and change, in terms of physical geography, as well as in human and economic 
terms. ' The influencing of the environment has been perhaps the most effective way 
of impacting upon the future way of life of Iraqi Kurds, whether by accident or by 
design. It is therefore of importance in understanding the current predicament of the 
Iraqi Kurds as it the theatre in which the regional actors perform in and, indeed, 
impact upon. 2 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This section depicts Iraqi Kurdistan and the dynamics and agents of change, such as 
the Anfal campaign, the Iran-Iraq war, the humanitarian aid programme of the 1990s, 
and how the manipulation of geography has been used as a tool to pursue political 
ends. The section is divided into three inter-related parts. The physical geography of 
Iraqi Kurdistan is firstly addressed, as this is the stage on which the Kurdish struggle 
is performed. To commence. with, the territory of Kurdistan in general and Iraqi 
Kurdistan in particular has to be defined. This is not an easy task since Kurdistan, 
however defined, has no official boundaries. However, there have been many 
descriptions of what constitutes Kurdistan, and I will proceed with an overview and 
analysis of these arguments. 
' The immense deforestation which has occurred in Iraqi Kurdistan is perhaps the most visible 
example of the changing physical landscape. 2 For example, the Anfal campaign of the late 1980s was a planned way of impacting the lifestyle of 
Iraqi Kurdistan, by destroying the physical landscape and removing the patterns of human geography 
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3.2.1.1 Defining Kurdistan 
"Kurdistan" is impossible to identify as one would identify a recognised state. There 
are no recognised international boundaries to the territory, and even internal 
administrative boundaries within states are sometimes controversial and, commonly, 
ephemeral. This problem is compounded by the normative viewpoints of 
neighbouring states refusing to acknowledge the existence of a contiguous Kurdish 
geographical entity, or, in the case of Turkey, to deny the existence of the Kurds as a 
distinct and discrete people and culture. 3 
Most writers have taken an anthropological approach and describe Kurdistan as being 
the land or region inhabited by the Kurds. 4 This demographic description allows a 
territory of Kurdistan to be approximately denoted on maps, but it is open to a great 
deal of interpretation, particularly as the human geography of the Kurdish people is 
in flux, with many having migrated from their homeland and intermarriage being a 
common feature between Kurds and their neighbours. This approach, while being 
popular, is unfortunately arbitrary in designating the required concentration of Kurds 
needed amongst the population to qualify the area as being part of Kurdistan. Figure 
3.1 depicts the area of Kurdistan according to such demographic descriptions. 
3.2.1.2 Defining Iraqi Kurdistan 
The issue of defining Iraqi Kurdistan became academic after the events of 1991 when 
a Kurdish controlled area in northern Iraq came into being in the aftermath of the 
Second Gulf War. 5 For the purposes of this thesis, the Kurdish territory of Iraq 
includes those areas evacuated by the GOI in 1991, and subsequently controlled by 
the regional parties and the KRG. This includes the entirety of Dohuk Governorate, 
most of Erbil Governorate, all of Suleimaniyah Governorate, and a portion of Kirkuk 
in the area. The effect of UN SCR 986 may not have been planned, but has resulted in a massive 
change of patterns of living for the population of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
3 Kirisci & Winrow (1997) The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic 
Conflict. London: Frank Cass & Co., p. 1. 
° For example, see Gavan (1958) Kurdistan: Divided Nation of the Middle East. London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, p. 9; Ghassemlou (1965) Kurdistan and the Kurds. Publishing House of the Czechoslovak 
Academy of Sciences, Prague / Collet's Publishers, London, p. 13; Iheigiel (1981) Rural Community 
of Contemporary Iraqi Kurdistan Facing Modernization. Krakow, p. 9; McDowall (1991) op. cit., p. 
8; Bruinessen (1992a) op. cit., p. 11. 5 The First Gulf War was the conflict which took place between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s (1980- 
1988), also known as the Iran-Iraq War. The Second Gulf War was between Iraq and the Coalition 
forces which took place upon the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. 
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Figure 3.1: Kurdistan Identified by Population Distribution 
Source: McDowall (1992) The Kurds: A Nation Denied. London: Minority Rights Group, p. 10 
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Governorate. The northern-most limit of the Iraqi Kurdish territory is the border with 
Turkey and Iran, the western-most limit is the Syrian border, and the eastern 
boundary is the Iranian border. 6 However, even within Iraq, the area of the Kurdish 
region is open to debate. Kurdish maps, as illustrated by Figure 3.2, depict Iraqi 
Kurdistan as covering a significant proportion of Iraq. 
However, after 1991, the identification of the Iraqi Kurdish region studied in this 
thesis is reasonably straightforward and includes those areas north of the line 
withdrawn to by GO! forces and administration in 1991, and including all Iraqi 
territory up to the recognised international borders with Syria, Turkey and Iran. This 
is not to say that this area is Iraqi Kurdistan in its entirety, it is the area of Iraqi 
Kurdistan controlled and administered by the KRG and the dominant political 
parties. Figure 3.3 illustrates the extent of this region and the KDP-PUK division of 
1996. 
3.2.2 Physical Geography of Iraqi Kurdistan 
The aim of this section is to provide a geographical description of Iraqi Kurdistan, 
and to set the stage for subsequent political developments. An emphasis is also laid 
upon the environmental degradation of the region which has resulted in changing 
human geography and economic activity. 
3.2.2.1 Topograph 
From the aspect of physical geography, Kurdistan lies at the mountainous transition 
belt of the fertile crescent, with the Taurus and Zagros Mountains forming an arc 
encircling the Mesopotamian "region. 
7 These mountains have been both home and 
safeguard of the Kurdish people. Izady notes that; 
"In contiguous Kurdistan, as well as in the many far-flung Kurdish 
settlements, mountains are the single most important natural 
phenomenon, and they have shaped the Kurdish history, people, 
tradition, and culture. s8 
6 Legally, the authority of the GOI extends over the whole of the state of Iraq, and covers the Kurdish 
regions of the north. In practice, however, the KRG, dominated by the KDP in Erbil and Dohuk 
Governorates and the PUK in Suleimaniyah Governorate and the eastern part of Kirkuk Governorate 
is the governing authority. 
' Dziegiel (1981) op. cit., p. 9. 8 Izady (1992) op. cit., p. 13. 
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Figure 3.2: Kurdish Depiction of Iraqi Kurdistan 
_ x" I-A 
68 
Chapter 3 
Figure 3.3: Kurdish-Controlled Iraqi Kurdistan, 1991-2001 
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Mountains have therefore become synonymous with the peoples of Kurdistan. 9 This 
is illustrated by the predominance of mountains in Kurdish folk literature and songs, 
in their names, and in their affection for the mountainous areas of the country, even if 
they live in an alluvial plain area such as Erbil, or in the increasingly and areas of 
Garmian in Kirkuk. 10 
The mountain chains of Iraqi Kurdistan run in a north-west to south-easterly 
direction along the border territories with Iran and Turkey. These chains slope to the 
south to the fertile plains of Harir, Erbil, Sharazur and the Garmian. These plains can 
be described as being a piedmont zone, coincident with the 30.5cm (12-inch) annual 
rain line, located between desert-steppe country to the south-west, and the foothills of 
the Zagros to the north-east. 11 
The foothills of the Zagros rise a few kilometres outside the major urban centres of 
Dohuk and Erbil, with the city of Suleimaniyah being located within them. Fertile 
valleys lie between the mountain ridges, and this intermontane zone is heavily 
dissected with active drainage systems. 12 Braidwood & Howe identify the Kurdish 
highlands proper as lying beyond the intermontane zone, with an altitude of over 900 
metres (3000 feet). 13 
3.2.2.2 Climate 
The high mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan are characterised by harsh winters and heavy 
snowfalls, with precipitation ranging between 400 and 2000 mm. According to the 
Koeppen system of climate classification, the mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan 
may be described as being of type DSa, which indicates a cool wet climate, 
continental in nature, with a dry season in the summer. Conversely, the plains and 
° For example, see the descriptions of Arfa (1966) The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study. 
London: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-2; Ciment (1996) The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey. 
Iraq and Iran. Conflict and Crisis in the Post-Cold War World, New York: Facts on File, pp. 75-76. 
10 Garmian literally means 'warm place' in Sorani Kurdish and refers to those areas which may be 
classified as semi-arid in the summer months, running south of Taq-Taq in Erbil Governorate, through 
Kirkuk to Kalar and Kifri. 
11 Braidwood & Howe (1960) Prehistoric Investigations in Iraqi Kurdistan. Studies in Ancient 
Oriental Civilization, No. 31, The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Illinois: University 
of Chicago Press, p. 13. 
'2 Ibid, p. 16. 
13 Ibid. 
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valleys of the region enjoy a CSa Mediterranean climate, characterised by rainy 
winters and dry warm summers with a yearly rainfall of between 200 and 600 mm. 14 
The temperatures within Iraqi Kurdistan vary sharply, from the hot, and undulating 
areas of the Garmian, to the bitterly cold high mountain areas in winter. 's In most 
parts of the country, the temperature does not normally exceed 35°C. 16 However, the 
Garmian region south of Darbandikhan commonly exceeds 50°C in the summer 
months, and it is not unusual for Erbil to attain temperatures of 45°C. 
3.2.2.3 Rivers, Oil and Natural Resources 
Kurdistan is rich in natural resources, and Iraqi Kurdistan in particular is well- 
endowed with a broad spectrum including water and oil. However, the control of 
such resources, whether in terms of dams, oil refineries or mines has rarely been in 
the hands of the Kurds, and has been controlled by the central authorities. 
3.2.2.3.1 River Systems 
Kurdistan is an oasis in a water-starved region. The abundant rainfall which is 
common over the Zagros and Taurus mountains has made Kurdistan one of the few 
watersheds of the Middle East, and home to the source of two of the world's major 
river systems, the Tigris and Euphrates. '7 
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the major river systems are three main tributaries of the Tigris - 
the Greater and Lesser Zab, and the Diyala. These three tributaries of the Tigris are 
all of especial importance to the Kurdish controlled territory of Iraq, and occupy a 
sentimental part of the mindset of most Kurds. However, none of these `Kurdish' 
rivers rise in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Greater Zabrises in Turkey between Lakes Van 
and Urmia, and the Lesser Zab and Diyala rise in the Iranian Zagros. 
18 Favourable 
geological conditions in Iraqi Kurdistan especially have combined with the -abundant 
14 Kliot (1994) Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. London: Routledge, pp. 104-104; 
Sajjadi (1992) op. cit., p. 48. 
's The foothills areas. 
16 Sajjadi (1992) op. cit., p. 48. 
"Kurdistan Democratic Party (1999) op. cit., pp. 46-52. 
18 Kliot (1994) op. cit., p. 104. 
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run-off to form an extensive aquifer and spring system. 19 These springs serve as the 
main source of artificial irrigation and domestic water for the Kurds. 
All three of these river systems are of a reasonably large size in terms of mean 
discharge. Over the 1919-1953 period, the discharge of the Greater Zab was 13.7 
billion m3, the Lesser Zab 7.65 billion m3, and the Diyala 6.16 billion m'. 20 However, 
these systems also display great variability. 
These rivers each have had hydro-electric generating installations built on them, 
however, while the proposed Bekhma Dam on the Greater Zab was almost fully 
completed, it was never commissioned. The Lesser Zab has been dammed at Dokan 
in Suleimaniyah Governorate, with the electricity generated here supplying 
Suleimaniyah and Erbil. The Sirwan-Diyala has been dammed north of 
Darbandikhan town by the Darbandikhan Dam, with the installation supplying 
electricity to Kurdish-controlled Kirkuk and Suleimaniyah, as well as to GOI 
controlled areas. These installations have suffered somewhat under the sanction 
regime since 1991, but are still operational. Table 3.1 shows the characteristics and 
capacities of these dams in the period immediately after their completion. 
Table 3.1 Hvdro-electric / Irrigation schemes in Iraqi Kurdistan21 
Dam 
Year of Lake Discharge Discharge 
construction area capacity 
a. cuýua a aciýaý 
capacity 
(lane) (million m3) (m) (m) (m3 per second) 
Darbandikhan 1961 120 3.0 535 128 11,400 
Dokan 1959 270 6.8 360 116.5 4,600 
19 Izady (1992) op. cit., p. 224. 20Ibid, p 107. 
21 Ockerman & Samano (1985) "The Agricultural Development of Iraq, " in Beaumont & McLachlan 
(eds. ), Agricultural Development in the Middle East. London: Wiley and Sons, p. 196, quoting 
Ministry of Culture and Information (GOI) figures (1980) and. Planning and Follow-up Department 
(GOI) figures, 1981; Kliot (1994) op. cit., p. 121. 
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It should be noted that the establishment of such large water bodies was achieved at 
the expense of Kurdish landholders and farmland in the valleys affected by these 
programmes, in a similar way as to how the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP) is 
affecting Turkish Kurdish farmers. Izady explains that: 
"Due to the extraordinary archaeological richness of the land, almost 
any dam built in Kurdistan drowns a portion of Kurdish history .... 
one can only guess the magnitude of the loss of the historical remains 
in sites like the Darbandi Khan ýDarbandikhan] Dam near Halabja, 
the very heartland of Kurdistan. s2 
3.2.2.3.2 Petroleum Resources 
Oil is found in abundance in the rock strata of the parts of Iraqi Kurdistan 
administered by the GOI. With approximately 45 billion barrels of oil, this area has 
among the largest oil reserves in the Middle East, and contains larger proven deposits 
than the US. 23 However, while the land of Kurdistan is undoubtedly well-endowed 
with petroleum riches, the peoples of Kurdistan have never directly benefited from 
the exploitation of the resource, and have only received its benefits indirectly from 
the GOI. 
Within the area governed by the Iraqi Kurds since 1991, there are a number of oil 
deposits which are potentially economically viable. In the environs of Taq-Taq, there 
are three wells capable of producing a total of 15,000 barrels a day. However, these 
were filled with concrete by the GOI army. Other reserves within the Kurdish- 
controlled territory are found at Qoratu, near Kalar, and Tawog near Zakho. It is 
estimated that Tawog is capable of producing 2,000 barrels per day, and Qurato 
10,000 barrels per day. 24 
3.2.2.4 Conclusion 
The northern regions of Iraq are indeed well-endowed with natural resources, and in 
particular oil and water. However, the Kurdish-controlled region of Iraqi Kurdistan 
does not benefit directly from the abundant oil resources due to the means of 
production being located in territory controlled by the GOI. Furthermore, whilst the 
22 Izady (1992) op. cit., p. 226. 
23 lbid, p. 221; Kurdistan Democratic Party (1999) op. cit., pp. 54-56. 
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major river systems of Iraq are supplied by tributaries which rise in the Kurdish- 
controlled regions, and two major dams also exist in the area (Dokan and 
Darbandikhan), the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan has recently been dominated 
by water-geopolitics, with the GOI threatening to invade the Kurdish regions in order 
to control the dams during times of drought. Whilst the Kurds may enjoy control of 
the means of storage and distribution, they are rarely free to exercise their authority 
over its usage. 25 
3.2.3 Human Geography 
As the aim of this thesis is to examine the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan, it is 
necessary to address the subject of human geography with an approach grounded in 
political geography. The importance of understanding the political geography of Iraqi 
Kurdistan becomes especially apparent when the geographical and geopolitical 
situation of the region is fully appreciated. Situated in one of the most volatile parts 
of a most volatile region (the Middle East), surrounded by states, dependent 
throughout history on the characteristics of the physical geography of the Kurdistan 
region for their survival as a discrete body of people, the understanding of this 
region's political geography in a purely contextual manner is an essential exercise to 
undertake before the complexities of the Iraqi Kurdish political system can be fully 
addressed. 
3.2.3.1 Population Geography 
Population statistics for Kurdistan proper are notoriously variable. The constituent 
states of Kurdistan are tempted to minimize the figure in an attempt to play down the 
importance of the Kurdish minority within their country, whereas Kurdish 
nationalists and the political parties are prone to exaggerate the number. Table 3.2 
presents a summary of estimates available in the literature. 
It is important to note the rise in estimates throughout the period, even taking into 
account such atrocities as the Anjal campaign, and Arabization and Turkification 
24 Keen (1993) "The Kurds in Iraq - How Safe is their Haven Now? " London: Save the Children Fund, 
67. 
2S The GOI came close to invading Suleimaniyah on 9 June 2000 over the issue of water discharge 
from the Dokan and Darbandikhan dams during the drought which afflicted Iraq in the summer of 
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policies. As well as witnessing an exodus of people from the region, there has been 
an influx in as well. Kurds have been returning from Iran throughout the 1990s where 
they have been -since the Kurdish retreat in 1975.26 The Kurds and Turkmen of 
Kirkuk have also been suffering under attempts by the GOI to arabize the city, and 
have been expelled into Kurdish controlled areas. 27 
Table 3.2: Estimates of the Kurdish Population28 
Author: . Ghassemlou Short & 
(1965)29 McDermott 
(1977)30 
Bruinnessen More McDowail 
(1978)31 (1984)32 (1992)33 
t, 
C 
7 
O 
U 
Turkey 4,900,000 (18) 5,600,000 7,500,000 (19) 10,000,000 (24) 10,800,000 (19) 
Iraq 3,300,000 (22) 3,400,000 2,500,000 (23) 3,000,000 (27) 4,100,000 (23) 
Iran 1,550,000 (16) 2,025,000 3,500,000 (10) 6,000,000 (16) 5,500,000 (10) 
Syria 400,000 (10) 500,000 (8.5) 800,000 (9) 1,000,000 (8) 
Other 259,000 165,000 100,000 --- 1,200,000 
Total 10,409,000 11,630,000 14,100,000 19,800,000 22,600,000 
2000. The result saw Talabani ordering the opening of the dams for long periods every day throughout 
the summer. 
26 See Chapter 4. 
27 These people are not classed as refugees by UNHCR as they have not been forced out of the 
country. They are therefore known, in UN parlance, as Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs). 
28 Figures in brackets indicate the percentage of the population of the named country who are Kurdish. 
For example, Syria 400,000 (10) indicates that there are an estimated 400,000 Kurds in Syria, 
constituting 10 percent of the total population of Syria. 29 Ghassemlou (1965) op. cit., pp. 21.23. Ghassemlou is precise in his descriptions of who is included 
in his figures. The totals presented here are the ones Ghassemlou arrived at for estimating the number 
of Kurds in the whole of the country, and not just in Kurdistan. 70 Developed from Short & McDermott (1977) The Kurds. London: Minority Rights Group, p. 5. The 
figures presented here and not strictly those of Short & McDermott. In their report, they quite rightly 
emphasise the unreliability of population statistics related to Kurds, and therefore provide a maximum 
and minimum figure. The figure presented here is the average of the two. '1 Bruinessen (1992) op, cit., pp. 14-15. Bruinessen's objective population estimates date from 1975 
and were subsequently published in his 1978 doctoral thesis. This, in turn, was published as the 1992 
reference. 
32 More (1984) Les Kurdes Aujourd'hui: Mouvement National et Partis Politiques. Paris: Editions 
L'Harmattan, p. 21. More presents the figures as percentages of the total population of the constituent 
country. The above figures were therefore calculated from More's percentages and appeared in 
Aguado (1990) "The National Liberation Movement of the Kurds in the Middle East, " in Premdas, 
Samarasinghe & Anderson, (eds. ), Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective. International 
Centre for Ethnic Studies; London: Pinter Press, p. 155. 
s' McDowall (I992a) The Kurds: A Nation Denied. London: Minority Rights Group, p. 12. McDowall 
chose to base his figures on the 1978 ones of Bruinessen, and apply his Kurdish population 
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Within Iraqi Kurdistan, population estimates are further compounded because there 
has been much population movement within the territory, and away from it. To some 
extent, this problem in Iraqi Kurdistan should have been alleviated by the influx of 
humanitarian aid agencies following the Second Gulf War. These agencies conducted 
large surveys, and the World Food Programme (WFP) is responsible for distributing 
a food ration to every person in the territory. However, surprisingly, there is still no 
consensus among the large agencies as to the total population of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Table 3.3 illustrates the variety of figures available for Iraqi Kurdistan and are the 
results of various surveys which have been carried out in Iraqi Kurdistan, normally 
by a department of the KRG and a UN agency or international NGO. 
Table 3.3: Population Estimates, By Governorate 
Department / Agency DRD WFP 
. 
CES DRD/DWS 
(and year of survey) (1996)34 (1996)35 (1996)36 (1995) 37 
Dohuk 747,334 783,865 691,914 755,378 
Erbil 1,054,567 1,141,505 1,011,748 1,120,765 
Suleimaniyah 1,194,099 1,026,322 1,055,154 1,529,40638 
ý7 Darbandikhan 335,307 363,512 332,550 --- 
Total 3,331,301 3,315,204 3,091,367 3,405,549 
3.2.3.1.1 Population Distribution 
It is a difficult task to ascertain the population of the urban areas as they are 
constantly expanding and contracting, depending on the influx of peoples from the 
rural areas of the region seeking economic benefit by coming to the cities, or by 
internally displaced peoples coming from GOI controlled Kurdish territory.. 
percentages to national statistics in the early 1990s. However, this does assume that Kurdish 
demography is similar to the demography of the neighbouring states. 
34 Department of Rural Development (Ministry of Reconstruction and Development, KRG) figures, 
1996 survey. 
ss WFP / General Directorate of Food Trade (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, KRG) 
figures, 1996 survey. 
76 Compulsory Education Survey, Ministry of Education - UNICEF (KRG), 1996. '"' Department of Rural Development / Department of Water and Sanitation (Ministry of 
Reconstruction and Development, Ministry of Municipalities and Tourism, KRG), 1995. 
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The figures of Table 3.4 have been developed from surveys undertaken by the KRG, 
UN agencies and NGOs. The exactness of the presented figures is problematic, and 
as with all population surveys, suffers from a high degree of ambiguity. However, 
even accepting the weaknesses of the absolute figures, the breakdown does offer 
useful information regarding population distribution. The figures suggest that current 
ratio between rural and urban areas in Iraqi Kurdistan is approximately 3: 1 (including 
collective settlements as urban). This fact illustrates the mass movement which has, 
and still is, taking place from the rural areas into the swollen towns and cities. In 
addition, these figures do not take fully into account the influx of internally displaced 
peoples into the urban centres of Iraqi Kurdistan, which may force the ratio even 
higher. 
Table 3.4: Rural - Urban Population Breakdown, All Governorates39 
Rural Urban 
Total 
Population Collective City/Town 
Population %<S Population %<5 Population 
Dohuk 783,865 217,670 18 194,153 18 372,042 
Erbil 1,141,505 237,675 17 177,818 23 726,012 
Suleimaniyah 1,026,322 265,921 16 308,41640 17 716,68841 
Darbandikhan 363,512 98,809 16 
Total 3,315,204 820,075 17 680,387 19 1,814,742 
2.3 
.2 Administrative Divisiöns of 
Iraqi Kurdistan 
The administrative organization of Iraqi Kurdistan is prescribed by the GOI's 
42 Governorate Law of 1969 (as illustrated by Figure 3.4). Iraq as a whole is divided 
sa Includes figures for Darbandikhan Governorate. 
39 Total population figures from WFP / Department of Food (Kurdistan Regional Government 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs) Northern Iraq database (1996), calculated from food 
agents reports on the Oil-for-food Programme. Rural population figures from Ministry of 
Reconstruction and Development (Erbil) / Directorate of Reconstruction (Suleimaniyah), Village 
Survey 1997. Collective figures from Durham University Collective Settlement Survey, 1998. 
City/town figures calculated by combining all sources. 
ao Includes figures for Darbandikhan Governorate. 
41 Ibid. 
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into governorates of varying size. These governorates are sometimes related to the 
districts, or vilayets of the Ottoman Empire, and some are new constructs, 
representing changes in population. Before 1991, in the north of the country, four 
governorates were home to a considerable Kurdish presence. These were the 
Governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Kirkuk. 
This situation was subsequently confused by the withdrawal of the GOI from parts of 
this territory in October 1991. The withdrawal did not take place along neat lines of 
governorate administrative areas. The Governorate of Erbil lost the area south of 
Qushtapa and Taq-Taq, and the Governorate of Kirkuk was left mainly under the 
authority of the GOI, including the oil-city of Kirkuk and the important Kurdish town 
of Tuz Khurmuta. The area known as Garmian, centred on the town of Darbandikhan 
and including Kalar and Kifri to the south, was left in the hands of the Kurdish 
forces. 43 
The boundaries of two of the four Kurdish dominated governorates of Iraq where 
therefore substantially altered. This resulted in an interesting battle of labelling 
between the Kurds and the GOI. The Kurds kept the names for Erbil, Dohuk and 
Suleimaniyah Governorates. This was an acceptable move by all parties and 
organizations as the vast majority of the Governorate of Erbil was still left in the 
control of the Kurds. However, the GOI established an alternate centre for the 
Governorate of Erbil under their control, centred on the town of Makhmour. There 
are therefore two Erbil Governorates existing side-by-side, separated by the dividing 
line between the GOI and the KRG. 44 
The situation was slightly different in the Governorate of Kirkuk, as the centre of 
administration, Kirkuk, was not under the control'of the Kurds. However, Kirkuk 
42 Government of Iraq (1969) Governorate Law (A! -wagaai'a a! -'iraaqya qaanun al-muhafadhat). 47 Garmian is not an official area, but designates a swathe of land which roughly starts at 
Darbandikhan and stretches down to Khanaquin in the south, Chamchamal to the west, and the Iranian 
border towns to the east. 
as This is an important fact to highlight and will be developed in the forthcoming chapters. Although 
the KRGs in Erbil and Suleimaniyah have a Defence Ministry in the form of Ministries of Peshmerga 
Affairs, the KRG does not have its own army and the political parties have kept their own separate 
party peshmerga. 
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Figure 3.4: Administrative Sub-Divisions, 199945 
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occupies an almost mystical position in the Kurdish psyche, and it was an important 
point for them to emphasise that at least part of Kirkuk Governorate was under their 
control. Even though the centre of administration for the remaining Kurdish 
controlled territory became the small town of Darbandikhan, the territory was still 
known by the Kurds as the Governorate of Kirkuk (or New Kirkuk), much to the 
45 Sources: Kurdistan National Assembly (1994) Ademocrattyya Aparliamen wa fiukumat fr Junub 
Kurdistan, (Parliamentary Democracy and Governance in Southern Kurdistan): Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan; 
interviews with Aso Sheikh Nuri, Suleimaniyah, 5 May 1998; Mahdi Khoshnaw, Erbil, 14 June 1998; 
for information regarding the governorate structure of Iraq, see the Iraqi Governorate Law of 1969; 
village numbers obtained from Durham University Iraqi Kurdistan Humanitarian Assistance Policy 
Planning Unit database. 
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annoyance of the GOI. However, for the purposes of clarity, I will refer to this 
governorate as Darbandikhan, following the logic of the names of the other 
governorates of Iraqi Kurdistan as carrying the name of the principle town under the 
control of the Kurds. It also acts to resolve confusion over which Governorate of 
Kirkuk is being discussed. 
A similar problem arose between the Governorates of Erbil and Suleimaniyah in 
1996 after the internecine fighting between the PUK and KDP, which commenced 
when the KDP captured Erbil City, with the assistance of the forces of the GOI, on 
the 31 August 1996. The result of the subsequent fighting was that the KDP retook 
Erbil City, and most of the Governorate of Erbil, while the PUK controlled the 
Governorate of Suleimaniyah, and a small part of eastern Erbil Governorate centred 
on the town of Koysinjaq, and part of Kirkuk Governorate centred on the town of 
Darbandikhan. The PUK dominated administration of the KRG based in 
Suleimaniyah named this region the Governorate of Erbil, and established a 
governorate structure centred on the town of Koysinjaq. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I will refer to this area as PUK administered Erbil, with the other 
administrative areas being the Governorates of Erbil, Dohuk, Suleimaniyah and 
Darbandikhan. 
3.2.3.2.1 The Administrative Sub-Divisions of Iraqi Kurdistan 
Kurdish-controlled Iraqi Kurdistan is sub-divided into administrative units according 
to the 1969 law, as shown by Figure 3.5. The governorate is divided into smaller 
administrative divisions, individually named as qaza. They are of varying size and 
are equivalent to a British district or American county. The Governorates of Dohuk 
and Erbil are divided into six qaza each, Suleimaniyah is divided into seven, and 
Darbandikhan is divided into four. The head of the qaza, the representative of the 
Governor, is called the Qaimaqamiyat, and has the power of Governor within his 
qaza. The smallest administrative sub-division used in Iraq is the nahiya. This 
division translates into sub-district, and again is of varying size. Again, nahiyas have 
an urban core, which is normally an established small town, although some are 
Collective towns established in the 1980s. The chief executive of the nahiya is the 
mudir al-nahiya. 
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Figure 3.5: The Governorates, Qaza, and Nahiva of Iraqi Kurdistan, 1999 
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3.2.4 Conclusion 
The geography of Iraqi Kurdistan has been forced into unnatural changes, which may 
be described as being the result of political actions altering the physical or human 
geography of the region, whether by accident or design. The physical environment 
has undergone tremendous deforestation and defoliation especially since 1975, and 
then through the 1980s with the Algiers Agreement and subsequent Anfal Campaigns 
of the GOI. Today, where the mountainous areas should be thickly wooded, they are 
bare and suffer from severe soil denudation and erosion, effecting the long-term 
fertility of the land. The climate has also suffered from the effects of exposure and 
lack of micro-climate regulation. 
These physical changes have affected the human geography. The rural population 
was forced from these areas into the increasingly sprawling cities, firstly due to 
political pressure from the GOI, then due to the destruction of the environment, and 
lastly, and perhaps most tragically, due to the lack of a market created by the oil-for- 
food deal. 46 Furthermore, the agricultural producing land of the mountains is 
dependent upon specific local farming knowledge which, if lost for just one 
generation, could be lost forever. This problem is further discussed in the economic 
section. 
The human situation is increasingly tragic. Cities, such as Erbil, which have grown 
naturally to a size of little more than 400,000 people, are now sprawling masses 
which may soon be in excess of 1,000,000 people. Suleimaniyah and Dohuk have 
suffered similarly under these pressures, as have most other urban centres. This has 
created immense human hardship and poverty for some people, and opportunities for 
economic, or even human, exploitation for others, resulting in societal problems 
previously unheard of in the region. With cheap labour readily available there are 
now no problems for unscrupulous employees to decrease wages. Similarly, there are 
no problems with increasing rents on inadequate housing. Once unheard of, 
prostitution is now rising, and the streets of the major cities and urban areas are home 
to an ever-growing number of street children. 
"6 See Section 3 of this chapter. 
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Such a social environment is unstable. In political terms, this instability has 
manifested into a proliferation of small radical parties, the increase of peshmerga for 
the major parties as they pay' a guaranteed salary, and by the rise of the Islamist 
parties benefiting from a wave of younger peoples increasingly disillusioned with 
attempting to improve their material status and turning to more spiritual lifestyles. 
Islamist parties have also become popular due to the humanitarian activities 
undertaken by certain NGOs under the banner of Islam. 
The unstable geography of the region, stemming mainly from political actions and 
having both physical and human manifestations, is one of the most important factor 
for any administration or political party charged with running Iraqi Kurdistan to deal 
with in the immediate future. Such an approach would have to address the population 
distribution, and institute economic and infrastructural incentives for the rural 
population to return to their ancestral lands, and for the appalling conditions in the 
major cities to be targeted. Without such an approach, the impact of the policies of 
any regional administrative body can only ever be short term and temporary. 
3.3 Language 
The degree of a shared language has long been identified as a key indicator of the 
development of an ethnic consciousness and ethnonationalism 
47 However, while 
virtually all exponents of Kurdish-ness argue that Kurdish is a distinct language and 
is used as the common means of communication in Kurdistan, and particularly in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, the importance of the Kurdish language in fostering a feeling of 
nationalism is debatable as, unlike their Arab, Turkish and Persian neighbours, the 
Kurds-have not yet evolved a single systematized written or spoken standard. The 
varied span of Kurdish dialects may also be an indicator of the varied origins of the 
Kurdish peoples, and it is interesting to note that, within Iraqi Kurdistan, linguistic 
divisions are often reflected in the spoken dialect of choice 
48 It is an unfortunate 
reality that the Kurdish language has often been on indicator of divergence rather 
than political unity. 
47 Entessar (1992) op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
" The KDP, for example, are often referred to as the Bahdinanis as the stronghold of 
KDP support is 
in the Bahdinan speaking region of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
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3.3.1 The Kurdish Dialects 
The language spoken by most of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan is Kurdish. 
However, "Kurdish" has many constituent dialects which are closely linked to 
Persian, but incomprehensible to Turks and Arabs. Kurds of different dialectic 
groupings cannot communicate easily with other Kurds in their mother tongue, 
somewhat weakening the positive attributes of a shared language. 49 The Bahdinani 
"Kurdish" of Zakho, for example, is quite different to the Hawrami "Kurdish" of 
Tawela. 50 The Kurdish group of languages belongs to the north-western or south- 
western subdivision of Iranian languagesS1 and can be broken down into four major 
subdivisions: 52 
1. The northern and north-western dialects, usually called Kurmanji. This dialect is 
spoken in Turkey, and the northernmost parts of Iraqi and Persian Kurdistan. In 
Iraqi Kurdistan it is referred to as Bahdinani. 53 
2. The southern dialects, often called Sorani, but is in. fact a grouping of many 
dialects from this area. Sorani is commonly considered tö be the classical Kurdish 
of Iraqi Kurdistan. This dialect is spoken in southern Kurdistan, including most 
of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
3. The south-eastern dialects such as Sanandaji, Kermanshahi and Leki. These 
dialects are closer to modem Persian than the previous two groups. 
4. The dialects of Zaza and Gurani. Zaza is spoken in north-western Kurdistan 
(north and west of Diyarbakir in Turkey), and Gurani is spoken in various parts 
of southern Kurdistan. 54 
a Cook (1995) The Safe Haven in Northern Iraq: International Responsibility for Iraqi Kurdistan. 
London: Human Rights Centre and University of Essex, p. 7. Ironically, when conducting surveys for 
humanitarian aid agencies in " 1998, the author found it easier and more efficient to use Arabic. 
Virtually all the surveyors, whether from Bahdinan or Soran, understood Arabic, and it proved to be 
less confusing than having to handle two separate surveying systems. When put in the same room for 
undergoing survey training, Kurds from Dohuk and Erbil would commonly communicate in Arabic 
rather than attempting to use the Kurdish dialect of the other. 
so Zakho is a major town in Dohuk Governorate, on the border with Turkey. Tawella is a small trading 
town in Halabja Qaza of Suleimaniyah Governorate, lying on the Iranian border. 
51 It used to be commonly accepted that Kurdish is a north-western Iranian language. MacKenzie 
however challenged this idea and showed that Kurdish may in fact have more in common with the 
south-western Iranian languages (Mackenzie (1961) "The Origins of Kurdish. " Transactions of the 
Philological Society, pp. 68-86. Quoted in Bruinessen (1992a) op. cit., p. 47). 
52 These divisions are based upon those of Bruinessen (1992a) op. cit., pp. 21-22. 33 Dzeigiel (1981) op. cit., p. 17. 54 Bruinessen (1992b) op. cit., p. 3. 
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These dialectic groupings are not mutually exclusive and merge into each other. This 
is particularly apparent in the late 1990s as there is increased rural to urban migration 
the presence of Kurdish refugees from Kirkuk, the expulsion of Kurds from the 
major urban centres of Iraqi Kurdistan by the KDP and PUK to the territory of the 
opposing party, and the return of Iraqi Kurdish refugees from Iran. 
3.3.1.1 Lexical Systems 
The lexical systems of these dialects display notable divergence due to Kurdistan 
being divided between different nation-states. Kurmanji and Zaza are written in Latin 
script in Turkey. This situation developed after the Turkification policies of Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk banned the Arabic script as the writing system of Turkish. The 
subsequent teaching of this script throughout schools in Turkey, including south-east 
Anatolia where the Turkish Kurds originate, guaranteed that Latin script would 
become the standardised script for both Turkish, and for the illegally spoken 
Kurmanji and Zaza. Similarly, the arabisation policies of the governments of Iraq and 
Syria, and the natural osmosis of linguistic characteristics, resulted in the Kurds of 
these countries writing and reading their language in a modified Arabic script. This is 
also the case with the Kurds of Iran. The script is commonly referred to as Arabic 
script, but has additional characters alongside those regularly found. Kurds who 
reside in Armenia and Azerbaijan, in effect the ex-USSR, use the cyrillic script. 
3.3.2 Iraqi Kurdish Dialects 
These dialect groups show considerable lexical and phonological differences, and 
also differ significantly in some grammatical features, such as the treatment of past 
tenses and transitory verbs. However, the language has survived both as a common 
means of spoken and written communication, as a medium of teaching in schools and 
universities in Iraqi Kurdistan, and as a language with a written literary tradition, 
dominated by the Sorani dialect. " 
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3.3.2.1 Bahdinani and Sorani 
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurds of Dohuk Governorate and the mountainous regions 
north of Erbil City speak Bahdinani Kurdish56, whereas those of the rest of Erbil, 
Suleimaniyah and Darbandikhan Governorates predominantly speak Sorani 
Kurdish. 57 There is also a small but significant grouping of Hawrami Kurdish 
speaking peoples who reside in the mountainous regions between Iraq and Iran, and 
are concentrated in the areas east and north of Halabja. 58 
Ghassemlou postulates that the dominance of the Sorani dialect in Iraqi Kurdistan 
may be traced to the prevalence of the dialect in Kurdish literature which took place 
during the existence of the Mahabad Republic in Iran between 1945 and 1946. 
Following the revolution of 14 July 1958 in Iraq, Kurdish literature began to develop 
at great speed because of the acknowledgement of Kurds in the Constitution. Sorani 
Kurdish therefore assumed a position of being the chief dialect of Kurdish literature, 
and the dialect taught in Kurdish schools in Iraq. 59 0 
McDowall estimates that, grammatically, the Bahdinani and Sorani dialects differ 
from each other as much as English and German, although vocabulary differences are 
probably of the same order as those between Dutch and German60, however, 
Ghassemlou contradicts this by saying; 
"... there is no substantial difference between these two dialects 
[Bahdinani and Sorani]; basically, they form a single language: they 
have a similar word stock and the same grammatical structure. It 
must be noted that in spite of certain differences between Kurdi 
[Sorani] and Kermanji [Bahdinani], it is quite easy for the Kurds from 
ss Nikitine (1958) Les Kurdes, Etude Sociologique et Hisiorique. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, quoted 
in Ghassemlou (1965) op. cit., p. 27. 
56 The Bahdinani dialect is more commonly known as Kurmanji in the academic literature. This 
dialect is spoken northwards for Mosul, through Turkey, and into Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Iraqi 
Kurdistan, Kurmanji is prevalent in the Iraq - Turkey border areas, Dohuk Governorate, Zakho, and 
the north-western areas of Erbil Governorate, and is known as Bahdinani due to this are being 
historically named Bahdinan by Iraqi Kurds. It is important to note that Bahdinani is the dialect 
spoken by the Barzani family. 
s The Sorani dialect is spoken is spoken across most of Iraqi Kurdistan, and in Iraq was the official 
Kurdish, indicating the cultural pre-eminence of Suleimaniyah over other Iraqi Kurdish centres. The 
Sorani dialect is commonly used by the PUK. 58 For further information on Kurdish dialects, see McDowall (1996a) A Modern History of the Kurds. 
London: I. B. Taurus. Hawrami is more commonly known as Gurani in the academic literature. 
However, within Iraqi Kurdistan it is known as Hawrami after the geographical area of Hawraman. S Ghassemlou (1965) op. cit., p. 27. 60 0 McDowall (1996a) op. cit., p. 9. 
86 
Chapter 3 
the north-western and south-eastern areas to understand one 
another. 23,61 
After spending 3 years in Kurdish-controlled Iraqi Kurdistan, it is my opinion that 
the difference between Bahdinani Kurdish and Sorani Kurdish lies somewhere 
between the views of McDowall and Ghassemlou. 
3.3.3 Conclusion 
As Iraqi Kurdistan is essentially home to a linguistic fault-line between the two major 
Kurdish dialects, the notion of a shared language promoting a unified sense of 
ethnonationalism may be weakened somewhat, and with it the idea of a shared ethnic 
consciousness. The division between the two dialects is commonly referred to as 
being the Great Zab River, which is now the administrative boundary between the 
governorates of Dohuk and Erbil. It is readily apparent that Sorani is dominant in the 
cities of Erbil and Suleimaniyah, and Bahdinani similarly so in Dohuk. While exact 
ratios of speakers of Bahdinani to Sorani are difficult to ascertain, it is likely that 
Sorani is the spoken dialect of the majority of Iraqi Kurds. 
Furthermore, there are other languages used in Iraqi Kurdistan, and, in localised areas 
of minority populations, are the languages of common usage. The Christian 
communities of Assyrians, Chaldeans and Nestorian speak Aramaic, and the 
Turkomen population speaks a Turkic dialect. 
3.4 Religion and Minorities 
The overwhelming majority of Kurds are Muslim. Entessar states that at least two- 
thirds follow the Shafa'i school of Sunni jurisprudence, Bruinessen estimates the 
percentage of Kurds who are Sunnis to be 80%, and McDowall suggests a higher 
figure with 85%. 62 There are major concentrations of Kurds following Shi'a Islam in 
the Kermanshah region of Iran and in the Khanaqin district of Iraqi Kurdistan. 63 
There are also pockets of various Sufi orders of the Naqishbandi, the Qadiri and 
some Ali-Allahis (Ahl-i Hagq). " Even though the vast majority of Kurds are 
61 Ghassemlou (1965) op. cit.; pp. 27-28, quoting Sovremennii Iran, Moscow, 1957. 62 See McDowall (1991) "The Kurds: An Historical Perspective, " Asian Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 
293-302, p. 6; Bruinessen (1992b) op. cit., p. 4; Entessar (1992) op. cit., p. 5. 63 Entessar (1992) op. cit., p. 5. 64 Ibid. 
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Muslims, religion is not a truly uniting factor of Kurds in Kurdistan. Kurds have 
accepted Islam with piousness and devotion to duty, but in a highly personal manner, 
with little thought given to Islam in a political or socially unifying sense. 65 
Furthermore, there are numerous religions practiced by other minorities in Kurdistan, 
which, interestingly, are factors in uniting non-Kurds in Kurdistan, an opposite 
situation as to that of the Kurds themselves. 66 
3.4.1 Kurdish Religious Minorities 
Within Iraqi Kurdistan, the most common of the sects which probably have an 
Islamic origin are the Ahl-i Haqq and the Yezidis. Ahl-i Haqq 67 is a small sect found 
in south and south-eastern Kurdistan that is probably a Shi'i syncretistic deviation. 
The central belief is in seven successive manifestations of the Divinity. Although Ali 
(the Prophet Mohammed's son-in-law) is venerated, the focus of the sect is on the 
68 founder of the Ahl-i Haqq, Sultan Sahak. 
Another syncretistic sect, the Yezidis are often incorrectly termed `devil- 
worshippers'. The origin of this sect appears to have been Sunni Islam, which has 
progressively incorporated elements of virtually every regional religion, including 
paganism, Zoroastrianism, Manicheanism, Judaism, Nestorian Christianity, and other 
Muslim features. 69 The main concentrations of Yezidis are in the Kurd Dagi district 
north of Aleppo in Syria, in the Sinjar mountains on the Syrian-Iraqi border, and in 
the south-western Causcasus. There is also a major concentration in Iraqi Kurdistan 
at Ain Sifhi, with their most sacred shrine of Shaikh `Adi, south of Aqra, although 
there are many Yezidis spread out over the rest of the territory. 70 Yezidis claim to be 
Kurdish, but due to religious and cultural differences, and a definite pride in their 
identity, they are notably different to non-Yezidi Kurds. In the past Yezidis have 
faced persecution at the hand of their Muslim neighbours. However, in the 1990s the 
situation seems to have improved. It is not uncommon to find Yezidis in positions of 
65 McDowall goes as far to say that religious belief plays no part in Kurdish distinctiveness. McDowall 
1992) op. cit., p. 13. 
My use of terminology is open to debate regarding geographical names and ethnic groups. The 
Assyrians of Erbil, for example would accept the label "non-Kurd", but like to label the territory as 
Ashur, rather than Kurdistan. They would then become Assyrians in Ashur. 
67 "Ahl-i Haqq" translates into "People of the Truth". McDowall (1992) op. cit., p. 14. 
68 Ibid. 
69 ibid. 
70 Bnrinessen (1992b) op. cit., p. 6. 
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responsibility in Iraqi Kurdistan, and even in high-ranking positions in the political 
parties and the KRG. 
3.4.2 Non-Kurdish Minorities 
There have always been non-Kurdish elements living amongst the Kurds. The two 
most distinctive are the Turkomen and Christians. The Turkomen share the same 
religious beliefs (and divisions) as the Kurds, but the Christians display a different 
religion, as well as being of a different ethnic origin. 
The Christian community in Iraqi Kurdistan is divided into distinct confessional 
groups. The largest Christian community used to be the Armenians, but, after 
assimilation with the surrounding peoples and conversion to Islam and the 
development of a Kurdish identity in the late nineteenth century and the mass 
deportation and massacres of Armenians in the Kurdish region in 1915, there are few 
Armenians left in Iraqi Kurdistan. 71 
In present-day Iraqi Kurdistan, the largest Christian community is the Assyrians. 
Assyrian communities are concentrated in specific areas of Dohuk and Erbil cities, 
Diyana in Erbil Governorate, and localised villages. Other Christian communities 
include the Chaldaneans. Both of these groups speak the Aramaic language and have 
a strong cultural identity. However, relations between the two groups are not close, 
and are against such practices as inter-group marriage. Christian relations with the 
Kurds are, again, complex. There have been cases of aggression between the two 
groups, but these are isolated incidents. Due to Christians occupying specific parts of 
the urbanised areas, contact between the two groups is minimal. 
The Assyrians also have' political parties with their own militia, dominated by the 
Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), their own television and radio stations, and 
five seats in the KNA. Furthermore, there are powerful political characters in the 
KDP especially who are Christian, and, while not ostensibly being employed for their 
71 lbid, pp. 6-7. 
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religious credentials, do portray an image that the party is working for the Kurdistan 
region as a whole, rather than the Kurdish people in particular. 72 
Finally, there are numerous pockets of non-Kurdish Muslims in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
There is a belt of Turkomen towns and villages running north to south throughout 
Iraq. The largest of these towns is Kirkuk, and Erbil also has a sizeable Turkoman 
population73. The Turkomen themselves have a strong cultural awareness of being 
Turkic. Relations between the Turkomen and the Kurds have often been violent, and 
have been recently, mainly because the Turkomen are obvious proxies for their 
ethnic cousins, the Turks, to use against Kurdish independence in Iraq. The presence 
of Turkomen in Kirkuk and Erbil has also been an argument the Government of 
Turkey uses in irredentist claims on Iraqi Kurdistan. In 1959, a political conflict in 
Kirkuk gave rise to heavy bloodshed between the two groups74 and in August 1998; 
the KDP destroyed the offices of the Turkoman Front in Erbil following the 
increased political activity of the organization. 75 
3.5 The Economic Structures of Iraqi Kurdistan 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The political and social structures of contemporary Iraqi Kurdistan have been greatly 
influenced by their traditional mode of production. The agrarian foundations of the 
society promulgated a political and social infrastructure and, subsequently, patterns 
of interpersonal relationships governing Kurdish decision-making and political 
activity. 76 For example, Dzeigiel describes the origin of the Iraqi Kurdish tribal 
system as being rooted in the activities of settled or semi-nomadic farmers, and 
72 The most famous Christian politician in Iraqi Kurdistän is Franso Hariri. He is a member of the 
Central Committee of the KDP (although with Political Bureau influence), Governor of Erbil (until 
2000), Member of Parliament, Minister of Region (Minister without Portfolio), and the Chairman of 
many inter-departmental committees in the Governorate of Erbil. 
"The Turkomen also say that Erbil is originally a Turkoman city rather than a Kurdish one. Similarly, 
the Assyrians also claim Erbil to be an Assyrian city. 
74 Marr (1985) The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder CO: Westview Press, pp. 164-166. 
75 This was an interesting event. Throughout the whole of the summer of 1998, the Turkoman Front 
was taking an increasingly provocative line against the KDP, including establishing more party offices 
than the KDP in Erbil City, and paying Kurds to register as being Turkish. The GOI was also 
displaying great concern over these actions and, after numerous discussions between KDP 
representatives and the GOI, the KDP closed down all the Turkoman Front offices in Erbil City, by 
force when necessary. 76 For evidence of the inter-relationship, see: Leach (1940) Social and Economic Organisation of the 
Rowanduz Kurds, Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 3, LSE. London: Percy Lund, Humphries 
& Co, pp. 13-27; Dzeigiet (1981) op. cit., pp. 35-48. 
90 
Chapter 3 
subsequently describes the development of tribal political structures from this point 
of reference. " This mode of production has left a legacy in contemporary Iraqi 
Kurdistan with relations, and styles of tribal relations and hierarchies, being traceable 
to the traditional agrarian mode of production. 
This idea in itself is not unique to the Kurds, but is one which has been often take for 
granted in analysing Kurdish politics. The study of the economic situation of Iraqi 
Kurdistan may provide further assistance in understanding Kurdish politics, and 
Leezenberg notes that "attention to the economic interests involved can give a better 
idea of the motivations for political behaviour which might otherwise seem difficult 
to explain rationally. "78 
What is of further interest are the changes which the Kurdish economic 
characteristics have been forced through, and the impact that such rapid changes have 
and could have on Kurdish politics and society. The aim, of this section is to partly 
fulfil this requirement by providing an understanding of the Kurdish economy, the 
impact of economic activity on political structures and political relationships, and an 
appraisal of the Iraqi Kurdish economy in the 1990s. 
The changes inflicted upon Iraqi Kurdish society by the impact of damaging GOI 
policies and events can be seen clearly in the economic sector. What should be an 
economy structured around the agrarian sector, with most of the incoming revenue 
being derived from the infrastructure and services provided by an immense national 
oil revenue being heavily eroded 79 During the 1980s, the GOI spent great sums of 
money idIragi Kurdistan, enabled to do so through the oil revenue. This wholesale 
spending urbanized Iraq, including the Kurdish regions, and created a culture of 
dependency upon central government within Kurdish society, an attitude which has 
proved difficult to overcome. 80 
" Dzeigiel (1981) op. cit., pp. 36-48. 7$ Leezenberg (1999a) Refugee. Camp or Free Trade Zone? The Economy of Iraqi Kurdistan Since 
1991. Unpublished paper, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands, p. 2. 
79 Ghassemlou (1965) op. cit., pp. 85 - 88; Sajjadi (1991) op. cit., p. 49. 86 For an analysis of the socio-economic transformation of Iraq, see Man (1985) op. cit., p. 285; 
Leezenberg (1999a) op. cit., p. 2 
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The economy of Iraq as a whole, and Kurdistan in particular, was devastated by the 
Iran-Iraq War. In this last period of GOI control in Iraqi Kurdistan, the military 
forces of the Ba'ath dominated government wrought unprecedented destruction in the 
rural areas of Iraqi Kurdistan in the infamous Anfal Campaigns, and in doing so 
fundamentally altered the agrarian foundations and structures of the economy. 
The period after the Second Gulf War has seen the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan 
placed under double sanctions, firstly by the UN81, and then by the GOI82, effectively 
creating an overall embargo and an embargo within it. These embargoes created 
immense hardship for the population of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. But, this hardship 
went someway in curing the inherent weakness of the Kurdish economy, the 
dependency built into the system by the GOI, by taking away any external source of 
economic support. 
This was a period of immense hardship for the Kurds, but, with the Kurdish political 
parties and the KRG increasingly coming to terms with this situation, and limited 
assistance being provided by UN agencies and NGOs, the Kurdish economy looked 
to be making some form of improvement, particularly in the all important agricultural 
sector. However, the planning and implementation of UN SCR 986, and subsequent 
renewals of this resolution, have weakened the progress made in the 1990s and again 
gone some way in creating a culture of dependency amongst the Kurdish populace 
with free food baskets, and simultaneously undermined the recovering agrarian base 
by not buying any of the food items from the Iraqi Kurdish regions. Simultaneously, 
an energetic informal economy based on services and trade developed which has 
made the task of regulating the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan extremely difficult. 
The following account of the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan is based along the subject 
areas mentioned and analyse the use of economic policies, or policies with an 
economic impact, by the central government against the Kurds. An analysis of the 
traditional mode of production of Iraqi Kurdistan has to be undertaken to provide a 
comparison for the changes which have since affected the region. 
81 UN SCR 661 was adopted on 6 August 1990 and called an all member states to impose a 
comprehensive package of financial and economic sanctions. (UN SCR 661, para 3-4). 82 Imposed with the withdrawal of GOI administration and forces in October 1991. 
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3.5.1.1 The Traditional Agrarian Mode of Production 
The relationship between politics and modes of production is explained by Ayubi 
who states that "most forms of power ... in the majority of cases ... [are] ... 
rooted in the economic base and, more specifically, in the modes of production. "83 
Ayubi furthers his discussion of traditional economy as being a `mode of production' 
comprising forces of production and the relations of production, with the lafter 
characterising the patterns of organizing the labour process, the ownership and 
control of the means of production, and the distribution of economic surplus. It is 
argued that this group of conditions mould and colour successive political structures 
and culture in general. 84 
3.5.1.2 Oil and the Agrarian Economy 
Before the upheavals presented by the political struggles between the Kurds and the 
GOI, and subsequent crises between the GOI and the international community, the 
indigenous, and realised basis of the Iraqi Kurdish economy was, and is, agrarian. 85 
The extraction of oil from Kurdish dominated regions around Kirkuk may also 
indicate that an oil economy may similarly be identified as a natural means of 
economic production, particularly as the greater part of the region's national revenue 
is from this source. 86 
However, the impact of the oil industry has not been the same as that of a traditional 
mode of production. 7 The political elite of Iraqi Kurdistan do not own the means of 
production, nor control the labour force, both of which are important requirements, 
according to Ayubi, for analysing the impact of a particular mode of production upon 
a political structure. This argument of the relationships between control of modes of 88 
83 Ayubi (1995) Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. London: IB 
Taurus, p. 38. 
84Ibiid, pp. 39-41; Rumaihi (1980) "The Mode of Production in the Arab Gulf Before the Discovery of 
Oil, " in Niblock (ed. ) Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf. London: Croom Helm. 85 I use the terms indigenous and realised to describe those modes of production which are in 
Kurdistan, and in the control of the Kurds themselves. The oilfields of Kirkuk and Mosul have never 
been under the control of the Kurds, and therefore are not classed as indigenous or realised modes of 
production. The impact of this industry is, however, uncontested although it is in an indirect manner. 6 Sajjadi, (1991) op. cit., p. 49. 87 This is not to say that there is no illegal involvement with the oil industry of Iraq. As we shall 
see, the KDP and PUK have been involved in illegal smuggling petroleum products, contravening the 
UN sanctions imposed by SCR 661. 
se Ayubi discusses this in terms of addressing the sources of power. Ayubi (1995) op. cit., p. 38, 
quoting Runciman (1989) A Treatise on Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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production and political structures supports the observations of Ghassemlou who, 
with reference to Iraqi Kurdistan, stated that; 
"It is a peculiar feature that the Kurdish industrial proletariat arose 
without the simultaneous rise of a Kurdish national industrial 
bourgeoisie; this phenomenon can be explained by the [fact] that the 
exploitation o$f oil is, exerted either by imperialist companies or by a 
state sector. " 
of 
The impact of the oil industry has mainly been through the expenditures of the GOI, 
rather than impacting directly the economic and political organization of Kurdistan, 
with the general economic organization of Iraqi Kurdistan. remaining mainly 
agrarian. 90 Other industries remained underdeveloped. Mining was developed to a 
low degree, and there is only a light industrial base present. 91 
3.5.2 The Economy Before the Algiers Agreement of 1975 
Iraqi Kurdistan has rarely enjoyed long periods of peace'and political stability, but 
the period before the mid-1970s, and particularly before the commencement of the 
Kurdish revolt 'in 1961, can be considered such a period. It is, admittedly, a relative 
stability, but the problems of these earlier periods are not of the same magnitude as 
the problems which erupted from the mid-1970s onwards. 
3.5.2.1 The Agriculture Sector 
Agriculture has been the backbone of the Kurdish economy. In the past, this 
economy has been so strong that the region provided the markets of Mesopotamia, 
Syria, Turkey, the Transcaucasus and Iran with agricultural products for centuries. 2 
The predominance of agriculture could be seen in the numbers of people dependent 
upon the sector during the 1970s. According to'. Sajjadi, more than half of the 
population was dependent on agriculture up to the late 1970s, and Vanly suggests a 
higher number with 55% dependent in 1975.93 Furthermore, Sajjadi contends that 
Iraqi Kurdistan produced as much as 45% of Iraq's wheat, and a third of its barley in 
1980 (see Table 3.5). 
'9 Ghassemlou (1965) op. cit., pp. 85-86. 
90 Sajjadi (1991) op. cit., p. 49. 91 Ghassemlou (1965) op. cit., p. 85. 92 Dzeigiel (1981) op, cit., p. 36. 93 Ibid. 
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Although Iraqi Kurdistan is described as a fertile land, less than half the land at this 
time was suitable for cultivation, and of this only 1.1 million hectares were tilled up 
to the early 1980s. 94 This situation was evident since the onset of large-scale 
extraction of oil, and particularly since the state secured direct control of the oil 
industry between 1972 and 1975.95 Stork estimates that the total arable and total 
96 cultivated land declined by perhaps as much as 30 per cent between 1958 and 1977 
Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1970s was a highly productive agricultural region. However, 
there were some internal problems related to the issue of land reform programmes. A 
ceiling of 250 hectares of irrigated or 500 hectares of rain-fed land was applied 
throughout Kurdistan, but not fully implemented until the latter half of the 1970s. 97 
Table 3.5: Production of Wheat and Barley in 198098 
Production of 
Production of 
Wheat ('000 ton) 
% Barley (1000 ton) 
% 
Iraqi Kurdistan 440 45 227 33.3 
Rest of Iraq 536 55 445 66.7 
Turkey 976 100 682 100 
The implementation of these policies was not achieved in a uniform manner by the 
GOI. The resultant internal upheavals, frequent changes of government policies and 
civil service personnel and modified agrarian law created an environment of 
uncertainty in rural areas. Furthermore, one of the outcomes of the implementation of 
the laws was state agencies taking control of the most productive land on behalf of 
the GOI. 99 The result was a depressed agricultural sector and the increase of rural- 
94 Ibid. 
's For further information on the changes the expanding oil industry made to the economic structure of 
Iraq at this time, see Stork (1982) "State Power and Economic Structure: Class Determination and 
State Formation in Contemporary Iraq, " in Niblock, (ed. ), Iraq: The Contemporary State. London: 
Croom Helm, pp. 27-46. 
96 Dzeigiel (1981) op. cit., p. 34. 
97 Sajjadi (1991) op. cit., p. 50. 98 Sajjadi (1991) op. cit., p. 50, quoting Central Statistical Office of Iraq figures for 1980. 99 [bid. 
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urban migration, 1°° draining manpower and knowledge from the rural areas and 
increasing inner-city style social and economic problems. 
3.5.2.2 The Oil Sector 
Oil is the dominating factor in the Iraqi economy and, similarly, it is commonly said 
that oil forms the most important part of the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan. '°' As we 
have discussed, this is only partly correct. Although the major oilfields of Iraq are 
located in territory populated by Kurds, the fact that the control of these fields lies 
with the GOI and not the Kurds themselves means that the benefits to the Kurds from 
these fields are limited to labourers working in the oil industry, whether in Kirkuk or 
on the pipelines or distribution systems, and from the GOI spending achieved by the 
high oil-rent available. However, the oil sector is commonly mentioned as being a 
part of Iraqi Kurdistan's economy, and as such must be studied. 
Petroleum products accounted for 90% of Iraq's exports until the imposition of 
sanctions, and at its peak the production capacity has been over three million barrels 
per day, with proven reserves of more than 100 billion barrels. 102 The most important 
oilfields in Iraq are located at Kirkuk, with estimated reserves of 16,000 million 
barrels and an output of 2.8 m. b/d in 1988.103 
3.5.2.3 Manufacturing Industry 
During this period of industrialisation in Iraq as a whole, Iraqi Kurdistan was 
relatively ignored by the development boards of the GOI. '°4 The industrial sector was 
therefore not developed at the same rate as the rest of the country, and developed 
along smaller consumer orientated lines, with'. the Kurdish region being the market. 
Common industries included cement, cigarette-making, furniture, stone, and bricks. 
The small scale of the industry is emphasised by official GOI figures stating that the 
number of people engaged in the industrial sector in Kurdistan at this time 
represented only 7.7 % of the total industrial employees in the country, and that the 
autonomous region of Kurdistan was home to only 4.9 % of heavy industry, and 11.1 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid, p. 52; Dziegiel (1981) op. cit., pp. 35-36. 102 Die & Gazdar (1992) "Hunger and Poverty in Iraq, 1991. " World Development, Vol. 20, No. 7, 
fg. 921-945, pp. 922-923. 
Europa (1990) Middle East and North Africa, p. 168. 
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% of smaller industrial plants of Iraq. '°5 By 1990, there were only nine major 
factories in Iraqi Kurdistan, : mostly producing cement and tobacco. Kurdistan again 
remained dependent on the centre and south of the country for the products of 
manufacturing industries. 1 06 
3.5.2.4 The Public Sector 
Perhaps the greatest impact the oil industry has on Iraqi Kurdistan was the 
predominance of the public service sector in the regional economy. This sector 
includes the armed services, civilian public services including administration and 
social services. The standard of the Iraqi social services was acknowledged to be 
among the highest in the Middle East, but needed a large workforce to satisfy public 
sector requirements. 107 
3.5.2.4.1 The Ministry of Northern Affairs 
The situation was similar in Iraqi Kurdistan as in the rest of the country, and 
particularly so after a Minister for Northern Affairs was appointed to the Iraqi 
Cabinet of Ministers. The Minister appointed for the task of effectively 
reconstructing Kurdistan in the aftermath of the Kurdish Revolt of 1961-1970 was 
Mohammad Mahmoud (Sami) Abdel Rahman. The appointment was by agreement 
between Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the GOI. 108 Schools and hospitals were built in 
every district-centre town, and Sami claims that his ministry was responsible for the 
building of 600 schools, 18,000 houses, 15 hotels and 2,500 kilometres of road. 109 In 
terms of construction projects, Sami described 1970-1974 as being a "golden era" for 
the Kurds, particularly as the Governors were also members of the KDP and the 
influence of the GOI was minimal. ' 10 Governorate administrative structure within the 
Kurdish north was identical to that which existed in other governorates. However, 
104 Sajjadi (1991) op. cit., p. 52; Dreze & Gazdar (1992) op. cit., p. 923. 
105 Sajjadi (1991) op. cit., p. 52. 
106 Figures from Leezenberg (1999) op. cit., p. 2, quoting Hafeed (1993) "The Embargo on Kurdistan: 
Its Influence on the Economic and Social Development, " in Hussein and Leezenberg, (eds. ) The 
Reconstruction and Economic Development of Iraqi Kurdistan: Challenges and Perspectives. 
Amsterdam: Netherlands Kurdistan Society, p. 40. 
107 Dreze & Gazdar (1991) op. cit., p. 923. 108 Henceforth known as Sami Abdel Rahman. Sami was also the main negotiator of the 1970 March 
A reement on Autonomy and is currently the Chairman of the KDP Political Bureau. 10 Interview with Sarni Abdel Rahman, Salahadin, 3 April 1998. 
110 Ibid. 
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according to Sami, many of the key positions within the administration were staffed 
by Arabs rather than by Kurds. 1 
3.5.2.5 Conclusion 
The Iraqi Kurdish economy was therefore overwhelmingly agrarian in terms of 
employment, but dependent financially upon the distribution of oil revenue. The 
ramifications of a large national oil industry, with fields located in Kurdish territory 
but controlled by the state, was beginning to have an impact on the socio-economic 
structure of Kurdish society, and succeeded in creating a large middle-class 
dependent on the central government. Kurdish agriculture was beginning to suffer 
under the stresses of political instability caused by the Kurdish Revolt of 1961-1970 
and inter-factional disputes between Kurds, and also by the attempts at land reform 
by the central government. Industry was poorly developed, and employed few Kurds. 
The social security system was extensive, and supported by the revenue accrued from 
oil rent. There was therefore an overall dependency on the distribution of oil wealth 
from the G0I developing, and particularly amongst the increasing urban population. 
3.5.3 The Economy During the 1970s and 1980s 
The Iraqi Kurdish economy, in this state, came to an abrupt end in 1975. The Kurdish 
Revolt of 1961-1970 was ended by a truce between Mulla Mustafa Barzani's KDP 
and the GOI, resulting in the 1970 March Agreement. However, the situation 
deteriorated over disagreements regarding the delimitation of the autonomous 
territory and fighting again broke out in 1974 due to the GOI not honouring the 
obligations as agreed in 1970.112 The withdrawal of Iranian support to the KDP after 
the Algiers Agreement of 6. March 1975 was concluded between Iraq and Iran 
resulted in the defeat of the Kurdish movement and the routing of KDP forces, with 
perhaps as many as 100,000 Iraqi Kurds, civilians and peshmerga, fleeing to Iran. 113 
11 Ibid. 
12 Key points of disagreement centred on the GOI's unwillingness to relinquish control of strategic 
border areas with Syria (Jabal Sinjar), and attempting to Arabize the Kirkuk and Khanaqin oil 
producing regions. Stichting Nederland-Koerdistan (1996) op. cit., p. 7. 
13 Iraq made concessions to Iran in its conflict ovdr the use of the Shatt al-Arab, in exchange for 
which the Shah gave up his support of the Kurds in revolt in Iraq. (Stichting Nederland-Koerdistan 
(1996) op. cit., p. 7; McDowall (1996) op. cit., pp. 338-339). For a comprehensive analysis of the 
Algiers Agreement, including regional impact, see Abdulghani (1984) Iraq and Iran: The Years of 
Crisis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 152-177. 
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3.5.3.1 The Algiers Agreement 
In order to prevent Kurdish guerrilla forces gaining footholds in the mountainous 
border territory of Iraq, the GOI declared a broad swathe of land 5-30 kilometres 
wide along the border with Turkey and Iran a forbidden zone. ' 14 The area was 
evacuated, villages destroyed, trees burnt and wells filled with concrete. Estimates of 
the number of villages and settlements destroyed in 1975 vary considerably, as it is 
difficult to separate the destruction attributable to the Algiers Agreement from that of 
subsequent Iraqi military operations in the 1980s. Sajjadi puts the figure of villages 
along the Iranian border razed by the Iraqi government at 800, and McDowall 
suggests that 500 villages were destroyed in the first phase of operations, and may 
have reached 1,400 villages by 1978.115 
Displaced peoples from these forbidden border areas were deported to the infamous 
collective towns. Again, numbers vary but at least 600,000 men, women and children 
were forced from their villages into these custom built settlements. ' 16 Anyone caught 
attempting to return risked being summarily executed by the GOI military based in 
the settlement. 117 The cost of these operations to Iraqi Kurdistan are impossible to 
accurately estimate either in terms of absolute financial cost, human suffering, 
destruction of the environment, and loss of knowledge. The rural areas particularly 
were devastated. Karadagi notes that; 
"The expulsions, the building of new villages, and the compensations 
to expellees, cost the government hundreds of millions of Iraqi dinars 
after 1975. The real cost, including the destruction of the economic 
structure of these agricultural areas, ran into billions. Money was 
certainly spent in Kurdistan at that time, but its purpose was not 
redevelopment as much as the change in demographic balance 
through piecemeal Arabization. " 118 
114 The extent of this zone varies. McDowall describes it as being progressively widened from 5 
kilometres to 30 in places (McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 339). Karadaghi describes it as being between 
5 and 15 miles in width, containing 1,500 villages. Karadaghi (1993) "The Two Gulf Wars: The Kurds 
on the World Stage, 1979-1992, " in Chaliand (ed. ) A People Without a Country: The Kurds and 
Kurdistan. New York: Olive Brach Press, p. 216. 
115 Sajjadi (1991) op. cit., p. 51; McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 339. 116 Karadaghi estimates that 750,000 people were relocated to the mujama'at. Karadaghi (1993) op. 
cit., p. 216. 
1" McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 339. 1e Karadaghi (1993) op. cit., pp. 216-217. 
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This policy of systematically destroying the rural infrastructure and deporting 
villagers continued and intensified through the 1980s as the relationship between the 
Kurdish parties-(mainly the PUK) and the GOI progressively stalled and worsened, 
and the cooperation between PUK peshmerga and Iranian military forces increased. 
The aim of the GOI was ostensibly to inhibit the ability of Kurdish guerrillas 
operating in the mountains but there was possibly a parallel aim of weakening 
Kurdish society at its most fundamental level by devastating the agricultural base of 
the region, forcing increased dependency on the distribution of oil revenues by the 
GOI. The combined threat of the Iranian military and Kurdish peshmerga heralded 
the commencement of the most infamous attacks yet to take place against the Iraqi 
Kurdish population. 
3.5.3.2 The Iran-Iraq War and the Anfal Campaign 
The tactics employed during 1975 were succeeded by progressively worse attacks on 
the Kurdish infrastructure, culminating in the. infamous Anfal Campaigns of the late 
1980s which were characterised by the comprehensive -destruction of the rural 
environment and infrastructure, deportation of the Kurdish population, and the use of 
chemical weapons on the civilian population. Furthermore, running throughout this 
period, and impacting the Iraqi Kurdish economy both in a direct way with army 
drafting, destruction of economic infrastructure, and population displacements, and 
in an indirect manner with the reduction of the overall oil revenue of the GOI, was 
the Iran-Iraq War. Commencing on 22 September 1980, this war had profound 
implications for Iraqi Kurdistan as the region effectively became a war zone. 119 
3.5.3.2.1 The Impact of the Iran-Iraq War and the Anfal Campaigns 
The Iran-Iraq War devastated- the Iraqi economy. At the beginning of hostilities, it 
was estimated that Iraq possessed an estimated US$ 35 billion in foreign reserves. 
These rapidly disappeared when the economic development programmes of the GOI 
were combined with increased military expenditures of US$ 1-2 billion per month. 120 
However, with the assistance of the international community, and particularly Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, the Iraqi economy was supported by loans, with states accepting 
"' For an analysis of the causes and implications of the Iran-Iraq War, see Abdulghani (1984) op. cit. 
120 Axelgard (1986b) "War and Oil, " in Axelguard, (ed. ), Iraq in Transition: A Political, Economic, 
and Strategic Perspective. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 
Colorado: Westview Press, p. S. 
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Iraq's short term difficulties, but recognizing the longer term viability of the oil-rich 
state and the need to have a strong Iraq to balance Iran. 121 
The Anfal Campaigns were a series of related assaults against Kurdish-Iranian 
positions in Iraqi Kurdistan, undertaken by targeting the entire population in 
designated rural areas with a full military offensive combining conventional and 
chemical weapons. By February 1988,1.5 million people had already been deported 
and over 3,000 villages razed. 122 5000 civilians were killed in Halabja on 15 March 
by a chemical attack. By the end of the operations, it was estimated that 150 - 
200,000 people were killed, 4,000 settlements destroyed, at least 1.5 million people 
resettled and, according to the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, by July 1988,45,000 out of 
75,000 square kilometres of Kurdistan had been cleared. 123 
The aim of destroying the strongholds of the peshmerga by targeting rural areas 
resulted in the depopulation of the countryside either by deportation or evacuation, 
and rendered large swathes of land unviable for agricultural usage due to the 
presence of chemical weapons, unexploded ordnance, and landmines. To prevent 
reoccupation, the GOI forces totally destroyed the villages, cut down vegetation and 
destroyed wells, springs, and irrigation projects. 124 The impact on agriculture was 
immense, and has a legacy into the next century. The Guardian noted that; 
"... since 1988, when Saddam Hussein completed a campaign [the 
Anfal Campaign] to relocate rural Kurds in camps close to towns, 
razing 4,000 villages in the process, there has been little agriculture 
in [Iraqi] Kurdistan. The region's food supplies have had to be 
brought in by truck from the south. "1Z 
121 Crusoe (1986) "Economic Outlook: Guns and Butter, Phase Two? " in Axelguard, (ed. ), Iraq in 
Transition: A Political, Economic, and Strategic Perspective. Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, Georgetown University, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 83. 
122 Daily Telegraph, 4 March 1988. 
123 According to the PUK, 3839 villages, 1757 schools, 2457 mosques, and 271 hospitals and medical 
centres were destroyed and 219,828 families totalling approximately 1.5 millions persons were 
deported. An ECHO report puts the figure of destroyed villages at 3,886 out of the existing 4,459 
(87%). McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 366; Menichini (1996) Evaluation Report on Humanitarian 
Operations in Northern Iraq. Report prepared on the request of the European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), January 1996, pp. 8-9. 24 Sajjadi (1991) op. cit., p. 51. 125 The Guardian, 16 March 1991, p. 28 (quoted in Sajjadi (1991) op. cit., p. 51). 
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3.5.3.3 Conclusion 
If the figures were studied without an understanding of the human misery behind 
them, the situation at the end of the 1980s in the period before the Second Gulf War 
did not appear to be too critical. Before the uprising of 1991, Iraqi Kurdistan was part 
of an upper middle-income country with a GDP per capita of approximately US$ 
3,000. Social services were freely provided by the state, food was highly subsidised, 
and, due to the strength of the Iraqi Dinar, imported products were reasonably priced. 
Government corporations distributed salaries to a great part of the population and, 
due to the construction of the collective settlements, many people were employed in 
the building sector. 126 This highly promising picture of Iraq as a whole is ideally 
portrayed in the following description; 
" .... by the end of the 1980s, 
92% of the population had access to 
safe water .... and an impressive 
93% lived in the catchment areas 
served by modern health facilities. The government's network of 
health centres and hospitals was well disseminated, well supplied, 
well staffed, and effectively if rather clinically engaged with the 
population in their jurisdictions. Iraq had converted oil wealth into 
enhanced social well-being with considerable success. Education 
expanded, child mortality declined, and life expectancy increased all 
quite impressively. " 127 
However, this description hides the fact that nearly 90% of villages had been razed; 
their inhabitants forced into 78 collective settlements and removed from their 
ancestral areas; only farmers close to the Ba'ath Party or southern Arabs had access 
to agricultural land; and public expenditure was not planned with any thought for 
socio-economic implications. 128 This is particularly important for the agricultural 
sector which, in its massively weakened state, could not hope to compete against the 
cheap imports of food the GOI was bringing into the country -a situation which 
would repeat itself with the implementation of UN SCR 986.129 
The rural infrastructure had been devastated. Huge settlements characterised by 
martial law and overcrowding now dotted the landscape, all totally dependent upon 
126 Menichini (1996) op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
127 Field (1993) "From Food Security to Food Insecurity: The Case of Iraq, 1990-1991. " Geojournal 
Vol. 30, No. 2, (June), pp. 185-194. 
128 Menichini (1996) op. cit., p. 9. 
129 Ibid. 
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the GOI for their livelihoods and the extensive food distribution system. 130 The 
countryside was depopulated and the political parties massively weakened. The 
political aims of the Algiers Agreement and the Anfal Campaigns have been well 
documented. There was also an economic attack on Kurdish society, aimed at 
weakening the structures which dominated the Kurdish way of life, politics, and 
uniqueness. This assessment is supported by the following statements; 
"Through a rational strategy aimed at controlling politically the Iraqi 
Kurds by undermining their economy, over a period of about 15 years, 
the Kurdish producers had been changed into consumers, completely 
dependent on subsidies. " 131 
"Socially, they [the Anfal Campaigns] brought the destruction of 
traditional bases of livelihood and Kurdish village culture. Large 
rural areas were left totally desolate, and even several larger cities, in 
particular Halabja and Qala Diza, were completely evacuated and 
destroyed. "132 
The destruction of the traditional Kurdish economy was comprehensive. Combined 
with the unprecedented scale of human suffering caused by deportations, harassment, 
summary executions and the targeting of civilians with conventional and chemical 
weapons, on the eve of the invasion of Kuwait and the commencement of the Second 
Gulf War, Iraqi Kurdistan was a broken land. The Kurdish economy was devastated, 
its society increasingly rootless, the political parties weak and demoralised, and the 
Kurds a broken, tired people. 
3.5.4 The Economy in the 1990s 
The imposition of sanctions on Iraqi Kurdistan, firstly by the UN and then by the 
GOI had a profound effect upon the economic and socio-economic status of the 
region and its people. 133 The Iraqi Kurdish infrastructure had been, systematically 
destroyed by 15 years of targeted degradation of the rural areas and eight years of 
destructive warfare. Furthermore, the region had been forced into being economically 
dependent on the welfare system established by the GOI. However, whilst the 
"0 Leezenberg suggests that the productive rural community of Iraqi Kurdistan was changed into an 
urban consumer society (Leezenberg (1999) op. cit., p. 3). 131 Ibid. 
132 Stichting Nederland-Koerdistan (1996) op. cit., p. 10. 133 The sanctions regime commenced with the implementation of SCR 661,6 August 1990. 
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descriptions of this period are distressing, the situation was one of relative, rather 
than absolute, decline as the following quotations illustrate; 
" .... the Iraqi welfare state was, until recently, among the most 
comprehensive and generous in the Arab World .... which ensured that Iraqis had the highest calorific consumption per head in the 
Middle East by the end of the decade [ 1980s]. 1 34 
"What we have in Iraq is a situation of rapid decline .... on the part 
of a society that had previously experienced over three decades of 
successful development. " 135 
3.5.4.1 The Sanctions Regime 
Iraq as a whole was hard hit by the imposition of sanctions and the subsequent lack 
of hard currency. 136 SCR 661 of 6 August 1990 was the Security Council's response 
to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The Security Council simultaneously created a 
Committee of the Security Council to carry out tasks related to the imposition of 
sanctions, commonly known as the Iraq Sanctions Committee. 137 SCR 661 was the 
most comprehensive and effective sanctions regime in history, placing a total ban on 
all Iraqi imports and exports. 138 
This total blockade was subsequently slightly relaxed by paragraph 6c, permitting the 
import of supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian 
circumstances, foodstuffs. 139 Upon the cease of hostilities between the GOI and the 
US-led coalition forces, SCR 687 exempted foodstuffs, and, with notification to the 
Sanctions Committee, materials and supplies for essential civilian needs. 140 The 
134 Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995-1996, pp. 6-7, quoted in Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(1996) UN-sanctioned Suffering: A Human Rights Assessment of United Nations Sanctions on Iraq. 
New York: Centre for Economic and Social Rights, p. 2. 
iss Field (1993) op. cit. 
136 For a comprehensive analysis of sanctions against Iraq, see Simons (1998) The Scourging of Iraq: 
Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice. London: Macmillan, particularly Chapter 3. 
"' The Security Council referred to the Committee as the "Security Council Committee established by 
Resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. " See Conlon (1995) 
"Lessons From Iraq: The Functions of the Iraq Sanctions Committee as a Source of Sanctions 
Implementation Authority and Practice, " Virginia Journal of International Law, No. 3, pp. 633-668. 
139 CESR (1996) op. cit., p. 3; Gazdar (1997) The Economy Under Sanctions. International Conference 
in Collaboration with the Iraqi Economic Forum on; Frustrated Development: The Iraqi Economy in 
War and Peace, Centre for Arab. Gulf Studies, University of Exeter, 9-11 July 1997, pp. 1-2. 139 Ibid. 
140 SCR 687,3 April 1991, paragraph 20. The definition of non-essential items caused considerable 
disagreement with items such as pencils, textbooks and engine spares being refused. (Quoted from 
CESR (1996) op. cit., p. 4). For further details of SCR 687, including formulation and operating 
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sanctions imposed by the UN have been remarkably effective in achieving their aims. 
Oil export restrictions dealt a large blow to the economy, with Gazdar arguing that; 
" 
.... even while imports 
have been prohibited, the main effect of 
sanctions has come through the complete shut down of oil exports and 
other sources of financing. This has so sharply reduced purchasing 
power, and raised the price of foreign exchange, that the need for 
import controls 'is limited. The result is the "temporary" shut down of 
an economy which was highly dependent on foreign imports financed 
by oil revenues. " 41 
3.5.4.2 The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq 
By 1996, the estimated earnings of Iraq were equal to its GDP of the 1940s prior to 
the oil boom. Gazdar estimated that industrial production was lowered by 85%, and 
imports into Iraq fell from US$ 10.3 billion in 1988 to just US$ 0.4 billion in 1991.142 
Furthermore, the combined compensation to Kuwait, reparations to Iran, foreign 
debt, and the value of destroyed infrastructure bill came to a total of over US$ 550 
billion. 143 By 1995, the UN Department for Humanitaiian Affairs (UNDHA) 
estimated that four million people were living in extreme poverty, about 20% of the 
population. 144 The consequences of such comprehensive sanctions were widespread 
and disastrous for the Iraqi population in general. However, the impact on the 
Kurdish region has had varying effects. While the economic situation has been 
difficult, politically, sanctions have seemingly benefited Iraqi Kurdistan. With 
reference to this difference, Lawrence notes that: 
"For almost a decade, three provinces in northern Iraq have been the 
de facto state of Kurdistan. They use their own currency, patrol their 
own borders. Paradoxically, the United Nations embargo that has 
helped devastate the economy of Iraq has provided Kurdistan with its 
greatest economic boom in 20 years, 'and its highest-ever level of 
personal freedom. " 145 
procedures, see Johnstone (1994) Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action. 
International Peace Academy, Occasional Paper Series; Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers; 
Simons (1998) op. cit. 
"1 Gazdar (1997) op. cit., p. 3. 
142 lbid, pp. 8-9. 
143 Alnaswari estimated that the total was conservatively US$ 586 billion, times Iraq's 1993 real GDP. 
(Alnaswari (1994) Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action. International Peace 
Academy, Occasional Paper Series; Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, pp. 152-153). 
144 policy Planning Unit (Durham University) (1998) The Socio-Economic Situation and the 
Humanitarian Aid Programme in Iraqi Kurdistan. Unpublished report for Department for 
International Development, London. 
145 Lawrence (2000) op. cit., p. 1. 
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The following sections analyse this paradox and presents an assessment of the 
economic structures which have formed in Iraqi Kurdistan during the period of the 
sanctions. 
3.5.4.2.1 Double Sanctions 
The GOI economic blockade of the Iraqi Kurdish region was an attempt to force the 
Kurds-to consider a political settlement. 146 All supplies from the centre and south of 
Iraq were prevented from entering the Kurdish-controlled territories. This embargo 
included all foodstuffs, medicine, and petroleum products. By 1992, this embargo 
was in full effect. Alongside this prevention of imports of essential commodities, a 
financial embargo was in effect with no salaries being paid to the swollen masses of 
civil servants, which were estimated to number 160,000.147 
Several reasons have been advanced as to why the GOI blockaded Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Keen espouses three. First, the economic embargo of Iraqi Kurdistan provided an 
opportunity for Saddam to show that he could flout the actions of the UN and the 
Western powers which he saw as dominating the UN. Second, it was an effective 
way of keeping scarce supplies in GOI-contolled territory. Third, the blockade 
removed the problem of governing a territory at a time when the GOI lacked the 
resources for both administering the north, and fighting a guerrilla war in the 
mountains. 148 
3.5.4.3 Monetary Developments 
3.5.4.3.1 The New Iraqi Dinar 
Inflationary pressures in the. Iraqi economy increased in 1992 due to the GOI 
introducing new locally printed bank notes (the. New Iraqi Dinar (NID)), in addition 
to the regular notes in circulation which were printed in Switzerland (the Old Iraqi 
Dinar (OID)). 149 In Iraqi Kurdistan, the population had little faith in the new, poor 
146 The events of 1990-1991 are developed further in Chapter 4. 
147 Stichting Nederland-Koerdistan (1996) op. cit., p. 19; Menichini (1996) op. cit., p. 9. Henceforth, 
the dinar printed in Switzerland will be known as the Old Iraqi Dinar, or OID, and the dinar printed 
in 
Baghdad since 1992 will be known as the New Iraqi Dinar, or NID. 
148 Keen (1993) op. cit., p. 31. 
149 Stichting Nederland-Koerdistan(1996) op. cit., p. 20. 
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quality currency. In the markets of Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, for example, the 
OID was worth as much as ten times the value of the NID in late 1992.150 
3.5.4.3.2 The Kurdish Unit of Currency and Economic Controls 
The Kurdish authorities, which at this time were becoming increasingly organised, 
had to develop a fiscal policy to counter this manipulation of the economy. The result 
was the OID being chosen as the "legal" currency of Iraqi Kurdistan. "' This 
situation has remained into 1999 and, from an economic point of view, is fascinating. 
The OID is not the recognised currency of the Republic- of Iraq, and therefore has no 
international legitimacy. It is used solely in the north of the country, and has little, if 
any, collateral behind it. Interestingly, due to the limited supply of the OID, inflation 
in Iraqi Kurdistan has been of a far less magnitude than in Iraq as a whole. For 
example, whereas food prices increased by approximately 620% between December 
1993 and December 1994, they increased by a mere 13% in Iraqi Kurdistan. ' 52 The 
Iraqi Kurdish economy certainly enjoys a degree of relative stability when compared 
with the rest of the Iraq, and this has succeeded in protecting the economic state of 
the Iraqi Kurdistan region, and has meant that the region has not been exposed to the 
same inflationary pressures as the rest of Iraq. 
An interesting question to raise concerns the amount of control exerted by either the 
KRG or the dominant political parties upon the Iraqi Kurdish economy regarding the 
value of the OID. Menichini believes that there are no regulatory policies operating 
in Iraqi Kurdistan, and states that; 
"Without any government and/or central bank control the current 
economic and financial situations are. strictly determined by the 
supply and demand law .... The supply, partially controlled by 
external factors, [impedes] any effective planning. In this context it is 
worth remembering that the GOI controls the flow of many goods and 
iso Ibid. 
151 The Kurdish authorities actually considered adopting the Turkish Lira as the unit of currency for 
Iraqi Kurdistan during the spring of 1993. The Turkish Government was not opposed to the idea, but it 
seems that all parties backed down from a decision which would have had profound implications as 
such an act would draw the region into the Turkish sphere of influence. However, Talabani made it 
quite clear in 1993 that he would prefer Kurdistan to "get rid of the Iraqi Dinar". Stichting Nederland- 
Koerdistan (1996) op. cit., p. 20; The Congress, 1 July 1993, interview with Jalal Talabani. 's2 Ibid, quoting United Nations (1995a) United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Humanitarian 
Cooperation Programme for Iraq: Mid-Term Review, p. 1. 
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energy into Northern Iraq with a view to creating there critical 
conditions and hence instability. "ßs3 
However, it is apparent that he political parties `play the markets' for their own 
benefits. The KDP especially, and also the PUK, hold large reserves of OID and US 
Dollars, and can affect the value of either on the markets of Erbil, Suleimaniyah and 
Dohuk. There are numerous routes by which the exchange rates are manipulated, 
with the more regular ones being through the limited banking system which. has 
recently been resurrected, or more usually through the scores of money changers 
commonly found in any town. 
Many of these money-changers are linked to a political party. The political parties, 
and especially the KDP, also control the trade routes with the surrounding states, and 
exercise customs control of imports and exports. Table 3.6 displays the PUK's 
estimates of the revenue generated at the Ibrahim Khalil crossing point (the main 
crossing point between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey, controlled wholly by the KDP). 
The financial worth of the parties is unknown, and it is not necessarily correct to 
equate the parties and their leaderships worth as being one and the same. For 
example, the PUK accuse the Barzani family of laundering huge amounts of money 
which accumulates in their own family accounts rather than in the accounts of the 
KDP or the KRG (Erbil). However, it is unlikely that Jalal Talabani is innocent of 
this practice either. 154 The powerful parties are capable of controlling the value of the 
OID, and have more than likely been exercising this power for some years. '55 
The most influential financial control relates to the presence of US Dollars on the 
local market. The OID-US$ exchange rate is also influenced by political factors, and 
perceptions of political activity. Indeed, perception is far more important than 
political action in this regard. For example, when SCR 986 was being discussed, 
exchange rates soared, the markets were -flooded with goods, and prices 
plummeted. ' 56 
15' Menchini (1996) op. cit., p. 9. 134 Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, the ex-leader of the Komala faction of PUK, member of the PUK 
Political Bureau and confidante of Jalal Talabani, stated that the Barzani's have accrued at least US$ I 
billion in foreign reserves (interview with Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, London, 4 March 1999). iss Menichini (1996) op. cit., p. 9. This paragraph is developed from a discussion with the UN Field 
Delegate to Erbil, Gerhard Monier, Erbil, 9 March 1998. 
156 Stichting Nederland-Koerdistan (1996) op. cit., p. 20. 
108 
Chapter 3 
- 
ß 
as 
D 
'c 
C 
cl 
0 x 
2. 
N Ü 
E. l 
3 M 
. 
u 
iiiý333 u ý" 
`y 
y 
ý 
Lam. Z± 0 
C" r+ V ý 
r 
ýV 
pAaý 
"U 
C 
Niýy 
. 
ý". V"1 C Ni 
.) `" CN 
" ýý pp O 
o ° 
0 ö 3 
d 
Etä 
u -u V; o  
äO O "v ei 
j NO 
N 
di ld wý+ 
y 
N 6' - 
Z aý C O 9. 
`Lý ßw0 
y 
EÖ 
Vf 
k 'O 
oV 
Ö 
Vo 
O 
Cp 
oho 
Z 
_ 
s 
w 
=U 
cNV 
°- w 
0, r41 t: " 
" 
U e 
X 
y 
m 
w 
?y 
y 
Irj 
ý 
r, 
2 
v0 ID C 
Z r- 
u Q 
or 3ý a+ 
U 
N 
ea N "ýE 
. 
Qw 
V 
Q 
.O "d .: u2 
i 
N Q 
1 0 
^ý"' 
v i . &: ) ' Ö r_ 
ti 
- 
o p 0 _ '^ O 
ca O I o°o 
o ä 
ß F m o o 
"e N 0 
Z :D 
u) lu 
y b., Ir 'Ci 
Z ö $ 
Inn '^ N 
F F 
O 
"V O 
V 
N 
VN 
" 
2 N 
U öE 
2 ""12 
Ü 
U W 
A A' 
o 
oOq 
äD 
o04 
cis 
Ü Ü Ü _ 
O 
109 
v9 
0 
ld 
C 
b 
vi 
'v 
V^z, 
ý4 
u 
F- 
0 V 
v 
U 
0 
64 
u 
Lil 
U 
v 
v 
O 
ü 
V 
O 
V 
u 
> 
10 
0 
W's 
C 
N 
Oo 
O 
ti 
ý4 
u 
N 
L 
u 
E 
1-0 
U 
I- 
4) 
e+ 
{Cd 
G 
!d 
. 
_C 
61 
"C 
C 
U 
.r 
C 
U 
UN 
U U 
7 
s U 
N 
u 
A 
Ö 
ö 
ýo 
A 
O 
'q 
O 
N 
E 
Y 
Q 
ld 
N 
2O 
N 
r. Cr 
v 
VV 
ýw 
ö ö. 
6cJ 
Gý 
üO 
VN 
OA 
NN 
lyr 
vÖ 
Oy 
. 
19-1.3 
U 
6L 
0C 
8 
Ö 
h 
.0e 
.5 
a 
.I 
00 
co 
v 
Ö 
b 
u 
ed 
cs. 
u 
O 
O 
O 
E 
.a 
! ! 
N 
I 
w 
C oG 
ä 
Chapter 3 
3.5.4.4 The Socio-Economic Situation, 1991-1996 
The economic situation of this period is most usefully seen as one of coming to terms 
with a unique set of conditions presented by the political environment. As well as 
coping with the impact of the Anfal Campaigns and the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq 
War, Iraqi Kurdistan was now under international and internal sanctions and isolated 
from the rest of the country. The internal political situation was unstable, with the 
internecine fighting breaking out several times during this period, with ferocious 
fighting taking place between the KDP and PUK. '57 
Agricultural inputs were among the first items to be embargoed by the Iraqis against 
the Kurds, inhibiting the ability of Kurds in the collective settlements to return to 
their villages. 158 The limited industrial base of Iraqi Kurdistan rapidly deteriorated 
and the cost of living substantially increased. Commodities which would normally 
have come from the rest of Iraq were now scarce. By October 1992, kerosene prices 
were 200 times higher than before 1990, and rice prices were 80 times higher. 
'59 
3.5.4.4.1 The International Aid Effort 
During the early 1990s, the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan received new impetus from a 
large-scale international aid effort. The impact of the programme is extremely 
difficult to ascertain, and is a source of confusion amongst agencies, the KRG, and 
the populace as a whole. Graham-Browne notes that "the humanitarian crisis in 
northern Iraq in April and May 1991 had drama, pathos and media appeal. Its messy 
and protracted aftermath attracted less public attention and sympathy. " 
160 The 
beneficiaries of such confusion were political parties, the black market, UN 
personnel, and the GOI, which benefited from the leakage of hard currency and 
marketable items at the expense of the Iraqi Kurdish peoples. 
161 
In April 1991, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the 
UN and the GOI regarding humanitarian operations in Iraq. However, the GOI 
15' See Chapter 4 fora political analysis of this period. 
158 Keen (1993) op. cit., p. 32. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Graham-Brown (1999) Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq. London: IB 
Taurus, p. 261. 
161 For a comprehensive analysis of the humanitarian aid programme in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991, 
see Graham-Brown (1999) op. cit., pp. 261-323. 
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secured firm control of the activities of international organization, to the extent that 
relief supplies had to be bought from Baghdad in hard currency at the official 
government rate. 162 Even though the UN targeted the northern governorates, by its 
own admission, supplies were inadequate, and rations suffered from seasonal 
fluctuations, often being reduced in the summer months. 163 The funding for UN 
operations in the 1991-1996 period came mostly from donor states and, although 
insufficient, the amounts raised were still considerable. During this period as a 
whole, a total of US$ 670.7 million was spent in Iraq by the UN Inter-Agency 
Humanitarian Programme. Table 3.7 provides a breakdown of the resources 
distributed. 
In addition to this sum, it is estimated that the NGOs channelled in approximately 
US$ 400 million during the same period. 164 Of these sums, it is estimated that the US 
paid approximately US$ 35 to 40 million per year to both UN agencies and NGOs. 165 
The response from the European Union (EU) was similarly massive; with the 
European Community Humanitarian Organization (ECHO) contributing 21,500 
million ECU in 1993 alone. 166 However, the effectiveness of these programmes was 
commonly called into question by political parties and the KRG alike, with 
allegations of corruptness and poor planning and targeting of assistance commonly 
mentioned. These sentiments are reflected by Jalal Talabani, who said that "sums are 
gathered in the name of the Kurdish people and eaten by the bureaucratic bodies of 
the United Nations. " 167 
3.5.4.4.2 The Agricultural Sector 
Heavily hit by the legacy of the previous fifteen years and the privation of double 
sanctions, the agricultural sector was one of the first to benefit from the influx of 
humanitarian aid which arrived in Iraqi Kurdistan upon the withdrawal of the GOI in 
October 1991. The rural infrastructure of the region was the first area to be addressed 
162 Leezenberg (1999) op. cit., p. 9. 163 Ibid, quoting Keen (1993) op cit. 164 Durham University Policy Planning Unit (1998) op. cit., p. 10. 
X65 Figures from Leezenberg (1999) op. cit., p. 11. 166 Ibid. 
167 The Congress, 1 July 1993, interview with Jalal Talabani. 
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by many NGOs as it could engage a large workforce and relieve some of the pressure 
facing urban areas. 168 
Table 3.7: Resources Channelled Through UN Agencies in Iraq (in USS million), 
1991-1996169 
Agency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
UNDHA 3.65 5.60 
UNHCR 103.60 13.20 
IOM 8.80 2.60 
UNICEF 16.93 32.53 
WFP 16.64 42.59 
FAO 1.26 1.27 
WHO 5.02 44.2 
UNESCO --- --- 
UNDP --- --- 
UNGCI 21.18 39.19 
UNV 1.80 1.10 
Total 178.88 142.50 
1.99 2.90 2.32 1.39 17.85 
--- 0.4 --- 0.26 117.46 
--- --- --- --- 11.40 
50.28 28.72 27.28 24.35 180.10 
30.44 38.84 16.93 30.71 178.85 
16.10 5.45 5.57 4.42 34.07 
6.27 2.50 4.54 1.20 23.95 
1.44 0.60 0.20 --- 2.24 
1.00 --- 0.60 --- 1.60 
15.62 14.16 7.37 2.51 100.03 
0.30 --- --- --- 3.20 
123.4 93.57 67.51 64.84 670.70 
According to the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development of the KRG, 2,800 
villages had been rebuilt by 1995. t70 However, the agricultural output of the region 
suffered under the sanctions regime, even though the area under cultivation increased 
during this period. 171 The ability of the humanitarian aid effort to resurrect the 
agricultural sector was nullified by the legacy of previous GOI actions from the 
1970s and by the availability of cheap imports from Turkey, which the UN agencies 
were increasingly purchasing to meet the demands of supplying the food ration. 172 
166 Overseas Fund for Disaster Aid. Figures from Leezenberg (1999) op. cit., p. 11. 169 UNOHCI (1997) Summary Report on Programme Funding. 170 Stichting Nederland-Koerdistan (1996) op. cit., p. 20. "' Menichini (1996) op. cit., p. 10. 172 Leezenberg (1999) op, cit., p. 12. 
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The scale of the humanitarian assistance was not of a great enough magnitude and 
suffered from being too localised, and by the larger UN agencies being obstructed in 
their developmental efforts by the GOI. In addition, the areas which had suffered 
attacks with chemical weapons proved to be infertile in many cases, and the 
resumption of normal farming activities was further impeded by the presence of 
landmines. 173 This situation resulted in Kurds deserting the agricultural sector, And 
resorting to activities giving short-term gain, such as the selling of capital assets, 
smuggling, chopping down trees, and collecting scrap metal. 174 Furthermore, there 
was little incentive for the Kurdish population residing in the collective settlements 
to return to their lands. 175 Conditions within the urban areas of Iraqi Kurdistan 
deteriorated rapidly with the upheavals after the uprising and subsequent embargoes 
against the territory. According to UN sources, by mid-1995 there were an estimated 
590,000 persons directly dependent on external food support, provided by the UN. 176 
3.5.4.4.3 Urban Unemployment and Underemployment 
Unemployment figures during this period were estimated to be between 70-80%, but 
could possibly have been higher. Those in public sector employment faired little 
better than the unemployed. The salaries of civil servants were approximately 200 
OID (US$ 6-16), and were little higher in 1997.177 It was estimated by UNICEF that 
in order to meet the minimum standard of life in terms of provision of basic 
amenities, a sum of at least 1500-2000 OID (US$ 50-65) would be needed to support 
a family of five persons. 178 
The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan by the mid-1990s was reaching critical levels. 
Monetary problems had reduced the purchasing power of the populace, and, 
according to the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) 1994 Household 
Expenditure Survey, 13% of the population had fallen below the poverty line, while 
173 Keen (1993) op. cit., pp. 38-39, quoting the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), which estimates that 
there may be as much as 5-6 million mines in Iraqi Kurdistan, and especially located around the most 
productive land. 
74 Ibid. 
173 This deterioration resulted in a bad harvest in 1994, resulting in the food ration being reduced. 
UNICEF (1994) Impact of Reduction in Food Ration, p. 3. 176 Leezenberg (1999) op. cit., p. 12, quoting United Nations (1995a) op. cit. "' Ibid; Durham University Policy Planning Unit (1997) Inception Report, Unpublished report for 
Department for International Development, London: p. 23. 178 Ibid. 
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the poorest 10% of households earned only 3% of the average household 
expenditure. 179 The economic recession also affected greatly the swollen middle 
classes and those dependent on government salaries, producing a social malaise of 
unprecedented proportions across many socio-economic strata. 
3.5.4.5 The Socio-Economic Situation, 1996 Onwards 
1996 was an eventful year for the Iraqi Kurdish region. The balance of power 
between the two dominant parties changed significantly in August, with the KDP 
capturing the city of Erbil with the assistance of the GOI. The administration of Iraqi 
Kurdistan was then divided between the KDP in Erbil and the PUK in Suleimaniyah, 
but with the PUK in a financially weak condition. There were also significant events 
occurring which would have an impact on the socio-economic condition of the north, 
and the situation of the agricultural base with the development and subsequent 
implementation of SCR 986, otherwise known as the oil-for-food deal. 
Iraqi Kurdistan at least benefited from a period of reasonable political stability from 
the end of 1996 onwards, with only a brief round of fighting between the KDP and 
PUK occurring towards the end of 1997. The increased experience of both sets of 
administrations in Erbil and Suleimaniyah reaped dividends, and SCR 986 provided 
some relief, albeit by risking returning the Kurds to a culture of dependency. 
3.5.4.5.1 SCR 986 
Due to mounting public pressure concerning the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, the 
Security Council proposed an oil-for-food agreement that would allow for some 
relief without reforming the comprehensive nature of SCR 661. This proposal was 
first suggested in SCR 687 and elaborated in SCRs 706 and 712 from August and 
September of 1991.180 At this stage, it was envisaged that Iraq would be allowed to 
sell US$ 3.2 billion of oil per year. This was well below what the UN had estimated 
the civilian needs to be, which was put at US$ 22 billion. Furthermore, the plans 
place strict conditions on the delivery of imported items' and reserved over 40% of 
the sum for such agencies as the Compensation Fund to Kuwait, the Boundary 
'79 Ward & Rimmer (1994) Targeting Basic Assistance in Northern Iraq: Findings from a Household 
Expenditure Survey, Unpublished paper for DFID. 180 Ibid. 
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Commission, and the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). Iraq rejected 
these proposals as an infringement on its sovereignty. 18t 
In April 1995 the Security Council proposed another oil-for-food deal with SCR 986, 
which allowed Iraq to sell up to two billion dollars worth of oil in a 180-day 
period. ' 82 This resolution was accepted after more than a year of delays by the GOI. 
An MOU was signed between the UN and the GOI in May 1996 organizing the 
details of the sale of oil, and establishing the necessary bank accounts. 183 Subsequent 
resolutions increased the amount of oil allowed to be sold to US$ 5.2 billion, but due 
to the inadequacy of the Iraqi oil industry in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War, it 
was not able to pump this amount. The ceiling was lifted in 1999, with revenue 
generated during phase VIII of the programme, in 2000, projected to be close to US$ 
10 billion. 184 
Table 3.8 details the volume and value of the oil exported to mid-October 2000. 
From this initial amount of US$ 2 billion every 6 months, the northern governorates 
of Iraqi Kurdistan were allocated 13% (US$ 260 million) for the purchase of 
humanitarian supplies to be distributed by the agencies of the UN. This amount was 
divided between the governorates according to population size, with Suleimaniyah 
Governorate receiving 43%, Erbil Governorate receiving 34%, and Dohuk 
Governorate receiving 23%. As the MOU of 1996 was signed between the GOI and 
the UN, Darbandikhan Governorate was not recognised as a separate entity and was 
instead included as part of Suleimaniyah Governorate. 
Furthermore, as the GOI did not recognise the local Kurdish authorities 
administering the northern governorates as being legitimate offices of the GOI, they 
were not included in the procedures of implementation of SCR 986. The UN, rather 
than the Kurdish authorities, was therefore left with the job of administering the 
programme and distributing the supplies in Iraqi Kurdistan. This contrasts with what 
happens in the centre and south of the country, where ministries and departments of 
181 Ibid. 
182 UN Office of the Iraq Programme (2000) Oil-for-Food: The Basic Facts, 1996-2000. "' Proceeds from the sales are deposited in a UN controlled Escrow account at the Banque Nationale 
de Paris. 
194 UN Office of the Iraq Programme (2000) op. cit. 
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the GOI wholly distribute the supplies, with the UN agencies acting in an observation 
capacity. 
Table 3.8: SCR 986 Series Revenue185 
Phase SCR Date Volume of oil 
(millions of 
barrels) 
Value of 
exports 
(US$ million) 
Price per 
barrel ($) 
One 986 14.4.95 120 2,150 17.92 
Two 1111 4.6.97 127 2,125 16.73 
Three 1143 4.12.97 182 2,085 11.46 
Four 1153 20.2.98 308 3,027 09.83 
Five 1210 24.11.98 360.8 3,947 10.94 
Six 1242 21.5.99 389.6 7,402 19.00 
Seven 1281 10.12.99 343.4 8,285 24.13 
Eight 1302 8.6.00 263.1 6,730'" 25.57 
Total 2,093.9 35,751 Av=17.07 
Up until mid-October 2000, according to the UN Office of the Iraq Programme, a 
total of US$ 35.751 billion had been generated by the oil-for-food programme since 
SCR 986. Of this, the 13% of the three northern governorates amounts to US$ 4.648 
billion. The amounts now being circulated within Iraqi Kurdistan by the agencies of 
the UN are huge and, whilst SCR 986 has undoubtedly averted a serious 
humanitarian catastrophe, the provision of revenue on this scale is creating serious 
structural 'problems for the Iraqi Kurdish economy and the sustainable development 
of the KRG. The impact of SCR 986 will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
However, in brief, the actions of the UN Security Council are promoting the 
development of dependency upon an external source of revenue within the Kurdish 
regions of Iraq, both within the KRG and the population at large. 
ias Source: UN Office of the Iraq Programme. 
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3.5.4.5.2 The Agricultural Sector 
Prior to the embargo of 1991, the availability of subsidised food and public service 
employment opportunities in a variety of sectors not only encouraged the 
urbanisation process but also rendered employment in agricultural production 
unattractive. This situation changed after the introduction of the economic embargo. 
Agricultural production played a vital role in attaining some measure of food security 
in the northern governorates. The deterioration of the public food rationing system 
and limited coverage of international food aid compelled the entire rural, and a 
majority of the urban population, to depend to a greater degree on local food 
production. 
This demand resulted in a favourable economic climate for agricultural production 
and encouraged agricultural expansion. The majority of the population had, at some 
time, been engaged in food production, including those residing in collective towns. 
Many urban families possessed land and would either travel to their fields and stay in 
temporary accommodation, or rent the land to others. 
By 1990, food importation ceased and Iraq came to rely on domestic food production 
which clearly did not meet the entire needs of the population. To encourage local 
production of food, the G0I increased the price of cash crops significantly. Thus, 
between 1990 and 1993, the price of wheat per ton doubled from 500 OID to 1,000 
OID due to high local demand and the discontinuation of subsidised imports from the 
G0I. 186 This in turn resulted in an increase in wheat and barley production during 
these years. 
However, this promising picture was weakened in the mid-1990s. Upon the 
discussion of the SCR 986, increasing land disputes, and internecine fighting, there 
was a decrease in the total cultivated area, yield, and production of wheat. Based on 
estimates of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), wheat production 
declined from its 1993 level of 500,151 tons to approximately 312,318 tons in 1996, 
a figure also supported by ODA crop units working in the region. 
186 Source: FAO/Iraq Reports (1996); Leezenberg (1999) op. cit., p. 11. 
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By June 1996, two important factors were influencing the agricultural sector in Iraqi 
Kurdistan; poor rainfall in the growing season, and the anticipated implementation of 
SCR 986. The news of Iraq's agreement to the latter in February of 1996 created 
expectations of large inflows of humanitarian supplies into Northern Iraq. As a result 
the OID appreciated in value and food prices fell dramatically, consequently 
depreciating the price of wheat. The drastic decline of wheat production was 'the 
conscious decision on the part of the farmers not to cultivate wheat. With the 
publicity surrounding the implementation of SCR 986, a price reduction of locally 
produced wheat was fully anticipated. A Dutch NGO noted at the time that "the 
announcement of a 'oil-for-food' deal between the UN and Iraq in May 1996 sent 
shockwaves through the regional economy. " 187 
Low wheat prices affected all agricultural output prices (as most foods became 
substitutes for the staple, wheat), while cost of non-labour inputs (i. e. fertilisers, 
seeds, pesticides, ploughing, vaccinations) remained relatively stable and the margin 
of profit that farmers expected on each donum of land planted or animal effectively 
fell. Thus, the incentive to produce declined. This is reflected in Table 3.9, showing 
the area under wheat before and after the imposition of the 986 programme. 188 
Table 3.9: Total area Under Wheat in Donums for 1994-97189 
Year (total for all three governorates) Area (in Don ums) 
1994/95 2,254,954 
1995/96 1,823,102 
1996/97 1,453,394 
The agricultural situation at the end of the 1990s is confusing. Reports from agencies 
in Iraqi Kurdistan claim that agricultural production is again rising. However, the 
causes of the decline have still not been remedied, and it is difficult to imagine how 
the agricultural sector could enjoy a significant recovery without these issues being 
addressed. The situation of agriculture has been further hit by drought over two 
19' Stichting Nederland-Koerdistan (1996) op. cit., p. 19. 188 See Stansfield (2000b) op. cit., 
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consecutive years, 1999-2000, and this has resulted in wholesale change of 
agricultural activities. 
3.5.4.5.3 The Informal Sector 
During this period of reduced central government authority in Iraqi Kurdistan, the 
(private) informal sector of the economy has flourished, particularly by providing 
hitherto abundant consumer items. 190 Many Kurds resorted to, or expanded, 
smuggling operations, with the largest smuggling sector being to transport Iraqi 
petrol to Turkey. This activity formed a major source of income for the political 
parties of Kurdistan, for the KRG, and for the political elite of Iraq. 19' As seen, it is 
estimated that customs levies at the Iraqi Kurdish-Turkish border at Ibrhahim Khalil 
amounts to at least several tens of thousand dollars per day. 192 
These sources of income of the political parties of Iraqi Kurdistan are much debated 
and pose a serious problem for the conciliation of the KDP and PUK. The positioning 
of the main crossing point into Iraqi Kurdistan between Iraq and Turkey in KDP 
territory has resulted in a skewing of resources between the KDP and PUK region, to 
the extent that it may be identified as one of the primary causes of conflict between 
the two parties. According to the PUK, the revenue generated by the KDP at Ibrahim 
Khalil amounts to some 4 million OID daily (approximately US$ 200,000). 193 
A further flourishing informal sector is in the smuggling of peoples out of Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Since 1991, large numbers of people have fled the region, mainly to 
Western Europe, but also to Australia and North America. 194 Initially, the more 
affluent members of society were attempting to leave, but it is now common to find 
poorer families attempting to save the required sums to ensure that members of their 
family can emigrate. The most worrying economic impact of this emigration is that 
189 Source: FAO (Erbil): February 1998. 
190 Leezenberg questions whether such activity can be classified as `illegal' as there was initially no 
adequately functioning state apparatus to define the legal economy. Leezenberg (1999) op. cit., pp. 15- 
16. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 PUK Foreign Relations Bureau document provided by Shwan Qliasani, September 1999. 194 Ibid; Stansfield (2000c) "A Qualitative Description and Analysis of Male Potential Asylum Seekers 
from Erbil (Northern Iraq)" in Efionayi-Mader, et. at, (eds. ), Distribution of Asylum Requests Over 
European Countries. Neuchatel: Schweizerisches Forum filr Migrationsstudien. 
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Kurdistan is losing its most highly qualified professional people from the educated 
middle class, creating a brain-drain with long-term consequences. 19s 
3.5.5 Conclusion 
Iraqi Kurdistan, in terms of its economic development in particular, and also in terms 
of its geography and population characteristics, is being forced into major changes, 
mostly for the worse in the short term. The activities of successive GOI policies and 
humanitarian aid inputs in the 1990s has succeeded in weakening the agricultural 
basis of Iraqi Kurdistan, and making a society which has the capability and resources 
to enjoy a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency dependent on external sources for all 
provisions, including food and everyday consumer items. 
In this depressed scenario of a weakened agricultural structure, mass unemployment, 
and dependency on imports, the informal sector has flourished, making a few people 
extremely wealthy and channelling significant funds to the political parties of 
Kurdistan and the KRG, amongst others. This has resulted in an extremely vibrant 
informal sector, creating an uneasy dichotomy in Iraqi Kurdistan between the 
majority who are destitute, and a minority of merchants who are extremely wealthy. 
195 Leezenberg (1999) op. cit., p. 17. 
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Chapter 4 
The Development of the Party Political System 
4.1 Introduction 
Organized political groupings in Iraqi Kurdistan have been a powerful variable in the 
dynamics of the region since the foundation of the KDP in 1946, and this has 
especially been the case in the 1990s. The withdrawal of the GOI in 1991 from Iraqi 
Kurdistan gave an opportunity to the principal political groupings to present 
themselves as organizations capable of mobilizing widespread popular support, 
military personnel, foreign national support, and substantial financial resources. In 
effect, they were presented with the opportunity to behave as political parties rather 
than guerrilla movements. The political system in Iraqi Kurdistan displays 
bewildering complexity and possesses parties of considerable sophistication. Much 
has been written on Kurdish political history, yet the internal aspects of the 
organizational structures and decision-making processes of the parties have rarely 
been addressed. Without such an understanding, it is impossible to appreciate fully 
the political system. ' 
4.1.1 Aims 
These aims of this chapter can be summarized as follows: 
1. To assess the development of the party political system, focusing on the transition 
of the organizational structure and personnel from guerrilla movements and 
peshmerga to political parties and politicians respectively. 
2. To identify the development of power groupings within the principal political 
parties for their impact upon the overall decision-making process. 
4,1.2 Methodology and Structure 
The structure of the analysis is chronologically based. This is of particular use as the 
foundations of many of the parties have roots in other parties. The analysis is 
' Natali makes a similar statement when she urges the need to understand the internal conflict in more 
detail. (Natali (1999) op. cit. ) 
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weighted towards the internal rather than external dimensions, illustrating: (a) how 
the main political actors and groupings formed; (b) the main tensions, alliances, and 
mechanics of Kurdish politics in Iraq, and; (c) analyses of key events, when 
necessary, to provide further understanding. The chapter is concluded with an 
assessment of the situation of the parties on the eve of the Second Gulf War. 
4.2 The Origins of the Party Political System 
The political system of Iraqi Kurdistan has its origins in the feverish state-building 
which characterised the Middle East in the aftermath of World War One. After 
failing to secure a nation-state of their own in the Treaty of Lausanne, the Kurds 
found themselves divided between the states they are in today. Kurdish rebellions, 
whether tribal or nationalist, became commonplace in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, with all 
of them being successfully repressed. Military attacks by state authorities against the 
Kurds were combined with policies of assimilation and/or dispersion in an attempt to 
weaken the Kurdish nationalist movement. 2 
4.2.1 The Kurdish Democratic Party 
Within Iraq, the most important event in the development of the Kurdish political 
system was the foundation of the Kurdish Democratic Party in 1946. Many aspects of 
the contemporary situation in Iraqi Kurdistan can be traced, both in structural and 
ideological terms, to the establishment of this party as it is from the Kurdish 
Democratic Party that the origins of the contemporary KDP and PUK can be traced. 
The following sections describe and analyse the formation of the early KDP, the 
influences surrounding its creation, and identifies those tensions which resulted in the 
establishment of the PUK. 
The origins of the KDP are complex and are the result of several political conditions. 
These conditions will be studied with reference to three dynamics: 
1. Tribal militancy in Iraq, Iran and Turkey; 
2. The development of an urban Kurdish intelligentsia in Iraq and Iraqi 
Kurdistan promoting Kurdish nationalism. The formation of the 
2 Bruinessen (1992a) op. cit., pp. 25-26. 
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Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iran (KDP-I) and attempts at state- 
building in Iranian Kurdistan. 
3. The role of the Barzani tribe, and particularly Mulla Mustafa Barzani. 
The following discussion centres on the period immediately before the 1950s and 
includes those events and dynamics which had a key influence in the establishment 
of the Kurdish Democratic Party. An assessment of the role of Barzani is included in 
each section in an attempt to investigate his role as a key linking character. Figure 4: 1 
charts the principal political events of the pre-1960 period which had an impact upon 
the genesis of the KDP, emphasising the interrelationships between developments in 
Iraq and Iran. 3 
4.2.1.1 The Role of Tribal Militancy 
The role of tribal militancy has had a great impact upon the development of the 
Kurdish political system. Kurdish revolts are best viewed as a balance between tribal 
and nationalist interests. The earlier revolts were instigated' primarily to benefit the 
interests of particular tribes, with later ones increasingly adopting a more nationalist 
tone. It is this change in emphasis which is of prime importance in this section, as it 
sees the broadening of the Kurdish issue in Iraq, and the mutually antipathetic 
tendencies of tribalism and nationalism manifest themselves into irreconcilable 
political structures and decision-making processes. The commencement of tribal 
uprisings can be traced to the activities of Sheikh Ubayd Allah from 1878 onwards. 4 
From then on, various tribal revolts took place in Kurdistan, with the focus remaining 
tribal rather than national, with many urban-based nationalist groupings refusing to 
aid the tribes' uprisings, and many tribal leaders not wanting to receive their 
support. 5 
3 Sources employed include: Arfa (1966) op. cit.; Zaid (1970) "The Role of the KDP in the Kurdish 
Revolution. " Kurdistan 14,1970, (The Annual Journal of the Kurdish Students Society in Europe - 
KSSE), pp. 7-10, p. 7; Roosevelt (1978) "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, " in Chaliand, (ed. ), 
1993, pp. 122-128; Vanly (1980) op. cit.; Ghassemlou (1965) op. cit.; McDowall (1996) op. cit., pp. 
237-246 & 288-297; O'Ballance (1996) The Kurdish Struggle, 1920 - 1994, London: Macmillan 
Press, pp. 12-35; Ghafour (1997) The Longest Revolution: The Kurdish Chrono-Political History. 
London: Avon Books, pp. 2-9. ° For further details on Sheikh Ubayd Allah, see McDowall (1989) The Kurds. London: Minority 
Rights Group, pp. 10-11; (1996) op. cit., pp. 53-59; O'Ballance (1996) op. cit., pp. 7-9. 5 See Arfa (1966) op. cit., p. 129; O'Ballance (1996) op. cit., p. 15. ' 
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Figure 4.1: The Origins of the KDP 
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The major revolts of this period (Sheikh Said, Khoybun, Simko Uprising, Dersim, 
and the Barzinja and Barzani Revolts) are all characterised by tribal aims and 
support, with little, if any, thought for Kurdish nationalism, or for alliance with the 
urban-based nationalists in Iran and Iraq. 6 If nationalism became part of these 
struggles, it was usually as a means of mobilizing support for the benefit of the tribal 
rebellion. Ghareeb emphasises this balance when he states that "Kurdish rebellions. . 
.. [were] motivated by personal ambition as well as nationalism to block the central 
authority's control over [the] region. "7 
This balance between tribal and personal interests on the one hand, and the use of 
nationaligm as a motivating force can be seen by studying two of the greatest revolts 
and Kurdish leaders - the first revolt of Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinja in 1919, and 
Barzani's revolt of 1943. 
4.2.1.1.1 The Rebellion of Shiekh Mahmoud Barzinja 
Sheikh Mahmoud had enjoyed a somewhat turbulent political career throughout 
World War One. His pro-British actions saw him almost achieve the establishment of 
a KRG based in Suleimaniyah. 8 However, his relationship with the British 
degenerated when he became more vociferous in demanding an independent Kurdish 
state. Sheikh Mahmoud proclaimed independence in May 1919 but, after fierce 
fighting, his rebellion was defeated and he was imprisoned. The independent Kurdish 
state did not materialise, and the region was incorporated by the British into the 
Republic of Iraq. 
While itmay seem that Sheikh Mahmoud's tendencies were nationalist, he had little 
in common with the nationalist movement. 'In discussing the balance between 
tribalism and nationalism, McDowall points out that: 
"It is tempting retrospectively to clothe Shaykh Mahmud in the garb of 
modern nationalist ideas .... It is significant that 
[he] did not waste 
his time appealing to nationalist sentiment .... Furthermore, 
his style 
was to use kin and tribal allies and his aim was the establishment of a 
6 For an in-depth analysis of these revolts, see Jwaideh (1960) op. cit. 
Ghareeb (1981) The Kurdish Question in Iraq. New York: Syracuse University Press, p. 11. 
Jwaideh (1960) op. cit., pp. 480-482; Arfa (1966) op. cit., pp. 111.112; Gunter (1993) op. cit., p. 3; 
McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 156. 
For details about the rebellion of Sheikh Mahmud Barzinja, see Jwaideh (1960) op. cit., pp. 516-535. 
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personal fiefdom. Shaykh Mahmud offered Kurds liberation from 
British rule, but not from himself. " 10 
4.2.1.1.2 The 1943 Revolt of Barzani 
After previous rebellions, Barzani was kept in detention in Nasiriya in southern Iraq, 
and then later in Suleimaniyah. " In 1943 he escaped and fled to Barzar with the 
assistance of the nationalist party Hiwa12 and mobilised his followers to prepare to 
revolt. 13 The main demands of Barzani were that an autonomous province consisting 
of Kirkuk, Suleimaniyah, Erbil, Dohuk and Khanaqin should be created and placed 
under a Minister for Kurdish Affairs. Upon the rejection of these demands, fighting 
broke out. 14 The revolt was crushed by the Iraqi army in collaboration with various 
Kurdish tribes, and Barzani was forced into exile into Iran and fled to Mahabad with 
some 3,000 fighters. '5 
Whether Barzani's 1943 rebellion could be called nationalist is debatable. Sivan 
suggests that the rebellion marked a new phase in the Kurdish struggle in Iraq, and; 
"Unlike previous revolts which were primordially tribal, this outburst 
was essentially nationalistic. Not only did Barzani himself declare the 
national aims of the rebellion, but for the first time the urban nuclei of 
the national movement joined the struggle, conferring a new 
dimension upon it. " 16 
Arfa agrees with this, and compares Barzani's revolt with that of Sheikh Mahmud; 
"The successive rebellions of Shaikh Mahmud of Suleimaniyah had 
been local movements with the autonomy of a Kurd-inhabited region 
in view, but in 1945 for the first time a co-ordinated action by a 
10 Morris holds a similar opinion to McDowall, describing the tribal leaders of the time as "being 
interested in protecting their own quasi feudal interests rather than combining in support of anything 
approaching a Kurdish national cause". McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 158; Morris (1999) op. cit., p. 
45. 
11 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 290. 12 Gunter (1993) op. cit., p. 9; For details of the escape of Barzani from Suleimaniyah, see Amin 
(1999) Khowlanawa la Nawbaznada: Diwa Nawaway Rowdawakany Kurdistans Iraq, 1984-1998. 
Berlin: Awadani e. V. " Arfa (1966) op. cit., p. 119; Ghareeb (1981) op. cit., p. 33. 14 Gunter (1993) op. cit., p. 9. 1' For details on the Barzani rebellion of 1943, see Jwaideh (1960) op. cit., pp. 671-707; Farouk- 
Sluglett & Sluglett (1987) Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. London: I. B. Taurus, 
pp. 28-29. 
Sivan (1975) "The Kurds: Another Perspective, " Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms: A World Survey, Vol. 2. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 147. 
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Kurdish nationalist party with tribal and religious leaders had been 
undertaken. " 17 
Conversely, McDowall points but that, although sometimes described as a nationalist 
rebellion, the evidence is contrary to this; 18 
"Although sometimes described as a nationalist rebellion, the 
evidence indicated that it was not .... There is little solid evidence 
that Barzani has espoused the Kurdish cause during the course of his 
revolt .... If one 
looks at his actions .. it is plausible that .. 
like any 
good tribal leader, he was constantly seeking to widen his regional 
authority. " 19 
While it is difficult to place the motivation of this rebellion, it would appear to be the 
case that if Barzani did not choose nationalism, the nationalists chose him. 20 Perhaps 
the most useful way to view the historical significance of the Barzani rebellion of 
1943 is that of a watershed in Kurdish politics. The 1943 revolt is the last time that 
tribal elements exploit nationalism with no opposition. From 1943 onwards, it is 
increasingly apparent that the nationalists are less inclined. to be used as pawns in 
tribal politics, and attempt to exploit tribalism for their own agenda. This conflict 
between the two groups has become a characteristic of Kurdish politics ever since. 
4.2.1.2 The Rise of Nationalist Groups 
The early focus of the rise of Kurdish nationalism was in Iran. It is therefore 
necessary to commence with a brief account of events in Iran which culminated in 
the establishment of the Mahabad Republic. 
4.2.1.2.1 The Republic of Mahabad 
During the period of the Second World War, the focus of Kurdish national 
aspirations was in the city of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan. 2' Facilitated by a 
weakened central government and a benevolent attitude on the part of Soviet forces 
occupying Azerbaijan, the Kurds of Mahabad declared an independent republic in 
17 Arfa (1966) op. cit., p. 129. 1$ McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 290. '9 Ibid, pp. 290-293. 
20 Ibid, p. 293. 21 For detailed accounts of the Republic of Mahabad, see Roosevelt (1947) op. cit., and Eagleton 
(1963) The Kurdish Republic of 1946. London: Oxford University Press. 
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1946.22 Iraqi Kurds, including Barzani and his militia, supported the fledgling 
Kurdish entity. The Republic of Mahabad only lasted for as long as the Soviet forces 
were present in Iran, and once they evacuated Mahabad fell to the Iranian army. 23 
Barzani escaped to Iraq, whereas the Iranian Kurdish leaders of the republic, 
including Qazi Muhammad, were captured and hanged. 24 The KDP-I fell apart, 
leaving a small clandestine rump with little influence. Barzani, facing difficulties in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, was forced to evacuate to the USSR where he was to stay for the 
next eleven years. 25 In the next decade, Kurdish nationalism appeared to have 
weakened in favour of class-based politics. However, unrest became increasingly 
apparent in Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan between Kurdish peasants- and landlords, and 
the 1960s witnessed a re-emergence of Kurdish nationalism. 26 
4.2.1.2.2 The Rise of Kurdish Nationalism in Iraqi Kurdistan 
Within Iraq, there was a waking of national consciousness among the first generation 
of secular educated and urban Kurds. 27 Informal groupings, such as Komala-i Liwen 
(Young Men's Organization), formed amongst the young urban Kurds in Baghdad, 
but, in the absence of any recognised Kurdish nationalist party, many joined the Iraqi 
Communist Party (ICP) when it formed in 1934.28 Following the coup d'etat by Bakr 
Sidqi, and subsequent anti-Kurdish feeling amongst Arab Iraqis, more radical 
clandestine Kurdish nationalist groups began to form such as Komala Brayeti 
(Brotherhood Organization), and Darkar (the Woodcutters) in Suleimaniyah. Darkar 
had strong links with the ICP's Kurdish wing, but soon fell into disagreement 
through its overt promotion of Kurdish rather than Iraqi nationalism. 29 It is 
22 The Kurdish flag was raised in Mahabad on the 7 December 1945 and the republic was proclaimed 
on 23 January 1946 under the presidency of Qazi Muhammad (Ghafour (1997) op. cit., p. 7). 
23 Pelletiere suggests that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mahabad, which resulted in the 
collapse of the Kurdish republic, was due to strong pressure being exerted by the United States which 
included President Truman allegedly threatening to use nuclear weapons if the Soviets did not 
withdraw. This incident is cited by some scholars as beginning the Cold War (Pelletiere (1991) op. 
cit., pp. 4-5, p. 29). 
24 Qazi Muhammad was arrested on 17 December 1946 and hanged on 31 March 1947 (Ghafour 
(1997) op. cit., p. 9). 
2$ Bruinessen (1992a) op. cit., p. 26. For sources on the Mahabad Republic, see: Jwaideh (1960) op. 
cit., p. 709; Eagleton (1963) op. cit.; Roosevelt (1978) op. cit.; Kutschera (1979) Le Mouvement 
National Kurde, Paris: Flammarion: p. 153; Barzani's formation crossed into Soviet territory on. 16 
June 1947 (Ghafour (1997) op. cit., p. 10). 26 Bruinssen (1992) op. cit., p. 26. 
27 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 288. Za Gunter (1993) op. cit. 
29 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 288. 
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interesting to note that these leftist groupings were forming mainly in Suleimaniyah 
rather than Erbil, a situation which has proven to be a constant in Iraqi Kurdish 
politics. 
From Darkar, a new more populist party formed named Hiwa (Hope), which was 
intended to solidify Kurdish nationalist sentiment. This party, led by Rafiq Hilmi, 
was first organized in Kirkuk and spread throughout north and central Iraq. 30 It was 
initially secret and was comprised of Kurdish intellectuals and GOI civil servants. 
The aims of Hiwa, centered on the provision of autonomy for the Kurdish region of 
Iraq, were distinctly nationalist, although the organization was leftist-minded with 
members being influenced by communist doctrines. 31 With this ideology was 
combined a distinctly urban support basis with initial centres of organization being 
located in Erbil, Kirkuk, Kifri, Kalar and Khanaqin, as well as in Baghdad, and well, 
away from the tribally-dominated areas. 32 
Whilst being a leftist party, Hiwa was politically astute enough to recognise the 
inherent strength of the tribes. 33 As such, it recognised Barzani as the leader of the 
Kurdish national movement, probably before he realised it himself, but remained 
suspicious of his tribal attitude. It is likely that Hiwa saw Barzani as a vehicle for the 
nationalist cause, and intended to discard him once the objective of autonomy was 
obtained. 34 
It is his relationship with Hiwa which possibly promoted the idea of the nationalist 
cause to Barzani. Upon receiving support from Hiwa, Barzani established his own 
nationalist-orientated party named `Freedom', which was composed mainly of Iraqi 
army personnel and liberal professionals, with few tribal cadres. Barzani also 
poached key personnel from Hiwa who were to play an invaluable part in the 
establishment of the Mahabad Republic. " 
30 Sheikhmous (1999) op. cit., p. 53. 
" Arfa (1966) op. cit., p. 123. 32 Ibid., p. 120; McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 288. 
33 Amin (1999) op. cit. 34 Arfa (1966) op. cit., p. 123. 33 Ibid. 
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The delicate relationship between the tribal chiefs and the developing urban 
intelligentsia has to be seen as a key part of the progression of the nationalist thinking 
of Barzani. The division between those who saw this as the development of 
nationalist thinking for the sake of the Kurds, and those who saw it as a tool to 
strengthen the Barzanis would create a schism which is still apparent today. 
4.2.1.2.3 Links Between the Iraqi Kurds and Mahabad 
Hiwa and Darkar both developed links with the Iranian Kurdish nationalists in 
Mahabad. Those present at meetings in 1942, in Mahabad, included mostly educated 
urbanites. 36 The meetings were encouraged by the USSR which had decided to 
sponsor the formation of a Kurdish organization in Iran. 37 Those regularly present at 
the meetings constituted themselves as a committee, under the name of Komala i 
Jianawa i Kurd, otherwise known as Komala. 38 Komala was divided into self- 
contained cells and members were aware only of the identities of members of their 
own cells, a system which lasted until recently in Iraqi Kurdistan. 39 Komala cells 
were widespread and units were founded in the Iraqi Kurdish towns of Kirkuk, Erbil, 
Suleimaniyah, Rowanduz and Shaglawa. 40 The Komala leadership even developed 
ties with tribal sheikhs, thereby crossing the urban-tribal divide. 41 However, the 
relationship between the two groups was not necessarily straightforward. McDowall 
notes that; 
".... most Aghas around Mahabad were attracted to Komala in spite 
of its class rhetoric, presumably because it symbolized independence 
from central government .... this did not imply solid support .... the 
chiefs were notorious for their mercurial politics. " 42 
Within six months Komala had 100 members, and in April 1945 Qazi Mohammad, 
the dominant political character of Mahabad, joined the party and was admitted as 
36 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 237. 
37 O'Ballance (1996) op. cit., p. 22. 
'$ Zaid (1970) op. cit., p. 7; O'Ballance (1973) The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970. Faber & Faber, 
London: p. 41; Ghareeb (1981) op. cit., pp. I 1-12; Ghafour (1997) op. cit., p. 3. Komala I Jlanawa I 
Kurd translates into `Kurdish Revival Organization'. Ghareeb states that ffiwa merged with rather 
than was subsumed by Komala (p. 12). It should be noted that the name "Komala"became a common 
political term in Kurdistan, and this grouping should not be confused with the subsequent Iraqi 
Kurdish Komala which became part of the PUK. 
39 Entessar (1992) op. cit., p. 17; McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 237. ao Roosevelt (1978) op. cit., p. 123. 41. O'Ballance (1996) op. cit., p. 25. 42 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 239. 
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President 43 Qazi Mohammad was a religious leader who could enhance the 
cooperation between leftist nationalists and the tribes. 4 Komala grew as a political 
party and, in November 1945, Qazi Muhammad convened a meeting at which the 
KDP-I was established, effectively absorbing Komala into it. " The KDP"I had 
nationalist aims including the use of the Kurdish language, self-government in 
domestic affairs, and the formation of a provisional council of Kurdistan. 
4.2.1.2.4 The Union of Nationalism and Tribalism 
Within Iraqi Kurdistan, the preserve of Kurdish nationalism was increasingly under 
the influence of Barzani who, in January 1945, sent a delegation to the GOI, Hiwa, 
and the British Ambassador asking for the immediate implementation of autonomy. 46 
As well as attempting to seize the diplomatic initiative, divisions occurring amongst 
the nationalist parties provided Barzani with an opportunity to utilise nationalism and 
further bridle the power of nationalist sentiment. Hiwa, which had attempted to 
become involved with the Barzani Revolt, dissolved after Barzan i's exile, and within 
the vacuum a number of small political groupings formed. 47 Of these, Shorish 
(Revolution) was the most important, and from it developed the popular Rizgari Kurd 
(Kurdish Liberation) in 1945 48 The increased popularity of these parties espousing 
Kurdish nationalism created tensions between the ICP and Shorish and Rizgari Kurd, 
and, by 1946, Suleimaniyah had become the scene of unrest. 49 However, through 
increasing pressure from the British and the GOI, both Shorish and Rizgari Kurd 
dissolved themselves in August 1946.50 
Meanwhile, Barzani had decided to form a political party in Iraqi Kurdistan. He sent 
a member of Shorish, Hamza. Abdullah to Iraq from Mahabad with a letter to the 
Iraqi Kurdish tribes proposing the formation of an Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party. 
Qazi Muhammad was against the formation of such an organization in Iraq, saying 
47 Entessar (1992) op. cit., p. 18; McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 239; O'Ballance (1996) op. cit., pp. 25- 
26. 
44 Entessar (1992) op. cit., p. 18. 
45 Roosevelt (1978) op. cit., p. 128. 
46 Arfa (1966) op. cit., p. 123. "Jwaideh (1960) op. cit., p. 794. 
a' McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 294. 49 Ibid, p. 295. 
S° Ibid. 
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"there is to be only one party, and you must not operate separately from it. "51 
However, Barzani continued with his plans. It appears by now he understood that, for 
a Kurdish movement to succeed, the tribes needed to work with the educated urban 
political parties, along the lines of the KDP-I. Shorish and Rizgari Kurd both 
dissolved themselves, with some members going to the proposed KDP of Barzani, 
and some joining the ICP. There was also tension between the planned new Iraqi 
Kurdish entity and the KDP-I, which had branches in Iraqi Kurdistan under. the 
leadership of Ibrahim Ahmed, who refused to join the new group without the express 
permission of Qazi Muhammad. 52 
4.2.1.3 The Establishment of the Kurdish Democratic Party 
The new Kurdish Democratic Party held its first congress in Baghdad on 16 August 
1946. The 32 delegates elected a Central Committee with Hamza Abdullah as 
Secretary-General, Barzani as President-in-exile, and Sheikh Latif and Ziyad Agha as 
Vice-Presidents. 53 
4.2.1.3.1 The Balance of the Tribes and Urbanites 
The balance in the leadership Barzani supported saw the position of Secretary- 
General going to a leftist, and two tribal elders in the positions of vice-presidents. 
These appointments created problems with the Shorish leaders, and Ibrahim Ahmed 
chose not to be involved with the KDP and instead joined the ICP. 54 The ICP Azadi 
faction grew rapidly as a result. 55 In response, Barzani pursued an overtly nationalist 
line in appealing for Kurds to support the KDP. 56 
With the collapse of the Mahabad Republic in early 1947, the closure of the KDP-I 
branches in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the exile of Barzani, parts of the urban leftist 
s1 Kutschera (1979) op. cit., p. 190. 
52 Ghareeb (1981) op. cit., p. 35. 
s' Gunter (1996a) "The KDP - PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq. " Middle East Journal Vol. 50, No. 2 
(Spring 1996), pp. 225-241, p. 226. 
sa For an analysis of the Iraqi Communist Party, see Batatu (1978) The Old Social Classes and the 
Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its 
Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers. NJ: Princeton University Press; Jawad (1981) Iraq and the 
Kurdish Question 1958 - 1970. London: Ithaca Press. ss Batatu (1978) op. cit., pp. 628-629; Ghareeb (1981)-op. cit., p. 35, quoting Talabani, 1971; Entessar 
(1992) op. cit., p. 57. 
56 See Andrews (1982) The Lost Peoples of the Middle East: Documents of the Struggle for Survival 
and Independence of the Kurds, Assyrians, and Other Minority Races in the Middle East. Salisbury 
NC: Documentary Publications, p. 131. 
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intelligentsia rallied to the banner of the Iraqi KDP, including Ibrahim Ahmed. 57 
However, these youthful revolutionaries became opposed to the blandness of the 
party which had been designed to appease the tribal elements of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
After a year of drifting, the new leftists convened a second congress in 1951 which 
elected Ibrahim Ahmed as Secretary-General. Barzani remained Leader-in-exile. 58 
4.2.1.3.2 The KDP after the Collapse of the Mahabad Republic 
The collapse of the Mahabad Republic in 1946 allowed the urban intelligentsia of the 
KDP to dominate the direction of the party. After the fall of Mahabad, Barzani's 
brigade was attacked by the Iranian military. 59 Barzani crossed- back into Iraq in 
April only to face repression from the GOI, with the deprivation of property and 
land, and, ultimately, the execution of four tribal leaders in May and the condemning 
to death of Barzani himself. 60 Barzani had little option but to fight his way out of Iraq 
and seek sanctuary in the USSR. He left Iraqi Kurdistan on 27 May 1947 with 496 
followers for Iran. 61 After three weeks of fighting with the Iranian army, the Barzanis 
crossed into Soviet territory, 300km from Iraq, on 15 June. Barzani was to stay in 
exile for 11 years until his return to Iraq in 1958, with the KDP being run by Ibrahim 
62 Ahmed. 
4.2.1.3.3 The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Ibrahim Ahmed 
The Third Congress of 1953 changed the name of the party to the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party as a gesture towards nationalism, and adopted a leftist programme 
calling for agricultural reform and recognition of peasants' and workers' rights. 63 
Under the leadership of Ibrahim Ahmed, the KDP worked among students and 
intellectuals, but received little support from rural areas which remained dominated 
by tribal leaders. 64 While some tribal discontent was still apparent among the 
57 Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett (1990) op. cit., pp. 28-29. 
58 Kurdistan Democratic Party (1993 a) Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Congresses 1946-1993. 
Erbil: Kurdistan News Press; Amin (1999) op. cit. 59 Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett (1990) op. cit., pp. 28-29. 60 O'Ballance (1996) op. cit., p. 34. 61 Eagleton (1963) op. cit.; Ghafour (1997) op. cit., p. 10. 62 Ghareeb (1981) op. cit., p. 34; O'Ballance (1996) op. cit., pp. 33-35; Ghafour (1997) op. cit., pp. 9- 
10. 
63 Kurdistan Democratic Party (1993a) op. cit. 64 Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett (1990) op. cit., p. 30. Nawshirwan Mustafa notes that, in this period, the 
KDP leadership in Iraq produced literature venerating the figure of Barzani, picturing him as an 
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remaining Barzanis and other tribes, the main source of unrest in Iraq during the 
1950s was of a socio-economic nature rather than tribal, allowing the KDP under the 
leadership of Ibrahim Ahmed to increase its strength. 65 McDowall notes that " ... . 
social change and growing discontent were already under way [by 1953] and the 
increasingly socialist hue of party doctrine was in tune with the times. , 66 
Improved economic conditions in Iraq, caused by increased oil wealth, were not 
trickling down to the lower social echelons of Iraq, and particularly in the Kurdish 
regions, with the result that many Kurds were migrating to urban areas in search of 
employment in the oil industry. 67 Throughout the 1950s, the need for agricultural 
development was urgent, yet the mechanization of the agricultural sector put peasants 
out of work and gave more wealth to the landlords, thereby exacerbating class 
divisions in Iraqi Kurdistan. The KDP and the ICP therefore were able to secure an 
increased support base in the rural areas of the region, and the KDP under Ibrahim 
Ahmed adopted a closer relationship with the ICP. 68 
4.2.1.3.4 The Emergence of New Cadres 
In 1956, Hamza Abdullah was re-admitted into the KDP Political Bureau and Central 
Committee, and many ICP members joined in 1957. For a while, to indicate these 
additions, the KDP became known as the United-KDP (U-KDP). The U-KDP had a 
Central Committee of twenty-one members, and an inner Political Bureau of five, 
which included some who were going to become important actors in the future of the 
Kurdish struggle, namely Ibrahim Ahmed, Jalal Talabani, Omar Mustafa, Nuri 
Shawais, and Ali Abdullah. 69 The orientation of the party remained clearly socialist, 
even though Barzani remained President-in-exile. 70 
4.2.1.4 Conclusion 
Changing social conditions in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan and leftist expressions of Arab 
and Kurdish nationalism encouraged the Kurdish tribes to distance themselves from 
invincible mythical leader. His conclusion is that the KDP leadership was of weak personality and 
feeble character (Amin (1999) op. cit. ). 
65 O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., p. 58. 
66 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 299. 
67 Ibid. 
68 ibid. 
69 O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., p. 61. 
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the Iraqi monarchy. Similarly, the KDP was also reacting to events in the Middle 
East. By 1958, the KDP had been in touch with the Free Officers of Iraq, chaired by 
Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassim, who sought the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy and 
establish a democratic state in Iraq. 71 
4.2.2 The Free Officers Coup 
The Free Officers overthrew the monarchy and seized power on the 14 July 1958. In 
an effort to unify the country and to broaden his support base, Kassim needed the 
support of the Kurds, and followed a pro-Kurdish policy. 72 On 27 July 1958, the 
Provisional Constitution was announced, and Article 23 stated that: "The Kurds and 
the Arabs are partners within this [the Iraqi] nation. The Constitution guarantees 
their rights within the framework of the Iraqi Republic. , 73 
Kassim also released numerous Kurds and Barzani himself was pardoned for his 
previous insurrections and, after several rounds of negotiations between Ibrahim 
Ahmed and the GOI including an appeal to President Nasser of Egypt, was formally 
invited to return to Iraq. On 6 October 1958, he returned to Baghdad from exile. 74 
4.2.2.1 The Return of Barzani 
Barzani arrived back in Iraq on 6 October to a KDP greatly different to the 
organization he left behind. Barzani's return was not greeted with enthusiasm beyond 
his own tribe. Tribal enemies of the Barzanis feared that they would lose the Barzani 
land granted to them by the GOI after Barzani was exiled, and within the KDP, there 
was open animosity between Ibrahim Ahmed and Barzani 75 Barzani in particular 
was displeased with the overtly socialist orientation the KDP had developed during 
his years in exile. 76 However; each realised that they needed the other. Ghareeb 
suggests that; 
70 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 300. 
71 O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., pp. 61-62; McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 300. 
72 Zäid (1970) op. cit., p. 7; O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., pp. 62-63; Taubinger (1975) "Suffering and 
Struggle of the Kurds, " Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A World Survey, 
Vol. 1. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 250; Ghareeb (1981) op. cit., p. 38. 
73 Ghareeb (1981) op. cit., p. 38. '° Gunter (1993a) op. cit., p. 11; Amin (1999) op. cit. Amin notes how the Abdel-Karim Kassim was 
not in favour of the return of Barzani, and instead it was facilitated by Abdussalam Arif, the Deputy 
Prime Minister. 
's' Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 5 September 2000. 
76 Ghareeb (1981) op. cit., p. 39. 
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"A marriage of convenience, albeit with suspicion on both sides, 
seems to have been struck between the KDP intellectuals and Barzani. 
They needed a strong figure who had popular appeal and military 
strength, and he needed a structure through which to act and receive 
advice. "77 
4.2.2.2 The Impact of the Agricultural Reforms of Kassim 
The return of Barzani coincided with further socio-economic upheavals from which 
he would subsequently benefit. The tribal-urban division within Kurdish society was 
polarised by the impact of the domestic policies of Kassim. In 1958, Kassim enacted 
his' reform of agricultural lands, which were against the interests of the major land 
owning tribes. 78 To protect their interests, the tribes recognised the ability of Barzani 
to effect an alteration in the policies of the GOI, and a secret agreement was reached 
with Barzani promising to stop or hinder the reforms in return for the support of the 
tribes. Conversely, the Kurdish Union of Farmers joined the KDP in an attempt to 
weaken the feudal system of Kurdistan. At this point, the line was drawn between 
feudals and farmers, and they were fighting for self-interest above anything else. 
Commentating on this division, Dr Kamal Khoshnaw noted that "there was a division 
according to interest .... even the Political Bureau of the KDP did not have the 
power to motivate people politically, it was purely interest driven. "79 
Within Iraq as a whole, Kassim was surviving politically by gaining the support of 
different political groupings and, invariably, turning against them when they grew 
more powerful under his patronage. Kassim had become extremely concerned about 
the growth of Communism in Iraq, and the ICP in particular. Barzani therefore drew 
the KDP away from the ICP, contrary to the wishes of Ibrahim Ahmed, and purged 
the party of communist members who had joined in the period of cooperation 
between the two groups. The U-KDP then reverted back to the KDP label. 
"Ibid. 
'a See Gabbay (1978) Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq. London: Croom Helm; Jawad (1979) 
"The Kurdish Problem in Iraq, " in Kelidar, (ed. ), 1979 The Integration of Modern Iraq. London: 
Croom Helm, p. 175; Ockerman & Samano (1985) op. cit.; Hussein (1990) "Iraq's Agricultural Land 
Use Program, " in A. Salman (ed. ), Agriculture in the Middle East. New York: Paragon; Hassanpour 
(1994) "The Kurdish Experience" Middle East Report 189, no. 24 (July - August 1994), pp. 2-7, p. 5. 
79 Interview with Dr Kamal Khoshnaw, Suleimaniyah, 20 June 1998. Dr Kamal was part of the 
delegation responsible for assisting in the reconciliation between Barzani and the Political Bureau in 
the mid-1960s. 
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However, the KDP was to suffer a similar fate as the ICP, as Kassim predictably 
decided that the KDP and the Barzanis were becoming too powerful a factor in 
exerting control over the north of the country. 80 As the KDP was holding its Fifth 
Congress in May 1960, Kassim was meeting with the Surchi and Herki tribes, 
enemies of the Barzanis. Inter-tribal fighting characterised the summer of 1959 as 
Kassim's policy of weakening the Kurds came into effect and saw the Barzanis 
pitched against the Lolans and the Pishdaris, among others. However, Barzani's 
success in defeating his foes forced Kassim to acknowledge his power and, 
conversely, his unpopularity among the other tribes. 81 
4.2.2.3 The Road to Rebellion 
Relations between the GOI and the Kurds from 1960 deteriorated rapidly. Fighting in 
Iraqi Kurdistan was nearly all tribally-based, with no involvement from the KDP. 
However, they were implicated with Barzani in the progression of events. Control of 
the KDP remained with the Political Bureau of Ibrahim Ahmed based in Baghdad, 
however, both sides were dependent upon each other, and, while the Political Bureau 
remained critical of Barzani, it continued to support him as leader. 
In March 1961, Barzani returned to Barzan from Baghdad. In June, both Barzani and 
the KDP presented a request to the GOI for the use of the Kurdish language in 
Kurdish schools, and for a share of the oil revenues of the Mosul and Kirkuk 
oilfields. The requests were rejected. The KDP again presented the petition, but with 
no reply. 82 
Descent into rebellion happened almost inadvertently. The first to revolt where the 
landholders who sought to reverse the agrarian reforms of the 1950s. Simultaneously, 
as the GOI's grip on the northern governorates began to weaken, Barzani took the 
opportunity to attack those tribes who had fought against him, and by mid-August 
1961 Barzani had a firm grip on the north. The final part of the revolt was the 
eo O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., pp. 68-69; Ghareeb (1981) op. cit., p. 39. 81 O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., p. 71; Taubinger (1975) op. cit., p. 250. 82 The reasons why the GOI rejected the demands are'identical to why they have consistently rejected 
Kurdish demands previously and afterwards (such as control of resources, the geopolitical problems of 
creating separate armed forces, and that the Kurds already had a reasonable degree of recognition). For 
further details, see al-Kanaani (1965) Limelight on the North of Iraq. Baghdad: Dar al-Jumhuriya, 
quoted in Gunter (1993a) op. cit., p. 12. 
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mobilization of Barzani's forces on the side of other rebelling Kurdish tribes after the 
airforce of the GOI responded to guerrilla attacks with indiscriminate bombing. 
McDowall notes that: 
"Kassim had, in effect, brought together two distinct Kurdish tribal 
groups, the old reactionary chiefs out essentially to protect their 
landed interests and Barzani whose agenda was a blend of tribalism 
s83 and nationalism. 
This unity between the tribes and Barzani explains why he was able to assume such a 
powerful position within a relatively short period of time. 84 Barzani reacted to the 
attacks of the GOI by issuing a proclamation to all Kurds on the 11 September 1961 
urging them to take up arms against the Iraqi forces. Since this time, the struggle 
between the Kurds of Iraq and the GOI has been going on until the present day. It 
was also the time to which some form of control of Iraqi Kurdish territory by the 
Kurds themselves can be traced. 85 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
The tensions which characterised Iraqi Kurdish politics throughout the second half of 
the twentieth century existed in the fledgling KDP. The KDP had been formed by an 
uneasy alliance of tribal and urban-leftist elements, with both attempting to take 
advantage of the other, but with the urban-leftists falling into the alliance with the 
tribes through the charisma and achievements of Barzani. The arrival of more radical 
and energetic leftists such as Ibrahim Ahmed again strengthened the left and the 
scene was set for the future internecine political fights which came to characterise 
Kurdish politics from then on. 
4.3 The Development of the System: The Kurdish Revolution, 1961-1975 
Kurdish political events in the 1960s took place against a backdrop of a series of 
rebellions against the GOI, and a series of coups within it. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
83 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 310. 
84 Gunter poses the question as to how Barzani achieved this popularity and concludes that it was 
through a combination of communist propagandists and Barzani's involvement with the 1943 revolt 
and the Republic of Mahabad: However, Kurdish revolutionary sentiment has shown to be dominated 
mainly by economic concerns and this rebellion is no different. Bauani benefited from the impact of 
agricultural reforms on the landed classes. (Gunter (1993a) op. cit., p. 13). 8 Taubinger (1975) op. cit., p. 250; interviews with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 April 1998; 
Franso Hariri, Erbil, 23 April 1998. 
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interrelationships between the tribal and urban Kurds, and the GOI. 86 The Kassim 
regime was replaced by the Ba'ath Party on 8 February 1963, which was in turn 
overthrown on 18 November 1963 by the army under Abdul Salam Aref. When 
President Aref was killed in a plane crash on 14 April 1966, his brother, Abdul 
Rahman Aref, assumed power. The Ba'ath Party again resumed power on 17 July 
1968 under the Presidency of Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, and his Vice-President 
Saddam Hussein. 87 Alongside this unstable situation, the Kurdish political arena was 
characterised by in-fighting with the left-wing of the KDP becoming increasingly 
exasperated with Barzani. 
A theme for this section is one of a massively unstable political situation in which the 
leftist-tribal split amongst the Kurds polarises Kurdish politics into the alignments 
which would characterise the political system in the 1990s. In this section, the 
progression of the Kurdish Revolution is noted and referenced, with the main focus 
of this section to bring out the polarisation which occurs in Kurdish politics, and the 
manner in which the GOI uses, or is used by, Kurdish political characters. 
4.3.1 The September 1961 Revolution 
The Kurdish revolt began in earnest by March of 1961. The first stage of Barzani's 
strategy was to consolidate his hold on the mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan by 
fighting his old enemies, the Lolani and Zebari tribes. 88 The revolt escalated when 
Barzani's allies, the Arkou, attacked a military column. Kassim's response of the 
indiscriminate aerial bombing of rural areas, including Barzan villages, resulted in 
the Barzanis and other tribes rebelling. By the end of September Barzani controlled a 
swathe of land stretching from Zakho to Suleimaniyah. 89 It is likely that Barzani's 
motives for fighting were more tribal than national at first. Apart from a few isolated 
cases over which Barzani had little or no control, neither the Barzanis nor their allies 
made concerted attacks against the Iraqi army. 90 
86 Sources for figure 4.2: O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., pp. 74-163; Taubinger (1975) op. cit., pp. 251- 
258; Vanly (1980) op. cit., pp. 151-177; McDowall (1996) op. cit., pp. 323.339; O'Ballancc (1996) 
o, cit., pp. 81-99; Ghafour (1997) op. cit., pp. 18-41. Key as for Figure 4.1. e Taubinger (1975) op. cit., pp. 251-254. 88 McDowall (1996) op. cit., pp. 309-3 10; O'Ballance (1996) op. cit., p. 47. 891bid. 
90 O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., p. 75. 
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4-3.1.1 Kassim's Offensive 
Kassim's forces encountered little difficulty in retaking the urban areas and 
connecting roads. However, Barzani retained the mountainous areas. Kassim 
therefore targeted the rural infrastructure by bombing the mountain villages, resulting 
in the destruction of almost 300 villages before the end of the year. 91 
Prior to the commencement of the revolution, the KDP had chosen to remain 
removed from the fighting, considering any sort of clash with the Iraqi army to be 
unfavourable. 92 However, on 24 September, Kassim declared the KDP to be illegal, 
thereby forcing the party to join the rebellion. 93 Within the KDP there had been great 
discussions concerning the role of the party in the rebellion. Talabani believed that 
the KDP should attempt to take over the leadership of the rebellion and use it for 
nationalist purposes, whereas Ahmed believed that the rebellion was totally contrary 
to the aims and ideals of the KDP. Furthemore, Ahmed still had the experience of 
Mahabad on his mind and believed that the KDP might disintegrate under the strain 
of war, particularly as neither the mountain tribesman nor outside support could be 
guaranteed. However, Talabani wanted to take advantage of the fact that the Iraqi 
army was a third Kurdish, whom he believed would support the KDP. Talabani 
travelled to see Barzani, who requested the KDP to wait unless Kassim attacked. The 
KDP Central Committee convened in December 1961 after several months of 
separation at Chami Rezan and decided to mount a reorganization of the revolt, and 
94 set about re-establishing relations with Barzani. 
4.3.1.1.1 The Formation of the Peshmerga 
Even though the KDP allied itself with Barzani,, it was forbidden by him to operate in 
his spheres of influence and instead operated between Raniya and Suleimaniyah. 
91 Ibid., p. 48. 
92 Amin (1999) op. cit. Nawshirwan Mustafa notes a Kurdish saying from the time as being `Barzani 
and the politburo were in two very distant valleys, ' (i. e. they acted separately and one did not know 
what the other was doing). The politburo eventually sent Talabani to the north from Baghdad to assess 
the situation, and he decided that it was the right time to mount a revolt. 
97 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 310. The KDP political bureau were scattered in an utter state of 
confusion after the first attack of the Iraqi army: Ibrahim Ahmed and Nuri Shawais remained in 
Baghdad; Talabani was in Chami Rezan; and Ali Askari and Ahmed Abdulla were in the Bahdinan 
region (Amin (1999) op. cit. ). 94 Amin (1999) op. cit. Nawshirwan notes that the cadre responsible for this task was Ali Abdulla, 
later to become Secretary-General of the KDP in the 1990s under the Presidency of Massoud Barzani, 
was derided by Barzani for hiding instead of fighting on his return from meeting with the Barzanis. 
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This division of territory was a reflection of the territorial division between the 
support bases of Barzani on the one hand and the Political Bureau of the KDP on the 
other. 95 
Ever wary of forming dependencies on the tribal militia of Barzani, the KDP Central 
Committee promoted the establishment of a regular-style armed force, which 
included the solidification of the branch structure of the party, and clandestinely 
revived urban party organizations, including a covert one within the police forces of 
Erbil and Suleimaniyah. 96 Barzani was reluctant to form such a unit, and so the KDP 
established a standing force in their sector which became known as the peshmerga. 
As more officers deserted from the ranks of the Iraqi army, the peshmerga numbers 
swelled, numbering approximately 15,000 men by September 1962.7 As to be 
expected from the influx of army personnel, the structural organization of the 
peshmerga commenced with Small platoons (dasteh) numbering approximately 10 
peshmerga, to companies (pel) of 30peshmerga, and to battalions (sar pel) of 120.98 
Within its region, the KDP organised four regional headquarters. Ibrahim Ahmed 
commanded Malouma near the border with Iran. Talabani commanded the Rizgari 
Force from the Chamirezan Headquarters to the north of Suleimaniyah; Omer 
Mustafa commanded the Kawa Force from Betwata; Ali Askari commanded the 
Khabat Force from Chwarta; and the Third and Fourth Forces of Qaradagh were 
commanded by Kamal Mufti, a renegade Iraqi-Kurdish army officer. 99 
It is important to note the impact of the formation of the peshmerga on the structure 
of the KDP and, subsequently, PUK. Due to the location of the KDP in the 
mountains of Raniya, the initial intake of the new force was predominantly tribal, 
with Kurdish deserters from the Iraqi army giving it some semblance of regular 
military organization. To this group was gradually added a mix of urbanised Kurds 
which provided the germ of Kurdish nationalism promoted by the urbanite KDP. The 
peshmerga had many problems at first, particularly as the tribal Kurds were reluctant 
95 O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., p. 79. 
96 Amin (1999) op. cit. 97 O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., p. 85. 
91 Figures from Amin (1999) op. cit. 
99 Amin (1999) op. cit.; interview with Kamal Mufti, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 1998. 
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to accept military discipline. However, the army discipline managed to develop them 
into a rough mountain army, with the peshmerga of the KDP being more politically 
and ideologically motivated than Barzani's undisciplined tribal militia. 100 Such 
organizational divisions were also reflected in the leadership, with two separate 
leaderships developing in the field representing the two different wings of the 
movement. Barzani controlled the Bahdinan, Choman, Rowanduz and Shaqlawa 
regions, and the Political Bureau controlled Suleimaniyah, Kirkuk and Erbil. 1° 
4.3.1.1.2 The Fall of Kassim 
By 1962 the war was going the way of the rebels, and Kassim was becoming 
politically isolated. The KDP had identified the Free Officers movement and the 
Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party (Ba'ath) as being the best placed to stage a coup against 
Kassim and assured the Ba'ath Party that they would not exploit the weak Iraqi army 
in the north while the coup was underway. In return it received assurances regarding 
autonomy. 102 The coup against Kassim occurred on 8 February 1963 and was 
undertaken by a group of Free Officers, with Ba'ath . Party involvement. The 
victorious junta, named the National Council of the Revolutionary Command 
(NCRC), appointed Colonel Abdul Salam Aref as President and Ahmed Hassan Al- 
Bakr as Prime Minister. 
4.3.2 The Kurds Divided 
The Kurds kept to their word and hostilities ceased after the coup d'etat. However, 
Barzani was unwilling to give unreserved support until Kurdish demands were met, 
which included a ceasefire, the release of prisoners of war, compensation for the 
injured, the removal of those responsible for torturing Kurds, and an official 
declaration of autonomy with Kurdish participation in the new central GOI. Barzani 
also demanded that a KRG should be established which was to have power over 
domestic affairs. 103 
The attitude of the Ba'athist regime became increasingly' antagonistic to the Kurds. 
Negotiations were further complicated by the potential union of Iraq and Syria,. 
10° O'Ballance (1973) op. cit., pp. 85-86. 101 Amin (1999) op. cit. 102 McDowall (1996) op. cit., pp. 312-313; O'Ballance (1973) op. Fit., pp. 95-96. 
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which would have resulted in the Kurds becoming a minority of 2 million in 13 
million, 'in an Arab dominated state. Similarly, the push towards Arab Nationalism by 
the Egyptian President Nasser did not leave much opportunity for Kurdish 
nationalism in territory considered by Arab nationalists as Arab land. '°4 
In subsequent meetings between Barzani and the GOI, Barzani increased his 
demands for an autonomous province to include the governorates of Erbil, 
Suleimaniyah, and Kirkuk, and parts of Mosul and Diyala governorates; that 1/3 of oil 
revenues to be devoted to the Kurds; that the Vice-President of Iraq be Kurdish; that 
1/3 of all seats in the GO! go to Kurds and that the Deputy Chief of Staff be 
Kurdish. 105 He further threatened to re-open Kurdish attacks if the GOI did not agree 
within three days. 
4.3.2.1 Recommencment of Fighting 
President Aref concluded that there was no' alternative but to fight. The NCRC 
announced that it was beginning military operations against the Kurds on 10 June 
1963. The Kurdish delegation negotiating with the NCRC was arrested as were 
Kurds in Baghdad and, simultaneously, Iraqi forces opened a major offensive against 
the peshmerga. 106 While the Iraqi army succeeded in capturing the urban areas, the 
Kurdish forces provided stiff resistance in their mountain strongholds and, with the 
ousting of the Ba'ath-dominated government by Abdul Salam Aref in November 
1963, the army's push against the Kurds collapsed. 107 
The relationship between Barzani and AS Aref appeared to be strong, to the point 
that there was some communication between the two of them before the coup. This 
was reflected by Barzani's acceptance of a cease-fire with the GOI on 10 February 
1964 without prior consultation with the KDP, creating serious friction between 
himself and the Political Bureau. The situation was made worse when the new 
103 Taubinger (1975) op. cit., p. 251; McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 313. 
104 Taubinger (1975) op. cit., p. 251; O'Ballance (1973) op. cit, pp. 100-101. Talabani, in negotiations 
with Nasser at this time, was assured of his sympathy for the Kurds, but not for their autonomy. 
10' O'Ballance (1973) op. cit.,. P. 101. McDowall provides a slightly different account, with the 
demands including a separate Kurdish armed forces, and that Kurdistan should receive 2/3 of the 
national oil revenue (McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 314). 
106 Taubinger (1975) op. cit., p. 251. 
107 Ghareeb (1981) op. cit., p. 67. 
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Provisional Constitution offered far less to the Kurds than previous agreements. 
Barzani had put his name to an agreement which omitted any mention of self. 
administration, let alone Kurdish autonomy, infuriating the Political Bureau. )°8 
4.3.2.2 The KDP Divided and the Aggregation ofLeft- WVin. Q Groupings 
The actions of Barzani created serious tensions in the ranks of the KDP. Whether 
Barzani did this to create a division and thereby have reason to attack the left wing of 
the KDP is unknown. However, his acceptance of an alliance with the new regime, 
the issuing of a warning stating that resistance to government forces would constitute 
a declaration of war against the Barzanis, and his indicating to the GOI that he had no 
objection to the abolition of political parties, certainly suggests that this was a plan to 
split the left-wing off the KDP. '09 
Kurdistan was totally divided. The KDP Political Bureau, which included Ibrahim 
Ahmed, Jalal Talabani, and Omer Mustafa vehemently opposed Barzani's actions 
which they described as being autocratic. ' 10 The Political Bureau travelled to Raniya 
to meet with Barzani and debate the agreement reached with the GOI. They argued 
that the agreement gave much less than Kurdish aspirations, whereas Barzani argued 
that the Kurdish people were tired and would be able to force autonomy at a later 
point. The Political Bureau attempted to create a negotiating body between Barzani 
and the KDP to 'present Kurdish demands to the GOI, but was blocked by Barzani, 
who instead demanded the resignation of Ibrahim Ahmed as Secretary-General. 
The response of the Political Bureau was to hold a conference in Mawat on 4-9 April 
1964. Attended by approximately 70 members, the conference resulted in the 
Political Bureau stripping Barzani of his authority to negotiate with the GOI. In 
response, Barzani expelled key peshmerga commanders including Omer Mustafa, Ali 
Askari, Kamal Mufti and Talabani. In the mind of Talabani, the KDP ceased to exist 
after 1964 due to the expulsion of its most capable members. 
' 1 
i°e lbid, p. 40; McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 31S. 
109 McDowall (1996) op. cit., pp. 315-316. 
110 Interviews with Kamal Mufti, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 1998; Kamal Khoshnaw, Suleimaniyah, 20 
June 1998. 
111 Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, '5 September 2000. 
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However, Barzani's influence proved to be strong, particularly as he was famed for 
reviewing his forces in the field compared to Ibrahim Ahmed who rarely undertook 
reviews. The result was the KDP rank-and-file carrying out Barzani's decisions, with 
the Political Bureau being ignored. ' 12 To legalise his own decisions within the KDP, 
Barzani convened his own Sixth Congress in Baghdad where fourteen of the former 
members of the leadership were charged with treason and expelled, allowing him to 
form a new leadership. 113 Many commentators identify the events of 1964 as 
heralding the origin of the PUK. Nawshirwan Mustafa contends that; 
"In the history of the political movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, 1964 
constitutes an ominous turning point, whose ramifications are deep- 
rooted in the Kurdish movement. The conflict between the leader of 
the party and the secretary-general penetrated into the core of the 
political and military organizations of the party and subsequently into 
all the people and the Kurdish movement and formed the inception 
and starting point of a permanent civil war. "' 14 
However, this split should not be seen as the first alignment of what was to become 
the PUK. Important members of the contemporary PUK, such as Dr Fu'ad Massoum 
and Adil Morad, apart from Talabani, remained allied with Barzani in 1964. 
Similarly, characters who would later become staunch Maoists and core members of 
the PUK displayed considerable unity with Barzani against the Talabani-Ahmed line. 
4.3.2.3 An Analysis of the Division 
Within the Political Bureau, three separate groups developed attempting to identify 
the best strategy of handling the division. The first group, which included 
Nawshirwan Mustafa, urged the Political Bureau to support the actions of Barzani; 
the second group, which included Shahab Shiekh Nuri, wanted the Political Bureau 
to fully support the Ahmed-Talabani line and split with Barzani, and; the third group, 
which included Abdel Sittar and Mulla Abdulla Mutto, espoused an additional 
strategy of supporting the GOI. Many members who would later became radical 
112 Amin (1999) op. cit. 
1" Those expelled included: Ibrahim Ahmed, Nuri Shawaise, All Abdulla, Omer Mustafa, Jalal 
Talabani, Hilmi All Sharif, Mulla Abdulla, and Sa'id Aziz Shamzini. The new leadership was formed 
from: Habeeb Karim, Dr. Mahmoud Othman, Salih Yousufi, Isma'il Arif, Abduli Soran, Siddiq Amin, 
Omer Sharif, Sheikh Muhammad of Harseen, Aziz Aqrawi, Dr. Fu'ad Jalal, Ali Sinjari and Yadulla 
Faili (Amin (1999) op, cit. ). 114 Ibid. 
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members of left-wing parties, such as Nawshirwan Mustafa, chose to stay with 
Barzani due to an understanding of realpolitik rather than any liking for him. ' 15 
One of the intermediaries between the Political Bureau and Barzani, Dr Kamal 
Khoshnaw, noted the futility of opposing Barzani and the GOI. They felt that in order 
to have any hope of surviving as a political unit, they had to exist in the mountains 
with Barzani and attempt to promote their left-wing ideals from within the party, 
rather than being part of a smaller faction with support only in urban areas which 
were occupied by the Iraqi army-116 Such astute political thinking characterised the 
actions of Nawshirwan Mustafa in particular. 
However, the Ahmed-Talabani faction remained opposed to Barzani. After they tried 
to rally support against Barzani, he expelled them from the KDP Central Committee 
and drove them and their 4; 000 followers into Iran in July 1964. Barzani then 
demanded autonomy from Aref, using the very arguments of Ahmed and Talabani, 
and increasing his demands to include the oilfields of Kirkuk in October, forcing the 
GOI to launch an offensive against Kurdistan in March 1965. 
The death of the Iraqi President Abdul Salam Aref in a helicopter crash in 1965 
resulted in a ceasefire, but fighting was resumed with the assumption to power of 
Abdul Rahman Aref in 1966. The attempts of Prime Minister Bazzaz to secure peace 
appeared at first to be successful with a 15-point offer, the Bazzaz Declaration, 
fulfilling most of the Kurdish demands. However, army officers forced Aref to put 
pressure on Bazzaz, resulting in his resignation. His successor, Naji Taleb, an army 
officer, did not have any intention of implementing the Bazzaz Declaration. 117 
The disagreements between Barzani and the Ahmed-Talabani faction had not been 
forgotten, and had now developed into a bitter, feud. The faction again broke, with 
Barzani in January of 1966 and commenced hostilities against him, this time funded 
by the GOI and in cooperation with the jash, the Kurdish tribes fighting on the'side 
of the government. 
1 15 Interview with Kamal Khoshnaw, Suleimaniyah, 20 June 1998. 
116 Ibid. 
117 McDowall (1996) op. cit., pp. 317-320. 
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During this period, a ceasefire was in effect. Barzani used it to again consolidate his 
hold in Kurdistan, and increased his demands to the GO[, and it was at this time that 
the infamous link to Israel and also , 
to Iran was developed. The link to these 
ideological enemies of the Iraqi regime proved to be devastating for the GOI. Faced 
with Kurdish peshmerga benefiting from Israeli assistance, and the capacity given by 
Iran to the peshmerga that they could evacuate to safe areas at times of attack by the 
Iraqi forces, resulted in the Iraqi military unable to deal with the Kurds. The 
weakness of the regime allowed the Second Ba'athist Coup to take place in 1968 
under the leadership of Hassan Al-Baler. 
4.3.3 The Kurds Under the Ba'ath 
The Ba'ath Party staged a coup d'etat against the regime of Abdul Rahman Aref on 
17 July 1968, with Ahmed Hassan AI"Bakr becoming President. The party also 
declared that it intended to respect the aspirations of the Kurdish people and the 
declaration of the Bazzaz programme. However, this was probably more of an 
expression of the party's opposition to the previous regime rather than attempting to 
reach a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue. 8 
4.3.3.1 Internecine Fighti 
Barzani was not supportive of this new Ba'ath position. Both sides were greatly 
suspicious of each other, particularly as Barzani had assisted Aref in bringing the 
Ba'ath regime down in 1963, and the Ba'ath offensive of 1963 had been one of the 
fiercest assaults against the Kurds. 19 However, the position of the Ahmed-Talabani 
faction, which was now in opposition to Barzani, was one of reconciliation with the 
new regime. The two groups fought sporadically in Iraqi Kurdistan in the autumn of 
1968. The Ba'ath preferred to deal with the Ahmed-Talabani faction as they were 
seen to be ideologically similar. 
However, Barzani retained military supremacy in Kurdistan. He attacked oil 
installations in Kirkuk at the beginning of 1969, and was having little trouble in 
1" Ghareeb (198 1) op. cit., p. 73. 119 /bid, pp. 74-75. 
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keeping the forces of the Ahmed-Talabani faction in check. 120 Fighting escalated 
throughout the summer, with the GOI backing the Ahmed-Talabani faction, and Iran 
supplying Barzani. Interestingly, the ICP also backed Barzani due to its hostile 
attitude towards the Ba'ath. However, the Ba'ath proceeded to consolidate its 
position and won over some Kurdish sentiment by granting lesser requests such as 
the establishment of the Kurdish new year (Nawruz) as a national holiday, the 
teaching of Kurdish in all Iraqi schools, the establishment of the University of 
Suleimaniyah, and the formation of Dohuk Governorate. 
4.3.3.2 Ba'ath - Barzani Rapproachment 
The success of Barzani against the Ahmed-Talabani faction forced the GOI to 
negotiate with Barzani. The potential for outmanouevring the Ahmed-Talabani 
faction led Barzani into negotiations with the GOI in December 1969. The talks 
between the two parties stalled on the status of Kirkuk, with Barzani wanting it to be 
included in any autonomous Kurdish region. The Ba'ath insisted that the demarcation 
of the autonomous region would depend on where there was a proven majority, and 
that this would be decided either by plebiscite or census. 
121 
The Ba'ath, ever concerned about the stability of their regime and the destructive 
effect the Kurds had had on their last period in power, were eager to obtain some 
form of agreement with the Barzani. The Vice-President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, 
travelled to Kurdistan to meet with Barzani, who was presented with blank sheets of 
paper and told to write his demands. Saddam took back to Baghdad details that led to 
the March Agreement. 
4.3.4 The March Agreement änd the Ashbatal ' 
The March Agreement was the best deal ever offered to the Iraqi Kurds. At the time 
of signing, the Agreement was hailed as a sincere move towards solving the Kurdish 
problem by all parties. Although Barzani still did not trust the Ba'ath, Kurdish 
opinion was strong enough for him to sign the agreement. For the Ba'ath regime, the 
120 Ibid, p. 77. 
121 McDowall (1996) op. cit., pp. 326-327. 
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agreement was born out of grim geopolitical necessity as, apart from the Kurds, the 
Ba'ath had no actual or potential political allies within Iraq. 122 
The GOI kept to its word in the implementation of the Agreement. A commission 
comprised of four Kurds and four Arabs was established, President al-Bakr 
reshuffled his cabinet appointing five Kurds in the process, and Barzani-KDP 
members were appointed as Governors of Suleimaniyah, Erbil and Dohuk. By the 
end of April, the Kurdish language was starting to be used in Kurdistan, Kurdish 
journals appeared and public organizations established. 123 
4.3.4.1 The Golden Period 
One of the Kurdish negotiators of the March Agreement, Sami Abdul Rahman, 
described it as being the start of a "golden period". The period 1970-1974 saw de 
facto autonomy throughout the region with the KDP effectively controlling the 
region through the appointment of the governors. During this periods the Kurds 
learned the techniques of administration and governance. Sarni was appointed the 
Minister of Northern Affairs, and, with reference to the period, noted that; 
"[During 1970-1974 the Kurds gained] four years [experience] of 
direct governance and administration in Erbil, Dohuk and 
Suleimaniyah governorates .... Kurds were also represented 
by five 
cabinet ministers in Baghdad During this period, the KDP had a 
strong militaryforce, and Kurdistan was peaceful 99124 
However, the trust between the KDP and the Ba'ath Party did not last for long. At the 
end of 1970 and attempt was made upon the life of Barzani's eldest son, Idris, in 
Baghdad,. and arguments raged throughout 1971 concerning the demographic 
alteration of Kurdish areas by government Arabization policies. 125 Conversely, the 
Ba'ath suspected the Kurds of packing Kirkuk with Kurds from Iran and Turkey. 
Relations between the Ba'ath and Barzani deteriorated to the point when Barzani 
advocated taking up arms over the status of Kirkuk, and the GOI attempted to 
assassinate Barzani himself in September 1971. 
122 See The Times, 4 July 1970; McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 328. 
123 Ibid, p. 329. 
124 Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 April 1998. 
125 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 329. 
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4.3.4.2 The Involvement of External Powers 
Barzani raised the stakes and demanded additional items to be included in the March 
Agreement, including the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Kurdistan, and the 
inclusion of Kurds into the power-holding Revolutionary Command Council. 1972 
saw Barzani behave increasingly antagonistically towards the government, 
particularly by not sealing the border with Iran, as required by the March Agreement, 
and appealing to the US for aid. The nationalisation of the oil industry by the GOI in 
1972 drew the US closer to Barzani, as it did not like losing control of Iraqi oil. 126 
However, the KDP misjudged the situation. US policy towards the Kurds was one of 
keeping a delicate status quo in effect in order to secure its own vital interests, a 
policy which has arguably persisted to the present day. Having supported Israel 
during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War by occupying units of the Iraqi army in Kurdistan, 
Barzani also received Israeli support in return. The GOI was therefore massively 
concerned about the involvement of the Kurds with three rivals of the regime, 
namely the US, Iran and Israel. Both sides verbally attacked-the other for not keeping 
to the terms of the agreement and the strength of the attacks brought about the 
collapse of the agreement. Both sides were guilty of failings which caused irreparable 
damage to the intrinsically fragile working relationship. McDowall contends that: 
"While Baghdad had to accept that its reluctance to implement the 
spirit of the accord left Mulla Mustafa with the irresistible temptation 
of resuming foreign friendships, the Kurds had to recognize that their 
outright association with 'imperialist' enemies had cost them dear 
inside Iraq. s127 
In 1974, the Ba'ath regime went ahead with a development of the autonomy law, and 
chose to negotiate with 600. independent and anti-Barzani Kurds, including the 
Ahmed-Talabani faction. 129 The GOI also sought to create rifts in Kurdish society by 
claiming that the KDP no longer fought for the interests of the Kurdish nation. 
Barzani, increasingly dependent upon Iranian supplies and assistance, was similarly 
preparing for a confrontation. 
126 lbid, p. 331, quoting Ghareeb (1981) op. cit., p. 141. 
121 Ibid, p. 332. 
128 Ibid, p. 333. 
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4.3.4.3 The 19 74 Autonomy Law 
Negotiations between the two groups continuously floundered over the status of 
Kirkuk, with Barzani insisting'upon its inclusion in a Kurdish autonomous entity as 
capital of the region, and the GOI pursuing a policy of removing Kurds from the city 
and introducing Arab settlers. 129 However, the GOI was willing to allow the Kurds to 
have Chamchamal and Kalar, and allow for some form of Kurdish representation' in 
Kirkuk. Neither side was willing to budge, even though Erbil and Suleimaniyah were 
the two most important cities in terms of Kurdish culture, and arguably more suitable 
as a capital. 
The GOI published its Autonomy Law on 11 March 1974. Barzani was given a 
fortnight to accept its proposals and join the coalition of parties known as the 
National Front. The Autonomy Law offered the Kurds far more than they had ever 
previously received, but it still fell short of the 1970 Agreement, and Barzani's 
demands regarding Kirkuk. The law effectively took away the power enjoyed by the 
governors and handed it to the central ministries in Baghdad. The President of the 
Republic had ultimate powers over the Executive Council of the Autonomous 
Region, and all decisions were subject to the Supreme Courts in Baghdad. In 
discussing these laws, McDowall notes that "It is clear that these articles allowed 
Baghdad to retain powers which, by judicious exercise, could effectively strip the 
autonomous region of any real self-control. "130 Such opinions are supported by those 
Kurds who were part of the administrative system at the time. Sami Abdul Rahman 
stated that "In 1974 the Ba'ath offered autonomy of a diminished nature. In practice 
it was called Paper Autonomy, and secretariats existed which answered directly to 
Baghdad. s131 Barzani and the KDP formally rejected the Autonomy Law, prompting 
yet another split within the Central Committee of the KDP, with prominent members, 
including Barzani's eldest son Ubayd Allah Barzani, feeling compromised by 
Barzani's alliances with three of Iraq's enemies. 
By April, the sides were drawn for battle. However, because of the relationship with 
external powers, and particularly Iran, Barzani had prepared to fight in a 
129 /bid, p. 335. 
130 Ibid, p. 336. 
131 Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 April 1998. 
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conventional manner, which proved to be disastrous. The Iraqi army succeeded in 
capturing Amadia, Aqra, Raniya, Rowanduz and Qala Diza by mid-1974. The 
Iranians were forced to provide large amounts of overt support to Barzani, including 
the deploying of regular forces and artillery. However, the Kurdish forces remained 
far inferior to the Iraqi army. 
4.3.4.4 The Military Organization of the KDP 
During this time, the KDP can be viewed as divided between party and peshmerga 
affairs more so than in previous times. The peshmerga was still the dominant element 
of the party, with Zaid putting their numbers at 180,000-200,000 mobilised 
personnel, with 40,000 reserves. 132 They were divided into 3 divisions (presumably 
by governorate), and 17 brigades of varying size. 133 The leadership of the revolution 
was exercised through a structure known as the Command Council headed by 
Barzani and comprising 46 members who elected an Executive Bureau of 9 
members. The KDP was represented on each of these by, members of the Political 
Bureau and Central Committee. Figure 4.3 illustrates this' organizational structure 
and the dominance of the Barzanis over both the political and military wings. 
It would therefore seem that the division between the tribes and the intelligentsia 
would still be identifiable, with positions on the Executive and Command Councils 
being open to those tribal peshmerga commanders not actually in the KDP. The role 
of the Political Bureau was the political training of party cadres, the provision of' 
primary education in liberated areas, and the collection of taxes and management of 
the judiciary. 134 It is interesting to note that the Kurdish leadership had also formed a 
number of administrative organs in place of the executive bodies of the GOI. Such 
offices included finance, agriculture, interior, employment, health, justice and 
education. 135 
132 Zaid (1970) op. cit., p. 10. 
"3 Ibid. ' 
'34 Ibid. 
135 It is possible to identify some of the previous holders of these positions in the mountains now 
holding similar positions within the KRG. For example, Hackani Khadr (Khadr Hama Jan) of the PUK 
was once a military judge in the peshmerga (Hackani means judge). He was then made head of Erbil 
Asayash (secret police) and then Governor of Suleimaniyah. 
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Figure 4.3: Organizational Structure of KDP During the 1975 Revolution136 
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The Parastin became notorious as the secret information service ostensibly of the 
KDP but in reality of the Barzanis. Its tasks included collecting news and sundry 
information, facilitating assassinations and covert operations and sabotage. The 
number of Parastin personnel is impossible to ascertain, as is detail regarding the 
internal structure. However, as so much of the Iraqi Kurdish political structure seems 
to be based on a cellular-type arrangement, it is likely that the Parastin was so 
organized. The head of the organization in the mid-1970s was Massoud Barzani. In 
the 1990s, the head of this organization would become Nechervan Barzani, the son of 
Idris, and then after the Twelfth Congress of the KDP in, 1999, Massoud's son 
Masrour appears to be increasingly prominent. However, the position of Massoud 
within the Parastin (which would later be renamed Rechrastini Taybet) remains 
unparalleled and he has kept a predominant position within the organization. 
4.3.4.5 The Algiers Agreement and the Ashbatal 
The only possibility the Kurdish forces had against the GOI military was of a full- 
scale intervention on their behalf by Iran. However, it was not a particularly 
attractive option for the Iranians, particularly as the GOI had been in negotiations 
with them for months resulting in the Iraqis offering to cede the Shatt al-Arab 
waterway in return for Iran withdrawing its support for the insurgent Kurds. On 6 
March 1975, at the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
Conference in Algiers, Saddam and the Shah of Iran formally settled all outstanding 
border differences, with both parties agreeing to maintain border security and prevent 
subversive infiltration, effectively destroying the lifeline of the peshmerga. 13 7 The 
Kurdish forces were devastated by this agreement. Barzani, Muhsin Dizayee and 
Mahmoud Othman met with the Shah on 12 March and were told that all support was 
finished. 138 Barzani's decision to end the Kurdish revolution was, perhaps, one of his 
most contentious. Jalal Talabani, for example, still claims that the decision was made 
due to Barzani's tribal interests; 
137 Jalal Talabani claims that he was notified in Cairo by the Soviet KGB officer Yevgeni Primakov 
(later Prime Minister of Russia) of the Algiers Agreement in early 1975, but the Barzani leadership 
refused to believe him. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (1977) Revolution in Kurdistan: The Essential 
Documents of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. New York: PUK Publications, p. 1; McDowall (1996) 
oý. cit., p. 338; interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 5 September 2000. 
e Interview with Feyeradun Abdelkadir, Suleimaniyah, 10 August'1999. 
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"The feudal leadership (the Barzanis) surrendered because of the lack 
of support from the West. They (the Barzanis) still had thousands of 
people under arms, at least US$ 150 million, and stores of weapons 
and ammunition. He finished the revolution because of his position of leader of the tribe .... 
he wanted the money. " 139 
The decision to abandon fighting was taken on 23 March 1975, and thousands of 
Kurdish families sought refuge in Iran or surrendered to the Iraqi army. 140 With the 
collapse of the Kurdish Revolution, the Ba'ath was free to implement the Autonomy 
Law. 141 The KDP was no longer a political force in Kurdistan, and overt political 
activism had been neutralised. Those who split from the Central Committee of the 
KDP were appointed to the Executive Council, with Hashim Aqrawi chairing it. The 
GOI moved quickly to secure its hold on Iraqi Kurdistan. A security belt was created 
along the Iranian and Turkish borders to an eventual width of 30 kilometres, and 
villages within the belt were systematically destroyed, with 600,000 people being 
deported to the collective towns, or to southern Iraq. A policy of arabization was 
enforced, particularly in Kirkuk, and a policy of assimilation was encouraged. 
4.4 The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
The period after the collapse of the Kurdish Revolution can be seen as a watershed. 
With the loss of the omnipresent influence of Barzani from the region, and the 
evacuation of the KDP leadership to Iran, the field was left open for left-wing 
groupings. Some remnants of the KDP were active, but were now under the influence 
of a new leftist programme developed by new decision-makers within the party. 
Barzani's sons, Idris and Massoud, kept the Barzanis tied with the KDP, but they 
were now joined by a new line of commanders. However, this rump of the KDP was 
somewhat discredited amongst the Kurdish populace, and its support was limited to 
the Bahdinan areas. 142 Meanwhile, Talabani, now in Damascus, coordinated some 
left-wing groupings and formed what was to become one of the major organizations 
139 Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 5 September 2000. 
140 The PUK name this event the ashbatal, which refers to leaving a table when the food is ready for 
eating. The KDP do not use this term as it is, in effect, a criticism of Barzani's actions. Interview with 
Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 5 September 2000. 
141 See Catudal (1976) "The War in Kurdistan: End of a Nationalist Struggle? " International 
Relations, Vol. 5; Feili & Fromchuck (1976) "The Kurdish Struggle for Independence. " Middle East 
Review 9, No. 1 (Fall 1976), pp. 47-59. 142 Sheikhmous (1999) op. cit., p. 56. 
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in Kurdish politics, the PUK, from three groups displaying varying degrees of 
socialist ideology. 
Alongside these internal political developments, the GOI was quickly implementing 
the Autonomy Law of 1974, and incapacitating the ability of the peshmerga forces to 
base themselves in the mountains. The large-scale destruction of the Kurdish rural 
landscape commenced, with mass-deportations to the infamous collectives, and the 
razing of agricultural lands. 
This section aims to provide a basis for an understanding of the contemporary 
structures and decision-making processes of the political parties. A description and 
analysis of the establishment of the PUK is developed, and the position of the KDP 
in this period similarly forwarded. It is argued that the period between 1975 and 1980 
can be seen as extremely significant in the development of the contemporary 
situation. 
4.4.1 The Establishment of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
The PUK was officially established on 1 June 1975 with the aim of. 
"organizing the revolutionary, patriotic and democratic forces of the 
Kurdish people in the form of a broad democratic and patriotic front 
that allows the fighting unity and coexistence of the different 
progressive tendencies under the leadership of a Kurdish 
revolutionary vanguard. " 143 
The declaration, signed by the Founding Committee of the PUK and originating in 
Damascus, signified the re-commencement of opposition against the GOI, primarily 
through the party organizations of Komala and' Bezutnawa in Iraqi Kurdistan, with 
Heshtigishti coordinating the external affairs of the struggle. 144 At the establishment, 
"' Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (1977) op. cit., p. 6. 
144 The 'founding fathers' of the PUK were Jalal Talabani (Damascus) and Dr Fu'ad Massoum 
(Damascus). They then approached Adil Morad (Tehran) and Abdel Azad Faili (Tehran / Damascus). 
These four met in Damascus and provisionally founded the PUK. Talabani then travelled to Berlin and 
contacted Nawshirwan Mustafa (Vienna), Omar Sheikhmous (Stockholm) and Dr Kamal Fu'ad 
(Berlin). These seven wrote the Declaration of Foundation. Interviews with Nawshirwan Mustafa 
Amin, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999; Jalat Talabani, Kalarcholan, 5 September 2000. 
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therefore, PUK was not a unified party in the sense of the KDP, but was more of a 
broad semi-front. '45 
4.4.1.1 The Origins of the PUK 
Much has been written about the formation of the PUK. Most analysts state that the 
PUK formed as a result of the political vacuum of 1975, that the PUK was the heir to 
the KDP Political Bureau which split with Barzani in 1964,146 and that the PUK was 
directed by Talabani from Damascus. Within all of these comments, there are 
elements of truth, yet they are far too simplistic to portray what was the formation of 
perhaps the most complex of guerrilla movements / political parties in Iraq. Most 
importantly, the PUK did not form hastily, it had a lengthy period of planning and 
preparation behind it, as shown by the opening statement of the Declaration of 
Formation: 
"The formation of PUK was not a hasty and spontaneous action, as it 
is asserted by certain circles, on the contrary, it, was very long- 
processed synthesis of a revolutionary and realistic idea about the 
nature of the liberation movement, that engulfes many democratic, 
progressive and leftist tendencies that cannot be assembled within the 
ranks of a single political party. The emergence of PUK was a result 
of a conscious awareness of the needs of a liberation movement of an 
oppressed nation. " 147 
Furthermore, the origins of the PUK can be traced to other pervasive influences. The 
following three-fold division illustrates the formative influences of the PUK: 
1. The impact of the Ahmed-Talabani faction, and particularly the character of 
Talabani; 
2. The activities of other KDP Political Bureau members, and; 
3. Leftist influences and the formation of political groups with a Marxist, 
and increasingly Maoist, ideology. 
The three groupings are not discrete and the relationships between them are complex. 
To understand these relationships it is necessary to address the split of the KDP in 
1964, the growth of left-wing ideologies in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the formation of 
145 Interviews with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999; Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 14 
September 1999,5 September 2000. 
146 Gunter (1999b) op. cit., p. 72. 
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what was to become the core organization of the PUK, the Komala. 148 As the history 
of the genesis and development of the PUK is linked with the KDP, the following 
sections also provide an analysis of the KDP during the period. 
4.4.1.1.1 The 1964 Division 
Some commentators have stated that the division of 1964 is the origin of the PUK, 
with the Political Bureau developing in opposition to Barzani. However, while it may 
be seen as being the first development of some form of schism, there is little to 
suggest that this event can fully explain the subsequent rise of the PUK. During this 
period, key personnel of the future PUK remained alongside Barzani, and some of 
the anti-Barzani men of this time later became close allies. By 1970, the problem 
between Barzani and the Political Bureau was effectively finished, and Komala was 
established by totally separate people to the Political Bureau. 
Figure 4.4: Constituent Groupings of the PUK 
PUK Leadership 
(Damascus) 
Komala Heshtigishtl Bezutnawa 
Iraqi Kurdistan Damascus, Syria Iraqi Kurdistan 
Nawshirwan Mustafa Talabani All Askari 
Feyeradun Abdelkadir Dr Kamal Fu'ad Dr Khalid Said 
Talabani Dr Fu'ad Massourn Omer Mustafa 
(in Damascus) 
While the split of the Political Bureau is important in understanding the position of 
Talabani, it does not explain how he secured an increasing basis of widespread 
support and managed to form the PUK so quickly in 1975. Factors other than the 
split of 1964 must therefore be taken into consideration, particularly when it is 
"' Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (1977) op. cit., p. 15. 
i« Formally known as Marxist-Leninist Komala. 
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realised that the only member of the 1964 division of the contemporary PUK in a 
decision-making position is Talabani. 
4.4.1.1.2 The Influence of Maoist Doctrine 
During the late 1960s, young Iraqis as a whole, including Kurds, were drawn into the 
sphere of influence of socialist politics, with the result that political activism was 
coloured by left-wing ideals. However, the established set of left-wing ideology, that 
of Soviet Communism, was challenged by the Chinese Communists at the end of the 
1960s, with the result that the Chinese Communists became known as `Revisionists', 
effectively mixing communist internationalism with nationalist sentiment, leading 
national revolutions in a leftist manner. These changes reached Iraqi Kurdistan 
through left-wing parties in Iran, such as Tafan and Tuda, which were against the 
old-style Communist parties, and through Palestinian parties and literature. 149 
To young politically minded Kurds, such a combination of socialism with Kurdish 
nationalism proved to be highly attractive, particularly when faced with the 
increasing autocracy of Barzani and the infighting with the KDP Political Bureau. 
Feyeradun Abderkadir notes that "the new ideologies created a basis of criticism 
against both wings of the KDP, arguing that none had the capabilities to make the 
revolution a success. s150 
The impact of Maoism on the students of Iraqi Kurdistan grew, with many of today's 
high-ranking cadres of the PUK originating from this period. Most notable of these 
cadres is Nawshirwan Mustafa who, in 1969, published his own left-wing magazine 
named `Rizgary', in which the new ideology. was discussed with articles by himself 
and Talabani appearing. " These new ideologues were critical of both Barzani and 
the Ahmed-Talabani faction, yet still identified themselves with the Ahmed-Talabani 
faction, hence the involvement of Talabani with this group. The aims of the students 
appeared, at this stage, to be little more than trying to influence the KDP to adopt a 
149 For example, `Al-Hadaf published by the Palestinian Liberty Front. (Nuri (1998) My Memories In 
the Komala Organization, 1971-1983. Suleimaniyah, p. 5). Interviews with Feyeradun Abdelkadir, 
Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999; Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
150 Interview with Feyeradun Abdelkadir, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
151 Nawshirwan Mustafa owned Rizgary, and it was edited by Shafiq Sayigh (Interview with 
Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999). A further influential newspaper 
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socialist line rather than to promote a deeper, more militant, split. However, they 
would have a profound impact upon the direction of the Kurdistan national struggle 
within Iraq, and within the future PUK. 
4.4.1.2 The Formation of Komala 
"To understand the PUK, you have to first understand the Komala. " 152 
The student groupings of Iraqi Kurdistan in the late 1960s were therefore influenced 
by. three separate but interrelated inputs: 
1. The polarization of Iraqi Kurdish politics between Barzani and the Political 
Bureau; 
2. The introduction of new radical ideas, particularly Maoism, and; 
3. The involvement of Talabani with this new way of thinking and his 
involvement with the training of party cadres in these new ideas. 
The signing of the March Agreement of 1970 proved to be a catalyst in the thinking 
of these young radicals. They decided that the Ba'ath Party could not implement such 
an agreement, and Barzani was certainly in no position to force them, with the result 
that a `third way' was increasingly discussed. 153 In May 1970 representatives of the 
Students' Union, including Feyeradun Abdelkadir, held discussions with Talabani. It 
was agreed to establish a new, covert, Maoist-style party, but Talabani insisted that 
other groupings should be approached. The resultant discussions, which included 
Nawshirwan Mustafa, Feyeradun Abdelkadir and Fu'ad Keraki, led to the formation 
of Komala. 
The first meeting of Komala took place in the Baghdad residence of Feyeradun 
Abdelkadir on 10 June 1970.154 The operations of the Komala were intensely 
secretive as, not only were they in opposition to the GOI, they could not afford to 
espousing similar political viewpoints was Hawkarl, which included the involvement of Shaswad Jalal 
(Martyr Aram) and Fu'ad Qaradaghi. (Nuri (1998) op. cit., p. 4). 
152 Interview with Shwan Qliasani, Suleimaniyah, 4 August 1999. 
'" Interview with Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
134 Those present were Talabani, Shahab Sheikh Nuri, Fu'ad Keraki, Faza Mulla Mahmoud, Dler 
Sadiq, Rafad Mulla, and Feyeradun Abdelkadir. 
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allow Barzani and the KDP realise the extent of Talabani's involvement with such a 
potential powerful grouping as left-wing students. '" 
4.4.1.2.1 The Early Organizational Structure of the Komala 
The result of the first meeting was a decision to expand the membership of the 
Komala in an attempt to strengthen the fledgling organization. Secret cells 
commenced operations with the intention of recruiting new revolutionaries. ' 56 In this 
first month of work, the cells recruited 200 people in Baghdad, over 200 in 
Suleimaniyah, and between 30 and 40 in Erbil. These new cells (shana) were 
organised in groups of between 3 and 5, with only one person knowing the person 
above. At this point, the aims of these groups was purely to indoctrinate the members 
with the teachings of Mao Tse-Tung and left-wing nationalism. This early structure 
of the Komala was headed by a leadership composed of the original 7 cadres of the 
10 June meeting, with Talabani being elected, in secret from the KDP, as the 
Secretary-General of the organization. The Komala accepted the peace between the 
Barzani wing and the Ahmed-Talabani faction, but to the leadership it became 
apparent that a gap had developed which Komala itself would try to fill. 
157 
4.4.1.2.2 Ideological Divisions within the Komala 
The transition from Old-Communism to the new Revisionism proved to be a task not 
devoid of difficulty. Indeed, the division between the two groups which commenced 
in the first year of formation of Komala, characterised the internal political dynamics 
of the PUK throughout the 1980s. Some members of the Komala, headed by Faza 
Mulla Mahmoud and Fu'ad Keraki wanted the new organization to follow the Old 
Communist line of Iraqi Nationalism, the others, led by Talabani and Shahab Sheikh 
Nuri wanted to follow the Revisionist line. The rapproachment between the Ahmed- 
Talabani faction and Barzani in 1970 removed the urgency of the disagreement with 
Talabani being posted to Beirut and then Dama§cus by the KDP in 1972. However, 
iss Interview with Feyeradun Abdelkadir, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
156 Of these new secret cells, the most important were those led by Martyr Aram (a code-name for one 
of the most important covert operatives of the Kurdish national movement in Iraq, Shaswad Jalal), 
Ibrahim Aso, Jafar Abdulwahid, and Ano Zurab (Interview with Feyeradun Abdelkadir, Suleimaniyah, 
10 August 1999). 
157 Interview with Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
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he noted that this division remained with the Komala and, even after the ashbatal, a 
division existed with some members still wanting conciliation with the GOI. 158 
4.4.1.2.3 The Komala and the Formation of the PUK 
At the beginning of 1975, Talabani sent a letter to the leadership of the Komala 
pushing for the formation of a union of leftist parties. Komala, this time, agreed. )59 
Before the plans could be put into action, the Algiers Agreement occurred and the 
left-wing Kurdish parties had immediate decisions to make about their future role. 
On 19 March, Barzani told all armed Kurds to hand in their weapons. Komala 
refused and on 18 March a meeting of all Komala leaders was held at the village of 
Qela near Penjwin, with 49 cadres in attendance, where it was decided to continue 
with the Revolution. 160 Fearful of being destroyed by the chaos of the ashbatal the 
leadership decided that a delay had to take place, otherwise the Komala would get 
sucked into the collapse. 161 
When people started returning to the cities on 23 March, peshmerga were sent to 
Kirkuk 162, Koysanjag163, Qaradagh and Suleimaniyah164, Sharazur-Halabja165, 
Erbil 166, and Bahdinan. 167 These mobilizations are behind the claim that the PUK was 
the first party to re-establish the revolution in Iraqi Kurdistan -a claim vociferously 
denied by the field commander of the KDP at this time, Sami Abdul Rahman, who 
claimed that KDP returned on 26 May 1976, and the PUK had still not fired a shot in 
anger until 1977.168 
158 Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 5 September 2000. 
's' Talabani had previously sent a similar letter in 1972, but the leadership of Komala rejected it 
(Interview with Feyeradun Abdelkadir, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999). 
160 Nuri (1998) op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
161 At this time, it is estimated that over 150,000 KDP peshmerga were withdrawing. 
162 Led by Ali Peshkar, Azad Hawrami, Ali Saleh, Hami Destor, and'Beston'. 
163 Led by Abdel Razaq and Mohammad Karim. 
164 Led by Sirwan Talabani and Mulla Ahmed. 
365 Led by Wasta Anwar. 
1" Led by Jafar Abdelwahid and Qadr Qabat. 
167 Leda by Ibrahim Aso (all positions named by Feyeradun Abdelkadir, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 
1999). 
168 Sami Abdul Rahman is extremely critical of the role played by Komala, stating that the aim of their 
cadres to introduce Maoism to the Kurds resulted in villagers ridiculing them. For notes on the return 
of the peshmerga, see Bulloch & Morris (1992) No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of 
the Kurds. London: Penguin Books, p. 148 (interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 27 June 
1998). 
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At this point, Komala was operating independently of other militias but decided to 
accept the proposal of Talabani for it to come under the umbrella of the PUK. 
Feyeradun Abdelkadir travelled to Damascus to inform Talabani of the decision. It 
was agreed that a leadership should also be established in Kurdistan, which would 
include Ali Askari (at the time exiled in Nasiriya), Dr Khalid Sa'id, Shahab Sheikh 
Nuri, Shazad Sayigh, Omar Mustafa, Rasoul Mamand and Feyeradun Abdelkadir. At 
the time, these names were a mix between Komala members and other famous 
figures within the national movement. 169 
4.4.1.2.4 The Komala Leadership 
Messages were sent to Ali Askari in Nasiriya, Jafar Abdelwahid in Koysanjaq, and 
Dr Khalid Sa'id explaining the establishment of the Komala leadership. However, the 
GOI arrested the members of Komala and the PUK, which resulted in the. 
incarceration of many leaders, including Shahab Sheikh Nuri, Feyeradun Abdelkadir, 
Omar Sa'id All and Jafar Abdelwahid. 170 Plans for the arrest were leaked to the 
leadership of the Komala which immediately identified replacements for the 
leadership positions. These included Azad Hawrami, Osman Baked, Arsalan Bayaez, 
and Abu Shahab. 171 The targeted men then went into hiding in Iran but were handed 
back to Iraq where three of them (Khala Shahab, Anwar Zorab, and Ja'afar 
Abdulwahid) were executed. 172 Martyr Aram continued to operate for Komala 
covertly and established a Comita of the Komala in each urban area. 173 
169 Interview with Feyeradun Abdelkadir, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
170 Of these members, Omar Sa'id All would later go onto being a PUK Political Bureau member and 
head of the PUK Branch of Suleimaniyah (Melbendi Yek). 
"' Of these members, Arsalan Bayaez would later go onto being a PUK Political Bureau member, 
head of PUK Central Organization Office (Maktabi Reckhrastin) and Minister of Education in the 
Third Cabinet (Suleimaniyah). 
172 Ibrahim Aso, a further member of the leadership of the Komala, managed to escape through 
Bahdinan, and was the first to return with peshmerga under the PUK name on 1 June 1976. (Nuri 
(1998) op. cit., p. 13). Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 5 September 2000. 
1" It was at this time that Mulla Bakhtiyar, Azad Hawrami, Salar Aziz and Abdel Razak rose through 
the ranks of Komala. Of these members, Salar Aziz would later go onto being a PUK Political Bureau 
member, a founder of an opposition group to the PUK (Alay Shoresh), returnee to PUK, Governor of 
Suleimaniyah, and Minister of Agriculture. Mulla Bakhtiyar would rise to prominence in the Komala, 
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4.4.1.3 The Formation of Bezutnawa 
Among the established cadres of the KDP, the events of 1964 had provided an 
impetus to form a party separate to the KDP. Chalaw Ali Askari, the son of Ali 
Askari, the leader of this grouping, stated that: 
"There was a long period of misunderstanding between Barzani and 
the Political Bureau of the KDP. Since 1963, Barzani always wanted 
agreement with the GOI, but the Political Bureau was against this. 
The Political Bureau was expelled to Iran in 1964, including Al! 
Askari, for 17 months. When they returned, Barzani tried to 
assassinate Ibrahim Ahmad, Talabani, Omer Mustafa, and All Askari. 
They fled, regrouped, and started to think about establishing another 
party. "174 
After the collapse of the revolution, Ali Askari, Omer Mustafa, Dr Khalid Sa'id, 
Sa'id Kaka, and Sa'ad Aziz were contacted by Talabani from Syria via Komala 
regarding the establishment of the PUK. 175 However, Askari would only 
recommence the fighting with the permission of Barzani, who he considered to be the 
only leader capable of leading a unified movement. Barzani's response was resolute. 
He would not see the recommencement of the revolution, and went as far as to say 
that he would fight against Askari if he chose to take up arms against the GOI. 176 
Unperturbed, Askari set about establishing his own political grouping independent of 
the KDP, Bezutnawa (SDM), in 1975.177 The natural support base of this 
organization was the leftist cadres of the KDP who had felt concerned at the actions 
of Barzani in 1964, and who had remained in Iraqi Kurdistan with the Ahmed- 
Talabani faction. Askari requested all the politically active peoples who had fled to 
Iran with- the ashbatal to return and join the SDM. This movement can therefore be 
seen as complementary to the younger more. radical Komala membership, and, 
indeed, relationships between the two groupings were characterised by mutual 
before similarly forming the opposition movement Alay Shoresh and then return to the PUK as head of 
the Office of Democratic Organizations. (Nuri (1998) op. cit., p. 14). 
174 Interview with Chalaw All Askari, Suleimaniyah, 10 June 1998. 175 Interview Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 5 September 2000. McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 364. 
176 Interview with Chalaw All Askari, Suleimaniyah, 10 June 1998. 1" Bezutnawa rougly translates as "movement" which is short for Social Democratic Movement 
(SDM). Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999.1 
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respect and cooperation. Komala enjoyed betier organization than Bezutnawa, but 
Bezutnawa commanded a wider support base and was a more populist party. 178 
4.4.1.4 Operational Structure of the PUK 
The early operations of the PUK were divided according to the divisions of Komala 
and Bezutnawa, with mafareza of both organizations operating independently. Each 
group had a discrete clandestine organization. Due to the ideological basis of 
Komala, and its 5-year history, its organizational structure was copied by 
Bezutnawa. 179 Figure 4.5 illustrates the structure of Komala and Bezutnawa. 
The reckhraw performed a political role, including intelligence gathering, and 
implementing political decisions. The kart organization was essentially for the 
peshmerga, but there were also rechkraw for the peshmerga as well. 180 While the 
mafareza remained part of the respective party organizations, there was a certain 
degree of coordination provided by the PUK. At the level of leadership of the PUK, 
each organizational wing, Komala, Bezutnawa and -feshtigishti, forwarded 
representatives which composed the PUK Political Bureau. Talabani returned to Iraqi 
Kurdistan in 1977 to promote morale in the fledgling PUK, and set up his, 
headquarters inside the Iranian border at Nawkan and in Iraqi Kurdistan at Qandil, 
from where he could direct the operations of Komala in Suleimaniyah, and 
Bezutnawa further west. 181 Furthermore, he established instituted procedures to 
formalise the peshmerga structure, commencing with appointing Ali Askari as 
Peshmerga Commander. 182 
The influence of Maoist doctrine on the Kurdish liberation movement is evidently 
clear. Talabani divided the peshmerga into harams (regiments), and each district 
(qadha) of Iraqi Kurdistan was allocated a haram. The organization of the haram 
was fluid, if the qaza was controlled by the haram then the peshmerga would 
establish a permanent base, otherwise, they would operate as a mobile haram and 
attack the forces of the GOI by night. The leaders of each haram constituted the 
18 Interview with Chalaw All Askari, Suleimaniyah, 10 June 1998. 
19 Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Suleimaniyah, 14 May 1998. 
'80 Ibid. 
1' Komata would remain reasonably inactive in Erbil until the arrival of Kosrat Rasoul in the 1980s. 182 Interview with Jabar Farman, Suleimaniyah, 18. June 1998. 
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Figure 4.5: The Hierarchy of Komala and £'ezutnawa183 
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Leadership Office of the PUK, -and, due to the distribution of the various wings of the 
PUK, each faction would have approximately 6 members office. The Political Bureau 
was less systematically constructed, with 2 members simply being appointed from 
each party, 184 
The composition of the PUK allowed it to generate a great deal of popular support 
upon its formation. The three parties within the umbrella of the PUK represented 
1 83 Ibid. 
184 Interview with Dr Kamal Khoshnaw, Suleimaniyah, 13 May 1998; Interview II with Jabbar 
Farman, Suleimaniyah, 18 June 1998. 
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three major groupings of the populace of Iraqi Kurdistan. Heshtigishti was a natural 
focus for the more established intelligentsia; Komala was attractive for the new style 
of nationalists inspired by the teachings of Mao, and Bezutnawa became increasingly 
associated with the middle classes. 
By 1977, the PUK had developed mass democratic organizations of different groups 
of people (e. g. farmers, students) which would later develop into the representative 
structure of the 1990s PUK. 185 At this time, the KDP had little else but a belief in the 
figure of Barzani and the strength of a certain few tribes. 186 However, within Iraqi 
Kurdistan, such loyalty to a charismatic leader and family was powerful and the 
strength of the KDP as a political and military force that enjoyed strong, if localised, 
popular support could not be underestimated. 
4.4.1.5 Conclusion 
The origins of the PUK can be traced to several inter-related factors. The original 
division within the KDP between the Barzani-wing and the Ahmed-Talabani faction 
is obviously a strong factor, but this division was more of a reflection of the division 
within Kurdish society rather than a planned schism. While its importance is great, 
one has to look elsewhere for other formative elements, particularly as even in the 
1964 and 1966 split, the cadres who would go on to form the PUK had not yet 
emerged. 
The growth of left-wing political ideas, culminating in the establishment of Komala 
is a further important factor. It is from this organization that the majority of the 
current PUK leadership originate, that the structure of the PUK originated, and the 
left-wing ideals of the party nurtured. The PUK was dependent upon the organization 
of Komala as it was the only political grouping operating on a reasonably large scale 
within Iraqi Kurdistan. The Komala represented the young radically minded Kurds, 
many of whom were students at the time. . 
Similarly, the PUK was dependent upon Bezutnawa because of its wide support base 
amongst a slightly older. generation which followed a less extreme brand of 
'" Interview with (Hackam) Khadr Hama Jan, Suleimaniyah, 6 September 2000. 
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socialism, thereby remaining attractive to those Kurds of a more conservative nature. 
This factor is reflected in the zones of operation of the factions, with Bezutnawa 
operating more -freely in the Bahdinan out of the Baradost region (the traditional 
tribal heartland), and Komala operating out of Suleimaniyah. 187 However, the 
relationship between Komala and Bezutnawa was strong. ' 88 
The impact that Komala has had on the political development of Iraqi Kurdistan can 
be seen to be significant. The majority of the decision-makers of the PUK were 
originally members. However, the extreme leftist sentiment which characterised their 
actions from the outset, combined with their rejection of the right of an individual 
family, the Barzanis, to head the Kurdish nationä movement, magnified the divisions 
which existed between urban and rural areas, and particularly between the 
Suleimaniyah and Bahdinan regions. This enhanced segmentation of Iraqi Kurdistan 
is apparent today and is a major obstacle to the unification of the region and 
administration. 
4.5 The KDP and PUK in the Aftermath of the Ashbatal 
After fleeing to Iran in 1975, the KDP returned to Iraqi Kurdistan on 26 May 1976, 
under the name of Kurdistan Democratic Party-Provisional Leadership (KDP-PL). 189 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the progression of events during this period. The reformation of 
the KDP so soon after the collapse of 1975 can be traced to the establishment of the 
PUK a year before. Possibly shocked by the speed in which Talabani had constituted 
the PUK, the rump of the KDP moved with urgency to return to Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Talabani claims that the return of the KDP was supported by SAVAK of Iran and 
Turkish Military Intelligence, (MIT) as both were concerned with the leftist 
orientation of the PUK, and its ties with Syria. 190 However, the KDP had been 
severely criticized because of its evacuation, and could not exercise power over the 
whole region. 
186 Interview with Daoud Baghstani, Erbil, 30 May 1998. 
187 McDowall (1996) op. cit.; p. 343. 
188 Interview with Dr Kamal Khoshnaw, Suleimaniyah, 13 May 1998. 
189 At the same time, a further organization established itself within Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan 
Democratic Party - Preparatory Committee (KDP-PC) was led by the previous Secretary General of 
the KDP, Dr Mahmoud Othman (McDowall, 1996, p. 344; interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, 
Salahadin, 27 June 1998; See Besifki (1996) The Kurdish National Liberation Movement Since 1975: 
Success or Failure? Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Southampton, p. 149. 190 Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 5 September 2000. ' 
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Figure 4.6: Chronology of Events, 1975-1990191 
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pp. 323-339; Ghafour (1997) op. cit., pp. 18-41: Key as for Figure 4.1. 
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The withdrawal of Barzani from the immediate political scene caused a major 
problem in the decision-making process of the KDP-PL, with new leaders surfacing 
in an unstable political climate. It is during this period that the figure of Sami Abdul 
Rahman comes to prominence. Sami, previously close to Barzani, had been the 
Minister of Northern Affairs in the 1970 cabinet of the GOI, and a member of the 
Political Bureau. With the collapse of the revolution in 1975, Sami was elevated to 
commander of the organization within Iraqi Kurdistan. Idris established his faction in 
Iran, and Massoud did not fully return to Iraqi Kurdistan until the death of his father 
in 1979.192 
4.5.1 The Power Struggle Within the KDP-PL 
Tensions within the KDP-PL leadership, similar to the previous problems which 
existed between the Ahmed-Talabani faction and the Barzani-wing of the KDP, 
surfaced. This time, the traditionalist-wing was led by Barzani's son, Idris, and the 
leftist-wing can be identified as being led by Sami Abdul Rahnian. The. position of 
Sami at this time is interesting, particularly when his later positions of Political 
Bureau member and Deputy Prime Minister are taken into account. At the time, Sami 
noted that there was a need to replace the party which had failed the Kurdish people. 
Besifki notes that `for Abdul Rahman and the other `progressives' and the 
frustrated', the alternative was a proletarian leadership and party. " 193 
Although this may seem to be initially difficult to understand when faced with the 
current situation, in the Revolutionary Alternative, Sami presents a scenario which 
shows an acceptance of Massoud by most of the factions within the KDP-PL. 194 
However, Sami contends that. Idris was plotting with `reactionary' forces to capture 
the leadership for himself. With the assistance of the new Islamic regime in Iran, 
Idris commenced with the recruitment of peshmerga from Barzani refugees on the 
border, and near the end of May 1979 began advocating the importance of the 
Barzani family in leading the KDP, opening a campaign to discredit the leftist 
intellectuals. 195 
192 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 344. 
193 Besifki (1996) op. cit., p. 150, quoting Abdul Rahman (1981) Al-Badie! AI-Thawryfr Al-Harakah 
A1-Taharuryah A! -Kurdiyah (Revolutionary Alternative in the Kurdish Liberation Movement), p. 19. 194 Abdul Rahman (1981) Al-Badiel A! -Thawryfr Al-Harakah Al-Taharuryah Al-Kurdiyah. 193 Besifki (1996) op. cit., p. 150, quoting Abdul Rahman (1981) op. cit., p. 31. 
171 
Chapter 4 
The power-struggle between Idris and Sami, with Massoud in the middle, came to a 
head in a meeting of the KDP-PL in the village of Shanawa. According to Sami, 
three factions emerged; the reactionary right wing (led by Idris), the progressive 
faction (led by Sarni), and the centrists (led by Massoud). The meeting, which saw 
Massoud faced with an obvious dilemma, elected Massoud as provisional leader, 
established the Political Bureau, and chose Sarni as Secretary-General. 196 
4.5.2 The Hakkari Massacre 
An event which was to have profound ramifications for the future of Iraqi Kurdish 
politics, and in particular the lack of trust within the system, took place in 1978. With 
so many individual mafareza operating in Iraqi Kurdistan, and so many opportunities 
for political advancement apparent to the leaders in the vacuum of the ashbatal, it 
was not too surprising that a major confrontation between different Kurdish 
groupings would take place. The disastrous feud which had taken place between 
Barzani and Talabani resulted in Talabani ordering mafareza of the PUK to attack the 
KDP-PL at any opportunity. The KDP commander, Sami Abdul Rahman, similarly 
was in "no mood to deal softly with such enemies and was backed by 1dris who bore 
a visceral hatred for Talabani". 197 
4.5.2.1 Chronology of Events 
In April 1978, Talabani sent Ali Askari and his deputy in Bezutnawa, Dr Khalid 
Sa'id, on a mission to pick up arms from Kurdish villages just inside the Turkish 
border. Talabani gave Askari written orders to destroy KDP-PL bases en route, an 
order which Askari ignored since he had already established a close working 
relationship with the KDP-PL in the Baradost area. 198 However, the orders 
manifested themselves to Sami who decided to äct decisively. 
After being weakened by both Iraqi and Iranian air and ground forces, the forces of 
Bezutnawa divided at Baradost. Askari made contact with the KDP-PL in Baradost as 
had happened previously, expecting no hostility. However, when he marched into 
Hakkari in Turkey, his forces were ambushed by a large formation of KDP 
196 ibid. 
197 McDowali (1996) op. cit., p. 344. 
198 Ibid, p. 345. 
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peshmerga and surrendered after heavy losses. A similar fate befell the force of Dr 
Khalid. Both All Askari and Dr Khalid Sa'id were executed, some say on the orders 
of Sami, some on the orders of the Barzanis. 199 
4.5.2.2 Anal sy is of the Hakkari Massacre 
To analyse the Hakkari Massacre produces several informative insights into the 
political history of Iraqi Kurdistan, the development of the key political characters, 
and assists in understanding the decision-making process and hierarchy of power 
within the KDP and PUK in the 1990s. 
Ali Askari was a politician who had enjoyed a long history with the KDP and, unlike 
most other political leaders, had the ability to galvanise support around him. 
Similarly, Askari was well respected as a peshmerga. 200 These factors meant that he 
was a threat to many other politicians of the left in particular. 201 A possible 
hypothesis based on these facts would therefore be that All Askari was killed by a 
conspiracy of leftist politicians who saw him as either being a threat within the 
organization he was already in (PUK), or occupying a political position deemed 
attractive by a potential adversary. 
McDowall hints at the first possibility and notes that many cadres within the PUK at 
the time believed that Talabani may have sent All Askari to his death by 
collaborating with the KDP-PL. 202 It was certainly the case that the KDP-PL were 
consistently one-step ahead of the doomed Bezutnawa. 203 The second possibility 
focuses on Sami. After this affair, Sami split from the KDP and his writings indicate 
19 McDowall states that Ali Askari and Dr Khalid Sa'id were executed on the orders of Sami Abdul 
Rahman (ibid), however, Sami states that the order came from the Barzanis (interview with Sami 
Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 April 1998). This was bad enough for intra-Kurdish relations, however, 
the reported manner in which All Askari was executed, by an RPG-7, made the matter even more 
serious. Other commentators have attributed the action of the KDP as avenging the killing of several 
of Barzani's nephews some months previously by the PUK peshmerga commander, Kamal Mufti. 
Whether true or false, this affair has reached a level of folklore within Iraqi Kurdistan. 
200 Interview with Chalaw Ali Askari, Suleimaniyah, 10 June 1998. 
201 Ibid. 
202 When I asked Talabani about this supposed involvement, he simply laughed and dismissed it. 
Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 5 September 2000. 203 McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 364. 
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his move to the left. 204 To do this effectively he needed to remove Ali Askari to 
control the popular support base occupied by Bezutnawa. 205 
Chalaw Ali Askari developed this hypothesis by broadening its scope. According to 
Chalaw, the USSR had asked to see Ali Askari at the Soviet Embassy in Lebanon as 
they had identified him, as being the route by which the USSR would become more 
involved in Iraqi Kurdistan. The US, extremely concerned about the potential 
increase of the involvement of the USSR in Iraqi Kurdistan at this time, sent the 
Barzanis against Askari. Chalaw believes that this would explain the advantages the 
KDP=PL forces had in terms of intelligence, coordination with Turkish and Iranian 
military units, and the mobilization of tribal forces. A similar conspiracy theory, was 
forwarded by the Deputy-Commander of PUK Peshmerga, Jabar Farman, who was a 
Komala peshmerga at this time; 
"The whole incident was planned by the KDP, Turkey and Iran in an 
attempt to destroy the PUK The left-wing ideology of the PUK 
frightened many surrounding countries who did not feel at ease with 
s2o6 its Marxist - Maoist viewpoints. 
To further complicate the situation, Chalaw recalls that, after the killing, Massoud 
attended the funeral of All Askari and insisted that he know nothing about 
conspiracies to eliminate him. However, he reportedly admitted that it was a killing 
for political issues. 207 
4.5.2.3 The Impact on the Political System 
The impact of the Hakkari Massacre had far-reaching ramifications for the political 
system. Faced with the loss of 3 skilled commanders (Ali Askari, Dr Khalid Sa'id, 
and Sheikh Yazdi) along with approximately 700 peshmerga, and the rump of 
Bezutnawa, the PUK was forced into an extensive period of reorganization. 
204 Interview with Chalaw Ali Askari, Suleimaniyah, 10 June 1998. 
205 Chalaw Ali Askari, the son of All Askari, favoured this interpretation and would not accept any 
possibility of the involvement of Talabani in the death of his father. The relationship between Chalaw 
and Talabani is very close. Indeed, Chalaw is influential within the PUK and has had positions ranging 
from Deputy-Minister of Humanitarian Affairs to private adviser to Talabani on political issues. 
Chalaw supports his argument by referring to evidence obtained while operating for the PUK covertly 
against the KDP, including the retrieval of the diaries of Idris and Sami from the period. 
206 Interview with Jabar Farman, Suleimaniyah, 30 August 1998. 207 Interview with Chalaw Ali Askari, Suleimaniyah, 10 June 1998. Nawshirwan Mustafa notes that 
Sami was ordered to undertake the act by Barzani himself (Amin (1999) op. cit. ). 
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Political ramifications were equally serious, with the resulting splits in the socialist 
part of the PUK severely weakening the party. Rasoul Mamand, increasingly 
disillusioned, led some of the surviving Bezutnawa peshmerga out of the PUK and 
allied them with the KDP-PC of Mahmoud Othman, forming the Kurdistan Socialist 
Party (KSP). 208 With the demise of Bezutnawa, the PUK did not possess a focal point 
for the moderate-left of the Kurdish populace. Therefore, the radically-orientated 
Komala no longer had a calming counterbalance within the umbrella of the union. 
Talabani embarked on a strategy of reorganising the union both in terms of structure 
and the introduction of new personnel, with the result that the 1980s saw the rise of 
many of today's decision-makers within the PUK, and the increasing dominance of 
Komala. Whether Talabani was involved or not with the Hakkari Massacre, he 
certainly benefited from the vacuum which developed within the decision-making 
structure of the PUK, and by the fact that popular opinion drastically turned against 
the KDP. The ramifications for the future of the events of this short period are still 
felt in the contemporary political system. The Hakkari Massacre is part of the 
folklore of the region, and some believe that the PUK will never forgive the KDP for 
its actions in 1978. 
4.5.2.4 The Aftermath of the Hakkari Massacre 
After the Hakkari massacre, the age-old divisions within the party polarized, with the 
right-wing of Idris operating independently of the KDP-PL and collaborating with 
the Iranian forces against the KDP-I. 209 According to Sami's account, Massoud's 
position similarly moved towards supporting his brother and, in the Ninth Congress 
of the KDP which took place of 4 October 1979, the party split with Sami's faction 
becoming "increasingly dissatisfied with the traditionalism implicit in Bartani 
leadership and its supporters" and leaving the party and the leadership of the KDP 
208 Chalaw Ali Askari noted that, while the defection of the rump of Bezutnawa with Rasoul Mamand 
had a detrimental effect on the operational status of the PUK, it conversely strengthened the 
organization which now had fewer dissenting voices (interview with Chalaw All Askari, 
Suleimaniyah, 10 June 1998; McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 345). 
209 Besifki (1996) op. cit., p. 150, quoting Abdul Rahman (1981) op. cit., pp. 36-39; McDowall (1996) 
op. cit., p. 346. 
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reverting fully to the Barzani brothers and, upon the death of Idris, to Massoud 
himself. 210 
This congress, the first to take place since the death of Barzani, was described by 
Massoud as being "the most difficult and burdensome congress". 21 1 The progressive 
faction, led by Sami, went on to form the Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party 
(KPDP or Parti Gel) and Sami became a vociferous opponent of the dominance of 
the Barzanis in the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan. 212 
4.5.3 The Iran-Iraq War and the Anfal Campaign 
On 22 September 1980, Saddam Hussein launched a full-scale offensive against 
Iran. 213 The initial offensive, focused in the south of the country, stalled and resulted 
in a conflict which would last eight years. 214 This war saw the internationalisation of 
the Iraqi Kurdish struggle with inputs capable of making a difference to the strategic 
map and balance-of-power of the Middle East 215 
The Kurdish parties were thrown into the frontline with the commencement of 
hostilities. They found themselves in a position to benefit from the fighting by acting 
as proxies for the combatant countries, a situation in which they have found 
themselves ever since. The subsequent success of the Iranian-Kurdish collaboration 
led to Iraq resolving to more lethal counter-measures, culminating in the use of 
chemical weapons in 1987, and the infamous Anfal Campaigns of 1988. It is 
estimated that perhaps as many as 100,000 noncombatant Kurds were killed in 1988. 
210 The name of the party also reverted back to KDP (McDowall (1996) op. cit., p. 346). 
211 Kurdistan Democratic Party (1993a) op. cit., p. 17. 
212 Besifki (1996) op. cit., pp. 150-151, quoting Abdul Rahman (1981) op. cit., pp. 23-45. The 
relationship between Sami and the Barzanis in the late 1970s is difficult to judge. However, Sami 
refuses to speak in bad terms about Barzani, and claims that he was very close to him. With regard to 
his work, The Revolutionary Alternative, he states that it was an attempt to guide the party programme 
of the KDP, rather than attacking the Barzanis (interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 27 
June 1998). 
Z" For a comprehensive assessment of the Iran-Iraq war, see Chubin & Tripp (1991) Iran and Iraq at 
War. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
214 Bulloch & Morris (1992) op. cit., p. 151. 215 Some writers have been stating that the main difference of the Iraqi Kurdish predicament in the 
1990s has been the internationalization of the problem, with the input of Turkey noted in particular. 
However, the Kurdish problem in Iraq has had a history of internationalization. 
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Perhaps the most infamous use of chemical weapons, although not strictly part of the 
2 Anfal campaign, was at Halabja, were 5,000 people were killed in March 1988.16 
The situation was further complicated by different divisions within the parties, and 
by their differing aims. Within the PUK, the pro-Iranian elements of the party forced 
the PUK throughout the period 1980-1988 to develop closer ties with Iran (the KDP 
was already with Iran). However, alliance between an Islamic Republic and a party 
influenced heavily by left-wing doctrines proved to be difficult. The problem was 
compounded when the Iranian forces fought the KDP-I in 1982. This act resulted in 
the PUK supporting the KDP-I against the Iranians and, after the spring of 1983, the 
Iranian Government allied itself with the KDP to attack the forces of the PUK. 217 
Such manoeuvring between the Iraqi Kurdish factions, Iran and Iraq were common 
throughout the duration of the Iran-Iraq War. 
The aim of this section is to present the final development of the political system in 
Iraqi Kurdistan before the onset of hostilities over Kuwait in 1990 and focuses on the 
development of the indigenous political system of Iraqi Kurdistan. For reasons of 
clarity, I am choosing to focus primarily on the organs of the PUK. The KDP was 
certainly active within -Iraqi Kurdistan throughout the 1980s, but not to the same 
extent as the PUK. Furthermore, in structural terms, the PUK would undergo 
numerous changes which are important to address, whereas the KDP would remain 
reasonably stable under the leadership of Massoud Barzani. 
216 The events of the Anfal Campaign are beyond the remit of this thesis. However, it is imperative that 
those wishing to become familiar with the political history of Iraqi Kurdistan have to understand the 
impact which the Anfal campaign has had on everyday life, economic activity, and political parties. 
The demographic problems created by the Anfal will take Iraqi Kurdistan many years to recover from, 
as will the environmental and long-term health problems caused by the use of both conventional and 
chemical weapons. References describing the Anfal campaign in detail include: Human Rights Watch 
(1990) Human Rights in Iraq. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; (1993a) Genocide in Iraq: The 
Anfa! Campaign Against the Kurds. New York: Human Rights Watch; (1993b) The Anja! Campaign 
in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Destruction of Koreme. New' York: Human Rights Watch; Meiselas & 
Whitley (1994) "The Remains of Anfal. " MERIP Middle East Report 189, no. 24 (July - August 
1994), pp. 8-11; Bruinessen (1994a) "Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim 
Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988), " in 
Andreopoulos, (ed. ), Conceptual and Historical Dimensions of Genocide. University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
217 Interview with Jabar Farman, Suleimaniyah, 18 June 1998. 
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4.5.3.1 The Iran-Iraq War 
At the commencement of the war, the PUK faced immense difficulties. With its 
support for the KDP-I, Iran's thrusts into Iraqi Kurdistan posed a threat to the PUK, 
pushing its headquarters away from the Iran-Iraq border area and closer to the forces 
of Iraq. The response of Talabani was to seek an accommodation with Saddam in 
1984, allowing the PUK breathing space in which to reorganize. It also made it 
possible for the PUK to receive Iraqi weaponry, and for the Autonomy Law of 1974 
to be further developed. 218 During this initial period of cooperation, the military 
structure of the party expanded, heralding the appearance of a new line of forceful 
and politically-minded cadres, including Mustafa Chaw Rash, . Mam Risha, Mam 
Rostam, Sheikh Ja'efar, Mulazim Omer, and Mulla Bakhtiyar. Later, new military 
leaders appeared, including Kosrat Rasoul. 219 
4.5.3.1.1 Unity and Division within the PUK 
Since the demise of Bezutnawa, the PUK was somewhat unbalanced and ran the risk 
of alienating the middle classes of Iraqi Kurdistan with the radical exhuberance of 
Komala. Dr Kamal Khoshnaw noted that if the two surviving wings continued as 
separate organizations, there would have been problems. Similarly, the practicalities 
of operating totally separate organizations under an umbrella of the PUK was 
increasingly cumbersome. It was therefore decided that the constituent entities of the 
PUK be brought together. 220 However, internal divisions, particularly in Komala, had 
not disappeared and the tensions of the political environment in the early 1980s 
brought them to the fore. 
The completion of these plans, culminating with the formation of the PUK as it is 
today, would not take place until the 1990s. However, the first important step was 
taken in 1983, with the unification of the remainder of Bezutnawa with Heshtigishtl. 
The new entity, named Shoresh Garan, was led by Dr Fu'ad Massoum, one of 
Talabani's compatriots from Heshtfgishti. After 1982, the PUK therefore consisted of 
two separate wings. 221 The relationship between these two groupings proved to be 
Z" For further details of the implications of these negotiations, see McDowall (1996) op. cit., pp. 348- 
349; Sheikhmous (1999) op. cit., p. 60. 
219 Interview with Massoud Abdel Khaliq, Erbil, 18 July 1998. 220 Interview with Dr Kamal Khoshnaw, Suleimaniyah, 13 May 1998 221 Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
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extremely cordial, although Shoresh Garan was almost certainly targeted to secure 
the support of the urban intelligentsia, with Komala remaining the wing of the more 
youthful revolutionaries. Again, Komala was by far the largest organization of the 
newly re-constituted PUK, yet the leadership of the PUK was evenly divided 
between the two wings. 222 
While the PUK was consolidating its internal structure, the ongoing negotiations 
between the leadership of the PUK and the GOI created serious ideological tensions 
within the ranks of the party. The initial doubt about the policies taken by the 
leadership can originally be traced to the division which characterised Komala from 
the moment of its inception, that of the pro-Iraqi communists versus the pro-Kurdish 
revisionists. The legacy of this disagreement did not dissipate with Talabani's 
seemingly pro-Kurdish bias, particularly when the most dominant man within 
Komala at the end of the 1970s, Mulla Bakhtiyar, favoured the pro-Iraqi solution. 
Within this struggle, Talabani favoured the pro-Kurdish line, represented by 
Nawshirwan Mustafa. 223 
Alongside this problem of ideology ran a clash of personalities. Within Komala, 
there was indignation against Talabani and his rapidly-ascending protege 
Nawshirwan Mustafa and, at the Third Conference of Komala in 1984, a problem 
became apparent when certain members were not selected for leadership positions. 224 
The main opposition to the leadership of Talabani and Nawshirwan Mustafa came 
from a group led by Salar Aziz and Imad Ahmed. 25 The accusations levelled at the 
leadership concerned: 
1. The power being given to Shoresh Garan. 
2. Beliefs that Talabani was increasingly dependent upon the leaders of important 
villages and tribes. 
222 Interviews with Arsalan Bayaez, Suleimaniyah, 24 May 1998; Mohammad Tawßq, Kalarcholan, 7 
August 1999. 
223 Interview with Massoud Abdel Khaliq, Erbil, 224 Amin (1999) op. cit. 2.5 Salar Aziz would later become the Governor of Suleimaniyah and then Minister of Agriculture 
within the Third Cabinet (Suleimaniyah) for a short period. Imad Ahmed would later rejoin the PUK 
and enter the Political Bureau, as well as being Minister of Health and Social Affairs and, later, 
Minister of Power and Industry in the Third Cabinet (Suleimaniyah). 
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3. Rumours that Nawshirwan Mustafa was not a communist and had forced Komala 
to do as he desired for the ultimate benefit of Shoresh Garan. 
4. Komala had deviated from the line developed by the work of figures such as 
Martyr Aram, and had become a bastion of nationalism at the expense of free 
226 ideology and political thought within the PUK. 
As the relationship between the PUK and the Ba'ath Party deteriorated and attacks 
both on the PUK and the Komala increased, the pro-Iraqi faction seized the 
opportunity to destabilise the PUK and created a party named Alay Shoresh. 227 An 
extensive propaganda campaign was undertaken against the PUK and Komala 
leadership, and Alay Shoresh members proceeded to leak plans and decisions of the 
PUK. 228 The PUK subsequently arrested Mulla Bakhtiyar and his compatriots, but 
Imad Ahmed escaped and managed to lead Alay Shoresh from Iran where he merged 
with the Toilers' Party of Abdul Khaliq Zangana. In 1992, both Mulla Bakhtiyer and 
Imad Ahmed rejoined the PUK Leadership Office in the political polarization which 
occurred after the elections. However, a great deal of damage had been done by this 
grouping to the position of the PUK, and the faultlines it created in the 1980s are still 
apparent twenty years later. 229 
4.5.3.1.2 The Collapse of PUK GOI Negotiations 
The negotiations of 1984 between the PUK and GOI collapsed in January 1985. The 
subsequent Anfal Campaign and the series of military defeats suffered by the KDP 
and PUK at the hands of the forces of the GOI forced both parties to withdraw to the 
mountainous border areas between Iran and Iraq. It was these defeats and the huge 
scale of the Anfal campaign which forced both parties into bilateral talks in the 
summer of 1987.230 These talks resulted in the formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front 
(IKF) in 1988. 
226 Amin (1999) op. cit. 227 A1ay Shoresh translates as 'Revolution Flag'. 228 Amin (1999) op. cit. 229 Sources requested anonymity. Also see Amnesty International (1995). op. cit., pp. 10-11. 230 Sheikhmous (1999) op. cit., p. 60. 
180 
Chapter 4 
4.5.4 The Formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front 
The final structural detail to note concerning the development of the political system 
was the formation of the IKF in May 1988. The IKF was established in order to 
coordinate opposition activity against the GOI. 231 The front was an umbrella 
covering the KDP, PUK, KPDP, KSP, PASOK, ICP (Azadi), KTP, and the ADM. 
The invasion of Kuwait by the forces of the GOI on 2 August 1990 acted as a catalyst 
for the re-invigoration of the Kurdish national movement in Iraq. According to 
members of the IKF, a meeting was held in Kasmorash (Iran) after the invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990. All parties and representatives were present and 3 scenarios were 
discussed. 232 
First, the IKF considered the possibility of Saddam holding Kuwait and effectively 
becoming the dominant Middle East power. In this case, the IKF acknowledged that 
the forces of the GOI could not be matched, and therefore planned to increase the 
size and scope of their covert forces, combined with a propaganda campaign. Second, 
the IKF studied the possibility of the Allied Coalition attacking Iraq and evicting 
Saddam's regime from Baghdad. If this were to happen, the IKF decided to attempt 
to unite Iraqi Kurdistan and bolster the peshmerga with Kurds returning from the 
Popular Army (conscripts) and Jash units. Once in a position of strength, they would 
seek autonomy, hoping that a post-Saddam Hussein Government would be more 
democratically minded. 
Finally, the IKF considered the possibility of the Allies destroying the forces of 
Saddam Hussein, promoting a popular uprising in Iraq. The IKF considered that this 
would be the most likely option and plans were laid to strengthen the mafraza 
structure of the peshmerga, to increase communications between groups, and to 
regularize activities between the parties of the IKF. Sheikhmous also forwards that 
these groups made significant efforts in winning over Kurdish jash forces and 
convinced the demoralised Iraqi forces to surrender without fighting. 233 
231 Amnesty International (1995) op. cit., p. 9. 232 Interview with Jabar Farman, Suleimaniyah, 18 June 1998. See Sheikhmous (1999) op. cit., p. 61. 233 Ibid. 
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On the eve of the Second Gulf War, the IKF had established a structure aimed at 
coordinating their component activities and taking advantage of the geopolitical flux 
which was about to occur. However, even after the defeat of the forces of the GOI, it 
would be a popular uprising rather than the peshmerga forces of the IKF which 
would signal the birth of the de facto state. 
4.5.5 Conclusion 
The characteristics of the current political system can be seen to have developed 
directly from events occurring since 1961. At this time, the KDP could not be 
described as a unified party representing a particular grouping. Instead, it was an 
uneasy alliance between the feudally-minded Barzanis, and the radical intellectuals 
characterised by the Ahmed-Talabani faction. Certain events can be identified as 
being influential in forming the contemporary political system. First, the division 
within the KDP in 1964, which resulted in the expulsion of members of the Ahmed- 
Talabani faction, would change particularly the orientation of the KDP in the future, 
and ensure that it would be continuously dominated by the Barzani family. The 
internecine fighting of 1966 enforced this division, but also identified the future 
importance of Talabani to the neighbouring states. The events of 1975, which saw the 
KDP of Barzani evacuating from Iraqi Kurdistan as a military force, witnessed the 
re-emergence of Talabani with the formation of the PUK. However, the involvement 
of foreign national powers in the massacre at Hakkari ensured that no alliance would 
ever exist between the feudal Kurds and the leftist politicians as represented by the 
PUK. Indeed, the impact of the Hakkari massacre on both the structure and 
morphology of the future PUK, and the relationship between the KDP and PUK, is 
still being felt today. 
The development of the party political system in Iraqi Kurdistan is best described as 
being characterised by punctuated equilibrium, with the steady development of the 
system being changed drastically by extraordinary events. Furthermore, the system 
can be seen to be increasingly politically polarized, particularly after the formation of 
the Komala and the return of the KDP-PL. This polarization was also heightened by 
the actions of the KDP-PL and PUK against each other, and, with each party 
enjoying localised support, the division of the Iraqi Kurdish political system was 
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mirrored culturally, with the division between the rural and urban areas, and between 
the Bahdini and Sorani regions. 
Indeed, this division between the two geographic regions of Iraqi Kurdistan was only 
one of several cleavages which existed within Kurdish society at the time. Social 
cleavages were particularly apparent, particularly between the traditionally-minded 
rural Kurds, and the increasingly educated urbanites of the major cities which were 
growing in size. Tribal cleavages, which were to weaken but not disappear, remained 
influential, with tribes such as the Baradosti and Surchi maintaining significant 
militia, which neither Barzani nor Talabani could afford to ignore. Cleavages even 
reigned within the structures of the parties, with the KDP being characterized by an 
inherent division between party and peshmerga cadres, a division which has 
remained to the present day. As seen, the PUK was itself divided according to a more 
support-base pattern, reflecting the divisions within Kurdish society. Linguistic 
cleavages were particularly evident, with the KDP becoming associated with Bahdini 
speakers, and the PUK with Soranis. Perhaps in terms of confessional differences, the 
cleavages were not so clear cut or important, but the association of Barzani with the 
Naqishbandi sufic order, and Talabani with the Qadiri order, could only add to the 
conflagration of political cleavages which were occurring. Therefore, it can be seen 
that the Iraqi Kurdish political system, and the origin and development of its major 
political parties, has been significantly, and damagingly, influenced by the multiple 
schisms which existed in Kurdish society, culture, and demographic characteristics, 
in addition to the conflicting political ideologies permeating the Middle East at the 
time. 
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Chapter 5 
The Organizational Structures and Decision-Making Processes of 
the KDP and PUK 
5.1 Introduction 
Since the conception of the KDP, political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan have been a 
powerful variable in the development of the region. This has been especially the case 
in the 1990s. In this decade, the KDP and PUK, along with other smaller parties, 
have managed to overcome the traditional tribal power bases once pre-eminent in the 
Kurdish region and present themselves as organizations capable of mobilizing 
widespread popular support, military personnel, foreign national support, and 
substantial financial resources. However, while much has been written on Kurdish 
political history and the characters of the principal leaders of the Kurdish national 
movement, the internal aspects of organizational structure, decision-making 
processes and the characters of the parties have rarely been analysed and assessed. 
The majority of analyses of the Iraqi Kurdish political parties, unfortunately in 
academic as well as journalistic literature, suffer from reductionist tendencies, with 
the KDP being described as tribal and the PUK as socialist. In discussing these 
reductionist viewpoints, Morris identifies the problems such analyses present to the 
understanding of Iraqi Kurdish politics: 
"A view has emerged over the years that [the] KDP and the PUK.... 
represent the two opposite poles of the Kurdish movement - the 
former rural and tribal, the latter urban and intellectual. This is an 
unhelpful simplification. On the one hand, both movements can be 
regarded as modern, if sometimes imperfect, political movements. On 
the other, the leaderships of both can often be seen behaving in a 
quasi-tribal way and using quasi-tribal methods to support their own 
political cause. "I 
5.1.1 Aims 
The aim of this chapter is to correct these reductionist tendencies and provide a 
detailed analysis of the operating mechanisms of the KDP and PUK. They are 
1 Morris (1999) op. cit., p. 47. 
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described and analysed in terms of their organizational structures and decision- 
making processes. The aims can be summarized as follows: 
1. To analyse and assess the organizational structure of the KDP and PUK in order 
to provide a basis for the analysis of the decision-making process. 
2. To assess the decision-making processes of the KDP and PUK. 
3. To identify power groupings, and their impact upon the overall decision-making 
process. 
Such a study has inherent problems. It is not an easy task to produce an insightful 
analysis into the internal dynamics of Middle Eastern political parties. This is 
especially the case when the parties in question possess protective traits which are 
remnants from being conceived in a hostile environment and maturing in the face of 
extreme coercion from other states. Iraqi Kurdish parties are therefore elusive targets 
for academic inquisition. However, after spending four separate substantial periods in 
the field, and having discussed the political parties with members and non-members 
alike, my position to produce an insightful analysis is unique. 
5.1.2 Structure 
I commence with a chronological analysis of the development of the political system 
through the 1990s, identifying key moments of political history. Then, I present a 
description and analysis of the morphology of the selected political parties, 
developing on the findings of the preceding chapter. Once a morphological structure 
has been developed from observation, interviews and party documents, the decision- 
making process and operating procedures of the parties will then be presented. 
5.2 Chronological Analysis of the 1990s 
The 1990s has been characterised as a decade of lost opportunities for the Kurds, 
with the leadership of the KDP and PUK often blamed for squandering the chances 
presented to them after the Second Gulf War. 2 However, the 1990s may be seen to be 
a decade of political development, with the political system finding some sort of 
equilibrium in the milieu of geopolitical forces affecting it. Concerning the 
development of the PUK, Talabani noted that "every party is like a man, and has a 
2 See Gunter (1999a) op. cit., p. 134. 
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childhood [and] adolescence. The PUK is now at the first level of being mature. " 3 
Talabani's sentiments can be applied to the Iraqi Kurdish political system in general 
throughout the 1990s. The system, and its failings, is best understood as undergoing 
the final stages of a transformation from being dominated by the control of central 
government and the guerrilla activities of political parties, to de facto statehood, with 
Kurdish government being established. 
The current level of development is represented as a divided political system. The 
KDP and PUK are effectively separated by their inability to cooperate and 
compromise on issues relating to the distribution of power and wealth among their 
respective political elite. The aim of this chronological analysis, therefore, is to 
provide a political-history context of the 1990s in which to place an analysis of the 
structural organization and decision-making process of the principal political parties, 
illustrating the current level of the transformation with the solidification of this 
divided political system. 
5.2.1 The Second Gulf War and the Rapareen 
The invasion of Kuwait by the forces of Saddam Hussein in August 1990, the 
international reaction and subsequent decision to apply sanctions to Iraq as a whole, 
and the ultimate use of force to compel an unconditional withdrawal came almost as 
a miraculous reprise for the embattled parties of the IKF. After the defeat of Iraq by 
the coalition forces, a popular uprising occurred on 4 March, commencing in 
Raniyah. 4 By 10 March, Dohuk, Erbil and Suleimaniyah had fallen to the insurgency, 
and on 13 March Zakho also fell. As these cities fell, the peshmerga of the IKF 
returned in increasing numbers to Iraqi Kurdistan from Iran (Kasmorash) and joined 
3 Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 14 September 1999. 
4 Sources in Kurdistan indicate that the rapareen (uprising) may have initially started in Erbil. After 
the Anfal campaign, the PUK and KDP returned covert groups of peshmerga back into the urban areas 
of Iraqi Kurdistan. These cells were active in promoting party ideologies, and in attempting to 
undermine the authority of the. GOI. The presence of these units may have been a catalyst for the 
rapareen, however, independent sources within the region who have choosen to remain anonymous 
state that the rapareen of Erbil commenced after a popular demonstration took place on 10 March, led 
by members of the Kurdistan Communist Party. Interviews with Jabar Farman, Suleimaniyah, 18 June 
1998; Shwan Qliasani, Suleimaniyah, 4 August 1999. 
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the insurgency. The forces of the IKF continued to advance and took Kalar, Kifri, 
Tuz Khurmatu, Chamchamal, and part of Kirkuk-5 On 19 March, Kirkuk itself fell. 6 
The triumph was shortlived. With the uprising in the south of the country under 
control, Saddam moved the Republican Guard, heavy weapons and tanks north. The 
expected support from the US led coalition did not appear for the Kurds, and, on 28 
March, Kurdish forces were forced out of Kirkuk, and then Erbil, Dohuk and Zakho. 7 
The result of the return of the Republican Guard to Iraqi Kurdistan was the exodus of 
approximately 2.5 million people to the mountains bordering Iran and Turkey. 8 
On 5 April, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688. It was an historic 
resolution as it was the first to ever mention the Kurds by name. It was also the first 
resolution in which the UN had insisted on the right of interference in the internal 
affairs of a member state by demanding an end to the repression of citizens of Iraq, 
particularly in the Kurdish regions. 
But, on the ground, the danger had not diminished. By the end of April, 250,000 
Kurds had reached the Turkish border with an equal number still on the way, and the 
majority were hopelessly equipped for winter in the mountains. In mid-April, the 
allied forces announced the establishment of a `safe haven' inside Iraq, prohibiting 
Iraqi planes to fly north of the 36 parallel. The first Kurds moved into this haven on 
28 April. This coincided with the massive relief operation mounted by NGOs that 
had begun unilaterally and then continued under the terms of an MOU signed by the 
UN and the GOI on 18 April 1998. 
s The IKF offered a general amnesty to jash units. The, KDP state that this was an initiative of 
Massoud, and helped to relieve the tension apparent within the political system at the time. However, 
the IMK refused to accept this and still refuse to operate with ex-jash personnel. Interviews with 
Ibrahim Tahir, Halabja, 19 June 1998; Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
6 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, 7 March 1991 (SWB ME/1016), 8 March 1991 
OWB ME/1017); Interview with Jabar Farman, Suleimaniyah, 18 June 1998. 
The swift return of the forces of the GO[ to the liberated areas is an indicator of the lack of fully 
mobilized peshmerga presence in the region. Indeed, anonymous sources indicated with some disdain 
that, intially, the peshmerga were welcomed into the areas liberated in the rapareen, expecting them to 
solidify the gains made. However, it is claimed that the peshmerga were tasked with ensuring the 
distribution of fuel amongst the vehicles of the parties of the IKF, leading some to say that they were 
more interested in guarding the fuel, rather than guarding Kurdistan. 
' Sheikhmous (1999) op. cit., p. 62. Also see Abd al-Jabbar (1992) "Why the Uprisings Failed. " 
Middle East Report, (May-June, 1992): pp. 2-14. 
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However welcome this initiative was in easing humanitarian hardships, it was little 
more than a stop-gap and certainly not an attempt at producing a political solution. 
The leadership of the LKF had little alternative but to negotiate with Saddam. 
, 
Confederation was discussed between the two as both sides wanted to dig themselves 
out of an increasingly intractable position. By mid-June it was obvious that 
negotiations were drawing to a halt. Talks were inconclusive and in the summer of 
1991, they consequently failed. 9 
In Kurdistan, disagreement was becoming apparent in the leadership. Talabani 
became more belligerent whereas Massoud seemed to be conciliatory towards the 
GOI. Frustration set in on both sides and, although in nominal control, GOI forces 
found it impossible to deny a peshmerga presence in Erbil and Suleimaniyah. Serious 
fighting broke out in October as both sides tested their defences and the response of 
the Coalition, and Kurdish autonomy appeared increasingly less likely. 10 In October, 
Saddam's government withdrew from the north and imposed an economic and 
administrative blockade on Iraqi Kurdistan leaving a vacuum which paralyzed the 
civil administration and its services. The GOI forces withdrew behind a defensive 
line, cutting off salaries to Kurdish employees, and imposing a second blockade on 
the Kurdish region. In doing so, the civil operation of Kurdistan was paralyzed. 
5.2.2 The De Facto State 
The IKF formally withdrew from the autonomy negotiations and announced its 
intention to replace the Iraqi Legislative Assembly with a freely elected KNA. " 
Multi-party elections occurred on 19 May 1992, resulting in an almost equal division 
between the KDP and PUK.. The KNA was therefore divided equally between the 
two parties, and a power-sharing arrangement was established which resulted in the 
executive organs of the government being dominated throughout by the KDP and 
PUK in a structure which exhibited stability for only as long as the two main parties 
refrained from fighting. 12 
9 Agence France Presse, Paris, 9 September 1991 (SWB ME/1173); Graham-Brown (1999) op. cit., p. 
219. 
10 Graham-Brown (1999) op. cit., p. 219. 
ý1 Gunter (1993) op. cit., pp. 88-93. 
12 The development of the 50-50 system is highly complex and fully analysed in Chapter 7. 
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Barzani and Talabani remained outside the official organs of governance and 
administration, acting as political arbiters controlling the activities of the de facto 
state from their respective political bureau. The political problems which plagued the 
government, alongside deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the polarization 
of the political system caused by the coalescing of smaller parties, meant that the 
political atmosphere of Iraqi Kurdistan did not remain calm, and the de facto state, by 
1993, was on the verge of being rent apart. 
5.2.3 The Conflict of 1994 
These factors resulted in the administration failing to make inroads in meeting the 
people's high expectations after the success of the election. Mounting security 
problems also limited the power of the administration at this time. The response of 
the KRG was to regulate tightly the resources it controlled, which were considerable, 
but this rigid attitude of governance again stifled initiatives and resulted in the 
paralysis of the administrative decision-making process. The decline into conflict 
seemed to be a rapid, and inevitable, process. 
The internal fighting of 1994 was due to many problems, but all of them can be 
traced to the struggle for power by the KDP and PUK. The manipulation of the KRG 
by both factions in 1993, and the operation of an aggressive alignment policy by both 
sides resulted in a serious rise of tension from September 1993 onwards. A push for 
fresh elections in 1995 by the KDP in January 1994 appeared to be the key to the 
PUK deciding that it must take power by a coup d'etat rather than by more 
constitutional means. 13 
5.2.3.1 The Involvement of the IMK 
Relations between the PUK and the KDP started to become dangerously strained 
from September 1993 after the rounds of amalgamations of political parties. The 
Kurdistan Socialist Party (KSP) faction of Hama Haji Mahmoud, which had 
ostensibly merged with the KDP, attacked the KDP in Suleimaniyah. This action, 
which should be seen as part of the polarization process was not significant in 
13 See Chapter 7 for a full analysis of the polarization of the political system. 
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military terms, but heightened the tensions in the changing political arena. 14 An 
attempt at reconciliation by both leaders resulted in detailed discussions on all policy 
matters taking place for a two-month period, culminating with the signing of a 
strategic agreement between Barzani and Talabani establishing a Presidential Council 
on 20 December 1993. However, on this day, fighting erupted between the PUK and 
the IMK, with the IMK attacking and gaining Raniya and Betwata. 15 At this time, 
Talabani was abroad leaving the control of the situation in the hands of the Political 
Bureau. The Political Bureau decided to send its Peshmerga Commander, Jabar 
Farman, to recapture Raniyah. In a campaign which was to add to the ruthless image 
of Jabar, PUK forces fought between 24 and 27 December, and defeated the IMK. 
Jabar captured the leader of the IMK, Sheikh Othman Abdul Aziz, and handed him 
over to the KDP which had threatened to attack if he was harmed. 16 
The affair was alarming on two counts. First, it illustrated the amount of covert 
political manoeuvring that was taking place by both sides, even when the leaders 
were in close consultation, and, second, it showed that the PUK was willing to use 
great force to achieve its aims. The relationship between the KDP and PUK after this 
event deteriorated into serious armed conflict in May 1994. 
5.2.3.2 KDP - PUK Conflict 
The tensions which existed between the KDP and PUK in 1994 meant that the 
Presidential Council collapsed and political control remained with Political Bureaus. 
The situation was extremely volatile and only required a spark to ignite a serious 
confrontation. This was provided when a land dispute in Qala Diza between members 
of the two parties escalated, seemingly without the input of the leaderships. '? The 
14 Gunter (1999a) op. cit., p. 75; Graham-Brown (1999) op. cit., p. 226. 
15 At this time, Raniyah was the stronghold of the IMK. Jabar Farman blamed this outbreak of righting 
on the manipulation of the IMK by the Iranian Government, which was concerned about the 
establishment of the KNA and wished to destabilize Iraqi Kurdistan. According to Jabar, the KDP had 
a military agreement in place with the IMK and pushed them to provoke the PUK. Dr Ibrahim Tahir, 
the *current Commander of IMK Peshmerga, did not confirm this, but hinted towards it by stating that, 
in 1993, "Kurdish parties forced the ! MK to fight". This is somewhat difficult to prove or disprove, 
but it does illustrate that, behind every political event in Iraqi Kurdistan, there is always a web of 
underlying motives and actions. Interviews with Dr Ibrahim Tahir, Halabja, 19 June 1998; Kamal Haji 
Ali, Halabja, 19 June 1998; Jabar Farman, Suleimaniyah, 30 August 1998. 
16 Interview with Jabar Farman, Suleimaniyah, 30 August 1998. 1' Kurdistan Democratic Party (1994) What Happened in Iraqi Kurdistan, hfay-1994? Salahadin, 
Erbil: KDP Research Department, p. 9; Graham-Brown (1999) op-cit., p. 226; Gunter (1999a) op. cit., 
p. 76. 
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PUK took the KNA and KRG institutions and pressed for military gains on the 
ground, particularly in Suleimaniyah Governorate. The KDP similarly mobilized and 
disorganised battles took place intermittently in Rowanduz, Shaqlawa, and Qala Diza 
until the end of August. While this fighting was ongoing, the IMK seized the towns 
of Halabja, Penjwin and Khurmal from the PUK and, in doing so, received 
considerable support from the KDP. 
Meetings were held between the leaderships of the PUK and KDP throughout June 
resulting in the signing of the Paris Agreement in July, which was ratified by an 
alliance pact of the two political bureaus-18 However, fighting again erupted in 
December leaving thousands of displaced civilians, the city of Erbil in the hands of 
the PUK, and the administration effectively divided. 19 
1995 began with the struggle between the two parties unresolved, and with Iraqi 
Kurdistan partitioned into two main areas, and a smaller' area for the IMK. With an 
election due in 1995 the tension again increased. The PUK was left in control of 
Suleimaniyah and Darbandikhan Governorates, and a substantial part of Erbil 
Governorate, including the city of Erbil itself. The KDP held Dohuk Governorate and 
the areas of Erbil Governorate north of Salahadin. 20 
5.2.4 The Invasion of Erbil. 1996 
The situation between the KDP and PUK remained tense throughout 1995 and by 
June 1996 there were reports of renewed confrontations, including the killing of 
Agha Surchi, the leader of the Kurdistan Conservative Party by the KDP during a 
disagreement over the allegiance of the powerful Surchi tribe. 21 The PUK accused 
Massoud of re-opening relations with Baghdad, and the KDP alleged that the PUK 
had assisted Iranian forces in their attack of a KDP-I camp in Koysinjaq in late July, 
'$ Graham-Brown (1999) op. cit., p. 226. 
" Massoud and Talabani met in Erbil on 5 June and in Silopi (Turkey) on 13 June. Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (1994) op. cit., p. 9. The KDP consistently contend that the plan had been pre- 
arranged by Talabani and the PUK, which explains his absence throughout the duration of the fighting, 
allowing the PUK peshmerga to make substantial military gains before he appeared to be in a position 
to call a cease-fire. The figure of Jabar Farman was heavily implicated in the escalation of the fighting. 
20 Graham-Brown (1999) op. cit., p. 227. 
21 Ibid, p. 232; Gunter (1999b) op. cit., p. 75. 
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where they also left a significant amount of arms for the PUK. == After Massoud 
failed to win support from the US in countering the perceived Iranian threat, he 
turned to the GOI for assistance. Ever cautious, Massoud defended his actions in 
language couched in terms of protecting Iraqi territorial intergrity: "After the United 
States and the West refused to listen to us, we agreed with the central government to 
end this foreign threat. " 23 Later, in a similar vein, Sami Abdul Rahman of the KDP 
Political Bureau stated, with reference to the invasion of Erbil, that "[we] would take 
any steps deemed necessary to protect the interests of the Kurdish people. " 24 
On 31 August 1996, the KDP attacked Erbil City with the support of the GOI. The 
PUK was forced out of the city and the KDP then pressed home their advantage and 
took Suleimaniyah. However, the PUK received Iranian support and the subsequent 
counter-attack pushed the KDP out of Suleimaniyah and back into Erbil Governorate. 
Massoud disparagingly noted that "Suleimaniyah was taken with the help of Iranian 
guards, Iranian weapons, and Iranian bombs". 25 The resulting cease-fire line 
developed from the subsequent stand-off between the two parties. 
5.2.4.1 Operation Vengeance Storm. 1997 
Throughout the remainder of 1996 and the beginning of 1997, US and western 
powers were actively involved in attempting to solidify the cease-fire between the 
two parties. The Ankara 'peace process, initiated by the US, UK and Turkey, 
attempted to consolidate the tenuous cease-fire and promote the re-unification of the 
administration through four main initiatives: 
1. The formation of an interim coalition government in Erbil; 
2. Normalization of the city of Erbil; 
3. Transfering of all Iraqi Kurdistan's border revenues to a central bank, and; 
22 Middle East News Agency, Cairo, 15 July 1995 (SWB M E/2357); Iraqi News Agency, Baghdad, 15 
July 1995 (SWB ME/2357); Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, 31 December 1995 
(SWB ME/2499), 29 January 1996 (SWB MFJ2523); Al-Hayat, London, 7 March 1996 (SWB 
ME/2556); Arm the Spirit Information Service, 30 July 1996 (SWB N1F. /2681); Voice of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, 17 August 1996 (SWB ME/2694), 22 August 1996 (SWB ME12699); Voice of the People 
of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, 22 August 1996 (SWB ME12699); Gunter (1999b) op. cit., p. 75; 
Graham-Brown (1999) op. cit., p. 232. 
'a Voice of Kurdistan, 23 September 1996, quoted in Gunter (1999a) op. cit., p. 86. 
24 Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 27 June 1998. 
2$ Quoted in Gunter (1999b) op. cit., p. 76. 
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4. Setting of a date for new regional elections. 26 
However, the Ankara initiative stumbled on the age-old issue of the revenue of 
Ibrahim Khalil. Tensions had also been seriously heightened by the alliance between 
the KDP and Turkish military which aimed to remove the PKK from Iraqi Kurdistan. 
The Turkish airforce reportedly attacked PUK positions as well as those of the PKK. 
The PUK and KDP met in London for the sixth round of talks in October 1997. 
However, when the KDP refused to agree to the immediate sharing of the revenue 
and the establishment of a coalition government, the PUK launched a large-scale 
offensive on 13 October 1997, code-named Operation Vengeance Storm. 27 The PUK 
made significant gains and deployed a large arsenal of heavy weapons including 
Soviet-made GRAD surface to surface missiles. However, the Turkish military 
assisted the KDP by deploying its airforce against the advancing PUK and, by the 
middle of November 1997, the KDP had regained the lost ground and the dividing 
line between the two reverted to the Degala-Koysinjaq position. 28 
5.2.4.2 Conclusion 
The geographical result of the 1996 round of fighting was the KDP being located in 
the governorates of Erbil and Dohuk, and the PUK being in Suleimaniyah 
Governorate and parts of Erbil and Kirkuk Governorates. The cease-fire line was re- 
established between Degala and Koysinjaq, and remains in 2000 (see Figure 3.3). 
The KDP's position appeared to be totally dominant, with full control of Ibrahim 
Khalil, Dohuk and Erbil cities. Talabani's position was more precarious. Farther 
away than ever from securing revenue needed for the party and, now, administration, 
the PUK had also been expelled from the natural seat of government in Erbil, and 
now had all of its high politicians in one small city. Perhaps more importantly, 
Talabani was now more reliant than ever on the support of surrounding countries. 
However, in terms of popular support, the KDP suffered. Many Kurds could not 
believe that Massoud had acted in collaboration with the GOI. Furthermore, the city 
of Erbil did not fully welcome the KDP, particularly with its GOI allies just south of 
its environs. Therefore, although not financially or geographically well placed, 
26 Gunter (1999a) op. cit., p. 87. 
27 Radio Monte Carlo, Paris, 13 October 1997 (SWB ME/3050); Voice of the People of Kurdistan, 
Suleinianiyah, 13 October 1997 (SWB ME13050); Gunter (1999a) op. cit., pp. 88-89. 
28 Interview with Shwan Qliasani, Suleimaniyah, 4 August 1999; Gunter (1999a) op. dt., pp. 89-90. 
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Talabani and the PUK did enjoy some form of resurgence of popular support in Erbil 
and Suleimaniyah. 
Expulsions of opposing party members from Erbil and Suleimaniyah took place 
resulting in a large increase in the number of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs), 
stringent check-points were established, and both sides consolidated their power. In 
practical terms, the political system was now characterised by the division of the 
territory between the two most powerful parties, and each would now go ahead and 
establish its own regional administration. Perhaps surprisingly, this system has 
proved to be remarkably stable and has allowed, in the political- party sphere, for the 
KDP and PUK to not be overly concerned with securing their power base vis-A-vis 
the other side. The reasonably stable environment has created a situation of political 
elite accommodation in which many internal party stresses have been addressed, and 
which has allowed the administration of the region to progress in a more 
technocratic, peaceful manner, rather than be coloured by partisan considerations. 
5.2.5 The Washington Agreement of 1998 
5.2.5.1 The Shaglawa-Koysiniaq Meetings 
To their credit, the KDP and PUK established an indigenous peace process in the 
winter of 1997. After an exchange of letters took place between Talabani and 
Massoud in December of 1997, delegations from the two parties met, initially under 
the auspices of the Ankara peace process, but being characterised as wholly Kurdish, 
and chaired by the respected ex-KSP leader Aziz Mohammad. The first meeting took 
place on 12 February 1998 in Shaglawa (territory controlled 
by the KDP). The KDP 
delegation was led by Sami Abdul Rahman, and also included Jawher Namiq Salim 
(Speaker of the KNA), and Bruska Nuri Shawaise (member of KDP Central 
Committee). The PUK delegation was led by Dr Kamal Fu'ad (PUK Political 
Bureau), and included Omer Sa'id Ali (Political Bureau) and Arsalan Bayaez 
(Political Bureau). This meeting formulated confidence building measures including 
the enforcing of the cease-fire, the ending of media attacks, the release of prisoners, 
the ending of expulsions, the establishment of a joint committee to ensure the 
implementation of SCR 986, and the promotion of increased coordination of public 
service ministries. 
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The meetings continued at approximately fortnightly intervals, and roughly 
alternated location between Shaglawa and Koysinjaq in PUK territory, or 
occasionally at Degala. These meetings should be seen as important as they proved 
that the KDP and PUK could sit down, at the same table and discuss technical issues 
separately from political issues. The specialised sub-committees formed to 
coordinate the public service sectors proved to be reasonably successful, and resulted 
in the reduction of check points between cities, and the easing of travel restrictions 
between Erbil and Suleimaniyah. 
5.2.5.2 The Washington Agreement 
Following the renewal of the US political initiative in Iraqi Kurdistan, David Welsh, 
the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, visited 
Iraqi Kurdistan on 17 July 1998 and met with both Massoud and Talabani, inviting 
both leaders to Washington DC for talks. The visit to Washington culminated with 
the Washington Agreement of 17 September 1998.29 
The Washington Agreement built on the previous Shaqlawa-Koysinjaq meetings. In 
effect, it mirrors the advances made by those meetings, but, with the sponsorship of 
the US, gave the Kurds increased security against the potentially destructive policies 
of the Governments of Turkey and Iraq. The agreement was expected to draw the two 
political parties into closer cooperation and, hopefully, result in the formation of an 
interim administration, in Erbil, followed by multi-party elections to unify the KNA 
and the KRG. 
However, its implementation has been characterised by limited cooperation on issues 
previously agreed at the Shaqlawa meetings. Issues such as the normalisation of 
travel between Suleimaniyah and Erbil, the supplementing of civil service positions 
from KDP revenues, and, until recently, the preservation of a ban on the use of media 
organs for propaganda purposes against the other side have been actively addressed 
with varying degrees of success. 
29 For a full analysis of the implementation of the Washington Agreement, see Stansfield (2000a) op. 
cit., pp. 14-16. Also see Gunter (1999a) op. cit., p. 100. For the full text of the Washington 
Agreement, see Appendix 2. 
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The implementation of some of the greater initiatives, such as the unification of the 
KRG and KNA, has proved to be problematic and subsequent disagreements have 
resulted in a significant increase of tension between the KDP and PUK, characterised 
by the resumption of media attacks and aggressive political maneuvering. The main 
problem with the implementation of the Washington Agreement is one of interpreting 
the key provisions, particularly with regard to: 
1. The normalisation of the situation of Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, with 
both parties able to operate in all cities; 
2. - Revenue-sharing, particularly with regard to the crossing-point of Ibrahim 
Khalil; 
3. The establishment of a temporary unified government; 
4. The re-unification of the KNA; 
5. Security issues, especially with regard to the PKK; 
6. The return of IDPs, and; 
7. The timing of multi-party elections. 
The PUK stated that the promotion of peace in Iraqi Kurdistan requires the following 
to be undertaken under the auspices of the Washington Agreement: 30 
1. A normalization of the situation in the capital, Erbil, then in Suleimaniyah 
and Dohuk. 
2. A fair distribution of revenues. 
3. The formation of a temporary government and the transferring of 
legislative authority to it. 
4. After forming the government, ensuring the security on the borders with 
Iran and Turkey, and form a policy regarding the position of the PKK in 
Iraqi Kurdistan. 
5. Return of the IDP's to their places of origin, with both the KDP and PUK 
releasing all prisoners. 
6. Set a date for the next democratic elections, to be held no later than 3 
months after the normalization of the situation of Erbil. 
30 The PUK was actively promoting these points in their two media outlets, Kurdistane Nwe (in 
Kurdish), and Al-Ittihad (in Arabic). The above list is taken from Al-Ittihad and discussions with ]alal 
Talabani, Kalarcholan, 14 September 1999. 
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The interpretation of the Washington Agreement by the KDP proved to be somewhat 
different to that of the PUK. The following were their main areas of concern: 31 
1. The normalization of the situation in Erbil, Suleimaniyah, and Dohuk, and 
all other cities and towns at the same time. 
2. The sharing of revenues between the KDP-controlled area and the PUK- 
controlled area should be dependent upon the current differences in 
revenue, and that such funding should only fund the public service 
ministries. 
3. The necessity of forming a government and parliament according to the 
results of the election of 1992 (officially, the result suggested that the 
parliamentary division should be 51-49 in favour of the KDP, although 
this is a point of disagreement between the two KDP and PUK). 
4. The KDP would not allow any concessions or conditions regarding the 
PKK, and would not allow them to be based in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
5. Financial and material compensation for IDPs. 
6. Elections should take place only after the normalization of relations in the 
major cities. 
7. Issues regarding the composition of security forces are optional and no 
decision should, as yet, be made. 
Such disagreements posed considerable problems to the leaderships of both parties. 
The PUK chose to focus mainly on the reliability of the results of the elections of 
1992 and the size and eventual destination of revenues from Ibrahim Khalil. The 
KDP chose to focus on the issues of normalization between the cities and the 
necessity of having a system of government based on the official results of the 
elections (51-49), rather than on the 50-50 system employed in the previous first and 
32 second cabinets of 1992 to 1994. 
31 Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 9 September 1999. 
32 Interviews with Sa'adi Ahmed Pira, Suleimaniyah, 13 September 1999; Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 
29 May 2000. 
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5.2.6 Conclusion 
By mid-2000, the problems of implementing the Washington Agreement remained, 
Due to the efforts of both the KDP and PUK, the cease-fire has remained intact, and 
media attacks have remained few and far between. However, the initiative to draw 
the two parties into a unified administrative and political structure has failed and, if 
anything, the political system has been characterised by further divergence. After a 
seemingly fruitful meeting occurred between Nechervan Barzani and Talabani with 
the PUK Political Bureau in attendance in Suleimaniyah on 22 October, at the end of 
the month, the PUK surprisingly divided the last officially unified organ of the 
administrative structure, the judiciary, by establishing a second Supreme Court in 
Suleimaniyah. 33 Furthermore, the PUK went further and elevated Talabani to the 
position of the Leader of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. 34 The impact on the unity of 
Iraqi Kurdistan is evident in the subsequent press release of the KDP, given by Sami 
Abdul Rahman: 
"The PUK's decision is regrettable since it comes right on the heel of 
several KDP positive initiatives aimed at enhancing the peace 
process, mentioning in particular the recent visit by a high level KDP 
delegation headed by Nechervan Barzani to Jalal Talabani .... In 
return, the KDP was expecting a positive response not to deepen the 
segregation by setting up an illegitimate Cassation Court and 
partitioning the Judiciary in Kurdistan, which is the only institution 
remain[ing] intact in the region. " 35 
The further promotion of municipal elections in the governorates of Suleimaniyah 
and Darbandikhan by the PUK again promoted a feeling of permanency to the 
current segregation. The elections, which occurred on 3 February 2000, were to 
select municipal councillors and the PUK won virtually all of the available seats. The 
KDP was again angered by the procedure, but intends to follow suit with similar 
elections in the near future. However, the KDP has not been innocent in the 
promotion of the segregation either. The provision of a regular tranche of revenue to 
" See KDP press release of 25 October 1999, Final Statement on the Joint Meeting Between the KDP 
and PUK. The KDP delegation was headed by Nechervan Barzani and included Sami Abdul Rahman, 
Jawher Namiq, Dr Roj Nuri Shawaise, Azad Berwari, Zaim Ali, Falakadeen Kakayi, Sarbaz Harwami 
and Dr Abdullah Agreen. The PUK delegation was composed of all members of the Political Bureau. 
The talks can be seen as an extension of the Shaqlawa-Koysanjaq meetings, with agreement being 
reached on prisoner exchanges, IDP repatriation, 986 implementation, freedom of movement, and 
revenue issues. Most importantly, the possibility of the KDP opening offices in Kalar and 
Suleimaniyah, and the PUK opening offices in Erbil and Dohuk was discussed. 74 The story was first published in the PUK newspaper Kurdistani Nwe, 30 October 1999, no. 1987. 
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the KRG (Suleimaniyah) has not been upheld beyond the payment of one tranche of 
50 million OID in 1999. Furthermore the establishment of the Fourth Cabinet in Erbil 
somewhat solidified the independence of the Erbil administration from that of 
Suleimaniyah, particularly as a political divide between constituent parties is still 
very much evident. 
Two years after the Washington Agreement was signed, a range of options are 
available, and the US may be seen to be accepting the fact that it is somewhat 
difficult to unify immediately Iraqi Kurdistan. 36 Two obvious options would be to 
either promote a traditional-type of consociational system, with both the KDP and 
PUK joining in a power-sharing government in Erbil, or to continue on the current 
path of almost separate development in each of the administrative/factional areas. 
However, neither of these options is particularly attractive as the first course of 
action has already resulted in serious interfactional fighting, with neither party 
proving to be able to handle the political pressures created within such a system. The 
second option is again unattractive due to the serious inefficiencies which 
characterise the system, and the increasing disparity in wealth which is apparent 
between the Erbil and Suleimaniyah administrations. 
An interpretation of the agreement includes possible areas of coordination in public 
service ministries, followed by a joint national assembly, and then possibly 
succeeded by a unified regional executive. 37 Such initiatives could be achieved with 
the adoption of a geographic-variant of a consociational political system, allowing 
the continued existence of two separate administrative structures, but with increased 
and enhanced coordination between the two, benefiting from progressive confidence- 
building measures at the political level, as envisaged by the Washington Agreement. 
The wisdom of bringing these two groupings back into one small city too quickly has 
to be questioned, particularly when this seemingly natural tendency of separation is 
being promulgated by the actions of the two parties, and indigenous peace processes 
are operating successfully due to the preservation of geographical areas of influence 
and security. 
ss KDP Europe, London, 2 December 1999. 
36 Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 37 Ibid. 
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5.3 The KDP and PUK 
5.3.1 Introduction 
As noted throughout the previous chapters, the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan is 
complex and has been characterised by tumultuous developments and events. The 
influence of particular leaders of the Kurdish national movement has been evident, 
and particularly the role of the Barzanis, Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani. Further 
influential dynamics have also been identified, both in terms of political movements 
other than the KDP and PUK, and characters other than Massoud and Talabani. 
Whilst the preceding chapters have gone into considerable detail about the 
development of the political system and the characteristics of the movements 
concerned, it is necessary to develop an understanding of the internal structures and 
decision-making dynamics of the KDP and PUK. 
5.3.1.1 Structure 
In order to analyse the KDP and PUK in terms of internal-characteristics/constraints 
and the relation between the parties and their external environment, the analysis 
commences with an assessment of their internal morphological structures. This is 
followed by an appraisal of the main channels of representation, as identified by the 
distribution of power within the party decision-making system. This corresponds to 
the first and second stage modelling process extemporised in the theory and 
methodology chapter. 
An analysis and assessment is then presented which incorporates the findings of the 
fieldwork period and analyses the internal power structure of the party concerned, the 
influence of different power-groupings within each party, and the decision-making 
process within the party at a range of levels. The analysis of power groupings within 
the leadership structure illustrates that the parties are characteristed by centralised 
leadership structures governing a politics of diffusion ensuring that pluralistic 
concerns are balanced within a hegemonic structure. 38 Finally, the chapter is 
concluded by identifying the main issues of the peace process which is ongoing 
between the KDP and PUK. 
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5.3.2 The KDP 
The design of the KDP has at its foundation the influence of political parties from the 
moment of its - inception, the influence of some influential Kurdish tribes and, 
subsequently, the influence of leftist thinkers such as Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal 
Talabani. Many of the key political characters of the contemporary political system 
of Iraqi Kurdistan have, been members of the KDP, and, therefore, the influence of 
the KDP on the physical design of other political parties is considerable. The analysis 
of the morphological structure of the KDP is undertaken in three stages: first, the 
leadership structure is developed; second, the main popular offices are identified, 
and; 'third, the recruitment and grass-roots offices are described. For the purposes of 
clarity, the structure described is that which was formulated by the Eleventh 
Congress of the KDP, held in 1993. Subsequent changes, particularly of personnel, 
are identified and analysed in later sections. However, the structure of the KDP did 
not change significantly between the eleventh and twelfth congresses. 
5.3.2.1 KDP Morphology 
5.3.2.1.1 KDP Leadership Morphology 
Figure 5.1 displays the morphology of the leadership structure of the KDP. The 
leadership is constituted of three separate layers, each overlapping to a certain 
degree. The largest body, and supposedly the most influential, is the Central 
Committee (maktabi nawandi). The prescribed composition of the Central 
Committee is 37 andams (members) and 9 reserve personnel, chosen by secret ballot 
of the party Congress. 39 The committee is scheduled to meet once every month 40 
The activities of the Central Committee are extensive, ranging from representation, 
oversight of party activities, and organizing of the party's internal elections. The 
main roles of the Central Committee include the providing of personnel and 
organizing of the KDP regional branch structure and Central Offices, and the 
identification of the Political Bureau 41 The regional branch organizations are headed 
38 For further analyses of such systems in the Middle East, see Frisch (1998) Countdown to Statehood: 
Palestinian State Formation in the West Bank and Gaza. NY: State University of New York Press. 
39 Kurdistan Democratic Party (I 993b) Internal Programme of the Eleventh Congress of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party. Erbil. Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 3. 
40 See Appendix 3 for the members of the Central Committee as appointed by the Eleventh and 
Twelfth Congresses. 
41 Ibid, article 7, paragraphs 1,13; article 8, paragraph 2 
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by a member of the Central Committee. The Central Offices of the KDP represent the 
administrative and policy implementation organs of the party. It is the role of the 
Central Committee to organise and staff these offices. However, these offices are 
normally headed by a member of the Political Bureau. 42 
The Political Bureau (maktab sayarsi) is, officially, the pre-eminent decision-making 
body of most Iraqi Kurdish political parties, and the KDP is no exception. It may be 
referred to as being the executive committee of the party. 43 As has been seen in the 
previous chapteers, the KDP Political Bureau has been heavily involved in the 
development and history of the Kurdish national movement. Its members possess 
perhaps the most power of any political institution within Iraqi Kurdistan, and, as 
individuals, possess considerable power and influence themselves. 
From studying Figure 5.1, it is clear that the Political Bureau is part of the Central 
Committee, as well as being considered a higher office. It is elected from members of 
the Central Committee by secret ballot. 44 The Political Bureau numbers 9 persons, 
and within the bureau there exists a steering committee whose role it is to oversee the 
running of the office. 45 The position of head of this committee is important and may 
be seen to be the highest official position within the party, apart from the immediate 
circle of the President. Between 1996 and 1999, the head of the steering committee 
was Sami Abdul Rahman, with the other members being Azad Barwari and Arif 
Taifour. Since the Twelfth Congress of October 1999, the previous Speaker of the 
KNA, Jawher Namiq Salim, has been head of the committee. 46 
The leadership structure of the KDP is headed by Massoud Barzani as President. 
Massoud is also a member of the Political Bureau and Central Committee. In 
addition, the President also has a number of his own private offices which act over a 
range of functions. Perhaps most importantly for the President, he retains control of 
42 Ibid, article 8, paragraph 7. 
47 Interviews with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 April 1998; Muhsin Dizayi, Salahadin, 30 May 
2000. 
44 Kurdistan Democratic Party (1993b) op. cit., article 7, paragraph 1; article 8, paragraph 2. 
°S Interviews with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 April 1998; Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 
May 1998. Kurdistan Democratic Party (1993b) op. cit., article 8, paragraph 1. 
46 Interview with Muhsin Dizayi, Salahadin, 30 May 2000. 
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Figure 5.1: The Leadership Structure of the Kurdistan Democratic Party47 
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" Kurdistan Democratic Party (1993b) op. cit.; interview with Sam! Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 
April 1998 
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both the intelligence service, the Rechrastin Taybet (Parastin), and the military 
bureau. 48 
5.3.2.1.2 Regional and Sub-Regional Structure 
As seen in Figure 5.1, the KDP geographic structure is headed by twelve regional 
branches (liq). Within each of these branches, the structure further subdivides into 
area offices (nawcha), then district organizational offices (rechkraw), community 
offices (shana) and, finally, recruitment cells. Figure 5.2 illustrates the morphology 
and relationship which exists between these organs. The liq may be seen to be the 
most public face of the party with regard to its interaction with the population of the 
region and represent, for the majority of the population, the highest office of the 
party dealing with immediate concerns and activities. The liq is the representative, 
and leader of, KDP activities in a large geographical area (defined by the Central 
Committee), and is appointed by and answerable to the Central Committee. Each liq 
is effectively a microcosm of the party itself, and contains representatives of each of 
the Central Offices, and a Liq Committee which manages the activities of the party 
within its region. The KDP, at this level, may be described as fractal, with the 
constitution of the lower offices being approximately the same as the higher ones. 49 
The head of the Liq Committee has to be a member of the Central Committee, and it 
is the duty of the Liq Committee to forward reports on all party activities directly to 
the Political Bureau. 
During the summer of 1998, I spent a considerable amount of time within the offices 
of Leqi Du (Branch 2, Erbil), discussing the operations of the office with its head, 
Sa'ad Abdullah. According to Sa'ad, the position of head of liq within the KDP is not 
considered to be permanent, and personnel are often rotated. Similarly, the internal 
structure of the branches are not the same and depend upon population size of the 
region, and political activity. Lfq also exist even. for those places which do not allow 
a KDP presence, including Suleimaniyah and Baghdad, but are currently based in 
Erbil with an attendant skeleton staff. Within Legi Du, there are 12 nawcha, making a 
branch committee of 17 persons. Not all branches are organized according to the 
'$ It should be noted that Massoud has been in charge of the Parastin and then Rechrastin Taybet since 
its foundation in 1964. Because of this, his knowledge of the personnel and procedures is unparalleled, 
giving him a great deal of personal security within the party. 
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49 Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 9 September 1999. 
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provisions of the party programme. In Leqi Du, for example, there are 17 members, 
but there be as many as 70 in other branches. 5° 
The nawcha may be a geographic or trade union-based organization. For example, in 
the city of Erbil there are 2 geographic nawcha and 10 separate ones for different 
trades, including teachers, engineers, civil servants, and farmers. A similar system is 
also in operation for the organization of the reckhraw. The number of reckhraw per 
nawcha can vary between 7 and 20, and there are between 7 and 12 shana per 
reckhraw, with a shana numbering between 10-15 persons. 5t 
Recruitment at the grass-roots level takes place at the level of the shana. The shana 
is a structure which developed during those times when the KDP had to operate 
covertly, and beneath the shana there are even smaller covert units. However, Sami 
stressed that, now that the KDP can be public, the operations of these units are less 
secretive and more open. 52 
5.3.2.1.3 Conclusion 
The above description depicts the outline of the KDP, and it is possible to apply this 
model to most political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, whilst this description 
can go some way to in assisting with the understanding of the political system of the 
region, it misses many important aspects. For example, perhaps the most important 
aspect of the decision-making structure of the KDP is within the Barzani family 
itself. However, such structures would not appear in official documentation, or be a 
prescribed dynamic of the party. This factor is brought out in the later sections. 
5.3.2.2 The Decision-Making Process o the KDP 
Critics of the KDP claim that the KDP decision-making process is dominated by the 
Barzanis, with the rest of the party being little more than the implementing agency of 
the family's wishes. In the following section, I examine the official decision-making 
process, as KDP documents and members describe it, before going on to address the 
views of KDP opponents. In the final section, I present an analysis of the internal 
so Interview with Sa'ad Abdullah, Erbil, 9 September 1999. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 April 1998. 
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politics of the KDP in an attempt to fully assess and analyse its political decision. 
making process. 
5.3.2.2.1 The Prescribed Decision-Making Process of the KDP 
Within the KDP, the highest recognised legislative authority is that of the Congress. `3 
According to high-ranking members of the KDP, its decision-making process is fully 
democratic, with the direction of the party being decided by a Congress once every 
four years, with participants to the Congress being elected from the regional 
organizations at nawcha level. Congress then elects the Central Committee, Political 
Bureau and President. In identifying the position of the Congress in the KDP, 
Hoshyar Zebari noted to me that "the KDP has been more democratic in the selection 
of its leadership than any other Kurdish party. It's leaders have always been elected, 
and never imposed. "54 
Just before the Twelfth Congress in 1999, I met with Massoud Barzani, who, in 
reference to the decision-making process of the party stated that; 
"It is worth noting that the KDP is the only party in Iraqi Kurdistan 
that has had a continuous programme of party congresses and 
conferences since its foundation in 1946. It is now nearing the Twelfth 
Congress. This shows one of the essences of the KDP when compared 
to other political parties. Congress is [its] highest authority. " 55 
As well as electing personnel to the leadership offices, Congress also decides upon 
specific policies for political actions, and a plan of action for the development of the 
Iraqi Kurdistan region. The Central Committee is then responsible for implementing 
the decisions made by the Congress. To achieve this, the Central Committee elects 
from its members a Political Bureau. Between the two meetings of the Central 
Committee, the Political Bureau implements the decisions of the Central Committee, 
Furthermore, the liq organizations of the KDP are also elected, as are all the organs 
beneath it. Decisions made for the implementation of Central Committee directives 
are sent from the Political Bureau to the liq. For local issues, the liq may develop 
their own solutions, and every few months, the Central Committee evaluates 
" Interviews with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 9 September 1999; Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 
May 2000. 
94 Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
55 Interview with Massoud Barzani, Saryrash, 22 August 1999. 
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activities. 56 Such a system may seem to be idealised. However, Massoud is confident 
that such a process does take place, and that this democratic approach is 
insitutionalised within the KDP. He himself is particularly proud of this characteristic 
of the KDP, especially as he feels it is not too common in other political parties. With 
reference to this fact, he noted that "the respect which KDP members have for each 
other and the procedures of the party is not found in the other political 
organizations. "57 
Before a Congress can take place, there has to be an extensive period of internal 
elections. The first stage of the KDP Congress election is held at the level of the 
rnawcha. This stage elects the Congress delegates, and there is a constant ratio of 350 
members per delegate. At the same time, the Iiq organizations form through this 
electoral process, with the nawcha committee being selected, followed by the 
formation of the liq committee. A special party committee coordinates all elections. " 
5.3.2.2.2 Criticisms of the KDP Decision Making Process 
Whilst this assessment depicts a structure which is undeniably democratic in plan, 
criticisms of the KDP abound, and particularly with regard to how power is exercised 
within the party. The prominence of Barzanis within the leadership has always been 
an immediate area of criticism which has been seized upon by all of the opponents of 
the KDP. When the leadership structure is analysed in detail, it is apparent that 
members of the Barzani family do indeed hold key positions within the party and 
government. Most notable of the family members is Nechervan, son of Idris and 
nephew of Massoud, who is in the steering committee of the Political Bureau, and is 
now Prime Minister of the. KRG. Massoud has also strategically positioned his 
brothers around the world, with Farhad in Washington DC and Delshad in Berlin. 
Closer to home, Massoud's youngest brother, Weji, is commander of the KDP 
special forces and his uncle, Hoshyar Zebari, is in charge of KDP foreign relations 
and representative to London. Furthermore, since the Twelfth Congress, Massoud's 
son, Masrour, is now in the Political Bureau and Massoud's brother, Sudat, has a 
position which may be likened to that of a whip of a UK political party. 
56 Ibid. 
5' Ibid. 
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It is therefore understandable why many analysts characterise the KDP as being 
dominated by the Barzanis. Members of the PUK describe the decision-making 
process of the KDP as being divided into three levels: 59 
1. Massoud, Nechervan, and some high level Barzani sheikhs. 
2. Sami Abdul Rahman, Muhsin Dizayi, Falahkadin Kakai and advisors form. an 
intellectual body, to present the decisions made by the Barzanis, with this 
group advising but having no power. 
3. The Political Bureau and Central Committee approve and rubber stamp the 
policy. 
However, should the supposed dominance of the Barzanis be a cause of concern, 
particularly in a democratic sense? Many legitimate regimes are dominated by 
families, is it fair to criticise this one for being so? The PUK certainly believe that the 
dominance of the Barzanis within the KDP is the main cause of corruption within the 
party. 60 However, Massoud has proven to be a leader willing to listen to the people 
around him and certainly values the expertise he has within the Political Bureau. 61 
There is a consensus of opinion from KDP Political Bureau members that the 
majority of decisions are reached by democratic procedures, and on occasion go 
62 against the wishes of Massoud. 
Similarly, the Political Bureau under the leadership of Sami Abdul Rahman, and now 
Jawher Namiq Salim, is not without influence. The KDP is keen to point out that its 
Political Bureau possesses more intellectuals, graduates and doctorate holders than 
any other party's political bureau. 63 Furthermore, while the predominant position of 
58 Interviews with Sarni Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 9 September 1999; Sa'ad Abdullah, Erbil, 9 
September 1999. 
39 Interview with Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 1998. 
60 Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 200Q. 
61 The identification of Massoud as being a quiet, cautious, thoughtful man is common the academic 
literature listed throughout this thesis, and has also been stated many times by others who have met 
him in a professional sense. I myself find Massoud to be the calmest of men. Such views are also 
shared by members of the Political Bureau who note that Massoud listens carefully to everything 
everybody says before speaking himself. Interviews with Phebe Marr, Durham, 9 July 1999; Massoud 
Barzani, Saryrash, 22 August 1999; Arif Taifour, Salahadin, I September 1999; Sami Abdul Rahman, 
Salahadin, 8 September 1999; Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
62 Interviews with Massoud Barzani, Saryrash, 22 August 1999; Arif Taifour, Salahadin, 1 September 
1999; Sarni Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 8 September 1999; Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
63 Interviews with Arif Taifour, Salahadin, 1 September 1999; Sami Abdul Rahman, 8 September 
1999; Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
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the Barzanis is obvious, the democratic procedures of the party are also readily 
apparent. While in Erbil, I followed closely the nawcha elections of the Second 
Branch of the KDP under the leadership of Sa'ad Abdullah. The elections were 
conducted with the utmost care, and the results of the elections (to the nawcha 
committees and to the Twelfth Congress) saw an increase in younger members at the 
expense of the old guard and, indeed, some Barzanis. 
However, within the KDP, it is apparent that there is a horizontal division in 
existence within the decision-making process, with the leadership of the Barzanis not 
being too involved with the grass-roots activities of the parties, thereby allowing the 
promotion of democratic procedures at the level of the nawcha elections. At the level 
of the Political Bureau, the Barzanis exercise their power to the full. However, it is 
apparent the Massoud does not dictate to the KDP. Nechervan, in discussing the 
managerial skills of Massoud, stated that: 
"Massoud Barzani has many advisors and listens- to many people 
while he is touring. He makes recommendations both to the Political 
Bureau and to the Administration. His style is to discuss and not to 
dictate. "64 
Massoud has always had a reputation of being quite, thoughtful, and keen to take the 
advice of those around him. This, at times, means that he appears more withdrawn 
than the effervescent Talabani, but Massoud does not suffer from the same 
accusations of being mercurial in argument and approach to leadership. However, 
perhaps more so than in any other political party in Iraqi Kurdistan, the KDP exhibits 
tendencies best described as `democratic centralist'. A situation certainly exists 
within the KDP where discussion is evident, however, once a decision has been 
arrived at by the leadership, it is implemented without question by the lower echelons 
of the party. 65 
What is needed to assess fully and analyse the decision-making process of the KDP, 
and, indeed, any political party, is a set of events which illustrates the different 
dynamics which exist in the party at a particular moment in time. Fortunately, Such a 
window was provided in the late 1990s for the main political parties in the region. 
64 Interview with Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 1998. 
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With regard to the KDP, 1998 proved to be a remarkably successful year. The third 
cabinet became increasingly institutionalised within the region, relations with all 
neighbouring countries were reasonable, and the PUK was still suffering from the 
setbacks caused by their misguided attack of 1997. However, toward the end of 1998, 
and then through 1999, the KDP underwent some changes which exposed many of 
the complexities of the decision-making process, and illustrating that, rather than 
considering the KDP leadership dynamics to be a case of the Barzanis dominating 
over the party, we should be looking at what is happening amongst the Barzanis 
themselves. 
5.3.2.3 Analysis and Assessment of the KDP Leadership Structure 
In 1998, the KDP could be characterised as being a strong political party which was 
largely devoid of internal division, particularly when compared with the PUK. 
Benefiting from reasonably reliable revenues from the border crossing at Ibrahim 
Khalil, the political and administrative spheres increasingly diverged, with both less 
reliant on the other for securing or employing power. However, the negative side of 
this success occurred with the mismanagement of finances and political manoeuvring 
within the party leadership structure. 
Throughout 1999 and 2000, the undeniable strength of the KDP in military, political 
and economic terms was readily apparent, however, it was also the case that this 
strength was fragile and Massoud, with one eye constantly on the opinion polls, 
realised that the party was ultimately reliant upon the electorate and being seen by it 
and the international community as a party of integrity. 66 Furthermore, and perhaps 
of more pressing concern for Massoud, the KDP was increasingly being affected by 
factionalisation around two wings - Massoud's own, and that of his nephew 
Nechervan. As the KDP has grown throughout the 1990s, so has the influence of 
different groupings within the power structure. The changes forced upon both the 
KDP and PUK by the changing external environment, for example, in becoming 
parties which have to administer rather than fight, has presented the leaders with the 
task of being seen to be maintaining democratic structures, yet not allowing for 
65 Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
66 Stansfield (2000a) op. cit., pp. 14-16. 
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opponents to gain too much power. It is the management of this problem which has 
opened a window onto the power-structure of the KDP. 
5.3.2.3.1 Power Groupings 
Throughout the late 1990s, the leadership of the KDP has been dominated by two 
Barzanis, not one. This structure, however, is an established feature of the KDP. The 
leader has always been supported by a member of the Political Bureau with almost 
equal power to the leader himself. During the mid 1970s, for example, Sami Abdul 
Rahman may be seen to be the support to Massoud. During the 1980s, Idris 
supported Massoud as President and, since the Tenth Congress in 1989, Nechervan is 
now the supporting Barzani. 67 However, Nechervan has been actively creating a 
support base within Dohuk Governorate and has accumulated a vast amount of 
wealth through various business dealings. The extent of his power is unrivalled 
within the KDP region, in both terms of political influence and financial control, and 
the management of this dynamic has been an issue which Massoud has been targeting 
particularly since 1998. 
Within the KDP, there are therefore different power groupings. The first, and most 
powerful group, is that of Massoud. As party leader, his position is unassailable 
(particularly since the Twelfth Congress), as he has surrounded himself with family 
members and, lately, his son Masrour. With Massoud, it is always important to 
remember that he is half-Barzani, half-Zebari, and the younger of the two `Barzani 
Brothers' who led the KDP in the late 1970s after the demise of Mulla Mustafa. 68 
The death of his brother, Idris, resulted in Massoud becoming undisputed leader. 
However, feelings for Idris have remained strong in some sectors of more traditional 
Kurdish society and the KDP, and are now focused on the figure of Idris's son, 
Nechervan. 
The second grouping is, therefore, led by Nechervan. As grandson of Mulla Mustafa 
and son of Idris, he has enjoyed a rapid rise up the hierarchy of the KDP and now 
67 Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
66 However, it should not be thought that Massoud is not the favoured successor of Mulla Mustafa. Of 
his three wives, Barzani's favourite was the second, Massoud's mother. It has often been stated in 
Iraqi Kurdistan that Massoud and Idris used to make a show out of having different mothers in an 
I 
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occupies a position in the Steering Committee of the Political Bureau and is Prime 
Minister of the KRG. Nechervan has also developed a power base within the city of 
Dohuk and has links with many of the lucrative import-export businesses in the city, 
as well as administering the revenue earned at the border crossing point with Turkey 
at Ibrahim Khalil. Furthermore, Nechervan operates the Kurdish part of a G0I- 
Kurdish initiative shipping oil from Mosul to Turkey. The result of these operations 
is that Nechervan is a tremendously wealthy individual with a very strong power base 
within the KDP. 
The third grouping is more of a collection of highly influential personnel under the 
leadership of Sami Abdul Rahman. As seen in previous chapters, Sami has not 
always been in the KDP, and in the 1980s led a vociferous opposition grouping 
which was highly critical of the tribally-orientated KDP, and particularly of Idris 
Barzani. 69 However, in the late 1990s, Sami was undoubtedly portraying himself as a 
true KDP man whatever his past may indicate, but remained highly. influential 
amongst his previous party cadres within the KDP. Personnel of Sami's previous 
party (KPDP, and then UPK) now represent the intelligentsia of the KDP and the 
inclusion of the UPK can now be seen to have been a move which has broadened the 
support base of the KDP, and benefited the party with the inclusion of politicians of a 
very high calibre. However, whilst Sami's background and history which has often 
been in opposition to the Barzanis, Massoud is keen to keep him close to the 
decision-making process. 
The interaction of these three groupings can be seen when the Twelfth Congress of 
the KDP is studied. The Congress, which occurred in October 1999, resulted in some 
major changes within the KDP. Perhaps most' importantly, Massoud significantly 
strengthened his own position by bringing his son, Masrour, into the Political Bureau. 
Sami's appointment to the position of Deputy Prime Minister is also seen as a 
political move which originated with Massoud. Similarly, other members of the 
cabinet which Nechervan wanted removed have remained in key positions. However, 
the appointment to what may be considered a cabinet watch-dog position of Minister 
attempt to encourage people into believing that there may have been a problem between them when, in 
reality, there was no issue present. 69 See Chapter 4 for an assessment of the political career of Sami Abdul Rahman. 
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of the Cabinet of Shawkat Sheikh Yazdeen, a Nechervan supporter, may indicate that 
the Prime Minister still wields considerable power. 
x. 3.2.3.2 Conclusion 
The divisions within the KDP are still in an early stage and it is possible that nothing 
will come of these groupings. Massoud is undeniably in control of the situation and 
has gone a considerable way in promoting the KDP as a party of Kurdistan rather 
than of the Barzanis. It has been said that the KDP is a `tribe behaving like a party', 
which is a reasonable assessment on one level. 70 The KDP displays strong internal 
cohesion of its party organs and, at least at the grass-roots level, has instituted a 
considerable degree of democratic procedures, particular with regard to the election 
of individuals to decision-making bodies. It should be noted that many members of 
the KDP do not consider it to be a party. Hoshyar Zebari stressed that the number of 
KDP members is actually quite limited, yet the KDP enjoys a great deal of support. 
He therefore characterised the KDP as a `movement' which benefits from taking a 
middle, cautious, line in the resolution of the Kurdish problem in Iraq. ' 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the KDP adhere to the principals of electing 
personnel to the Central Committee and Political Bureau much more rigidly than 
does the PUK. For example, the KDP Political Bureau established by the Eleventh 
Congress in 1993 was unchanged throughout the next six years apart from the 
enforced changes caused by the death of an original member. The Twelfth Congress 
subsequently altered the composition of the office. This is quite different from what 
happens within the PUK, where appointments to the Political Bureau and Leadership 
Office are much more fluid and are by agreement between the different groupings 
which exist within the leadership itself. 
5.3.3 The PUK 
Structurally, the PUK has a similar morphology to that of the KDP, which is perhaps 
not surprising when it is realised that their origins and development have been 
70 The identification of the KDP as a party of the tribes is somewhat flawed, as most of the powerful 
tribes of the region, including the Surchis and Baradostis, still dislike the KDP. Massoud noted to me 
that the KDP represents tribal peoples, intellectuals and technocrats alike, and has combined the forces 
of tribalism with those of Kurdish nationalism. Interview with Massoud Barzani, Saryrash, 22 August 
1999. 
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inextricably linked. However, the manifestation of extreme-leftist political groupings 
has had a structural impact upon the PUK, and it is possible to trace many of the 
design features to Komala, one of the founding parties of the union. Notable 
differences include aspects of terminology, and in some more detailed areas 
regarding representation within the decision-making process. Perhaps the biggest 
structural difference can be seen to exist in the leadership apparatus, and particularly 
in the position of Talabani. The appraisal of the morphological structure of the PUK 
is identical to that of the KDP, enabling a close comparison to take place. 
5.3.3.1 PUK Morphology 
5.3.3.1.1 PUK Leadership Morphology 
Figure 5.3 displays the morphology of the leadership structure of the PUK. The 
similarities with the KDP are obvious, with both employing the same overlapping 
type structure. However, there are some apparent differences. The PUK equivalent to 
the Central Committee is the Leadership Office (maktab sakredayeti). The prescribed 
composition of the Leadership Office is 17 madams (members), however, in practice, 
the number is approximately 35, although this varies considerably depending upon 
who is in the region at any particular time. The activities of the Leadership Office, 72 
as prescribed in the programme of the PUK, are virtually identical to those of the 
PUK, as are the roles of the subordinate offices of the structure. However, differences 
are apparent in the high-leadership structure, with Talabani being effectively the 
official head of all PUK Central Offices, with Deputies appointed to direct their daily 
operations. For example, the head of the Foreign Relations Bureau is Talabani, with 
Sa'adi Pira being his Deputy. A similar system is in force with the peshmerga, with 
Talabani being commander, and Jabar Farman running the organization as his 
second-in-command. 73 All offices are therefore answerable to Talabani, via the 
Political Bureau. Each of the Central Offices are also coordinated by a member of the 
Political Bureau, with these offices also having representatives in each geographical 
74 melbend. 
71 Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
12 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (1993) Internal Programme and Afethod of the PUK. Erbil. Article 7, 
paragraph 7. See Appendix 3 for the members of the Leadership Office. 
3 Interview with Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 1998. 
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Figure 5.3: The Leadership Structure of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistans 
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74 Interviews with Arsalan Bayaez, Suleimaniyah, 24 May 1998; Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 
1998. 
's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (1993) op. cit.; interviews with Mohammad Tawfiq, Suleimaniyah, 14 
May 1998; Arsalan Bayaez, Suleimaniyah, 24 May 1998; Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 1998; 
Shwan Qliasani, Suleimaniyah, 18 June 1998; Omar Sa'id Ali, Suleimaniyah, 20 June 1998. 
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5.3.3.1.2 Regional and Sub-Regional Structure 
The PUK geographic structure is headed by nine regional branches (melbend). When 
in Suleimaniyah, I had the opportunity to spend time in melbendi yek (Branch One), 
under the coordination of the PUK Political Bureau member Omar Sa'id Ali. As 
centre for the PUK in Suleimaniyah, it provides a useful comparison with Legi Du of 
the KDP in Erbil. The structure of the regional and sub-regional structure is similar to 
that of. the KDP, therefore Figure 5.2 is a useful reference. The following analysis 
highlights those areas which exhibit differences. 
Within the Suleimaniyah melbend, there are 41 members, 18 of whom are women. 
The organization is headed by Omer Sa'id Ali along with two deputies. There is then 
a Steering Committee of 6 members, and beneath this there are the Comila 
Representatives, which number 23. The remainder of the members are in the offices 
of sectors, and each office is headed by one of the Steering Committee. 76 
The melbend is the PUK's central organizing office. Within the KDP areas, the liq 
manage the structure which is mainly geographical, with some trade union-type 
organizations as well. Within the PUK areas, it appears that the reverse is the case, 
with a greater focus on trade union organizations, and then geographic ones. To 
coordinate the activities of the PUK and provide feedback channels, the melbend has 
within it smaller organizations called comita. Within melbendi yek there are 23 such 
comitas mainly according to profession, with some for geographical locations in 
more rural parts of Suleimaniyah. 77 
The comita break down futher into kart. The kart are built on a professional / 
geographical level such as a grouping of shops for example. Each member of the 
Comita Committee is responsible for one kart, which can number between 150 and 
250 members. The head of the kart has a committee consisting of approximately 10 
members. Each of these is responsible for a further subdivision known as a pol. A pol 
is composed of approximalty 4 shana with eachshana containing 10-15 people. 
78 
76 Interview with Omar Sa'id All, Suleimaniyah, 20 June 1998. 
". Interview with Arsalan Bayaez, Suleimaniyah, 24 May 1998. 
'a Interview with Omar Sa'id All, Suleimaniyah; 20 June 1998. 
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5.3.3.1.3 Conclusion 
The influence of both the heritage of the KDP and the impact of the structures of the 
extreme left factions such as Komala can be readily seen in the structural 
morphology of the PUK, with elements of both the geographic approach of the KDP, 
and the trade union-style approach to politics of the leftist groupings being combined. 
Furthermore, many of the terms used within the PUK were first employed within 
Komala. However, there are certainly more similarities than differences in the 
structure of these two parties. Nechervan Bartani commented upon this point, 
identifying that ideology was not the source of conflict between the KDP and PUK: 
"The programmes of both parties are virtually identical, and the goals 
are the same. The problem is one of who has power, and this may be 
solved by either elections or violence .... Believe me, there is no 
apparent external difference between the KDP and PUK, it Is a 
personal matter. 09 
5.3.3.2 The Decision-Making Process of the PUK 
If opinions relating to the decision-making process of the KDP are strong, the reverse 
is the case for the PUK. Within Iraqi Kurdistan, rather than being to identify one 
personality in which all power resides, as the KDP is so often accused, the power. 
exercising structures of the PUK are seemingly more opaque. Critics of the PUK 
describe Talabani's approach as being dictatorial, and PUK Political Bureau 
meetings as being highly charged and chaotic. It does appear that common 
preconceptions of the PUK within Iraqi Kurdistan see the party as being dominated 
by arguments and tense discussion. In this section, I provide an analysis of the PUK 
decision-making process, again both prescribed and actual. In the final part of this 
section, I again present a reading of contemporary PUK political activity in an 
attempt to provide insights into its decision-making processes. 
5.3.3.2.1 The Prescribed Decision-Making Process of the PUK 
According to the official programme of the PUK, it is of no surprise that the highest 
official decision-making authority within the party is, again, the Congress. 
80 The 
procedures by which it is organised involve a democratic voting system, and renewal 
once every two years. As. in the KDP, the PUK have elections for the different party 
79 Interview with Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 1998. 
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positions up to the melbend and Central Offices. The heads of the melbend and 
Central Offices then form a plenum which then elects the congress. At the Congress, 
the Leadership Office is elected, the party programme reviewed, as are the policies of 
the PUK in general, again in an identical manner to the KDP. The Leadership Office 
then elects the Political Bureau. The Political Bureau is in charge of implementing 
the decisions of the Leadership Office between the two meetings of the Leadership 
Office, which is required to meet four times a year. 81 
However, whilst the PUK system may be seen to be identical to the KDP on paper, in 
practice it is very different as the last PUK Congress took place in 1992, and there 
has not been one since. Before the unification of the PUK took place in early 1990s 
into one party, the separate groupings of the union, Komala and Shoresh Garan held 
their own congresses, so there is not a continuous history of PUK Congresses as 
such. This fact is often seized-upon by the KDP as an example that it is the PUK is 
command driven rather than the KDP. 82 Probably because the last congress was a 
considerable time ago, there is little discussion concerning congress activities when 
one investigates the decision-making process of the PUK. However, there is much 
more discussion regarding the grass-roots activities and the involvement of the rank 
and file of the party, which is possibly a reflection of its socialist origins. 83 
Within the PUK, the comita are identified as the main source of policies. According 
to PUK members, recommendations usually commence in the comita, and progress 
to the melbend before being forwarded to the Political Bureau. Within the Political 
Bureau, the forwarded issues are discussed beforehand in two separate Leadership 
Office. meetings then recommendations are passed to the Political Bureau for a final 
decision. Decisions are therefore reached in the Leadership Office. The Political 
Bureau checks / ratifies these decisions, but may also take some decisions by its own 
authority. 94 This mechanism is less centralised than that found in the KDP, but may 
10 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (1993) op. cit., article 11. 
'' Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
'2 Sami Abdul Rahman noted that the PUK Political Bureau has changed several times since 1993, and 
never with the permission of the Party Congress. Interviews with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 9 
September 1999; Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
13 The Second Congress of the PUK is due to take place in January-February 2001. 'J Interviews with Kamal Khoshnaw, Suleimaniyah, 13 May 1998; Mohammad Tawfiq, Suleimaniyah, 
14 May 1998; Arsalan Bayaez, Suleimaniyah, 24 May 1998; Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 1998. 
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be characterised as a form of democratic centralism, as the final directive from the 
Political Bureau has to be implemented throughout the whole organization. 
Within the Political Bureau, the Steering Committee appears to have greater 
predominance over activities than the KDP committee does over its own meetings. 
The secretary of the committee, Dr Kamal Fu'ad, develops the proposals before the 
meeting of the Political Bureau, where they are discussed and ratified. Before 1999, 
the Steering Committee used to be composed of the most dominant members of the 
Political Bureau. However, an important change occurred in May 2000. Talabani 
decided that members of the Political Bureau Steering Committee could only hold 
one post, and they all therefore had to choose whether to remain within the 
committee, or retain their additional posts. The result saw Kosrat Rasoul resigning 
from the committee, choosing to retain his position of Prime Minister. Jabar Farman 
chose to resign his position of Commander of PUK Peshmerga and retain his 
committee position. The other members of the committee are now Dr Kamal Fu'ad, 
Mohammad Tawfiq, Khadr Haji Ali, and Omer Abdullah. $s Within the PUK, the 
Political Bureau members acknowledge that Talabani is the overall decision-maker, 
and he appears to be more active in this position than does Massoud Barzani. Many 
PUK members see Talabani as a form of guide for the party due to his institutional 
memory and widely reported voracity for reading and learning in general. 86 
The PUK operates a less rigid system than the KDP with regard to the membership of 
the Political Bureau. Whereas the KDP is proud of the fact that its Political Bureau 
only changes after a Congress, the PUK is equally proud of the fact of the fluidity of 
personal within its Political Bureau. The Political Bureau and the steering committee 
alters depending on who is in the country at the time. 87 The position of Talabani 
within this overall decision-making structure is interesting. While Talabani is indeed 
the head of all PUK Central Offices and Peshmerga, he apparently has few of his 
as Interview with Jalal Talabani, Suleimaniyah, I1 September 2000. It was also decided that no 
minister could serve for more than three years, and a policy was forwarded to identify technocrats for 
ministerial positions rather than members of the PUK Political Bureau and Leadership Office. After 
this decision, the administration was reshuffled, with some non-PUK personnel being appointed, to 
ministerial level, for example, Dr Yedgar Hishmat to the Ministry of Health and Dr Jamal Fu'ad to the 
Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs & Cooperation. 
16 Interviews with Chalaw Ali Askari, Suleimaniyah, 10 June 1998; Talabani, Kalarcholan, 14 
September 1999. 
11 Interview with Arsalan Bayaez, Suleimaniyah, 24 May 1998. 
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own personal offices as Massoud Barzani does, and makes a specific point of visiting 
as many of the lower offices of the PUK as often as possible. 88 The political 
openness of Talabani is often compared to the more reserved actions of Massoud 
Barzani. During the summer of 1998, for example, Talabani visited the Suleimaniyah 
melbend twice to discuss separate party issues with its members. 
5.3.3.2.2 Criticisms of the PUK Decision-Making Process 
Even with the lack of a recent Congress, the evidence from interviews with members 
of the PUK indicate that the organization is one which operates a convincing 
democratic process down through the grass-roots of its structures and up into the 
Political Bureau as well. However, the dominance of Talabani in all the affairs of the 
PUK is often quoted as a major weakness by the KDP especially, as is the existence 
of supposed power groupings within the Political Bureau, meaning that many PUK 
decision-making meetings are weakened by bitter internal disagreements. 89 
Furthermore, according to Hoshyar Zebari of the KDP, members of the PUK 
leadership have confided in him that the decision-making process of the KDP is more 
coherent than that of the PUK, with Talabani proving to be somewhat argumentative 
even with decisions where consensus had been achieved. 90 
Certainly, the PUK is not a totally unified party. As we have seen, its strength in the 
past has been secured by appealing to a wide range of leftist-sentiments by being an 
umbrella of different groupings and, even now, the PUK is still characterised by 
some vertical divisions within its structure. However, should the fact that the PUK 
Political Bureau decision-making process is often volatile means that it is any less 
effective? The members of the Political Bureau do not deny that, at times, their 
meetings are often highly charged. A senior Political Bureau member, Mohammad 
Tawfiq, noted that while there is free discussion within the meetings, the proceedings 
are of course dominated by strong personalities 91 In regard to this, Talabani himself 
said, with strong inference to the KDP, that "In the Political Bureau, I am not always 
in the majority. Each member obviously has a personality, and their own prestige. 
ee Ibid. 
a9 The KDP Political Bureau member (Eleventh Congress) Arif Taifour, noted to me that when 
Talabani is angry, nobody will disagree with him. Interview with Arif Taifour, Salahadin, 1 September 
1999. 
90 Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000 
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We are not all yes men. "92 Furthermore, he noted that "it is a dream that [the] PUK is 
divided through our arguments. It is a strength, showing the party is alive. It is a 
signal of the capability and seriousness of the partys93 According to Talabani, the 
result of this lack of command from any one person within the decision-making 
apparatus has meant that the PUK is not constrained, and, for this reason, may 
sometimes appear to be chaotic. However, he also stated that he was quite prepared 
to encourage this as a means of promoting a democratic process within the party. 94 
With regard to the presence of strong power groupings within the PUK, again, 
Talabani did not deny this. He instead identified it as evidence illustrating that those 
politicians who have acquired a great degree of popular support are now in the 
Political Bureau, whereas those who have lost support are no longer in office. He 
noted that the original founders of the PUK are either no longer in the party at all, or 
are in the lower Leadership Office, such as Adil Morad for example, a founder 
member of the PUK who is now in charge of the media office. Members who were 
not in the PUK from the beginning but joined at a later stage and then became 
popular, such as Kosrat Rasoul, are now in the Political Bureau and have developed 
influential positions due to their popular support 95 
However, even with such observations from Talabani, the internal political dynamics 
of the PUK suggest that the party is characterised by vertical divisions which 
originate in the Political Bureau. These divisions became particularly apparent after 
31 August 1996 when the PUK was forced out of Erbil. It is therefore at this date that 
the analysis of the contemporary power structure of the PUK will commence. 
5.3.3.3 Assessment and Analysis of the PUK Power Structure 
The PUK under the leadership of Talabani has been officially in existence since 
1975, yet its roots go back much further. As a party of the urban intelligentsia, it 
enjoys a strong support base in urban areas, similar to that enjoyed by the KDP in the 
more rural areas. However, unlike the KDP, the PUK does not possess the same unity 
91 Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
92 Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 14 September 1999. 
°' Interview with Jalal Talabani, Suleimaniyah, II September 2000. 
94 -Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 14 September 1999. 95 Ibid. 
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and internal cohesion and, indeed, disunity has been a characteristic avidly promoted 
by Talabani himself. While the PUK may be described as being a more democratic 
party than the KDP and perhaps possessing a more dynamic leadership, the party is 
divided by design. 
5.3.3.3.1 Power Groupings 
The leadership technique of Talabani can be identified as managing the natural 
divisions apparent in the PUK. Talabani's leadership tactic has been characterised by 
managing to balance two opposing factions. For example, between the radical 
Komala with the more traditional Shoresh Garan, and now, balancing between the 
PUK organization of Erbil and that of Suleimaniyah. Figure 5.4 illustrates the 
development of the divisions within the PUK. 
Figure 5.4 : The Divisions of the PUK, 1975-1999 
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Throughout its history, the PUK has been characterised by some form of internal 
division. Such a division is a manifestation of the promotion of socialist ideology 
within an inherently traditional, tribal, society. The successful management of this 
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division is one of the primary reasons why the PUK remained popular throughout the 
1980s. It is also apparent that Talabani's skilful management of these inherent 
stresses and strains have benefited his position as leader, as he has often managed to 
associate the most popular of the PUK leaders with his own charismatic personality. 
Talabani achieved this task in the 1980s when this division was apparent in a planned 
manner with the existence of the two wings of the PUK, the Komala and Shoresh 
Garan. 
However, in the late 1990s, the division within the PUK was more geographical 
rather than ideological. Particularly becoming apparent after the GOI-KDP invasion 
of Erbil in 1996 and subsequent PUK retreat to Suleimaniyah, the PUK division can 
be characterised as being between those members from Suleimaniyah, and those 
from Erbil. 
The PUK organization within Erbil, led by Kosrat Rasoul, fled to Suleimaniyah. The 
integration of the Erbil personnel with the Suleimaniyah organization has not proven 
to be a straightforward task for the PUK. However, unlike past divisions, this new 
division is potentially difficult for Talabani to manage as Kosrat enjoys an 
unprecedented popular support base. Those peshmerga units from Erbil, and indeed 
many from Suleimaniyah, pledge their allegiance to Kosrat, and he is also the Prime 
Minister of the KRG based in Suleimaniyah. 
In the aftermath of the evacuation of Erbil by the PUK, Suleimaniyah became 
literally overcrowded with too many PUK politicians, particularly as Kosrat brought 
many of his Erbillian supporters and civil servants with him. 96 The Suleimaniyah 
equivalent at this time was Jabar Farman, the Commander of PUK peshmerga, who 
had achieved a high degree of notoriety by defeating the IMK in 1994. Kosrat 
naturally assumed the position of Prime Minister of the KRG (Suleimaniyah) and put 
many of his Erbillian staff in key positions in the ministries. This was 
administratively a very wise move, as many of the Erbillian staff had experience of 
administration and the new administration was in a position to start work quickly. 
96 In terms of numbers, however, Jalal Talabani noted that, in August 1996, the total number of PUK 
members in Erbil was approximately 45,000. Of these, only 5,000 evacuated to Suleimaniyah. 
Interview with Jalal Talabani, Suleimaniyah, II September 2000. 
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Talabani proceeded to play each of these characters off against the other. Kosrat was 
appointed as Prime Minister of the KRG, and Jabar remained in command of the 
peshmerga. However, Kosrat was politically active in developing his Erbillian power 
base and eroding what many consider to be the old guard of the PUK, whereas Jabar 
appeared to be allying himself more closely with Talabani and drawing his strength 
from this source. As already stated, Suleimaniyah became a politically 
claustrophobic place with the arrival of the Erbillian element of the PUK with tension 
immediately became apparent between the offices of the Suleimaniyah Governor and 
Erbil Prime Minister. Mohammad Tawfiq noted that: 
"There were originally problems with all the Erbillians coming to 
Suleimaniyah, but they were mainly problems of logistics as 
Suleimaniyah is a much smaller place than Erbil. "97 
The territory controlled by the PUK had been cut drastically, and the small city of 
Suleimaniyah now had a full executive cabinet alongside the offices of the Governor 
of Suleimaniyah, essentially making them moribund. Kosrat succeeded in replacing 
. the governors (Feyeradun Abdulkadir and then Salar Aziz) with his old Erbillian 
Chief of Asayash (police), Hackam Khadr Hama Jan. The strength of Kosrat has now 
reached a point where he is almost unassailable. In discussing this, Sami Abdul 
Rahman of the KDP stated that "Kosrat has always been Important for the PUK as 
they considered that he could take Erbil for them. He couldn't, but he Is now taking 
Suleimaniyah instead "98 
However, it should be noted that, perhaps more than any other politician in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, Kosrat Rasoul is seen as a man of people. His support base is strong 
particularly amongst the working classes of the region, and his exploits as a 
peshmerga have generated a significant degree of idolatry. Similarly, his fighting 
history means that he feels free to speak his mind to any politician of either the KDP 
or PUK. Within the PUK, he is obviously a player of paramount importance and 
influence. However, he is also respected by most cadres of the KDP, and particularly 
by Massoud. 99 
" Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
98 Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 9 September 1999. 
99 The relationship between Kosrat and Massoud is interesting as it appears to have commenced rather 
antagonistically. Kosrat was one of the Commanders of the PUK forces which expelled the KDP from 
Erbil in 1994. In a subsequent news propaganda report, Massolid taunted the pedigree of Kosrat 
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A further change in this complex game has occurred with the return of the traditional 
second-in-command of the PUK, Nawshirwan Mustafa, from an extended sojourn in 
London. His reappearance has provided the members of the PUK from Suleimaniyah 
with a political personality of at least equal abilities and ambition to Kosrat. The 
position of Talabani in this potential power struggle is one of interest.. Reports 
indicate that Talabani requested the return of Nawshirwan in order to preserve the 
balance of power within the PUK. Certainly, Nawshirwan is gaining in influence, 
especially as he was already a hugely popular figure within Iraqi Kurdistan in general 
and Suleimaniyah in particular before he arrived. He also commands a great deal of 
loyalty due to him previously being the leader of Komala, which formed the core of 
the peshmerga throughout the 1980s. Nawshirwan was elected to the Political Bureau 
of the PUK in 2000, even though he did not want the position and did not stand for 
it. 10° His position is one of political counsellor to the PUK in general, and he enjoys 
a position of being recognised as an academic authority on Kurdish politics, as well 
as the reputation of being the charismatic leader of Komala. 
5.3.3.3.2 Conclusion 
The PUK is in a period which it will strengthened or be divided. The divisions within 
the party are highly unstable. However, Kosrat is perhaps the one Kurdish politician 
who possesses the ability to unite disparate political groupings around him. His 
reputation as a peshmerga, and particularly the stories surrounding his evacuation 
from Erbil in 1996 elevated him to a supremely powerful position within the PUK, 
one which can only be countered by the ever-impressive Nawshirwan Mustafa. The 
balance of power within the PUK between these two persons in the future will be a 
key dynamic in the future development of Kurdish politics in Iraq. 
The management of this balance, as always, lies with Talabani. For the PUK to 
successfully negotiate the forthcoming years intact will rest on the ability of 
Talabani, and, to a lesser extent Nawshirwan and Kosrat, in guiding the fractious 
party through this difficult period. In 2000, the PUK has staged a remarkable 
recovery from instability. As a political party, the PUK is still very popular within 
Rasoul, stating that nobody knew his father, and that Massoud is the son of the legendary Barzani. 
Kosrat responded by saying that his father was a poor man, but he still managed to remove the famous 
man's son. Since this, however, Massoud in particular appears to rate the abilities of Kosrat. 
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Suleimaniyah and also in Erbil. The population seem to find it easy to give its 
support to the enigmatic Talabani and his cohorts, and the washing of the PUK's 
dirty linen in public is something which the Iraqi Kurdish population have been used 
to for a considerable period of time. Talabani's health appears to be reasonably 
strong despite rumours to the contrary and, with the return of Nawshirwan and 
evidence of Kosrat and Nawshirwan cooperating, the tensions within the PUK are 
decreasing. Again, this could be a reflection of Talabani recognising the popular 
position of Kosrat, but it has surely been facilitated by the shrewd political actions of 
Nawshirwan. 
5.3.4 Conclusion 
The above analysis of the PUK and KDP, at a variety of different levels, has 
indicated many areas of similarities and differences. Structurally, and officially, the 
two parties exhibit few differences from each other. Both of their internal 
organizations are similar, and both have a similar structure of authority. However, 
when the power structures of both parties are assessed, it is clear that they are 
radically different, with the KDP being characterised by a strong central leadership 
and by democratic centralist tendencies. While there are divisions apparent within the 
leadership of the KDP, they are being managed in a subtle manner by Massoud, and 
the stability of the party should remain. Within the PUK, the central leadership 
possesses strong, personalities with their own support bases and, while they are all 
loyal to Talabani, the decision-making process within the PUK suffers from these 
divisions. The leadership of the PUK has gone a considerable way to easing some of 
the tensions which were apparent in their midst towards the end of the 1990s, but 
there is still some way to go before it can be said that the PUK is as stable as the 
KDP. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, both parties exhibit strong patrimonial 
tendencies within their leadership structures, with both Massoud and Talabani 
maneouvring themselves into positions where they remain in command of their 
organizations, while attempting to encourage more democratic processes within their 
respective parties. In 2000, it appears that these internal dynamics are being 
10° Interview with Jalal Talabani, Suleimaniyah, -11 September 2000. 
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controlled effectively by both parties, and that some form of internal balance is being 
achieved, particularly in the KDP. However, there are still many difficulties ahead 
for both parties, and time is needed for both Massoud and Talabani to further 
increase the stability of their parties before they are once again reunited into the same 
political system. 
If the Washington Agreement is successful and the KDP and PUK are indeed 
reunited into one system, it is highly likely that the instabilities apparent in the 
divided political system will be magnified, as they were between 1994 and 1996. 
Neither the KDP nor the PUK are, as yet, political mature enough in terms of the 
stable operation of their internal decision-making processes for them to become 
involved in a political system in which they are not the undisputed main players. 
Until this stability is obtained, a divided consociational political system allows them 
to target their internal inconsistencies without being overtly concerned with the 
activities of `the other side'. Any united system without adequate consociational 
safeguards, with both parties in one government for example, would simply result 
in 
a transferance of internal party instabilities into the greater political arena. 
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Chapter 6 
The Organizational Structure of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government 
6.1 Introduction 
Self-governance has developed from being an ethereal aim of the political parties to 
being a reality at the core of the political system. The events of the early 1990s, 
which commenced with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and culminated with the defeat 
of Iraq, the rapareen, and the withdrawal of the administrative organs and military 
forces of the GOI from the north of the country provided the Kurds with a unique 
opportunity to administer their own region. It is not an exaggeration to consider the 
establishment of the KRG as being the most important single event in the history of 
the Kurdish national movement in Iraq. ' 
Criticism of the Kurds' attempts to govern themselves is widespread both in the 
academic literature and journalists' accounts. Academics have questioned the success 
of the entity particularly in terms of its internal security and order. Gunter, for 
example, after noting the formation of the KRG in 1992, begins his analysis of the 
"Kurdish Predicament in Iraq" by asking "How did everything go so wrong"? 2 
To criticise the KRG experience up until 1996 is a relatively easy task. The Kurdish 
political parties commenced with good intentions with a multi-party election in May 
1992. The subsequent 50-50 system was a workable but extremely fragile 
consociational-type of governmental organization, dependent upon the preservation 
of a balance of power between the KDP and PUK. When this balance was altered, the 
system became unworkable and provided yet another catalyst for the decline into 
confrontation and conflict. 
It is incorrect to continue with these criticisms with regard to the two third cabinets 
of the KRG which have been in existence since the summer of 1996. It is true that the 
1 This statement is strongly supported by Nawshirwan Mustafa of the PUK. Interview with 
Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 29 July 1999. 
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events of August of that year were one of the most painful of the 1990s for the Kurds 
and damaged the unity of the party poltical front. However, the resultant situation is 
now characterised by a stable structure by which the divided KRG is actively 
governing the region, albeit with an arrangement that is cumbersome and inefficient. 
It is my intention to analyse the KRG in two separate chapters. It is first necessary to 
concentrate on the failings of the first and second cabinets which led to inter. 
factional fighting, and to then focus on the characteristics of the divided third 
cabinets. It is in my opinion that the Kurds stumbled onto a system which provides 
the answer to the question of how to satisfy both the KDP and PUK, at the same time 
as alleviating the concerns of neighbouring states and the western powers. Such an 
analysis is only possible by first examining the internal structure and framework of 
the KRG, and then drawing conclusions regarding its role, success and operational 
mechanisms. Therefore, I will address these morphological aspects of the KRG and 
prescribed operating mechanisms in this chapter, and, investigate the decision- 
making process and incipient strengths and weaknesses of the system in the 
proceeding chapter. 
6.1.1 Aims 
The existence of the KRG is a cause of great concern to the neighbouring states 
which do not wish to see the strengthening of the Iraqi Kurdish political system by 
the founding and subsequent institutionalization of an indigenous administration. 
Therefore, the analysis of the governmental system is as difficult as that of the 
political parties themselves. Furthermore, as Iraqi Kurdistan is still under double 
sanctions, many of the procedures expected of an administration are often chaotic 
and therefore difficult to analyse. The aims of this chapter are therefore: 
To provide a political history of the formation of the KRG; 
2. To analyse the elections of 1993, and; 
3. To model the organizational structure / morphology of the KRG. 
2 Gunter (1999a) op. cit., pp. viii - ix. 
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6.1.2 Structure 
Before commencing with the analysis of the organs of governance and administration 
of the Iraqi Kurdish political system, it is essential to develop an accurate 
understanding of the layout of the constituent parts of the KRG (morphological 
modelling). Then, it is necessary to analyse the prescribed manner in which the 
system is conjectured to work (information flow modelling). 
Such an exercise serves numerous purposes. First, it illustrates the morphological 
sophistication of the KRG. Second, it provides the starting point of the forthcoming 
analysis of the decision-making process. The KRG has undergone many changes 
over its lifetime and it is beneficial to have some comprehension of what the KRG 
originally was and has developed into. Third, the provision of a morphological 
analysis of the KRG provides the first step of understanding the decision-making 
process. For the purposes of this chapter, I am choosing to divide the KRG into the 
KNA (the assembly), the KRG (the executive), and the judiciary. The role of 
leadership is constantly referred to in subsequent sections, particularly when the 
decision-making process and control of policy is analysed. 3 
6.2 The Aftermath of the Rapareen 
The short period after the withdrawal of the GO[ from Iraqi Kurdistan may be seen 
to be instrumental in the development of the de facto state in Iraqi Kurdistan. The 
IKF was forced to make rapid decisions regarding the emergency administration of 
the liberated areas, and to decide upon the best method of governing Iraqi Kurdistan 
without incurring the wrath of neighbouring states. Alongside these stiff tasks, the 
IKF was facing a rapidly deteriorating military . situation, then negotiations with the 
GOI, and then an internal economic embargo and the withdrawal of all the 
administrative organs of the central government. 4 
After the withdrawal of the GOI, the leaders of the IKF held several meetings with 
the technocrats of Iraqi Kurdistan. In describing these meetings, Massoud Barzani 
This division corresponds with standard divisions found in texts of comparative government. I am 
choosing not to address the military as the military capability of the KRG is still in the hands of the 
dominant political parties and is not controlled by the KRG itself. For comparative government texts, 
see Hague, et. a!. (1992) op. cit.; Blondel (1995) op, cit.; Peters (1998) op. cit. 
Interview with Jawher Namiq Salim, Erbil, 8 September 1999. 
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told them that his experience, and the experiences of the peshmerga were in 
destroying bridges, cutting electricity and destroying roads. 5 Massoud therefore 
claimed that he and the leadership of the IKF requested assistance from builders, 
engineers and technocrats in order to assist in the rebuilding of the infrastructure and 
administration of the region. When focusing on the role of the KDP in this exercise, 
Massoud stated that "the KDP had the assistance of many experts who cooperated 
with the political parties to provide stability. There was good coordination between 
the peshmerga and the technocrats. "6 
6.2.1 Emergency Government 
The initial governance of the region was exercised through the governorate structure 
and the peshmerga of the political parties. It is important to realise that, at this time, 
the majority of the population was in urban areas due to the destruction of the rural 
infrastructure which had taken place over the previous ten years. This necessitated 
the need for an emergency system for the cities and towns. 
$ Nawshirwan Mustafa 
noted that, ".... at this time there was not too much left to govern. The Iran-Iraq 
war had wiped out the villages, and the Anfal had destroyed the rest. All that was left 
were the cities and the collectives, no villages or towns. " 9 
The IKF divided the urban areas into regions governed by committees comprised of 
members from-the different parties of the IKF. Suleimaniyah, for example, was 
governed by a committee composed of the PUK, KDP, PASOK, and the KSP. 
10 In 
this emergency period, the governing committee commonly reflected the political 
colouring of the region under its control, meaning, in practical terms, that each region 
was controlled by a particular political party. " 
The situation lasted for one month before the GOI launched their successful 
counterattack against the peshmerga of the IKF, capturing most of -the areas 
Interview with Massoud Barzani, Saryrash, 22 August 1999. 
° Ibid. 
Ibid. 
$ Interviews with Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999; Massoud Barzani, 
Saryrash, 22 August 1999. 
Interview with Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
10 Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999; Nawshirwan Mustafa 
Amin, 
Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999; Massoud Barzani, Saryrash, 22 August 1999; Arif Taifour, Salahadin, 
1 September 1999. 
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previously lost. 12 The GOI then withdrew, placing Iraqi Kurdistan under an economic 
embargo from the south as well as from the international community. The IKF then 
returned to the area committee system of governance, combined with the structure of 
the governorate, until the elections of 1992.13 There was extensive reliance upon the 
organs of the governorate structure during this emergency period. Even with the 
absence of central government, the governorate structure remained intact, even if it 
was simply nominal offices with no staff because all of the pro"GOI civil servants 
had fled. Even so, the Kurdish civil servants had experience of working within this 
system under the GOI administration. 14 
This initial emergency system of governance was haphazard in the extreme and had 
many serious problems, with the IKF displaying neither consistent decision-making 
powers nor the ability to fully control its own forces. 's Jalal Talabani identified the 
crux of the initial problems when he stated that, "we came from the mountains, we 
were trained as fighters, and now we had to run cities. " 16 Further problems were 
identified by Gunter who, quoting a report from early 1992, forwarded that ".... the 
remnants of Iraqi civil authority in this region, deprived of leadership and money 
from Baghdad but lacking direction from any central Kurdish authority, are nearly 
paralysed. " 17 
Furthermore, the decision-making process within the newly founded Kurdish power 
structure proved to be problematic. In a scenario which would appear after the 
elections of 1992, the Kurdish drive for fairness and democracy within its fledging 
decision-making apparatus was hamstrung by the inclusion of provisions rarely 
found even in established liberal democracies. Each member of the IKF, for example, 
11 Talabany (1999a) The Kurdish View on the Constitutional Future of Iraq. London, p. 144. 
12 For an account of the counterattack of the forces of the GOI, see the interview with Nawshirwan 
Mustafa in Randal (1998) After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness: My Encounters with Kurdistan. 
New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, pp. 46-50. 
13 Interview with Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
10 Interviews with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 27 June 1998; Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 
2000. 
" Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
16 Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 14 September 1999. 
17 Gunter (1993a) op. cit., p. 88, quoting "Barzani Cited on Disputes within Kurdistan Front, " Al- 
Hayat, London, 22 December 1991, p. 5, cited in FBIS-NES, 3 January, 1992, p. 25. 
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had the ability to exercise a veto power, resulting in few decisions of importance 
being made. 18 
6.2.2 The Establishment of Legal Provisions for Government Formation 
The IKF desperately needed to formulate some form of constitutional procedure 
before tackling the issue of self-governance. However, their political position was 
treacherous. The withdrawal of the GOI administration from Iraqi Kurdistan was 
seen by many of the Kurdish leadership as a trap. The temptation to declare an 
autonomous state was huge. However, such an action would have been met with 
strong opposition from Iran and Turkey, as well as Iraq itself; Mohammad Tawfiq 
noted that "we could have no constitution, as such, as the 1KF had to exercise extreme 
caution in promoting separatist type changes in 1991. "19 
The direction decided upon by the IKF was to legitimise its authority by forming an 
assembly with the aim of administering the region and establishing a legal authority 
by democratic elections. 20 Ever mindful that its regional neighbours would see this 
move as an exercise in independence rather than as a step towards emergency 
administration in the short-term, the leadership of the IKF formed an electoral 
steering committee from judges and lawyers rather than politicians. Their task was to 
ascertain the best methodology for the construction and formation of the proposed 
KNA. 2' Table 6.1 lists the members of the committee. 
The committee met between 23 December 1991 and 28 January 1992. Its findings 
were accepted and confirmed by the political leadership of the IKF and formed the 
core of Law Nos. 1 and 2 of 1992: the Laws of the KNA and the Leader of the 
1b Gunter (1993a) op. cit., p. 89. 
19 Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
20 There is some disagreement between the KDP and PUK as to which party forwarded and supported 
the idea of handing over power to a democratically elected assembly. Massoud Barzani, Sami Abdul 
Rahman and Hoshyar Zebari state that it was a KDP initiative, Jalal Talabani and other members of 
the PUK said that it was the PUK which promoted the initial committee structure of emergency 
government and then forwarded the development of a national assembly. Similar disagreements are 
apparent over the issue of the need for a constitution. Interviews with Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 9 
June 1998; Fuad Massoum, London, 21 June 1999; Massoud Barzani, Saryrash, 22 August 1999; Arif 
Taifour, Salahadin, 1 September 1999; Jalal Talabani, Kalarcholan, 14 September 1999; Hoshyar 
Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. Kurdistan National Assembly (1995) Demokrasi Parlament u 
Hukumeta Basura Kurdistan. South Kurdistan: SILC. 
_' Mohammad Tawfiq noted that the Iranian Government stated that, at this time, it preferred to see a 
vacuum rather than an administration develop. Interviews with: Dr. Kamal Fu'ad, Suleimaniyah, 5 
May 1998; Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil, 18 May 1998; Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
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Table 6.1: The Electoral Steering Committee of 1991-199222 
Name Position 
1. Rashid Abdul Kadil Judge, President of Kurdistan Supreme Court 
2. Marouf Ra'uf Judge, Minister of Justice in the Regional 
Ministry's of the Front 
3. Nathem Hwaezi Judge, Head of Erbil Court of Appeal 
4. Ameer Hwaezi Judge, Member of Erbil Court of Appeal 
S. Shamssaddin Mufti Lawyer 
6. Mohamad Baban Lawyer 
7. Dr Sa'adi Barzinji Dean of College of Law and Policy in Salahadin 
University 
8. Dr Khurshid Professor in College of Law and Policy in 
Shawkat Rowanduzi Salahadin University 
9. Mustafa Askari Lawyer 
10. Firsat Ahmed Lawyer, Secretary of Iraqi Kurdistan National 
Assembly 
11. Dr Qais Dewali Lawyer, Councillor of Iraqi Kurdistan 
12. Hassan Abdul-Karim Lawyer, Councillor of Iraqi Kurdistan 
Barzinj i 
13. Bakhtiyer Haydar Lawyer, Councillor of Iraqi Kurdistan 
14. Khadir Jabari Minister of Justice, Second Cabinet, 
Representative of the IKF (KSP) 
15. Franso Hariri IKF Representative (KDP) 
Kurdistan Liberation Movement. These laws, as stated, were not intended to be 
constitutional, but were rather identified as rules governing the relationships between 
different political and administrative powers. 
23 However, while in name these 
documents were not a constitution, in style and in practice they moulded the political 
characteristics and direction of the de facto state. 
22 Kurdistan National Assembly (1995) op. cit.; interview with Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, 
Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
23 Interview with Mohammad Tawf iq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
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6.2.2.1 Law No. 1, The Law of the Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly 
Law No. 1, signed on 8 April 1992,24 detailed the principles and procedures of the 
proposed KNA, the electoral rules and procedures, conditions of candidature, the 
voting procedure, and the role of the KNA. Both the KDP and PUK continuously 
refer to Law No. 1 as having immense political, historical and cultural meaning for 
the Kurds, and they have a strong case for doing so. Falak al-Din Kakai, a member of 
the KDP and subsequently elected MP in the KNA, described Law No. I as being; 
".... the first law in the history of modern Iraq to be enacted by a de 
facto Kurdish authority exercising power and assuming decision- 
making rights within the Kurdish region of Iraq, irrespective of the 
central government in Baghdad. The resolution to hold a genera! 
election in Iraqi Kurdistan in May 1992 was a crucial element in this 
assertion of authority. "2S 
The principles and procedures described in Law No. 1 for the formation of the KNA 
were developed from the study of parliamentary democracies in a variety of 
26 countries. The main principles and procedures are summarized as follows: 27 
1. The KNA should consist of no less than 100 members, each representing 
approximately 30,000 people (Section 1, article 1). 
2. The KNA operates according to a secret ballot (Section 1, article 2). 
3. Equality exists between men and women in electoral candidature (Section 
5, article 1). 
4. The election of candidates is according to proportional representation, and 
according to the party lists (Section 8, Article 36.1). 
5. Parties have to secure 7% of the overall vote to obtain seats in the KNA. 
Exceptions were made for the Christians (Section 8, Article 36.3). 28 
24 Law No. I was signed by the 'political leadership of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front', which consisted of 
the following members: Jalal Talabani (PUK), Massoud Barzani (KDP), Abdullah Agreen (PASOK), 
Rasul Mamand (KSP), Aziz Mohammad (KCP), Sami Abdul Rahman (KPDP), Kadir Aziz (Toilers), 
Yakub Yousif (ADM). 
25 Kakai (1992) op. cit., p. 118. Kakai refers to Law No. I as 'Rule I of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front'. 
During my sojourns in Iraqi Kurdistan, the article in question was always labelled as a 'Law'. 
However, as the use of the word 'Law' does carry some constitutional connotations, it is perhaps 
understandable why Kakai uses the term 'Rule'. 
26 Interview with Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 1998. 
27 The main sources for this section come from the text of Law No. I itself; a subsequent publication 
by the Kurdistan National Assembly entitled Demokrasl Parlament ß Kukümeta BasGba Kurdistan 
(Parliamentary Democracy and Governance in Southern Kurdistan); and interviews with individuals 
involved in the formation of the laws. 
28 This ruling was subsequently dropped. 
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6. It is not permitted to combine a Council position with that of Public Staff 
(Article 4.1) 
7. An electoral committee to be established on order to supervise the 
proceedings of the election. The duties of this committee includes the 
positioning of ballot boxes, establishing local committees, and provide 
guidance to the electorate (Article 6.1 - 6.3). 
The conditions of candidature forwarded by Law No. 1 were similarly constructed 
with reference to established liberal democracies. A candidate for election to the 
KNA had to meet the following criteria: 
1. Be a civilian of Iraqi Kurdistan, and resident in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
2. To be fully qualified and be of at least 30 years of age. 
3. The candidate must be literate. 
4. The candidate should not have committed violations of moral codes. 
5. The candidate should not have committed murder or larceny. 
6. To not have been involved in crimes planned by the central government 
against the population of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
The elections were based upon a system of proportional representation with each 
competing party submitting a list of candidates. The liberated area was divided into 4 
electoral regions, 29 and each region was then divided into electoral centres, 30 
dependent upon the decision of the electoral committees. ' Parties were free to 
coalesce, which many did including the PUK with the Toilers' Party, and the Islamist 
parties merged (although remained dominated by the IMK). The parties representing 
the Christian minority competed on a closed 
. 
list, thereby guaranteeing that there 
would be 5 Christian seats within the KNA. 
6.2.2.2 Law No. 2: The Leader of the Kurdistan Liberation Movement 
It was envisaged that the executive power in the Kurdistan region would be headed 
by the Leader of the Kurdistan Liberation Movement, elected according to Law No. 
2. The Executive Leadership would consist of the Leader and the Council of 
29 Law No. 1, Sec. 2, Art. 9. 
'0 Law No. 1, Sec. 2, Art. 10. 
31 Law No. 1, Sec. 1, Art. 6-7. 
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Ministers, formed according to Law No. 3. A presidential-style system was therefore 
planned by the IKF, with both the President and the assembly being elected, with the 
assembly appointing the Government Executive, but with the President possessing a 
veto. 
The electoral principles and procedures for the election of the Leader of the 
Kurdistan Liberation Movement were identical to those of Law No. 1, with 
provisions made for a secret ballot, and for the two elections to be run at the same 
time. The main provisions of the position and requirements of candidature were as 
follows; 
1. The'term of the Leadership of the Kurdistan Liberation Movement is for 4 
years (Article 2). 
2. The candidates must be no less than 40 years old (Article 5.1). 
3. He should be a citizen of Iraqi Kurdistan and live within its territory 
(Article 5.2). 
4. The Kurdistan Liberation Movement represents and speaks on both internal 
issues and foreign affairs (Article 1). 
5. The leader is the Commander for all Kurdish armed peshmerga units in 
Iraqi Kurdistan (Article 12). 
6. The leader invites the KNA to hold ordinary and extraordinary sessions 
(Article 10.1). 
7. The leader sanctions agreements validated and confirmed by the KNA 
(Article 10.2). 
8. He enacts laws and regulations confirmed by the KNA (Article 10.3). 
9. He issues decisions on laws and regulations decided upon during the recess 
of the KNA or in urgent circumstances. The decisions have to be presented 
to the KNA at the earliest opportunity (Article 10.4). 
10. The leader proposes laws to the KNA (Article 10.5). 
11. He announces the proceedings for the election of the KNA during a fifteen 
day period before the end of the final session. 
12. He orders the establishment of the executive authority of the KRG through 
the KNA (Article 11.1). 
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13. He develops a general set of policies for the region with the executive 
authority (Article 11.5). 
14. The leader may sanction the use of a death penalty, or choose to alleviate to 
a lesser sentence (Article 11.6). 
Perhaps most importantly for the political dynamics of the future, Article 13 allowed 
for the Prime Minister to replace the Leader of the Kurdish Liberation Movement 
when absent from his duties, and Article 14 allowed for the Speaker of the KNA to 
replace the Leader temporarily if the position became unoccupied, until a new Leader 
could be elected within a period of 2 months. 
6.2.2.3 The Laws of the IKF as de facto Constitution? 
Constitutions are concerned primarily with the organization of governments and 
indicate the formal distribution of authority 32 Differences in constitutions reflect 
differences in the approach to the embodiment of political principles such as 'power 
to the people', `popular sovereignty' and 'federalism'. 3 Constitutions cover three 
main areas of governmental organization: the executive, the assembly (parliament), 
and decision-making structures. Their provisions specify how the central decision- 
making body is to be organized, the structures and powers of the representative body, 
including the relationship with the executive (e. g. the distinction which differentiates 
between separation of powers systems and parliamentary systems), and the extent to 
which public decisions are taken at different levels, and therefore the apparent level 
of decentralization. 
As we have seen, prominent Kurdish politicians in the KDP and PUK were not keen 
to identify the laws of the IKF" as constitutional; as it would imply that their aim was 
to establish an independent Kurdish state. However, it is possible that these laws may 
be considered the basis of a de facto constitution. Constitutions aim at organizing the 
operation of governments, however, some countries do not have a document 
identifiable as `The Constitution', but instead have a set of conventions, customs, 
rules and statutes which shape the organization of the government. There is no single 
written constitution in the United Kingdom. for example, but there are many statutes 
32 Duchacek (1973) Power Maps: The Comparative Politics of Constitutions. Santa Barbara, Calif.: 
ABC Clio; Hague, et. at (1998) op. cit., p. 262. 
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which display constitutional character as they organize governmental institutions. 34 
To some extent, the constitution may relate to the actual organization of the polity, 
and simply be a description of the structure and operating procedures of existing 
institutions. 
With regard to such references, Colin Turpin suggests a definition of the Constitution 
of the United Kingdom which may have be useful to apply to the Laws of the IKF: 
"[the Constitution is] a body of rules, conventions and practices which describe, 
regulate or qualify the organization and operation of government in the United 
Kingdom. " 35 
Nouri Talabany, a constitutional lawyer, supports the notion that the laws of the IKF 
may be identified as having constitutional functions: 
".... any government that does not come to power through election 
by the people is not a legitimate government. The exercise of power is 
determined by legal principles set down by peoples' representatives 
and thus the constitution is considered which as the highest legal 
standard, supersedes all laws.... The people of Iraqi Kurdistan, too, 
have a right to govern themselves through a legitimate, elected body. 
They were exercising this right when, on May 19 1992, they elected 
^36 their first Regional Parliament in a free atmosphere.... 
Therefore, in identifying the constitution, it is not necessary that a document named 
`The Constitution' should exist. In studying the de facto state, it appears that the 
tenets of the Laws of the IKF could be seen to exhibit considerable constitutional- 
type powers and authorities, and the subsequent Laws of the KNAhave gone even 
further in their intentions to organize the structure of authority and decision-making 
responsibilities within the de facto state. However, in order to preserve their delicate 
situation, Kurdish politicians refuse to name any of the Laws as fully constitutional. 
Perhaps a satisfactory solution would be to identify the laws as a de facto constitution 
for the de facto state. 37 
" Blondel (1995) op. cit., p. 225. 
34 Turpin (1990) British Government and the Constitution: Texts, Cases and Materials. London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 3. 
35 ibid. 
36 Talabany (1999a) op. cit., p. 1. 
" It is interesting to note that Nouri Talabany prepared a draft constitution which was adopted by the 
Electoral Committee of Kurdish jurists in 1992. The draft was then presented to the KNA on 4 
October 1992, when 1/3 of the assembly presented their support to the Speaker in written form. The 
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6.2.3 The Elections 
Elections took place according to Law No. 1 on 19 May 1992, under the observation 
of human rights organisations, MPs from other states and foreign journal iStS. 38 An 
immediate problem faced by the Electoral Supervising Committee was how to plan 
the election in the absence of a regional census. The IKF originally estimated a figure 
of 1.1 million eligible. voters but, as a consequence of the demographic upheavals 
caused by the catastrophic events of the 1980s, the existing electoral registers of the 
GOI were of little use. 39 However, the figure of 1.1 million remained and Iraqi 
Kurdistan was divided into four electoral districts, forming the basis of the 
geographical organization of the election. 
6.2.3.1 Anal sY is of Results 
The election was one of the most democratic to be held in the Middle East, with an 
unprecedented number of people voting. Hoff, et. al., stated that "practically the 
entire electorate, both men and women turned up, " with IKF spokesmen estimating 
that 90% of the electorate had actually voted. Independent observers present during 
the elections wrote that "the turnout was an unambiguous sign of the population's 
awareness of the importance of democratic principles, and of protest against 
Saddam's regime. " 40 
6.2.3.1.1 The KNA Results 
For both elections of the KNA and the leader of the Kurdistan Liberation Movement, 
the polling process commenced at 8 am with the finishing time extended from 8 pm 
to 12 am due to the large turnout. However, the results, announced on 22 May 1992, 
have proved to be a constant source of confusion. In the election of the KNA, the 
KDP secured a marginal victory, which they claimed would have given them 51 seats 
out of 105 41 However, figures from the PUK taken from the same period claim that 
the true result, while giving a marginal victory to the KDP, resulted in an equitable 
draft constitution includes many aspects of the Laws of the IKF, and places them in a framework of 
federalism within the Iraqi state. Talabany (1999a) op. cit. 
38 Voice of Rebellious Iraq, Salahadin, 23 January 1992 (SWB ME/1288). The sources employed in 
this section include interviews with politicians from the period, documents provided by the KDP and 
PUK, and the comprehensive article by Hoff, et. aL (1992) op. cit. 
191bid, p. 9. 
40Ibid, p. 11. 
41 Interview with Muhsin Dizayi, Salahadin, 30 May 2000. 
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division of seats. 42 Appendix IV presents the figures range of results presented by the 
KDP and PUK. 
Irrespective of the results, the outcome would be decided by force. Sources in 
Kurdistan indicate that the PUK was following a militant line and would fight rather 
than become an opposition party in the new assembly. 43 The final result was the 
sharing of the seats equally between the PUK and KDP, with the Christian parties 
receiving their guaranteed five seats. 44 
Table 6.2: The Competing Parties of the May 1992 Elections 
List Party Name Acronym 
No. 
1. Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP 
2. Kurdish Socialist Party (inc. Kurdistan Socialist Party) " PASOK 
3. Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party KPDP 
4. Iraqi Communist Party ICP 
5. Islamic Movement of Kurdistan IMK 
6. Independents 
7. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (inc. Kurdistan Toilers Party) PUK 
Christian Lists 
8. Assyrian Democratic Movement ADM 
9. Kurdistan Christian Unity (pro-KDP) KCU 
10. Democratic Christians (pro-PUK) DC 
11. Kaldo-Ashur Democratic Party (pro-ICP) KAD 
42 PUK Foreign Relations Bureau, Suleimaniyah, document provided on 28 August 1999, entitled The 
Result of Distributing the Seats in the National Assembly of Kurdistan. It is indicated on the document 
that the results were produced by the University of Salahadin, presumably at the time of the election. °' Interview with Massoud Barzani, Saryrash, 22 August 1999. 
44 See Appendix 4 for list of the KNA members of 1992. 
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Table 6.3: The Electoral Regions of the 1992 Election45 
Electoral Region Polling Stations 
Erbil Governorate 64 
Dohuk Governorate 56 
Suleimaniyah Governorate 42 
Darbandikhan Governorate 16 
Total 178 
6.2.3.1.2 The Leadership Results 
The election for leader of the Kurdistan Liberation Movement took place on the same 
day as the elections to the KNA. The candidates for the position were Massoud 
Barzani of the KDP, Jalal Talabani of the PUK, Sheikh Othman Abdul-Aziz of the 
IMK, and Dr Mahmoud Othman of the KSP. 
Table 6.4: Votes and Percentages for the Leadership Election46 
The Candidate Votes Cast Percentage 
Massoud Barzani (KDP) 
Jalal Talabani (PUK) 
466,819 47.51 
441,507 44.93 
Othman Abdul-Aziz (IMK) 38,965 3.97 
Mahmoud Othman (KSP) 23,309 2.37 
Total 970,600 100 
Again, the results have again been a cause for much debate. Barzani and Talabani 
dominated the ballot, as their respective parties did in the KNA elections, but neither 
was capable of securing an absolute majority. 
45 Ibid, p. 10. 
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6.2.4 Conclusion 
The results being so evenly divided between the two main parties and the two main 
candidates for leader presented the political system with a difficult problem. Law No. 
2 allowed for such an outcome by providing for a further election to take place 
fifteen days after the first round. However, Massoud and Talabani agreed to stay out 
of the official organs of governance after the first round and this arrangement was 
retained for the next two years. 47 This effective isolation of the two pre-eminent 
political leaders from the fledgling administrative structure, combined with the equal 
division of power in the KNA and, subsequently, the KRG would result in the 
increasing politicization of the governmental system and the migration of the 
decision-making process into the political bureaux of the KDP and PUK. 
6.3 The Morphology and Prescribed Operating Procedures of the KNA 
The KNA held its inaugural session on 4 June 1992 in the parliamentary buildings of 
Erbil. 48 The duration of the KNA was to be three years (ordinary sessions), unless an 
extraordinary state of affairs became predominant in the region and then 
extraordinary sessions would be held. 49 It was prescribed that the KNA would have 
two sessions a year, with the first session commencing in March and culminating in 
June, and the second sitting from September to December. " 
6.3.1 The Morphology of the KNA 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the morphological design of the KNA. The KNA is still in 
existence, albeit in a modified state. The following description focuses on the legal 
requirements for the KNA, rather than on what currently exists which will be 
developed at a later point. The assembly has a. full membership of 105 MPs (although 
this was halved after the invasion of Erbil in 1996) of whom 99 were male, and 6 
female. The distribution of MPs by governorate were as follows: Dohuk - 20.2%; 
Erbil - 30%; Suleimaniyah - 34.3%; New Kirkuk -15.2%. 
46 Hoff, et. al. (1992) op. cit., p. 14. Of the 982,649 votes cast, 12,079 votes were deemed void and/or 
unreadable. 
47 Natali (1999) op. cit., pp. 9-11. 
48 Kurdistan Democratic Party (1994) op. at., p. 5. 
49 Kurdistan National Assembly (1994) op. cit. An extraordinary session of the KNA was held on 27 
May 1995 in Daraban village where it was agreed that the duration of the KNA would be extended 
from 4 June 1995 to 4 June 1996. (Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly Proceedings, Vol. 13,1997). 
50 Kurdistan National Assembly (1998) op. cit., p. 29. 
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Figure 6.1: Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) Morphology 
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As expected, Dohuk was the electoral stronghold of the KDP, and Suleimaniyah of 
the PUK with Erbil in the middle, politically as well as geographically. 51 
The KNA is unicameral in structure, which is a remnant of the previous provincial 
assembly of the GOI, and also a reflection of the need for simplicity due to the time 
constraints imposed upon the IKF. Tribal leaders were actively promoting the idea of 
forming an advisory committee, effectively acting as a second, higher, chamber. 
However, such initiatives were rejected. 52 For each ten MPs there exists a 
Parliamentary Councillor. The task appointed to this position is to forward proposals 
to the Presidium of the KNA for further discussion. Similarly, for a proposal to be 
forwarded, it is necessary that it is supported by no less than 10 MPs. 
6.3.1.1 Principles and Procedures 
The duties of the KNA, as defined by KNA protocol and interviews with members of 
the KNA, are as follows: 53 
1. To legislate laws. 
2. To decide and debate the critical issues facing the Iraqi Kurdish people, and 
determine the legal relationship with the GOI. 
3. To name the Prime Minister. 
4. To support or criticise ministerial offices. 
5. To determine development strategies for the population. 
6. To supervise the activities of the executive offices. 
7. To form investigation and over-sight committees when required. 
8. To establish an internal system of administration, determine its possessions 
and appoint staff to offices. 
9. To form permanent and interim committees to regulate the internal system. 
10. To keep records of indictments and try civil servants who breach the oath of 
honour. 
s1 Kakai (1992) op. cit., p. 122. 
32 Natali (1999) op. cit., p. 35. 53 Kurdistan National Assembly (1994) op. cit., p. 33; interviews with Mohammad Tawfiq, 
Suleimaniyah, 14 May 1998; Jawher Namiq Salim, Erbil, 8 September 1999. 
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6.3.1.2 Offices and MPs 
The KNA is headed by a Presidium body composed of the Speaker, the Vice- 
President, and the Secretary. All positions are elected by the KNA at the first session. 
Both the KDP and PUK were in agreement in the appointment of the Speaker and 
Vice-President, with Jawher Namiq Salim of the KDP Political Bureau becoming 
Speaker and Mohammad Tawfiq of the PUK Political Bureau becoming Vice- 
President (later to be replaced by Nazad Aziz Agha of the same party). 54 As to be 
expected, these decisions were reached by the political bureaux of the two main 
parties and then forwarded to the KNA for ratification. However, while this suggests 
that two political systems were developing, each with separate political elites and 
decision-making bodies, the subsequent disagreement over the position of Secretary 
of the KNA illustrates the democratic thinking which the Kurdish political parties 
were following at this time. The KDP nominated Firsat Ahmed to the position, 
against the PUK nominee Ayad Namiq. The KDP nominee won after a secret ballot 
of the MPs. 55 
The duties of the Presidium are straightforward and involve the organization and 
daily activities of the KNA. They are as follows: 56 
1. To form an agenda for each session. 
2. To settle points of dispute between and among committees. 
3. To apply the rules formulated by KNA sessions. 
4. To certify the minutes of the sessions. 
5. To propose the establishment of Investigative Committees. 
6. To- form Investigative Committees during the recesses. 
6.3.1.3 Committees of the Assembly 
Kayshap observes that `an assembly is known by the committees it keeps', and the 
KNA is no exception. " The KNA has two main types of committees - permanent 
54 Jawher Namiq would remain in this position until the re-shuffle of the Erbil administration by the 
KDP Twelfth Congress in October 1999. 
ss Kurdistan National Assembly (1994) op. cit. 
56 Ibid, p. 33; interview with Jawher Namiq Salim, Erbil, 8 September 1999; Mohammad Tawfiq, 
Suleimaniyah, 7 August 1999. 
s' Kayshap (1979) "Committees in the Indian Lok Sabha, " in Lees and Shaw (eds. ) Committees in Legislatures: A Comparative Perspective. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, p. 321, quoted in 
Hague, et. al. (1998) op. cit., p. 289. 
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and temporary, with both being known as investigative committees. The permanent 
committees, formed at the first session of the assembly, duplicate ministerial 
portfolios and effectively act as watchdogs over ministerial activities. Temporary 
committees address extraordinary problems which are of a more limited duration 
such as the drought of 1999. MPs are allowed to be in no more than 2 permanent 
committees, with restrictions being relaxed for temporary committees. 
The committees themselves have to contain between 3 and 9 MPs and are formed by 
majority agreement. 58 They can also be formed by the Presidium alone when the 
assembly is in recess. The Presidium has the right to call any technical or expert 
advisor to present evidence to the committees. 
Fieure 6.2: The Formation of Committees of the KNA 59 
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Kurdistan National Assembly 
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6.3.2 The Legislative Process 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate the legislative process which is the presribed practice of 
the KNA. Laws and regulations are proposed to the KNA from two main sources: 
Parliamentary Councillors and the Council of Ministers. Councillors have the right to 
propose laws and resolutions to the Presidium which represent the opinion of ten or 
sa Kurdistan National Assembly (1994) op. cit., pp. 29-31; interview with Jawher Namiq Salim, Erbil, 
24 August 1998. 
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more MPs. The Council of Ministers may propose motions to the KNA, and then the 
proposals are entered into the KNA agenda. 
6.3.2.1 The Passing of Laws 
Drafts of agreed motions are sent to the Permanent Legal Affairs Committee and the 
specialist technical committee relevant to the proposal. It is then distributed to the 
assembly by means of the leaders of the Parliamentary blocks. The proposal and 
Figure 6.3: Schematic Representation of the Proposal of Laws and Regulations60 
Proposals Proposals 
presented by 10 presented by 
or more MPs via ministries via the 
the Parliamentary Council of 
Councillor Ministers 
The Presidium of the I 
I"""" Kurdistan National Assembly 
1ý 
Technical 
Committees 
A 
ýI 
Legal Affairs 
Committee 
Kurdistan 
National Assembly 
Council of Ministers Official newspapers 
for implementation for public information 
comments are then returned to the Presidium by the assessing committees and 
redistributed again. The draft is then entered into the agenda of the assembly for 
59 Ibid. 
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discussion by all members. The second route available for the passing of laws is by 
the Council of Ministers which has authority to present proposals to the KNA. A 
similar system of commentary is employed and the confirmation of a proposal 
requires a majority vote in the KNA, unless there is a call for a special majority. 
6.3.2.1.1 Parliamentary Questions 
Any MP is allowed to ask questions from the floor to the Speaker and/or Council of 
Ministers representatives about subjects of interest to themselves and/or the findings 
of Committees. Figure 6.4 illustrates the' questioning and answering process of the 
KNA: 
Figure 6.4: Questioning and Answering in the KNA61 
uestionin 
Question from Members of the 
Kurdistan National Assembly 
The Presidency of the Iraqi Kurdistan The Prime Minister or Member of the 10 National Assembly Council of Ministers 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
j 
---------------- 
Answering 
The Council of Ministers or the individual minister has to answer the 
question during a seven day period from the date of being asked. The 
question is answered at a special Parliamentary question-and-answer session. 
60 Ibid, p. 40; interview with Jawher Namiq Salim, Erbil, 8 September 1999. 
61 Source: Kurdistan National Assembly (1994) op. cit., p. 40; interview with Jawher Namiq Salim, 
Erbil, 8 September 1999. 
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6.3.3 Conclusion 
Until August 1996, the KNA held 193 ordinary sessions and 15 extraordinary 
seesions. 140 laws and resolutions were promulgated and the Assembly had a key 
role in establishing a cease-fire between the KDP and PUK during the internal 
fighting of May-June 1994. While ultimately failing to achieve a comprehensive 
cease-fire between the. KDP and PUK, the KNA demonstrated that it was an 
institution of considerable influence and power even in the most troubled of times. 
The verve with which the legislature was addressed by the newly elected MPs 
resulted in a plethora of legislation establishing the executive offices, regularising the 
judiciary, and attempting to bring some normality to the region. As a legislature, the 
KNA seemed to thrive on a divided political system, which enhanced the negotiating 
powers of participant parties and was a useful non-combative arena in which party 
politics could be played out. Dr Fu'ad Massoum noted that "even with these inherent 
problems [of internal fighting], the KNA did not suffer one day of verbal abuse 
between different members or groupings, even at times of tension. s62 For these 
reasons, as an institution, it is difficult to argue that the KNA should be anything but 
unified and, as such can only strengthen the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
6 .4 The Morphology and Prescribed Operating Procedures of the 
Executive 
Offices of the KRG 
The first cabinet was formed on 4 July 1992 according to Law No. 3 of 1992. The 
number of participant ministers in the cabinet was 15 besides the Prime Minister and 
Deputy Prime Minister. Only parties who competed in the 1992 election contributed 
to the cabinet as most non-participant parties were established after the election. The 
major ministries were divided between the two main Parliamentary Blocks of the 
KDP and PUK. The KCP was granted the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and 
the Toilers' Party, as it was in coalition with the PUK in the KNA, was granted the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. The ADM was granted the Ministry of Public 
Works and Housing. 
Existing alongside the newly formed executive structure of the KRG was the local 
executive structure of the - governorates. As the highest official organ of the GOI 
62 Interview with Dr. Fuad Massoum, London, 21 June 1999. 
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within Iraqi Kurdistan, the office of the Governor held an unusual amount of power 
and influence in the region. 63 However, instead of vowing allegiance to the GOI, the 
governors of the newly formed de facto state were KDP or PUK appointees, 
depending upon which party was dominant in a particular governorate. 
In this section, I address both the ministerial executive structure of Iraqi Kurdistan, 
and the local executive structure as in an attempt to illustrate the overlapping 
authorities and linkage between the two systems, and the impact that individual 
characters can have on the workings of a political system. 
6.4.1 The Morphology and Prescribed Planning Process of the Regional Executive 
Upon passing Law No. 3 of 1992 which established the executive authority of the 
KRG, the KNA undertook an extensive programme of establishing the constituent 
ministries and mandates. 64 The ministries, and their mandates, were based upon the 
previous GOI administration for the northern governorates,. and simply upgraded, so 
that the previous General Directorate for Health in the Northern Governorates now 
became the Ministry of Health of the Iraqi Kurdistan region. However, the division 
between Iraqi Kurdistan and the central government, and problems peculiar to the 
north, forced the formation of four new ministries, namely: Humanitarian Aid & 
Cooperation (to liaise with the rapidly growing international NGO and UN presence); 
Reconstruction & Development (to address the redevelopment of the devastated rural 
areas); Peshmerga Affairs (to coordinate the joint peshmerga forces), and; Culture. 65 
6.4.1.1 Cabinet Composition 
The cabinet is composed of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, all 
ministers with portfolios, and 5 ministers of state. The cabinet holds regular meetings 
every Wednesday, commencing at 11 am. The Council Bureau (the Prime Minister 
63 Even when compared to the rest of Iraq, the Governors of Iraqi Kurdistan have always been 
characterised as enjoying enhanced executive authority due to the central administration relying 
heavily on the governor for the maintenance of security in the Kurdish regions. Interview with Sami 
Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 April 1998. 
64 See Appendix 5 for a complete set of organograms illustrating the morphology of each ministry. 
65 The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Cooperation is effectively a thinly disguised Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. However, due to the status of the administration of the de facto state and lack of 
international recognition of its legitimacy, the Public Relations Office of the KDP and the Foreign 
Relations Bureau of the PUK handle the foreign affairs of the KRG. Interviews with Sa'adi Pira, 
Suleimaniyah, 17 April 1998; Dr Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil 18 May 1998. 
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and his offices, in consultation with Ministers' bureaux) prepares an agenda to 
structure the meetings. According to KNA protocol regarding the executive process, 
the naming of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister is made by the KNA, 
Table 6.5: Ministry Establishing Laws of the KNA66 
Ministry Law Year 
The Cabinet 3 1992 
Education 4 1992 
Peshmerga Affairs 5 1992 
Interior 9 1992 
Culture 11 1992 
Justice 12 1992 
Finance & Economic Affairs 13 1992 
Municipalities & Tourism 15 1992 
Health & Social Affairs 1 1993 
Transport & Communications 2 1993 
Power & Industry 5 1993 
Awqaf & Islamic Affairs 7 1993 
Agriculture & Irrigation 10 1993 
Reconstruction & Development 11 1993 
Public Works & Housing 13 1993 
Humanitarian Aid & Cooperation 20 1993 
after consultation with the Parliamentary Blocks. The KNA has the authority to 
support or withdraw its confidence in the Council of Ministers, effectively resulting 
in its dissolution. 
6.4.1.2 Cabinet Procedures 
The agenda (which includes policy project proposals) is discussed in the cabinet, and 
decisions are a collective responsibility. The budget for ministerial programmes is 
66 Kurdistan National Assembly, Parliamentary Protocols; Voice of the People of Kurdistan, 
Salahadin, 26 April 1993 (SWB ME/1674); Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Salahadin, 21 
December, 1993 (SWB ME/1880). 
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agreed in. cabinet, with the approval of the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs. Proposals for new legislation is also prepared by the cabinet and forwarded 
to the KNA for acceptance and ratification. 67 It is the task of each ministry to develop 
an annual plan through the operations of its own bureaucracy which is then submitted 
to the Council of Ministers upon completion. Then, a specialist committee studies all 
the plans (normally technicians from the field in question). The proposals are then 
forwarded to the Cabinet with recommendations where it is then again discussed. It is 
finally forwarded with recommendations to the Ministry in question, along with an 
agreed budget. 68 
6.4.2 The Executive Offices of the Governorates 
Iraqi Kurdistan is divided into governorates which represent the highest level of 
executive power within a specified geographic area apart from that of the President 
and the Prime Minister. 69 The Governors are powerful individuals, appointed by the 
KDP or PUK, whose position is to be the representative of the President (or leader of 
movement) within his (there are no female governors) designated governorate. 70 This 
power structure is maintained in the division of the governorate, with the 
Qaimaqamiyat possessing the powers of the governor with his Qaza, and Mudir al- 
Nahiya possessing the same within his Nahiya. 71 
67 Interviews with Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 17 April 1998; Ahmed Sharif, Suleimaniyah, 13 May 
1998; Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil, 18 May 1998; Neechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 1998; Dr. Fu'ad 
Massoum, London, 2 June 1999; Rafad Abdullah, Suleimaniyah, 9 July 1998; Mohammad Tawfiq, 
Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999; Kosrat Rasoul, Suleimaniyah, 8 August 1999. 
68 Interviews with Ahmed Sharif, Suleimaniyah, 13 May 1998; Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 
1998; Kosrat Rasoul, Suleimaniyah, 8 August 1998; Krekar Abdullah, Suleimaniyah, 10 July 1998; 
Raf ad Abdullah, Suleimaniyah, 9 July 1998. Chalaw Ali Askari, Suleimaniyah, 13 May 1998; Sheikh 
Ma'amon Brifkani, Erbil, 20 May. 1998; Abu Hikmat, Erbil, 9 May 1998; Bahman Hussein, 
Suleimaniyah, 11 July 1998; Dr Fu'ad Massoum, London, 2 June 1999; Badrea Osman, Erbil, 1 July 
1998; Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 17 April 1998; Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil, 28 February 1998; Idris Hadi 
Saleh, Erbil, 19 May 1998; Sheikhallah Ibrahim 'Sheikhallah, Erbil, 1 July 1998. 
69 The governorate system in Iraq, including the designation of powers, was formalised in the 1969 
Iraqi Governorate Law. The KNA has the authority, according to its own operating procedures to alter 
the tenets of the law, but did not do so during the first two cabinets. However, unconfirmed reports 
suggest that the KDP-dominated KNA in Erbil will promote the formation of two new governorates in 
the immediate future, possibly in the regions of Soran and Aqra. Interviews with Aso Sheikh Nuri, 
Suleimaniyah, 5 May 1998; Mahdi Khoshnaw, Erbil, 14 June 1998. 
70 Due to the present ambiguous situation surrounding the election of the Leader (President) of. the 
Iraqi Kurdistan region, the governors are official appointed by the Prime Minister, to whom the 
appointed persons have to swear an oath. Interview with Aso Sheikh Nuri, Suleimaniyah, 5 May 1998. " See Chapter 4 for a description of the governorate structure of Iraqi Kurdistan. The structure of the 
governorates in Iraq was established by Article 2 of the Iraq Governorate Law of 1969. Interviews 
with Mahdi Khoshnaw, Erbil, 14 April 1998; Aso Sheikh Nuri, Suleimaniyah, 5 May 1998. 
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While the system so far appears to be structurally straightforward, with corollaries in 
Iraq proper and the Middle East in general, it is apparent that, at times, there has been 
a significant amount of confusion caused due to the official legality of the position of 
the governor compared to the de facto legality of that of a Minister of the KRG. This 
division has been compounded by the fact that the governors, as the executors of 
activities within the governorate, control and oversee the activities of all general 
directorates, whereas the Kurdish system implemented since 1992 quite clearly 
places the general directorates, in a technical sense, beneath the ministerial structure. 
The following section investigates the structure of the governorate and its role in the 
administration of Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991. 
6.4.2.1 Principles and Procedures of the Governorate Executive Process 
According to the Deputy Governor of Suleimaniyah, Aso Sheikh Nuri, the clearest 
way of describing the role of the governorate structure is that it is responsible for the 
administration of the governorate, overseeing the implementation of programmes and 
policies promulgated by the ministerial structure. The primary areas of concern for 
the governor include all public services and the protection of public property. 72 
In achieving these roles, the governor relies on two important relations, one to the 
Ministry of the Interior to which he is administratively subservient, and the other to 
the sectoral ministries whose directorates are tasked with implementing policies and 
programmes within the governorate. 73 The governor therefore possesses a 
considerable amount of authority over the activities of the directorates within the 
governorate, if not over the prescription of their activities which comes from the 
ministries. This level of control covers all general directorates and directorates of all 
ministries, apart from those directorates of the Ministry of Justice and the organs of 
the judicial system. Similarly, the governor has no authority over the universities or 
military forces. 
In general, directorates and general directorates receive their instructions from the 
ministry concerned, and a copy of these instructions must be sent to the governor. 
The role of the governorate structure is then to order and monitor the activities 
72 Interview with Aso Sheikh Nuri, Suleimaniyah, 5 May 1998. 
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detailed in the instructions and report on the activity of the lower executive organs to 
the ministry concerned, and the Ministry of the Interior. 74 
The ministries also employ the infrastructure of the governorate and hand over some 
administrative rights to the governor. The governor then is free to establish 
committees which work in conjunction with the ministries providing public services 
within the governorate, effectively creating a miniature government for the 
governorate. 75 For example, in Suleimaniyah, the governor is the chairman of several 
committees, including the Suleimaniyah Security Committee, the Agriculture 
Committee, and the Education Committee. The committees have branches in the qaza 
and nahiyas, with the head of the area as the chairman. These committees submit 
reports to the Ministry of the Interior, and have the power to submit directives, 
requests and advice to individual ministries concerning policies within the 
governorate. 
6.4.3 Conclusion 
The governorate represents more than the title would suggest, and the Prime Minister 
of the first cabinet, Dr Fu'ad Massoum, acknowledged that governors had created 
problems on several occasions. 76 In a position which essentially requires a technocrat 
to follow the sectoral activities of the executive, the appointees of the KDP and PUK 
were politicians and members of either the KDP Central Committee or the PUK 
Leadership Office. 77 This resulted in the governor possessing at least the same degree 
of political power as ministers, if not more, particularly as the governorate system 
had been operational since 1969, and the KRG only since 1992, enhancing the 
legitimacy of the governor. 78 Sami Abdul Rahman highlighted some of the situations 
this has led to, with governors exercising their considerable political power: 
" Interview with Fadhil Merani, Erbil, 26 August 1999. 
" Mahdi Khoshnaw, the Deputy Governor of Erbil, explained the system with reference to the 
implementation of education policies in Erbil. The Ministry of Education is responsible for fixing the 
dates of exams and forming a regional curriculum, while the Governorate of Erbil is responsible for 
implementing and supervising these orders. Interview with Mahdi Khoshnaw, Erbil, 14 June 1998. 
's Interview with Dr Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil 18 May 1998. 
76 Interview with Dr Fuad Massoum, London, 21 June 1999. 
77 The Governor of Dohuk until 1999 was Abdel Aziz Tayyib (KDP Central Committee); Erbil, 
Franso Hariri (KDP Central Committee); Suleimaniyah, Hackam Khadr Hama Jan (PUK Leadership 
Office); Kirkuk, Jalal Jawher (PUK Leadership Office). 
79 Interviews with Gerhard Monier, Erbil, 9 March 1998; Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil 18 May 1998. 
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"[In Erbil and Dohuk] both governors are in the Central Committee. 
This is different to Iraq. In Iraq, the regime places technocrats in such 
positions who are not willing to argue, politicians and peshmerga will 
argue more. "79 
There is a structural control in place in the fact that the immediate superior of the 
governor, the Minister of the Interior, is always a member of the Political Bureau. 
However, it is apparent that the relative strength of the governors has been enhanced 
and supported by UN agencies. Caught in a minefield of legal prerequisites by the 
GOI, UN agencies have had to work primarily with the official organs of the GOI, 
including those in Iraqi Kurdistan. 80 As the GOI does not recognise the ministries of 
the KRG, the UN is forced to work directly with the governors which, at times has 
proved to be problematic both for the implementation of UN SCRs and the 
development of clear administrative structure within the de facto state. 8 
6.5 The Judiciary 
With the withdrawal of the GOI in 1991 came the need for the IKF to establish a 
judicial system to restore law and order across the territory. Civilian police forces 
were reconstituted and placed under the control of the local committees of the IKF. 
Similarly, local courts and judicial institutions were reopened and operated through 
the organizational structures of the governorate. 82 Before an official legal system 
could be formed by the KNA, the police and courts of the region operated according 
to the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure of Iraq, which, according to an 
Amnesty International report, fell short of international standards. 83 This was 
compounded by the fact that many aspects of these emergency procedures appeared 
to be more party orientated rather than independent, resulting in several reported 
cases of miscarriages of justice. 84 
'Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 April 1998. 
8° Interview with Dr Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil 18 May 1998. 
81 Interviews with Gerhard Mortier, Erbil, 9 March 1998; Dr Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil 18 May 1998. 
Gerhard Mortier, the UN Field Delegate for Erbil during 1998, believed the position of governor, 
particularly in Dohuk, to be noticeably more influential than the ministerial structures. Similarly, the 
positioi of Franso Hariri, the Governor of Erbil until 1999, was bolstered by him also being an MP, 
Minister of Region (without portfolio), and member of the KDP Central Committee. 
82 For details regarding this earlier period, see: Amnesty International (1995) op. cit., p. 25. 83 Penal'Code, Law No. Ill of 1969; Code of Criminal Procedure, Law No. 23 of 1971. Amnesty 
International (1995) op. cit., p. 25. a' Ibid. 
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6.5.1 Principles and Procedures 
Law No. 44 of the 28 December 1992 established judicial power in the region, 
according to Law No. 14 of 1992.85 The judiciary was designed to be an independent 
establishment of the KRG, independent from all other institutions, including political 
parties. The Kurds certainly had the expertise to design and implement such a 
system, with an extensive legal system previously operating in Iraq requiring the 
training and provision of significant numbers of legally trained personnel. Courts of 
the Judiciary were to sentence in the name of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan, and had 
authority over all persons, including those in positions of authority in the KRG. The 
design of the judicial system (and the organization of the courts), either civil or 
criminal, corresponded to the Iraqi system. Correspondingly, the courts apply the 
laws of Iraq in all cases. However, they retained the right, through the KNA, to 
nullify any Iraqi law issued before the date of the GOI withdrawal. The judicial 
system also retained the right to implement those laws issued by the KNA after this 
date, according to Law No. 11 of 31 August 1992.86 The most important of the laws 
establishing the Judiciary was the Judicial Authority Law of December 1992.87 This 
law affirmed the independence of the Judiciary and allowed for the establishment of 
a Supreme Court in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
6.5.2 The Organization of the Judici 
The highest court in Iraqi Kurdistan is the Supreme Court (Court of Cassation), 
which was originally designated to reside in Erbil and be responsible for reviewing 
the entire region. Beneath the Supreme Court there are two appeal districts based in 
Erbil and Suleimaniyah (previously Kirkuk). 
The Supreme Court was perhaps the only aspect of the Judiciary which was created 
wholly by the Kurds after 1991. In order to operate under Iraqi law, the services of a 
Supreme Court were required, however, the only one which existed in Iraq was in 
Baghdad. 88 In addition to this, the hierarchy of courts in the region already existed 
within the previous Iraqi system and are as follows: 1. Court of Appeal; 2. Court of 
85 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Salahadin, 27 November 1992 (SWB ME/1551). 86 Interviews with Khadir Jabari, Erbil, 30 June 1998; Abdul Rahman Nurisi, Suleimaniyah, 19 July 
1998. 
87 Law No. 14, December 1992. See Amnesty International (1995) op. cit., p. 44. S81bid. 
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First Instance; 3. Personal Status Court; 4. Criminal Court (Court of Assizes); 5. 
Misdemeanours Court; 6. Court of Accidents; 7. Industrial Tribunal Court; and 8. 
Investigation Court. 
6.5.3 Conclusion 
The judicial system of Iraqi Kurdistan is perhaps the most difficult of the institutions 
of government to analyse. The description of the morphology and the analysis of its 
formation have been provided, but to assess the decision-making process beyond 
what it prescribed by the KNA is somewhat problematic. In such an area as Iraqi 
Kurdistan, which has suffered from severe problems of internal security in the early 
1990s, and the input of political parties' interests into the operations of the judiciary, 
it is perhaps not to be expected that the activities of the judiciary are beyond 
reproach. Analyses provided by organizations such as Amnesty International indicate 
that, particularly in the earlier periods covered by the first and second cabinets, party 
political issues dominated the judicial process, particularly because the most 
dominant, antagonistic political entities were not only in the same geographical area 
together, but were also within the same organs of governance. 
However, since 1996 and the separation of the parties, the party political rivalries 
have subsided considerably. The judicial system of Iraqi Kurdistan still has many 
problems, but, as Nawshirwan Mustafa opined, with regard to the levels of law and 
order in the streets of Suleimaniyah, when compared to neighbouring states, the 
levels of civilian security in Iraqi Kurdistan certainly may be judged in at least a 
comparable light. Of course, this does not allow one to hide the inadequacies of the 
current system. However, it is an indicator that, in the present political climate, the 
judicial system has been organised with the input of the previous national system, 
changes imposed by the KNA, and enforced changes caused by the changes which 
occurred in the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1996. While still needing to 
progress considerably, there are signs that the political parties, the KRG, and the. 
judiciary are attempting to promote legal as well as civil society in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The organizational structure and prescribed decision-making processes of the 
institutions of the KRG are extremely sophisticated, especially considering the 
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timeframe in which they have been developed. While it is a relatively easy task to 
identify flaws in the manner by which Kurds have been governing Iraqi Kurdistan for 
the last decade, the circumstances, in both political and economic terms, in which 
these institutions have been conceived and developed should not be overlooked. 
This chapter has presented the bases for an in-depth analysis of the development of 
the KRG to take place. By employing a methodology grounded in comparative study 
of governance systems, it has been possible to place the institutions and processes of 
the Iraqi Kurdish governance system in some form of comparable perspective with 
other, perhaps more established systems. 
This chapter has effectively established the skeleton of the administrative system, 
and the reasons and inputs for the initial formation and processes at the beginning of 
the 1990s. It has also presented aspects of defending the legality of the system, at 
least in a de facto sense. This now needs to be combined with an approach which 
identifies the way in which this system has operated over the last decade. The 
proceeding chapter attempts to provide such an analysis by addressing the different 
variables which have effected the system in the last decade, and by employing a 
methodology which allows the system to be studied at first hand. 
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Chapter 7 
The Kurdistan Regional Government 1992-2000 
7.1 Introduction 
In the political environment of Iraqi Kurdistan, the development of the KRG cannot 
be separated from the status of the relationship between the KDP and PUK, and the 
impact of the revenue generated by SCR 986. The KRG commenced the decade as a 
unified administration encompassing the two most dominant parties in a coalition 
executive and legislative, but suffered by being inextricably linked to the party 
political dynamic and by seriously lacking funds. It finished the decade divided 
geographically and politically between the cities of Erbil and Suleimaniyah, 
mirroring the division of the KDP and PUK respectively, with both administrations 
receiving SCR 986 revenue equivalent to the GDP of a small country. 
Whilst this current division undoubtedly causes immense problems for the 
administration of the region, it has resulted in a system of government which is able 
to operate more effectively, if not more efficiently, than the previous 50-50 
government. It is apparent that the initial system of coalition government adopted 
after the elections of 1992 promoted a system of governance dominated by two 
competing parties, effectively resulting in a moribund governmental process. The 
separating of " these two unconciliatory political forces has promulgated the 
development of a divided system of government which, while being cumbersome and 
highly overstaffed, has proved to be a more successful system and one which has 
promoted political stability. 
This chapter charts the development of the KRG throughout the 1990s and the 
characteristics of the operating procedures of the three separate cabinets of the 
period. The starting point is the formation of the KRG after the elections of 1992. 
The first attempt at power-sharing in a traditional consociational manner (the 50-50 
sytem) is analysed, as are the reasons for its ultimate failure and subsequent decline 
into conflict. The geographically-divided political system which has existed from 
1996 until the present is again analysed, and reasons for the increased stability which 
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has been apparent particularly since 1997 are identified. It is argued that this system 
is a geographic variant of a consociational political system and, whilst being 
unsuitable as a long-term solution for political development in Iraqi Kurdistan, is an 
ideal mechanism for the promotion of confidence-building measures between the 
KDP and PUK and the enhancement of administrative cooperation. 
7.2 The Kurdistan Re2ional Government, 1992-1996 
The election results of 1992 presented the participating parties with a quandary. The 
KDP and PUK were so close that neither party achieved a majority within the KNA. 
After negotiations occurred between the two competing parties, a system was devised 
which was intended to provide some form of administration for the region and satisfy 
the KDP and PUK in the short-term until a new election took place. The design 
adopted, which effectively divided all executive and legislative positions equally 
with real power being unofficially vested in the political bureaus of the KDP and 
PUK, became known as the 50-50 system. 
7.2.1 The Power Sharing System of the First and Second Cabinets 
While designed to alleviate the ever-present tensions apparent in the political arena, 
the 50-50 system was dependent upon the goodwill and support of the sources of the 
tension. However, within 2 years, Iraqi Kurdistan would be characterised by fierce 
interfactional fighting, with the power-sharing system perhaps being a catalyst rather 
than constraint. In analysing the development of the political system in these difficult 
years, I address the tensions developed by this specific power-sharing system 
identifying the problems of bringing the KDP and PUK together in supposed 
governmental harmony. 
7.2.1.1 The Establishment of the 50-50 S sy tem 
Events in the immediate aftermath of the elections were somewhat chaotic, with KDP 
personnel insisting that the PUK was preparing to fight in the precincts of Erbil 
rather than to become the opposition in the KNA, and the KDP similarly being 
provocative against the PUK. Even though several important cadres in the PUK, led 
by Nawshirwan Mustafa, were pushing for the PUK to become the party of the 
opposition, the deal brokered between the two sides resulted in an even division of 
power between the KDP and PUK in the KNA. However, while the system was 
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called 50-50, it was apparent that the KDP relinquished a considerable number of key 
ministerial portfolios as well as a seat in the KNA. Sami Abdul Rahman noted that 
"the J0-. i0 was not so, it was 3: 1, but the KDP tolerated it. "' Nechervan Barzani 
supports this fact by naming the system "70-30", and states that the KDP accepted 
the deal because they believed that another election was forthcoming. 2 
7.2.1.2 The Aim of the 50-50 System 
The aim of the system was to achieve, at least on the surface, an even division of 
power between the KDP and PUK in all government offices throughout the territory. 
Such a balance was deemed to be particularly appropriate as the two leaders of the 
parties remained out of the official governmental equation, postponing dealing with 
the most problematic issue of who was to be President. However, the exclusion of the 
two leaders would ultimately be identified as a serious flaw. 
As seen, the Presidium of the KNA was divided between'KDP and PUK personnel, 
with Jawher Namiq Salim of the KDP becoming the Speaker, and Mohammad 
Tawfiq his Deputy. An identical division was then applied to the cabinet, with the 
minister being from one party and the deputy from the other. However, the decision- 
making process of the administration was still ultimately dominated by the KDP and 
PUK, thereby preserving the influence of the parties' elite. Mohammad Tawfiq of the 
PUK Political Bureau noted to me that: 
"With the first and second cabinets, there was an unwritten 
understanding between the political bureaus of the KDP and PUK 
that all the decisions of the KRG must have [their] prior approval. So, 
there was a consensus of taking a decision. Both political bureaus 
discussed the main issues and them issued a message to the 
government. Sometimes it would be the government who would 
propose a policy, but it would still require the political bureaus to 
issue a decision. The political bureaus met weekly, sometimes twice 
weekly to discuss such issues. s3 
At the ministerial level, the deputy enjoyed the same power and influence as the 
minister as each needed the support of the other to plan policies and implement 
programmes, with each, similarly, possessing a veto. This typology of division 
' Interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 9 September 1999. 
Z Interview with Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 1998. 
3 Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarchölan, 7 August 1999. 
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existed throughout the governmental structures, from the cabinet to the town 
councils, and also including schools, health facilities, and internal security positions. 
7.2.2 The First Cabinet of the KRG 
The first cabinet of the KRG was presented with an unenviable task of attempting to 
govern the newly formed de facto state. Within the territory, UN sanctions and the 
GOI embargo were creating immense socio-economic problems, in addition to the 
unease created by the tense political environment. Furthermore, the first cabinet had 
to -manage several internal and structural problems. Dr Fu'ad Massoum, the PUK 
Prime Minister of the first cabinet, noted that; 
"We had many problems, the first problem being that the GOI system 
was massively overstaffed. The second problem was that the Kurdish 
leadership did not have enough skilled personnel, and the third 
problem was the Iraq had never enjoyed any democratic tradition. "4 
The first cabinet targeted these problems highly effectively and the achievements of 
this cabinet have often been overlooked due to the subsequent breakdown of inter- 
party relations and the formation of the second cabinet under the premiership of 
Kosrat Rasoul of the PUK. 
7.2.2.1 Ministers and Deputies 
According to most reports of the first cabinet, perhaps the greatest problem presented 
to the decision-making process was the equality of power which existed between 
ministers and their deputies creating an administration effectively hamstrung by the 
contrary political motivations of its highest executive members. However, in the 
region itself, the first cabinet, and Dr Fu'ad in particular, is often held in high regard 
for what they managed to achieve, and the manner by which they achieved it. 
According to Dr Fu'ad, there were undeniably some problems with the minister- 
deputy division. However, as most decisions had actually been made in the political 
bureaus of the KDP and PUK with the approval of Talabani and Barzani, any 
4 Interview with Dr Fu'ad Massoum, London, 21 June 1999. Wimmer, quoting the findings of 
Bozarlan, suggests that the parties enlarged the bureaucratic apparatus in order to grasp the support of 
the professionals. Within the governorate of Suleimaniyah, the civil service staff was increased from 
80 to 150,000 persons between 1991 and 1996, according to these sources. (Borzalan (1997) 
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Table 7.1: The First Cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(4 July 1992)5 
Name Position Party 
Fu'ad Massoum Prime Minister PUK 
Roj Nuri Shawaise Deputy Prime Minister KDP 
Amin Mawlud Industry and Power PUK 
Amin Abdulrahman Deputy KDP 
Sherko Bekass Culture PUK 
Ahmed Salar Deputy KDP 
Mohammad Tawfiq Humanitarian Aid PUK 
Kamal Kirkuki Deputy KDP 
Idris Hadi Saleh Transport and Communication KDP 
Feyeradun Rafiq Deputy PUK 
Younadim Yousif Housing and Public Works ADM 
Tayyib Jabir Amin Deputy PUK 
Nasih Ghafour Education KDP 
Uthman Hasan Deputy PUK 
Kadir Aziz Agriculture KTP 
Akram Izzat Deputy KDP 
Kamal Mufti Peshmerga Affairs PUK 
Azad Fattah Deputy KDP 
Ma'ruf Ra'uf Justice Independent 
Salah al-Din Hafidh Finance and Economic Affairs PUK 
Salah Dalo Deputy KDP 
Kaffia Suleiman Municipalities and Tourism PUK 
Salih Ahmed Deputy KDP 
Kamal Shakir Health and Social Affairs ICP 
Abd al-Ahad Afram Deputy KDP 
Mohammad Mulla Qadir Islamic Affairs (Awgajj KDP 
Mohammad Salih Deputy PUK 
Ma'moun Brifkani Reconstruction and Development KDP 
Hussein Sinjari Deputy PUK 
Younis Rojbayani Interior KDP 
Ahmed Sharif Deputy PUK 
"Kurdistan: Kreigswirtschaft - Wirtschaft im Kreig" in Borck, et. al. 
(eds. ) Kurdologie, Ethnizitat, 
Nationalismus, Religion und Politik in Kurdistan. Lit. S, pp. 79-112; Wimmet 
(1998) op. cit., p. 5) 
5 Kakai (1992) op. cit., pp. 123-124. 
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subsequent disagreement between the executive officers would be relatively 
straightforward to resolve as their role was essentially to implement what had already 
been decided. 6 The success of the 50-50 system therefore seemed to be guaranteed 
for as long as the KDP and PUK relationship remained secure, both in terms of 
popular support and political power. Mohammad Tawfiq of the PUK, with reference 
to this version of power-sharing, insisted that "[the 50/50 system] was a very suitable 
and proper form of governing the region. "7 
Apart from having a decision-making process obviously dominated by the political 
elite of the KDP and PUK, Dr Fu'ad insists that, as Prime Minister, he was never 
asked to undertake anything in favour of one party or the other, and, beyond the 
influences exhibited by the respective Political Bureau, there was little negative 
interference from the parties. While still making obvious his own political 
convictions, Dr Fu'ad stated that; 
"There was not one day when Jalal Talabani asked 'the Cabinet to do 
anything according to the line of the political parties. Occasionally, 
Barzani would ask the Cabinet to perform some tasks, but this was not 
very often. s8 
The actual decision-making process of the cabinet therefore appears to have been 
managed by some form of coordination between the two political bureaus. However, 
there was a problem with achieving a balance within the governmental structure with 
regard to the inclusion of civil servants trained by the GOI, and those Kurds who had 
spent their lives fighting in the peshmerga brigades. 9 The civil service of the GOI had 
been grossly overstaffed, and Kurdistan was no exception and the inclusion of extra 
personnel presented the fledgling KRG with an immense problem. Dr Fu'ad noted 
that; 
"The problem of a large number of civil servants within the system 
was serious. After the Kuwait Crisis, 210,000 people of the Popular 
6 Dr Fu'ad noted to me how close his working relationship with his deputy, Dr Roj Nuri Shawaise of 
the KDP Political Bureau, was, and how he went to great efforts to make sure that he consulted both 
Barzani and Talabani personally. He further noted that, when tensions increased and fighting broke 
out between the KDP and PUK, French political counsellors immediately focused upon the problems 
posed by the `equal deputy'. Interviews with Dr Fu'ad Massoum, London, 2 June 1999; Mohammad 
Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
8 Interview with Dr Fu'ad Massoum, London, 21 June 1999. 
Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
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Army returned to the north, many of them civil servants, they were in 
addition to the civil servants we already had, and the women [in the 
administration] had never left their posts either. s10 
Alongside these civil servants, the political parties strove to secure positions for their 
most valued cadres, men who had been peshmerga most of their lives and committed 
to fighting for the cause of their parties. " Dr Fu'ad, identifying both dynamics within 
the governmental system, stated that he wanted to use both groupings of personnel, 
but that difficulties arose as a peshmerga thinks quite differently to a GOI trained 
bureaucrat. 12 The attempts at achieving a balance between these two groupings 
would create the first signs of tension between the KDP and PUK, with both sides 
accusing the other of placing peshmerga personnel into positions which required a 
technocrat. 
7.2.3 The Second Cabinet of the KRG 
Towards the end of 1992, the first cabinet of the KRG was becoming embattled. 
Faced with increasing partisan problems caused by the seemingly inextricable 
problem of revenue control at Ibrahim Khalil, the leadership of the cabinet attempted 
to become more technocratic in the face of the politicization of the governmental 
structures by the KDP and PUK. 13 This approach led to Dr Fu'ad and his cohorts 
becoming somewhat alienated from the decision-making bodies of the KDP and even 
the PUK. He noted that "the KDP accused me of being secretive. The PUK even 
accused me of being so. They did not like my technocratic approach and would have 
preferred me to be more political in my position. " 14 
The result of this attempted division between administration and party, and the 
effective isolation of party elites not in the administration was that the Political 
Bureaus of both parties would forward recommendations directly to the cabinet for 
10 Interview with Fu'ad Massoum, London, 21 June 1999. 
Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000. 
12 Interview with Fu'ad Massoum, London, 21 June 1999. 
13 The arguments over the revenues of Ibrahim Khalil are somewhat confusing. Whilst the area still 
remained a KDP stronghold, it was the case that, as the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance and 
Economic Affairs, and Head of the Central Bank were all members of the PUK, the grip of the 
Barzanis should have been somewhat relaxed. Whenever this issue is raised amongst members of the 
KDP, they certainly note that the PUK indeed controlled the key administrative positions. However, 
the PUK retort is that the KDP peshmerga loyal to the Barzanis, along with the KDP Governor of 
Dohuk ensured that their hold on Ibrahim Khalil was not weakened at all. Interviews with Nechervan 
Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 1998; Muhsin Dizayi, Salahadin, 30 May 2000. 
14 Interview with Dr Fu'ad Massoum, London, 2 June 1999. 
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implementation, a tactic which Dr Fu'ad identifies as a key weakness and a reason 
why he was replaced. However, this is presented somewhat differently by other PUK 
members. Kosrat Rasoul, the man who was to replace Dr Fu'ad as Prime Minister, 
explained that the removal of Dr Fu'ad was due to reasons of old age rather than his 
attempt to secure neutrality for the cabinet in the face of the polarization of the 
political system. 15 
7.2.3.1 The Formation of the Second Cabinet 
The second cabinet was formed on 25 April 1993 and is characterised by the 
replacement of Dr Fu'ad Massoum with Kosrat Rasoul as Prime Minister of the 
KRG. Dr Roj Nuri Shawaise remained as the Deputy Prime Minister. Kosrat was 
duly given a majority vote by the KNA, and thereby legally elected to the position. It 
was felt that a peshmerga commander with a prominent background (and none were 
as infamous as Kosrat) could motivate the civil service at a very difficult time for the 
de facto state. 16 Other notable PUK appointees during this period were the enigmatic 
Sa'adi Ahmed Pira to the Ministry of Agriculture & Irrigation, and the infamous 
Jabar Farman to the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. Khadir Jabari of the UPK 
became the Minister of Justice. 17 
7.1.3.2 Analysis of the Second Cabinet 
This cabinet is commonly criticized as being more partisan than that of its 
predecessor, and dominated by the charismatic figure of the new Prime Minister, 
Kosrat Rasoul. 18 This partisanship of the governmental structures is considered a 
primary reason for the subsequent fall into conflict which occurred in 1994. 
However, the dynamics of the second cabinet, and particularly the character of 
Kosrat Rasoul, may be seen to be more subtle. As a renowned peshmerga 
commander with an infamous fighting reputation, it was and is an easy task for 
members of the KDP to describe him as uneducated and volatile. However, he 
proved to be able to mobilize public support behind his cabinet and his premiership 
13 However, Dr Fu'ad's current position of head of PUK outside Iraqi Kurdistan suggests that he is not 
too infirmed. 
16 Interviews with Kosrat Rasoul, Suleimaniyah, 8 August 1999; Shwan Qliasani, Suleimaniyah 
8 
August 1999. 
"The UPK was'an amalgamation of several smaller left-wing parties, including the KPDP, the 
KSP 
and elements of PASOK. It was under the leadership of Sami Abdul Rahman. 
18 See Gunter (1999a) op. cit., p. 75. 
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far more effectively than the more technically minded Dr Fu'ad. Furthermore, he 
was, and is, keen to portray himself as a man of the people and, particularly in Erbil, 
achieved this aim with great success. 
Table 7.2: The Second Cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
Name Position Party 
Kosrat Rasoul Ali Prime Minister PUK 
Dr Roj Nuri Shawaise 
Younis Rojbayani 
Kadir Aziz Mohammad. Jabari 
Dr Idris Hadi Saleh 
Muhammad Amin Mawloud 
Shirko Fayk Abdu-Allah Bekar 
Dara Skeikh Nuri 
Sa'adi Ahmed Pira 
Kaffia Suleiman 
Kamal Shakir 
Jabar Farman Ali Akbar 
Ma'amoun Brifkani 
Mohammad Tawfiq 
Mohammad Abdullah Kadir 
Dr Nasih Ghafur Ramadan 
Deputy Prime Minister KDP 
Interior KDP 
Justice UPK 
Transport and Communication KDP 
Industry and Power PUK 
Culture PUK 
Finance and Economic Affairs PUK 
Agriculture and Irrigation PUK 
Municipalities and Tourism PUK 
Health and Social Affairs KSP 
Peshmerga Affairs PUK 
Reconstruction and Development KDP 
Humanitarian Aid PUK 
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs KDP 
Minister of Education KDP 
Younadam Yousif Kana Public Works and Housing ADM 
The truth of the activities of the second cabinet is, as perhaps to be expected, found 
somewhere in the midst of allegations of partisanship and the political strengths of 
the cabinet. KDP members have deep-rooted feelings regarding Kosrat in particular 
and attribute much of the failings of the 50-50 system to his influence, including his 
alleged use of government funds to promote his own enterprises. 
19 However Kosrat, 
as an Erbillian, undeniably enjoyed huge support within the city where he came from 
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and, to a significant degree, deserved it for the direction he gave to the KRG at this 
difficult time. However, the political atmosphere in which the second cabinet had to 
operate was intense, with the tension between Barzani and Talabani remaining high, 
and neighbouring and interested countries becoming increasingly exasperated with 
the fact that the KRG was seemingly becoming more institutionalised in the region 
with the successful, and peaceful, reformation of the cabinet. As events show, in this 
scenario, with both major parties located in the de facto capital of Erbil, any change 
in the balance-of-power which existed between them would be critical enough to 
through them into a downwards spiral of violence resulting in open conflict. The 
following section traces the dynamics which resulted in the collapse of the 50-50 
system of governance, and one of the most destructive internecine conflicts yet to 
take place in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
7.2.4 The Polarization of the Political System 
As seen with the results of the elections of 1992, a structural problem was the setting 
of the threshold to secure a seat in the KNA at 7 percent, effectively ruling out all of 
the smaller parties, and several highly capable and influential politicians, including 
the leader of the KPDP, Sami Abdul Rahman. 
7.2.4.1 The Changing Position of the Smaller Parties 
Realizing this weakness, the KDP and PUK agreed to lower the threshold, but, 
recognizing the problems faced by the new-born KNA, the smaller parties refused to 
take part and chose to remain in the sidelines until the next elections. After the 
elections, Sarni led a merger of his party along with two others, the KSP and 
PASOK, to form the UPK. The relationships between these parties had been apparent 
before the elections, when the KSP and PASOK formed a joint leadership. This 
arrangement was then expanded after the elections to include the KPDP resulting in 
the formation of the UPK in August 1992. After the unification, both the KPDP and 
PASOK dissolved themselves placing themselves under the leadership of Sarni 
19 The names normally associated with causing problems for the KDP in the Second cabinet are 
Kosrat 
Rasoul, Jabar Farman, and Dara Sheikh Nuri. Between the three of them, they exerted a huge amount 
of influence over the activities of the Second cabinet. 
272 
Chapter 7 
Abdul Rahman. The KSP continued to operate under the leadership of Rasoul 
Mamand. 20 
7.2.4.2 Part' Amalgamations 
In December 1992, the KSP was dissolved as Rasoul Mamand joined the PUK 
Political Bureau. This event was followed by the Eleventh Congress of the KDP in 
August 1993, when the UPK subsequently merged with the KDP, 2' resulting in three 
of its leaders joining the KDP Political Bureau, including Sarni Abdul Rahman and 
Muhammad Haji Mahmoud, formerly of the KSP. 22 
The KDP certainly fared better than the PUK from these polarizations in terms of 
securing increased electoral support, and perhaps increased their share of the vote in 
a future election by as much as 3percent. 23 The reasons behind this coalescence of 
parties, and particularly the move of Sami Abdul Rahman to the KDP, are again 
difficult dynamics to understand fully, particularly when one remembers the 
vociferous criticism aimed at the KDP and the Barzanis by Sami in the 1980s. 
However, it is commonly assumed that a combination of political necessity and a 
certain amount of pressure were responsible. 
These changes did indeed send shock waves through the PUK camp and altered the 
balance between the groupings partaking in the already strained consociational 
20 Amnesty International (1995) op. cit., p. 9; Graham-Browne & Zackur (1995) "The Middle East: 
The Kurds -A Regional Issue. " December 1995, WRITENET Country Papers, UNHCR, Switzerland, 
ýara. 3.4; interview with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 8 September 1999. 
1 The KDP refer to this union as "sending shock-waves through the PUK camp": It is also interesting 
to note that, for a brief period, the KDP became known as the Unified KDP (U-KDP). However, this 
was not to last. Jalal Talabani remains adamant that it was the PUK which benefited most from the 
amalgamations of this period. Kurdistan Democratic Party (1994) op. cit., p. 7; Gunter (1996a) "The 
KDP - PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq. " Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996) pp. 225-24 1, p. 
232. Interview with Jalal Talabani, Suleimaniyah, 11 September 2000. 
22 Mohammad Haji Mahmoud would then split from the KDP in October and re-establish the KSP 
under his leadership. (Amnesty International, 1995, p. 10). At the Second Conference of the KSP in 
November 1994, the party was renamed as the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party (KSDP). The 
Political Bureau of the KSDP was removed to an obscure location between Sa'id Sadiq and Halabja, 
and very close to the Iran-Iraq border, prompting several rumours that Mohammad Haji Mahmoud 
was receiving funds from the Government of Iran. The merger of the KSP with the KDP was an 
unexpected move, as many expected it to instead merge with the PUK. Jalal Talabani noted that 
Mohammad Haji Mahmoud was encouraged to merge with the KDP by the UK Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS) which was keen to keep a balance within the political system. Interview with Jalal 
Talabani, Suleimaniyah, 1I September 2000. 
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system of governance. Prior to these changes, the two main parties were careful in 
their dealings with each other and effectively played the smaller parties out of the 
picture. The system had developed into a structure which exhibited stability through 
its inability to make a decision quickly. However, the inclusion of the smaller parties 
created a sharp polarisation between the PUK and KDP, with the KDP feeling in a 
stronger position to alter the perceived imbalance within the government and reduce 
the influence of the PUK in Erbil, and the PUK aiming to increase its own control 
over the revenue of Ibrahim Khalil. At the same time, Mohammad Tawfiq noted that 
an increase in the involvement of the neighbouring states had occurred, allowed by 
the division of administration and the polarization of party politics, promoting 
internal destabilization. These factors, throughout 1993, resulted in the efficiency of 
the second cabinet being reduced and the ability of the KRG to govern the de facto 
state to be dramatically weakened, particularly after the increase of the internal 
sanctions imposed by the GOI. The polarization of the parties also politicized the 
population by reintroducing politics back into society as the two main groups became 
more competitive. The ability of the KRG to govern the region and not allow party 
political colouring to invade the decision-making process became progressively 
weaker until public service, for example, was dependent upon overt loyalty to the 
controlling party. 24 
In January 1994, the Central Committee of the KDP met and, believing to have been 
strengthened by coalescing with the smaller parties, decided that the 50-50 system 
was no longer the favoured method of power-sharing. Massoud subsequently 
proposed to the KNA that a new election should take place in the immediate future. 25 
The result of this move towards elections caused by the polarization of the parties 
was the decline into warfare and the division of the KRG. 
23 Interview with Nechervan Barzani, 21 May 1998. Other sources put the potential increase in support 
caused by this union at 9percent, calculated from the total amount of votes these three parties received 
in the 1992 elections (Kurdistan Democratic Party (1994) op. cit., p. 7). 24 For an account of life under this political system, see Suleiman (1994) "The Politics of Green and 
Yellow, " Dialogue, September 1994. 
25 Arif Taifour of the KDP Political Bureau noted that, at this time, the KDP was increasing its 
military capabilities, received positive publicity from the return of the bodies of Mulla Mustafa and 
Idris Barzani to Iraqi Kurdistan, won the university elections, and benefited from the inclusion of the 
UPK. However, Talabani notes that it was he who negotiated the return of the bodies, and escorted 
them to Barzan, promoting his position as being the political heir to Barzani. Interviews with Arif 
Taifour, Salahadin, 1 September 1999; Jalal Talabani, Suleimaniyah, il September 2000. Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (1994) op. cit., p. 7. 
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7.2.5 Conclusion 
It is incorrect to state that the 50-50 system was doomed to failure from the outset. 
Indeed, the division of positions within the governmental structure was cumbersome, 
but the political will for the initiative to succeed in the early 1990s was sincere and 
resulted in the first cabinet proceeding reasonably well for a short period. While the 
decision-making process of the cabinet was essentially externalised due to neither 
Talabani nor Massoud being part of the official structures of governance, as long as 
the political balance remained between them, it seemed that stability would remain 
within the governmental sphere. Certainly, the early relationship between Massoud 
and Talabani suggests that their absence from the official structures was not 
problematic. However, if they had participated from this early point, and also 
included prominent politicians, such as Sami Abdul Rahman and Nawshirwan 
Mustafa, 26 it is possible that many of the subsequent problems could have been 
solved in a manner more acceptable to each party. 27 The two leaders effectively 
wielded political power, but did not affiliate officially with the administration, in 
either the legislative or the executive, resulting in a very weak system of 
government. 28 
Further fundamental problems existed which were never fully addressed. The KDP 
and PUK handed over control of revenue sources to the KRG in name only, 29 and the 
KRG exerted little control over the main crossing points, and particularly Ibrahim 
Khalil. Similarly, the control of peshmerga forces was nominally handed over to 3° 
the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, but in reality the KDP and PUK both retained full 
26 It is interesting to note that both of these important figures would later become intrinsic parts of the 
administrative structures, with Sami Abdul Rahman becoming Deputy Prime Minister of the KRG 
(Erbil), and Nawshirwan Mustafa assuming a position of senior advisor to the KRG (Suleimaniyah). 
Nawshirwan Mustafa has a reputation of being a `hawk' within the PUK. However, his ideas on the 
development of the KRG and political system of Iraqi Kurdistan remain more balanced than his critics 
would suggest. 
27 Dr Fu'ad Massoum noted that, in 1995, the PUK suggested that both Massoud and Talabani should 
participate in the KRG. The KNA agreed that whatever Massoud wanted (he was reportedly offered 
first choice by the PUK), then Talabani would take the other position (the positions being Prime 
Minister and Speaker of Parliament). However, the arrangement fell through, with Barzani's 
supporters suggesting that he was too great to assume a governmental position, and the PUK 
subsequently responding likewise, resulting in the demise of the initiative. Interview with Dr Fu'ad 
Massoum, London, 21 June 1999. 
2e Interview with Dr Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil, 18 May 1998. 
29 See Natali (1999) op. cit., for a good assessment of the various crossing points available to the KDP 
and PUK at this time. 
30 Graham-Brown & Zackur (1995) op. cit., para. 3.4.2. 
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control of their respective militia with the PUK Minister of Peshmerga Affairs, Jabar 
Farman, controlling the official financial resources. The security structures remained 
separated and dominated by Karim Sinjari on the KDP side, and Hackam Khadr 
Hama Jan on the PUK side. 31 
There were therefore positive and negative aspects. Positive aspects included the 
maintenance of a balance between the two political parties, allowing a built-in 
method of self-regulation. However, the negative side was that the system was 
essentially unworkable if the political balance did not remain and, if imbalances 
became apparent as they did, the inadequacies of the system would multiply as 
members became increasing politically-minded in their positions. 32 
7.3 Divided Government and the Establishment of the Third Cabinets 
The culmination of the political problems which had become apparent within the 
second cabinet were combined with problems which existed between the major 
political parties, including the IMK and KSDP, resulting in the commencement of 
fighting in December 1993.39 Neighbouring powers, notably Iraq and Iran, were also 
heavily involved with the deterioration of the relationship between the KDP and 
PUK. The result of this fighting saw the KDP expelled from Erbil and establishing a 
ministerial committee in Salahadin, administering the northern part of Erbil 
Governorate and the whole of Dohuk Governorate. 34 The PUK controlled the 
ministerial and parliamentary infrastructure of Erbil, and governing the eastern parts 
of Erbil Governorate, the whole of the Suleimaniyah Governorate, and the Kurdish- 
controlled parts of Kirkuk Governorate. 35 
31 Ibid.; Gulf Newsletter, 1994, No. 10, "Conflict in Iraqi Kurdistan", p. 2; interviews with Sa'adi 
Ahmed Pira, Suleimaniyah, 17 April 1998; Fadhil Merani, Erbil, 26 August 1999; Karim Sinjari, 
Salahadin, 30 May 2000; Hackam Khadr Hama Jan, Suleimaniyah, 6 September 2000. 
32 Interview with Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
33 Gunter (1999a) op. cit., p. 75. See Chapter 5 of this thesis for a comprehensive analysis of the 
fighting of 1993-1994. 
34 Interview With Arif Taifour, Salabadin, 1 September 1999. 
's Officials of the KDP consistently state that it planned to forcibly retake Erbil from the PUK, but was 
prevented from doing so by the international community. The Drogheda peace talks which occurred 
between 9 and 11 August 1995 indicate the importance of maintaining a cease-fire for western powers, 
particularly with regard to the stability of the city of Erbil. Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Tehran, 28 June 1994 (SWB ME/2035). 
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There were no links between the two cabinets, and the overall efficiency of both 
structures was fundamentally undermined by the ongoing tensions which existed 
between the KDP and PUK until the invasion of Erbil on 31 August 1996 by the joint 
forces of the KDP and GOI. 36 
7.3.1 The Division of Iraqi Kurdistan 
On 31 August 1996, the combined forces of the KDP and GOI invaded Erbil, 
expelling the PUK from the city. The subsequent routing of PUK forces saw the KDP 
fully controlling Suleimaniyah Governorate. 37 However, successful Iranian- 
supported PUK counterattacks resulted in the PUK recapturing the city of 
Suleimaniyah, all Kurdish controlled parts of Kirkuk Governorate, and the eastern 
part of Erbil Governorate, centred on the town of Koysanjaq. 38 
A further round of serious fighting took place in 1997, but a cease-fire was reached 
and the division between the KDP and PUK reverted to the status quo ante. 
Particularly after the 1997 conflagration, the two political areas of Iraqi Kurdistan 
developed into two administrative areas, dominated by the KDP in Erbil and Dohuk 
Governorates, and by the PUK in Suleimaniyah and New Kirkuk Governorates. Both 
sides claimed legality for themselves and scorned the illegality of the other, with the 
political system of Iraqi Kurdistan becoming characterised by two separate, almost 
identical, political and administrative systems. 39 
J6 Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999; Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, 
Salahadin, 28 May 1994,1 January 1995,8 March 1995, (SWB ME/2009; 2191; 2248); Voice of the 
People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, -3 January 1995,4 -January 1995 (SWB ME/2193; 2194); Al- 
Hayat, London, 16 September 1996 (SWB ME/2720). 
" Interview with Rast Nuri Shawaise, Erbil, 25 April 1998. Rast Nuri Shawaise was appointed 
Governor of Suleimaniyah for the short period which the KDP held the city. Also see Radio Monte 
Carlo, Paris, 6 September 1996 (SWB ME/2712); Voice, of Iraqi Kurdistan, Salahadin, 8 September 
1996,10 September 1996 (SWB ME/2713; 2715); Iraqi TV, Baghdad, 9 September 1996 (SWB 
ME/2714); Islamic Republic News Agency, Tehran, 9 September 1996 (SWB ME/2714). 
" For details of the counter-attack, see: Islamic Republic News Agency, 16 September 1996 (SWB 
ME/2719 & 2720); Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, 23 September 1996,13 October 
1996 (SWB ME/2726; 2743); Radio Monte Carlo, Paris, '14 October 1996 (SWB ME/2742). Also see 
Gunter, 1999, pp. 86-87, quoting Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, 13 October 1996 
(FBIS-NES) 
39 Dr Fu'ad Massoum described both situations as possessing aspects of illegality. Interview with Dr 
Fu'ad Massoum, London, 21 June 1999. For statements from the KDP and PUK concerning the 
illegality of the opposing administration, see: Milliyet, Istanbul, 22 September 1996 (SWB ME/2725); 
Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Salahadin, 27 January 1997 (SWB ME/2829). 
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While being extremely inefficient, this system has proved to be a stable alternative to 
the previous power-sharing arrangement, at least in the interim period. It has 
managed to preserve the influence of the political elite of both parties, and also 
allows governance and administration to take place with less consideration for party 
politics than when all political groupings were located in Erbil. Furthermore, the 
divide in the system implies that the potential for the de facto state to become more 
institutionalised has been somewhat diminished, thereby reducing the necessity for 
neighbouring states to promote instability within a unified structure. 40 
The system may be characterised as a geographic variant of a consociational political 
system. While extreme in design, however, it is argued that the cabinets of the 
divided administration have been the most effective of the Kurdish political 
institutions formed since 1991. The ability of the two main factions to dominate the 
administrations within their strongholds has enabled both entities to relax somewhat 
and promote a more effective system of administration. 
The following analysis presents an assessment of 1) the structure and personnel of 
the third cabinets of the KRG, and 2) the strengths and weaknesses of the system, 
focusing primarily on a comparative analysis of the operating procedures of the PUK 
and KDP dominated administrations. 
7.3.2 The Establishment of the Post-1996 Political System 
The events of August 1996 culminated with the establishment system of government 
divided between two geographically distinct regions. The KDP consolidated its hold 
on Erbil and established the third cabinet of the KRG under the premiership of Dr 
Roj Nuri Shawaise with Nechervan Barzani as his deputy. 41 Similarly, the PUK 
secured its own stronghold of Suleimaniyah and established its own third cabinet 
again under the premiership of Kosrat Rasoul Ali. 
s0 It is interesting to note that the regular meetings which took place between Syria, Iraq, Iran 
and 
Turkey regarding Kurdish affairs in northern Iraq ceased upon the division of the administration. They 
were resurrected in mid-2000 due to the obvious consolidation of the strength of the KDP and PUK. 
See Stansfield (2000). 
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7.3.2.1 The Formation of the Third Cabinets 
Both parties staffed their cabinets with personnel from their respective political 
parties, or from other allied parties. However, the situation was somewhat different in 
Suleimaniyah as the political system of which Kosrat's third cabinet was a 
constituent part did not operate with a functioning legislative, whereas the system in 
Erbil retained a rump KNA. The KNA, while truncated with the majority of the PUK 
MPs fleeing the city, managed to retain a quorum with the 50 remaining KDP 
members, alongside the 5 representatives of the Christian community. 42 
The, arguments concerning the respective legality of each administration may be seen 
as a regression, with each side appealing to earlier and earlier dates to justify their 
own bending of the rules. The KDP claimed that its formation of a new cabinet was 
legal, particularly as it believed the actions of PUK members in the second cabinet to 
be illegal, as was the subsequent expulsion of the KDP from Erbil in 1994. The 
KNA, even in its diminished form, still maintained a quorum according to Law No. 1 
and therefore had the authority to alter the constitution of the cabinet. In doing so, it 
appointed Dr Roj Nuri Shawaise the new Prime Minister. 
The PUK, similarly, declared that its administration in Suleimaniyah was the legal 
regional government, particularly as Kosrat Rasoul had been legally, and 
unanimously, elected as Prime Minister by the last full session of the KNA and had 
not resigned or removed legally. 43 With regard to the KNA, the PUK invoked parts 
of Laws Nos. 1 and 2, claiming that Erbil had been invaded, and transferring all 
legislative powers to the Prime Minister. 44 
" The third cabinet (Erbil) was formed on 26 September 1996. Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Salahadin, 16 
September 1996,26 September 1996 (SWB ME12720,2729). 
42 The rump-KNA held an extraordinary session on 3 September 1996 at the assembly buildings in 
Erbil. The aim of the session was to legitimise the gathering of the remaining KDP MPs as a legal 
quorum, and for extending the duration of the assembly. The assembly commenced with a symbolic 
count of members, which numbered 56, and identification of a quorum. The duration of the KNA was 
then extended to 4 September 1998 (Kurdistan National Assembly, Extraordinary Session No. 1,3 
September 1996). 
43 Interviews with Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 1998; Dr Fu'ad Massoum, London, 21 June 1999; 
Mohammad Tawf q; Kosrat Rasoul, Suleimaniyah, 8 August 1999. 
" For opposition to this move from the KDP, see: Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Salahadin, 27 January 
1997 (SWB ME/2829). 
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The ministerial structures established in Suleimaniyah were identical to those found 
in Erbil. However, both sides experienced initial difficulties. Suleimaniyah did not 
possess a ministerial infrastructure, and many of the General Directorates and 
governorate offices were overshadowed by the presence of the new KRG organs. 
Erbil had no such infrastructural problems and the KDP took over an administrative 
structure which was well established. However, the KDP had to contend with a 
reduced KNA, whereas the PUK invoked Law No. 2, giving legislative power to the 
Prime Minister, allowing a smooth transition of authority to take place. 
7.3.2.2 The Divided Political Sy stem 
Iraqi Kurdistan was therefore divided geographically and politically between a KDP- 
dominated axis of Erbil-Dohuk, and a PUK-dominated axis of Suleimaniyah- 
Darbandikhan. Within each area, the respective political party dominated the 
administration and, indeed, political life in general resulting in further polarization. 
However, the creation of this system enabled smaller parties to enjoy more political 
power as both the KDP and PUK realised the dangers of being seen to be too overly 
dominant, both to the Iraqi Kurdistan populace in particular, and the international 
community at large. Some smaller parties were included in the cabinets and virtually 
all of the other political parties, including those in the cabinets, operated through a 
structure which covered the entire Kurdish-controlled area. In this respect, it was the 
KDP and PUK which were anomalies and, while each dominated the political system 
of one-half of the area, they possessed no official presence in the opposing area. 45 
However, no single party appeared in both cabinets, thereby polarizing the system 
further. Whilst the administration remained divided between Erbil and Suleimaniyah, 
the judiciary remained unified and was headed, by the Supreme Court of the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Region based in Erbil. It was the presence of this unified institution, and 
the unwritten agreement not to alter the interim status of the position of President 
which seemed to exist between Talabani and Barzani, which provided a small degree 
of unity to Iraqi Kurdistan. 
°S Unofficially, both parties operated, and still operate in each others area, with the KDP possessing ! iq 
for all areas outside their control, and the PUK similarly operating melbend covering areas outside 
their own jurisdiction. From these offices, each party coordinates a system of secret cells as part of the 
intelligence and propaganda apparatus, alongside the offices of the Rechrastinf Taybet (KDP 
intelligence) and Zanyari (PUK intelligence). See Chapter 5 for further details. 
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7.3.3 Conclusion 
The two systems were dominated by the two political parties in their respective areas. 
Such a division has led to both parties criticizing the other system with identical 
claims of domination of the administrative process by the respective political party. 
For example, KDP cadres claim that the third cabinet (Suleimaniyah) was totally 
dominated by the characters of Kosrat Rasoul and Jalal Talabani (and, increasingly, 
Nawshirwan Mustafa), while the PUK similarly claimed that the third cabinet (Erbil) 
was wholly controlled by the Barzanis. 46 
Whilst the spheres of influence of the two KRGs undeniably present a divided 
system, this was not the case in the party political arena, with only the KDP and PUK 
not operating over the entire territory. All of the other political parties retained a 
party structure which covered the entire region. Furthermore, the judiciary, on paper 
at least, remained unified and the potentially highly divisive issue of President 
47 remained suspended. 
However, the internal dynamics of the PUK and KDP, and particularly in the 
leadership structures, were and are not necessarily homogenous and it is somewhat 
simplistic to state that the administrations were and are controlled by either Massoud 
or Talabani. The third cabinets were certainly heavily influenced by their respective 
parties, but, perhaps more so by the internal divisions within them and prevailing 
aspects of the political economy as dictated by the continuing development of the UN 
oil-for-food programme. However, it is my contention that the operating procedures 
of these cabinets display a situation where party politics was more removed from the 
administrative structures than in the previous two cabinets. 
7.4 The Third Cabinets of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
The following analysis studies the morphology, prescribed mechanisms and decision- 
making processes of the governance structure during the period of the third cabinets 
46 It is a strong belief of PUK members that Dr Roj Shawaise, the Prime Minister of the third cabinet 
(Erbil), while being a highly capable politician, was nothing but a facade due to the presence of 
Nechervan Barzani as his deputy. Interviews with Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 1998; Sa'adi 
Pira, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 1998; Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
" It was the PUK's change on the status of the Judiciary and the President in late 1999 would create 
an upsurge in tension between the two parties. 
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(1996-1999), and the early stages of the fourth cabinet (Erbil), and the re-organized 
third cabinet (Suleimaniyah) of early 2000. 
7.4.1 The Kurdistan Regional Government (Erbil) 
7.4.1.1 General Morphology and Prescribed Mechanisms of the Political S sy tem 
After the expulsion of the PUK from Erbil, the KDP dominated the city and, indeed, 
the KNA. All ministries remained intact, as they would also later do in Suleimaniyah. 
The KNA continued with, according to the KDP rump, a legitimate quorum. The 
judiciary continued to operate over the entire territory, with the Ministry of Justice 
dealing with its administrative affairs within the sphere of influence of the KDP. The 
design and structure of the administrative system did not deviate from that prescribed 
by the earlier laws of the IKF and the KNA. The KDP was vociferous in its claims of 
the legislative possessing real power within the decision-making structure, and the 
judiciary remaining truly independent of any party-political colouring. 48 
7.4.1.2 Cabinet Composition 
The KDP wasted little time in consolidating its hold on Erbil and solidifying its new 
position. The KDP-dominated KNA convened on 1 September 1996 in Erbil, 
dissolved the previous cabinet and asked Dr Roj Nuri Shawaise to accept the position 
of Prime Minister, a position which he duly accepted. The design of the third cabinet 
was identical to that of previous cabinets, but was composed almost entirely of 
members of the KDP. 49 In the initial composition, the IMK was given two portfolios. 
However, these were subsequently withdrawn by the KDP when the IMK joined the 
third cabinet in Suleimaniyah. 50 Other parties which participated included the ADM 
and ILP. Each of these parties had reasonably strong links with the KDP, either 
through their inclusion in the' KNA (as was the case with the ADM), or simply 
hoping to benefit from the increased legitimacy offered by securing a seat in the 
regional executive (as in the case of the ILP). 
48 Interview with Dr Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil, 18 May 1998. 49 Dr Sýafiq Qazzaz noted that, even though the de facto state had been a reality for 5 years, it was still 
not possible to upgrade the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Cooperation to a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. He suggests that the reasons for this were perhaps more to do with the fact that external 
governments had become used to going directly to Massoud and Talabani rather than the Prime 
Minister due to the administration not being internationally recognised. Interview with Dr Shafiq 
Qazzaz, Erbil, 18 May 1998. 
50 Voice of Iraq Kurdistan, Salahadin, 9 August 1997 (SWB ME/2994). 
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Figure 7.2: The Constituent Parts of the Political Systerr of Erbil-Dohuk 
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-º Regional 
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7.4.1.3 The KDP and KRG Relationship 
The third cabinet (Erbil) presents numerous points of interest. It is reasonably 
straightforward to see that the KDP dominated its composition in terms of its 
members holding all of the key ministerial portfolios. Furthermore, the KDP held 51 
of the 56 seats of the KNA, with the Speaker and Secretary also being members of 
the party. However, whilst many see these factors as obvious indicators that the 
executive and legislative was controlled from Saryrash by the Barzanis, it is apparent 
that, when the backgrounds of individual ministers are investigated, this cabinet 
benefited from the inclusion of some highly educated and technically minded 
individuals. For example, the cabinet had 5 members with doctorates and several 
trained engineers, in addition to the regular quota of peshmerga cadres. 51 
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Table 7.3: The Third Cabinet (Erbil) of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
Name Position Party 
Dr Roj Nuri Shawaise Prime Minister KDP 
Nechervan Barzani Deputy Prime Minister KDP 
Shawkat Sheikh Yazdeen Finance & Economic Affairs KDP 
Younadim Yousif Kana Public Works & Housing ADM 
Khadir Jabari Justice KDP 
Abu Hikmat Agriculture & Irrigation ILP 
Dr Jerjees Hassan Minister of Education KDP 
Dr Shafiq Qazzaz Humanitarian Aid KDP 
Dr Idris Hadi Saleh Power & Industry KDP 
Sheikh Ma'amoon Brifkani Reconstruction & Development KDP 
Fadhil Merani Interior KDP 
Falakadin Kakai Culture KDP 
Hussain Sinjari Municipalities & Tourism KDP 
Dr Hameed Acrayi Transport & Communication KDP 
Kamal Shakir Health & Social Affairs KCP 
Kawa Mahmoud Hafeed Awqaf & Islamic Affairs KDP 
Za'een (Rafiq) Ali Peshmerga KDP 
Dr Jasim Elias Minister of Region KDP 
Franso Hariri Minister of Region KDP 
7.4.1.3.1 The Position of Massoud Barzani and the Political Bureau 
As with the 1992-1996 system, Massoud Barzani did not have an official position 
within the post-1996 governmental structure. However, it is undeniable that he 
exerted a significant influence over the actions of the administration through the 
Political Bureau of the KDP, of which many of the ministers were also members. The 
relationship between the Political Bureau of the KDP and the cabinet and structures 
of governance is a key issue to develop and analyse. It is unrealistic to expect the 
KDP not to exert an influence over the administration to some extent and criticisms 
s' Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29'May 2000. 
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of the partisanship of the Iraqi Kurdish administrations are somewhat unfair. It is a 
fact of a party political system that administrations often adopt the colouring of the 
party in power. However, the degree of control exerted by the party over the 
administration is of interest, and particularly the amount of autonomy the 
administration does, or does not, have over its supposed mandated areas. 
Members of the KDP, as expected, describe the political system of Erbil and Dohuk 
as exhibiting a division between the constituent parts as identified in Figure 7.2. The 
position of the KNA in this system may seem to be somewhat weakened with it being 
dominated by KDP MPs, and with the KDP Political Bureau and third cabinet 
seeming to be somewhat interchangeable in terms of members. 
The Deputy Prime Minister of the third cabinet (Erbil), and, later, Prime Minister of 
the fourth cabinet, Nechervan Barzani, admitted that critics see the KNA as a 
superficial entity, particularly with his own involvement in the executive office. 
However, he noted that the KNA often rejected proposals from the cabinet regarding 
possible policies, or prevented the cabinet from undertaking actions deemed to have 
been planned without regard for the methods in the prescribed laws. 52 
Dr Shafiq Qazzaz, the erudite Minister of Humanitarian Affairs & Cooperation, when 
describing the reasons as to why the third cabinet may have been described as 
operating independently from the KDP, stated that: 
"Massoud Barzani stayed outside the formal structure of Government 
for the duration of the third cabinet. He ha[d], both as leader and 
President of the KDP given great freedom of action to the 
administration and supported the government in financial [terms] and 
[by the] provision of personnel. [He] allowed the cabinet to work 
52 Specific examples provided by Nechervan Barzani of the KNA exercising its authority include the 
following: The KNA nullified the appointment of a deputy minister made by the cabinet in April 
1998. The KNA rejected the appointment according to Laws 1,2 & 3, as the mandate of the cabinet 
does not cover senior appointments. A second example is of the Security Committee of Erbil deciding 
to execute individuals convicted of serious crimes with the approval of the cabinet. The KNA again 
refused to allow this and referred it to the Courts. Jawher Namiq Salim, the Speaker of the KNA, 
whilst being a member of the KDP Political Bureau, similarly went to great lengths to illustrate that 
the KNA, as an institution, was not under the influence of the KDP, or, indeed, any other party, citing 
the famous sit-in of 1994 which was conducted against both the KDP and PUK in an attempt to stop 
the fighting. Interviews with Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 1998; Jawher Namiq Salim, Erbil, 
8 September 1999. 
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[and] did not breathe down the necks of ministers - the government 
was allowed to function as a government. "53 
In discussing his relationship with the administration and the third cabinet, Massoud 
Barzani himself notes the preponderance of KDP Political Bureau cadres, but still 
claims that the administration is independent. When discussing these points, he 
promoted a realistic view of the relationship between the KRG and KDP by stating 
that "the KDP cannot interfere with the technocratic ministries, and instead will 
always support them. But they are not separate as the KDP guides the general 
political development of the KRG in Erbil. "54 
Such guidance includes controlling the personnel of the higher echelons of the 
executive in particular. For example, cabinet re-shuffles are decided upon by the 
Political Bureau and, similarly, changes in the composition of planning departments 
and ministerial oversight committees have come directly from the Political Bureau. 
Sami Abdul Rahman noted that "no Political Bureau member is allowed to directly 
interfere with the running of the administration. However, all ministerial and 
governors positions have to be selected and approved by them. " 55 
One of the most influential members of the KDP Political Bureau, Fadhil Merani, 
also held the position of Minister of the Interior in the third cabinet, and subsequently 
kept it in the fourth cabinet. He again describes a political system characterised by 
the separation of roles and believes that it is in the interests of the KDP to be seen to 
operate this type of system as it enhances the legality of both organizations. When 
illustrating the relationship between party and government, he noted that; 
".... many members. of the leadership of the KDP are also in the 
third cabinet, and we meet weekly in the 'Political Bureau as well as in 
the cabinet. Plans for government are certainly discussed in the 
Political Bureau, but instruction is passed through the Prime 
Minister. The cabinet then takes a decision. It is possible for the 
cabinet to reject proposals. Similarly, with the legislative, the Speaker 
of Parliament is also in the Political Bureau and relays requests from 
the Political Bureau to the Assembly where they are accepted or 
rejected by the expert committees. , 56 
57 Interview with Dr Shafiq Qazzaz, Erbil, 18 May 1998. 
sa Interview with Massoud Bartani, Saryrash, 22 August 1999. 
"This was also supported by Nechervan Barzani. Interviews with Sarni Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 3 
April 1998; Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 1998. 
56 Interview with Fadhil Merani, Erbil, 26 August 1999. 
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Particularly with regard to the daily procedures of government, KDP-KRG officials 
admit that many issues have not been thought through comprehensively, particularly 
with regard to the relationship between local government offices and party offices in 
the districts and sub-districts. Hoshyar Zebari noted that this weakness stems from 
the fact that the KDP, and the other political parties, have always been reacting to a 
situation which is highly dynamic. Now, within Erbil, Hoshyar noted that difficulties 
may arise over security and between the offices of the Governor and Leqi Du of the 
KDP, particularly due to the fact that the current Governor, Akram Mantik, used to 
be a member of the security service of the KDP, and the current head of Leqi Du, 
Franso Hariri, used to be the Governor of Erbil. 57 In principle, the KDP is informing 
their party offices to stay out of the affairs of the KRG and administration, however, 
in practice it is sometimes proving to be difficult. 
A further interesting relationship between the KDP and the KRG (Erbil) can also be 
seen before and after the Washington Agreement. Before the agreement, the KDP 
position toward the administration was one of indirect intervention. However, after 
the agreement, with its calls for elections, the KDP has been increasingly keen to 
associate itself with the activities of the KRG, and particularly the public service 
ministries, and promoted highly visible programmes such as road building and 
infrastructural developments within the cities. Since August 1997, the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Affairs estimates that it has spent a total of 237 million OID 
(US$ 13 million) on infrastructural development projects in the governorates under 
its jurisdiction. 58 
7.4.2 The Kurdistan Regional Government (Suleimaniyah) 
After the evacuation of Erbil by the PUK and the subsequent counterattack in the 
autumn of 1996, the PUK part of the KRG resurrected itself in Suleimaniyah. While 
s' Similarly, Hoshyar joked that when Sami Abdul Rahman was the head of the Political Bureau he 
insisted that the Political Bureau was the centre of the decision-making process. Now, as Deputy 
Prime Minister, his opinion has changed somewhat. Interview with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 
May 2000. 
58 The impact of these activities on the citizens of Erbil has been one of appreciation alongside- an 
understanding that the KDP is trying to buy allegiance for the future. For example, when I asked an 
inhabitant of Erbil city what his opinion was of a new road widening scheme which had taken place 
between Erbil and the KDP stronghold of Salahadin, his reply was that it would allow the constant 
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seemingly similar in terms of possessing an identical executive structure, the KRG in 
Suleimaniyah displayed some considerable differences compared to the previous 
system left behind in Erbil. 
The problems faced by the KRG in Suleimaniyah were a reflection of the polarised 
geopolitical position the PUK found itself in after August 1996. The PUK suffered 
from a lack of revenue, compounded by the fact that it now had a full government 
structure, albeit substantially reduced in size, and a large body of pro-PUK civil 
servants who had fled Erbil. These problems of finance and imbalance in party- 
personnel structure were added to the simple fact that Suleimaniyah, whilst being a 
cultural and educational centre for Iraqi Kurdistan, did not possess the necessary 
infrastructure to support an administration. 
7.4.2.1 General Morphology and Prescribed Mechanisms of the Political System 
The PUK re-established all the ministries of the second cabinet. However, there was 
a problem with reforming the KNA in Suleimaniyah as any 'gathering under its name 
would not achieve a quorum as the KDP and Christian MPs remained in Erbil, as did 
a handful of PUK members. Therefore, the PUK, through the Prime Minister, 
invoked certain articles of Laws No. I and 2. Their interpretation of the laws 
officially handed legislative authority to the Prime Minister, Kosrat Rasoul, but in 
reality to the PUK Political Bureau. The judiciary continued to operate within 
Suleimaniyah and Darbandikhan in a unified manner under the Supreme Court of 
Erbil. However, the administrative affairs of the judiciary within the sphere of 
influence of the third cabinet (Suleimaniyah) were handled by the new Ministry of 
Justice. 
7.4.2.2 Cabinet Personnel 
The position of the PUK with regard to the establishment of the third cabinet is that, 
as the previous cabinet had not been legally dissolved by the KNA, Kosrat Rasoul 
was still the Prime Minister of the KRG and, due to the invasion of Erbil, had the 
legal right to establish any administration he saw fit in the new political situation. 
The PUK therefore proceeded to establish the third cabinet in late 1996. This cabinet 
flow of ministers which run between Erbil and Salahadin to receive their daily instructions more 
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was again a coalition of parties, but parties already in the Erbil coalition were not 
included. Parties included in the Suleimaniyah coalition were the PUK, KTP, 
Conservatives, and, at a later date, the IMK. 59 The PUK held all the major portfolios, 
although many deputy positions were awarded to the coalition partners, including the 
Figure 7.3: The Constituent Parts of the Political System of Suleimanivah 
Kurdistan 
Regional 
Government 
PatriotifUnion Legislative Judiciary 
Function Kurdistan 
'------------" 
Other 
------------ Political 
Parties 
Ministryof the Interior which was handed to the IMK. The parties in the cabinet 
were a mix of those who were directly aligned- with the PUK, as in the case of the 
KTP; those which had little in common with the PUK apart from opposition to the 
KDP, as was the case with the Conservatives; or those which were forced into 
coalition and which had to join due to the strength of the PUK in their geographic 
area, as was the case with the IMK. 60 
easily. 
59 KTP: Kurdistan Toilers' Party; Conservatives: Kurdistan Conservative Party, led by Agha Surchi, 
this party is directly opposed to Barzani and the KDP. When the IMK joined the Suleimaniyah cabinet 
in 1997, the KDP expelled the IMK from the third cabinet (Erbil). 
60 The IMK's stronghold of Halabja is in the governorate of Suleimaniyah and comes under the 
executive authority of the PUK Governor. Furthermore, the proximity of HAlabja to Suleimaniyah 
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Table 7.4: The Third Cabinet (Suleimanivah) 1998 
Name Position Party 
Kosrat Rasoul Ali Prime Minister PUK 
Dr Kamal Fu'ad Deputy Prime Minister PUK 
Dara Sheikh Nuri Finance & Economic Affairs PUK 
Adil Nasr Public Works & Housing PUK 
Abdul Rahman Nawrisi Justice IMK 
Salar Aziz Agriculture & Irrigation PUK 
Arsalan Bayaez Education PUK 
Sa'adi Pira Humanitarian Affairs PUK 
Bahman Hussein Reconstruction & Development KTP 
Mu'alizim Omer Abdullah Interior PUK 
Jamal Abdullah Culture PUK 
Kaffia Suleiman Municipalities & Tourism PUK 
Najim Hussein Surchi Transport & Communication Conservative 
Ihmad Ahmed Health & Social Affairs PUK 
Mohammad Abdul Aziz Awqaf & Islamic Affairs IMK 
Kamal Mufti Peshmerga Affairs PUK 
7.4.2.3 The PUK and KRG Relationship 
The establishment of the third cabinet (Suleimaniyah) was a brave move by the PUK, 
and their subsequent intelligent legal defence of their actions has been a match for the 
KDP, even if the tenets of Laws Nos. 1 and 2 were at times stretched. Once again, the 
new cabinet certainly contained some impressive members. Many of the previous 
ministers of the second cabinet retained their posts, and these were joined by a 
number of resourceful technocrats, including Bahman Hussein of the Toilers' and the 
Yezidi, Adil Nasr. Perhaps the most important of the additions to the cabinet was the 
assiduous Dr Kamal Fu'ad of the PUK Political Bureau, a founder member of the 
made it imperative that the IMK should attempt to conciliate with their foe of 1994 if they were to 
continue to enjoy some security within Halabja. The inclusion of the IMK into the third cabinet 
(Suleimaniyah) did not overtly antagonise the KDP, with whom the IMK continued to have good 
relations, but the KDP was not prepared to keep a governmental coalition partner of the PUK within 
its own cabinet. 
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PUK and a character with the political experience to complement that of the Prime 
Minister and also act as the proxy of Talabani within the cabinet. b' 
However, life for the new cabinet was never going to be easy, with the PUK in an 
embattled position and even further away from the sources of revenue, as well as 
having to cope with being located in one small city. The concentration of cadres 
caused by the influx of PUK personnel from Erbil into Suleimaniyah created many 
serious problems. As Prime Minister, Kosrat Rasoul formed his new government 
quickly, and was understandably dependent upon his trained staff from Erbil. 
However, the geographical division which had become increasingly apparent within 
the PUK, and with which Kosrat was associated, now became focused within the 
structures of the administration. 62 
The resultant atmosphere within the city becoming highly charged, with so many 
ministers, party personnel, governors and the Prime Minister all being in. one place. 63 
One of the first indicators of a change occurring within the political elite of the PUK 
was the expulsion from Suleimaniyah of a string of governors including Salar Aziz 
and Feyeradun Abdelkadir, both Suleimaniyah-members of the PUK. Their 
replacement with the previous Head of Asayash (secret police) of Erbil, Hackani 
Kadr Hama Jan, emphasised the distinctly Erbil-styling which became common in 
Suleimaniyah. 64 
7.4.2.3.1 The Position ofJalal Talabani and the Political Bureau 
As was the case with Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani did not have an official 
position within the third cabinet. However, in the claustrophobic political maelstrom 
of Suleimaniyah after 1996, it was to be expected that the most influential of political 
characters would exert a significant degree of control over the administrative system. 
61 Dr Kamal Fu'ad is a lawyer by training and held the Chair of Kurdology at the University of 
Suleimaniyah for a number of years. 
62 See Chapter 6 for details of this division. 
63 Nawshirwan Mustafa noted with considerable humour that Suleimaniyah was home to at least 10 
governors, everybody wants to be governor'. Interview with Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, 
Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999. 
64 Interview with Hackara Khadr Hama Jan, Suleimaniyah, 6 September 2000. 
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The cabinet had, at any one time, no less than 5 ministers who were also members of 
the PUK Political Bureau, and several who were in the Leadership Office. 65 
Once again, PUK members are keen to forward the opinion that there remains a 
division between administration and party within the third cabinet, and to a greater 
degree than what occurs in Erbil, possibly due to the personality of Kosrat Rasoul. 66 
However, it is interesting to then note that those same members of the PUK do not 
describe this division as being clear-cut. Mohammad Tawfiq, a well-respected 
member of the PUK Political Bureau and minister of the first cabinet, stated the 
following: 
"[it is] the PUK [which] administers the area. The administration is 
meant to be independent of the political parties, but the Political 
Bureau dominates and nominates down to even the headmaster of a 
school. In the 50/50 administration, everything was controlled by the 
administration, but after the split, the administration became heavily 
dependent on the parties. In technical matters, experts advise on 
general policy, and this will always be accepted by the Political 
Bureau. "67 
Such a relationship between the PUK and KRG is grounded in both the political and 
economic conditions found in Suleimaniyah since August 1996. It is no secret that 
the economic situation of the PUK within Suleimaniyah is severely constrained by 
the inability to secure significant revenue from its border crossings, and this has 
filtered down to the KRG. One of the major impacts of this lack of funds is the 
drawing together of the administration and the PUK, with the Political Bureau having 
a pre-eminent position in the decision-making process. In addition to these reasons, 
Mohammad Tawfiq, includes the lack of international recognition for either of the 
fledgling administrations: 
"In the political bureau, all subjects, including government and 
administration, are discussed. The states surrounding Iraqi Kurdistan 
will not deal with the KRG and therefore the political bureau is the 
65 It is difficult to put an exact figure on the numbers of personnel who were also in decision-making 
organs. of the PUK as both the Political Bureau and the third cabinet (Suleimaniyah) were 
characterised by a much higher turnover of personnel than what occurred with the KDP Political 
Bureau and the third cabinet (Erbil). 
66 Conversely, Nechervan Barzani, now Prime Minister of the KRG (Erbil), stated that the 
Suleimaniyah administration is totally dominated by Kosrat Rasoul and Jalal Talabani. Interview with 
Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 21 May 1998. 
67 Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Suleimaniyah, 14 May 1998. 
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main [conduit of contact] between the political parties and the 
surrounding governments. Therefore, for this reason, the political 
bureau ends up ordering the government. "68 
When discussing this relationship, the then Minister of Humanitarian Aid & 
Cooperation, Sa'adi Pira, went to great lengths to describe the division which exists 
between the party and administration within Suleimaniyah. However, he also 
identified that, at times, it is more beneficial for both the party and administration to 
`join' certain aspects of their structures, using his own position as an example. From 
1996 to 1999, he was Minister of Humanitarian Aid & Cooperation, and also headed 
the PUK Foreign Relations Bureau. Both positions are complementary, with the 
ministry dealing mainly with NGOs and UN agencies within Iraqi Kurdistan, and the 
Foreign Relations Bureau representing the PUK in particular to the outside world. As 
well as the minister being involved with both offices, several civil servants/party 
cadres similarly performed a dual party-administration role. 69 
7.4.3 Conclusion 
The divided system of government which has characterised Iraqi Kurdistan since 
1996 has been responsible, to a significant degree, for the maintenance of a fragile 
peace. In addition, the socio-political tensions created by having the KDP and PUK 
held together in a tight power-sharing system were relieved and both sides could 
address the domestic affairs of the de facto state in a more efficient manner, without 
worrying about the activities of their counterparts. Fadhil Merani, the Minister of 
Interior of the third cabinet (Erbil), is responsible for security within Erbil and Dohuk 
Governorates. He noted that, since 1996, the KDP and PUK have controlled the 
security of their respective regions in a more satisfactory manner than when they 
were together. He attributed this change to the organs of security now receiving 
instruction from one source, rather than from two: 
"After the separation of 1996, security was much improved, even in 
Suleimaniyah, because of the recognition of one executive power in 
both places. Each party and administration had less need to worry 
about the internal party situation within their respective areas, each 
68 Interview with Mohammad Tawfiq, Kalarcholan, 7 August 1999. 
69 Interview with Sa'adi Pira, Suleimaniyah, 9 June 1998. 
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was also trying to show that they were legal, powerful, and had an 
operating security and justice system. " 70 
According to the minister, evidence of this change can be seen in the lower crime 
rates characterising Iraqi Kurdistan. 7' Similarly, Hoshyar Zebari noted that the 
current system is much easier for both the KDP and PUK to operate, mainly because 
there is no longer competition between them in staffing the offices of the KRG. 72 
The major problem now facing the KRGs is that of finances combined with an 
inefficient planning mechanism. Any government has to know the sources of income 
before they know how it is going to spend the money. However, as governments, 
neither cabinet knows the future level of inputs into the system, especially as income 
is dependent upon the actions of, and relationships with, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the UN 
and the internal relationship with the other party. Even though the KDP controls 
considerable resources at Ibrahim Khalil, its vulnerability has been shown on 
numerous occasions when Turkey has stopped the flow of trade. Furthermore, due to 
the de facto status, neither side can receive loans and, due to the constantly changing 
socio-economic situation and emergency situation, personal taxation has proved 
impossible to implement. 
Furthermore, both Prime Ministers (Kosrat Rasoul and Nechervan Barzani) recognise 
that the ability of the KRGs to adequately plan policies and programmes is also 
severely limited, and is, in part, detrimentally affected by the huge amounts of funds 
being circulated in Iraqi Kurdistan by the oil-for-food deal, via UN agencies. As we 
shall see, the provision of such sums has created a culture of dependency not only in 
Kurdish society, but also within the administrative structures, with both Prime 
Ministers and Political Bureaus now attempting to resolve this problem. 73 
70 Interview with Fadhil Merani, Erbil, 26 August 1999. Fadhil Merani is also a highly influential 
member of the Political Bureau. 
'1 Ibid. In support of this argument, the minister discussed the problems faced by the Judiciary during 
the 50-50 system. Even if the Justice Department gave an order to arrest a suspect, the implementation 
of the order it would always depend upon the political party of which the suspect was associated 
allowing the arrest to take place. These sentiments were also supported by Hackam Khadr, who was 
the PUK appointee for security issues within the joint-KRG. Interview with Hackam Khadr, 
Suleimaniyah, 6 September 2000. 
72 Interviews with Hoshyar Zebari, Salahadin, 29 May 2000; Muhsin Dizayi, Salahadin, 30 May 2000; 
Karim Sinjari, Salahadin, 30 May 2000. 
" Interviews with Sami Abdul Rahman, Salahadin, 1 August 2000; Kosrat Rasoul, Suleimaniyah, 26 
August 2000,1 October 2000; Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 22 October 2000. 
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The development of the Kurdish political system in terms of political parties and 
institutions of government has now been established. The peaceful development of 
the political system, particularly since 1997, is evidence of the current suitability of 
the geographic-consociational system which has been in existence since 1996. The 
following section provides an analysis and assessment of the decision-making 
process of the two cabinets, identifying areas of similarities and differences, and 
possibilities for the enhancing of governmental cooperation and consolidation. Even 
if party political differences remain severe enough to keep the Iraqi Kurdish region 
administratively divided, an ongoing programme of cooperative activities between 
the administrations could be an area of collaboration which encourages the 
normalizaiton of the political system in Iraqi Kurdistan, firstly to a standard 
consociational power-sharing system, and eventually to a fully-fledged democratic 
system of government. 
7.5 Analysis of the Policy Making Process of the Third and Fourth 
Cabinets 
While it is certainly the case that I have benefited from numerous interviews with 
officials of the KRGs and political parties of the region, as well as observers of 
Kurdish politics in general, any conclusions based on such findings would suffer to a 
certain degree from bias and ambiguity. This fact is not a fault of the officials who 
have been kind enough to spend considerable amounts of time discussing their 
perceptions of the political system, but rather of the nature of the political 
atmosphere within Iraqi Kurdistan. In order to corroborate the analysis constructed 
from interviewing those politicians who hold decision-making responsibility within 
the administration, I requested, and was allowed, to undertake a further programme 
of research within the administrative structures themselves. 
7.5.1 Framework of Analysis 
The ministries I targeted for this most important aspect were those which I 
considered to be the most accessible and which provided evidence of most aspects of 
the policy making process of the administration and possible cross-linkages with 
other components of the political system, including the executive offices of the 
governorate and the political parties. I therefore targeted the ministries of agriculture 
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& irrigation, education, reconstruction & development, municipalities & tourism, and 
health & social affairs within the two administrative systems. 74 
Once inside the ministries, I identified a range of governmental activities which 
together would illustrate comprehensively the manner in which the administrative 
structure operates, in terms of planning and implementation. With a set of target 
programmes, I then assembled all the relevant paperwork and interviewed personnel 
involved with the particular assignment, as well as sometimes visiting the area 
targeted by the programme if applicable. It should be noted that the findings 
represent a `snap-shot' of the Iraqi Kurdish administrative process in action. As such, 
they do not pertain to account for all possibilities, but serve as indicators of 
governmental activities. 
7.5.2 Analysis of the Kurdistan Regional Governments 
Within the KRGs, I studied primarily the programmes of the Ministries of 
Reconstruction & Development, Education, Municipalities & Tourism, Health & 
Social Affairs, and Agriculture & Irrigation. From these ministries, I selected a range 
of case studies which showed the decision-making process in full, and illustrated 
cross-agency cooperation (including NGOs), and programmes which may be deemed 
as failures as well as those considered successful. 
7.5.2.1 The Initial Planning Process 
A point of great concern for the Prime Ministers is the initial planning process. The 
lack of reliable data within the local authority structure, combined with a seemingly 
patrimonial system of distribution supported by the huge funds being made available 
by the oil-for-food programme through the UN agencies, has resulted in the poor 
targeting of policies and programmes. Both Nechervan Barzani and Kosrat Rasoul, 
for example, cited this as the major weakness within the adminstrations which they 
'` As these ministries are also key public service ministries, the civil servants within these institutions 
were more used to working with foreigners, something which is not common within Iraq, and the 
majority of their ministerial programmes would not be considered politically confidential, as would be 
the case with the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, for example. 
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are attempting to correct. In doing so, both Prime Ministers have passed legislation 
allowing for the establishment of a Central Statistics Office (CSO). 7s 
The problem may be identified as serious. Few ministers, for example, could provide 
detailed information regarding the origin of policies beyond mentioning engineers 
and surveyors within their respective ministries. The ones which could manage this 
were of the technocratic variety and included individuals such as Sheikh Ma'amoon 
Brifkani and Bahman Hussein (Ministers of Reconstruction & Development in Erbil 
and Suleimaniyah respectively). However, even these members recognise the 
existence of this weakness within their own ministries. 76 Other ministers and deputies 
tended not to become too involved with technical affairs but relied more on 
technically trained subordinates for advice relating to more technical issues. 77 
However, the lack of comprehensive databases of information by which policies, 
programmes, and the distribution plan for SCR 986 could be adequately planned 
means that the direction of many KRG policies remains unguided, resulting in overall 
poor targeting of both indigenous governmental policies, and the SCR 986 
programme. 78 
Therefore, at the level of macro-planning, the KRGs need significant support and 
assistance. However, once a policy has been identified, however misguided it may 
be, the procedures within the administrations display considerable thoroughness. 
Upon identification, public service programmes are developed through an initial 
planning procedure which exhibits a high degree of thoroughness, including the 
presence of feed-back loops within the system, and oversight committees on 
's The legislation still has to be approved in Erbil due to it having to pass through the KNA. Within 
Suleimaniyah, Kosrat Rasoul has the authority to approve the legislation, with the support of the PUK 
Political Bureau. 
76 Interviews with Sheikh Ma'amoon Brifkani, Erbil, 20 May 1998; Bahman Hussein, Suleimaniyah, 
I IJuly 1998. 
" Interview with Falah Mustafa Bakr, Erbil, 21 May 1998. 
78 Certain organizations have been attempting to assist the KRGs in alleviating this problem, amongst 
them the Iraqi Kurdistan Research Programme (IKRP) of the University of Durham. The database 
created by the University of Durham-KRG programme is intended to form the starting block for-the 
future CSO within the KRG in. Suleimaniyah. Further, Nechervan Barzani has recommended to 
his 
cabinet that the distribution plan for SCR 986 should be designed in consultation with this new 
database, illustrating in real terms the drive of the Prime Minister in attempting to adopt an 
information-based decision-making process. Interviews with Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 22 October 
2000; Dr Barham Saleh, Suleimaniyah, 3 November 2000. 
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technical and budgetary issues. The problem is not with the design of policies and 
programmes once agreed, but with the initial identification of the policy direction. 
This system is sometimes short-circuited, in both administrations. Again both Prime 
Ministers remain open about this weakness. 79 For example, in an environment as 
economically constrained as Suleimaniyah currently is, and with perhaps the harshest 
socio-economic problems caused by the actions of the GOI in the 1980s and 
subsequently population displacement from Kirkuk, it is perhaps not too surprising 
that some people turn towards the PUK for assistance. The process can take the form 
of a direct appeal to the Prime Minister, who has continued with his weekly public 
audience session, or can go through the PUK hierarchy and commence with a 
petition to the local Comita. The latter route resulted in the residents of Zerinok, a 
collective settlement almost within the city limits of Suleimaniyah, receiving a health 
centre in an unusually quick time. A similar method can be seen with regard to the 
villagers of Sheney, who, after an audience with Talabani, benefited from the 
construction of a new water project by Ministry of Reconstruction & Development. 80 
However, in such circumstances, it could be seen that such , short-circuiting and 
fluidity may have some benefits. Certainly with regard to Zerinok, as internally 
displaced peoples from Erbil and Kirkuk, the population did not have the same 
recourse of action to approach the Governor of Suleimaniyah, as they are not covered 
by his jurisdiction. The only organization they could approach was the PUK itself, 
particularly as it had two Comita within the collective. 
Both cabinets state that they are striving to reduce this patrimonial-type approach to 
the design of programmes and policies. It is, perhaps, most notable in Erbil where the 
Deputy Prime Minister, Sami Abdul Rahman, instigated a removal of civil servants 
identified as being inefficient or corrupt up to the level of Director-General. Within 
Suleimaniyah, where finances are problematic, there has been less of an overt drive 
to reduce this characteristic. 
74 Interviews with Kosrat Rasoul, Suleimaniyah, 23 May 2000; Nechervan Barzani, Saryrash, 22 
October 2000. 
B° The following sources are quoted with reference to the order used in Appendix 6 which displays a 
full catalogue of programme paperwork. The reference here refers to the number of the document in 
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Figure 7.4 schematicizes the planning process undertaken by the selected public 
service ministries identified in the case studies. Programmes start in a variety of 
ways, but rely heavily on the infrastructure of the executive organ in question. The 
initial process may involve some preliminary field investigations, negotiations with 
NGOs, and comparison with available data. This latter point is somewhat weakened 
by the fact that the KRGs suffers from a severe lack of available data due to a 
combination of much information being held in the counterpart ministry of the GOI, 
and by the sheer confusion of having a plethora of humanitarian agencies operating 
in the territory, each with its own data-set. 
Once an initial identification of a possible programme has taken place, a provisional 
programme passes through the executive infrastructure, being passed through 
relevant planning offices of the directorates, and culminating with the General 
Directorate of Planning, and the relevant technical general directorate in the ministry 
concerned. The provisional programme may also be processed by the Governorate 
office, although this seems to be more probable if the initial impetus occurs either 
through public petition or through NGO/UN operations. The final part of this initial 
process is achieved when the minister and minister's bureau accepts a final proposal 
with which he/she then presents to the Council of Ministers for consideration. 81 
Once agreed within the ministry, the minister then forwards the proposal to the 
Council of Ministers for consideration by the planning directorate of the council, and 
for discussion with the other ministers. At this point, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs becomes part of the official process with regard to planning the 
possible budget for any new programme. The programme proposal is then examined 
the appendix, the date it was issued, and its official KRG number. Sources: MRD, Suleimaniyah, (1), 
Doc. Nos. 1 (1423), 30 July 1996; 2,2 July 1996. MRD, Suleimaniyah, (4). 
81 MMT, Erbil, (1), Doc. Nos. 1 (2475), 26 March 1997; 3 (1639), 27 April 1997. MMT, Erbil, (2), 
Doc. Nos. 1 (5295), 30 December 1997; 2,15 January 1998 (petition); 5 (302), 21 January 1998. 
MHSA, Erbil, (3), Doc. No. 1 (1450), 18 May 1997. MHSA, Erbil, (4), Doc. No. 2 (3598), 29 June 
1997. MAI, Erbil, (5), Doc. Nos. 1 (8090), 17 November 1993; 2,29 November 1993 (8383); 3 
(6958), 1 December 1993; 4 (8547), 6 December 1993; 6 (479), 9 August 1994. MAI, Erbil, (6), Doc. 
Nos. 2 (204), 6 November 1996; 3,30 November 1996. MRD, Suleimaniyah, (1), Doc. Nos. 1 (1423), 
30 July 1996; 2,2 July 1996. MRD, Suleimaniyah, (2), Doc. Nos. 1, n. d.; 3, n. d.; 8 (2603), 2 October 
1997. MRD, Suleimaniyah, (3), Doc. No. 1, MHSA, Suleimaniyah, (4), Doc. Nos. 1,5 August 1997; 2 
(783), 6 August 1997; 3 (2046), 17 August 1997. MHSA, Suleimaniyah, (5), Doc. No. 1 (5880), 25 
December 1996. MMT, Suleimaniyah, (6), Doc. Nos. 2,21 July 1997; 3 (231), 26 July 1997. 
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in more detail by a combination of ministry offices, technical offices of the 
legislative, or independent reports from consultants or international agencies. 82 
7.5.2.2 Budgetary Planning 
Perhaps the easiest aspect to investigate with regard to the operational procedures of 
the KRGs is how programmes within the administration are financed. Particularly 
during the latter stages of the third cabinet, the KDP have felt increasingly open 
about discussing financial issues, mainly because they are benefiting from the highly 
significant revenue-generating region of Ibrahim Khalil. The increases in the amount 
of funds being made available to the KRG in Erbil is a policy which the KDP wishes 
to make increasingly public, particularly as current peace initiatives emphasise the 
need for multi-party elections in the future. The KDP is keen to be seen to be a party 
which supports the administration within its territory, and is therefore quite open 
about the finances it allows for the KRG, if not for its own party organization or 
private coffers of the Barzanis. 
Conversely, the PUK is reasonably open about most governmental activities, but is 
somewhat reticent regarding budgetary issues. It is painfully obvious that the KDP 
are putting far more financial reserves into the KRG in Erbil, and it is an issue which 
the PUK cannot hope to match. The initial response of the KRG in Suleimaniyah was 
to attempt to hide the figures, with the KDP subsequently being extremely forthright 
about its openness compared with the secrecy surrounding the finances of the KRG 
in Suleimaniyah. However, recently, the PUK and KRG in Suleimaniyah have been 
using this issue of lack of finances to their own advantage in an attempt to win favour 
with the US and to force the KDP into sharing revenue from Ibrahim Khalil in order 
to target perceived and actual differences in socio-economic standards in the region. 
The impact of this' difference upon the operating procedures of the two 
administrations has been profound. The KRG (Erbil) enjoys an extensive public 
sector activities programme largely funded from the coffers of the KDP. It still 
operates alongside UN agencies and NGOs, in particular with regard to the 
82 Sources: MMT, Erbil, (1), Doc. Nos. 3,27 April 1997 (1639); 4,23 June 1997 (2599). MHSA, 
Erbil, (3), Doc. Nos. 2,25 May 1997 (2678). MAI, Erbil, (5), Doc. Nos. 1,17 November 1993 (8090); 
4,4 December 1996 (328). MRD, Suleimaniyah, (1), Doc. No. 3,30 July 1996. 
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implementation of SCR 986, but is not ultimately dependent on this source. 
However, the KRG (Suleimaniyah) is much more dependent on the revenue derived 
from the oil-for-food deal and NGO activities, with the result that many of its 
ministries are almost wholly dependent upon UN contracts and support to carry on 
functioning. This, at times, has created problems between UN staff and their KRG 
(Suleimaniyah) counterparts, as the KRG (Suleimaniyah) has attempted to exercise 
more control over the spending of these funds compared with their counterparts in 
Erbil. 
Figure 7.5 illustrates the initial budgetary planning process undertaken by the 
selected public service ministries identified in the case studies. The initial budget 
preparation is somewhat interlinked with the initial identification of the programme, 
and it is the lower levels of the administrative structure which undertakes this 
preliminary work. At this level, it is apparent that there are significant cross-linkages 
between different directorates and departments of different ministries and 
governorate offices, particularly with regard to planning the sharing of equipment 
and pooling of resources. Within Suleimaniyah, there is also a significant element of 
approaching NGOs for additional funding for programmes. The provisional budget 
planning is an element of the preliminary survey procedure, and feed-back loops can 
be identified within the system if the local office considers the budget to be 
unacceptable. 83 
Once agreed, the budget is passed either through the ministerial structure, or, more 
unusually, directly to the counterpart planning office within the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Affairs. The budget is discussed alongside the programme plans by 
the Council as a whole, and then between the technical departments of the ministry 
concerned and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The budget is then 
either accepted or rejected. If rejected, the programme could either be scrapped or 
suspended, but more likely to be re-budgeted by the department which constructed 
83 Sources: MMT, Erbil, (1), Doc. No. 2,23 April 1997. MMT, Erbil, (2), Doc. No. 1 (5295), 30 
December 1997; 5 (302), 21 January 1998. MHSA, Erbil, (3), Doc. No. 1(1450), 18 May 1997. MAI, 
Erbil, (5), Doc. No. 2 (8383), 29 November 1993; 3 (6958), 1 December 1993; 6 (479), 9 August 
1994. MAI, Erbil, (6), Doc. No. 5 (346) 23 December 1996. MRD, Suleimaniyah, (1), Doe. Nos. 1 
(1423), 30 July 1996; 2,2 July 1996. MHSA, Suleimaniyah, (4), Doe. No. 3 (2046), 6 August 1997. 
MHSA, Suleimaniyah, (5), Doe. No. 1(5880), 25 December 1996. MMT, Suleimaniyah, (6), Doc. No. 
4,26 July 1997. MAI, Suleimaniyah, (7), Doc. No. 1 (480), 5 April 1997. 
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the original proposal. If accepted, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 
notifies the ministry concerned that the agreed funds have been released, and informs 
the Governorate Treasury (where the work is planned to take place) to release the 
required sum either from the agreed account of the ministry in question, or from 
emergency funds specially designated by the Council of Ministers. 84 
To oversee the programme spending and expenditure, a Finance Committee is 
established jointly between the sectoral ministry and the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs. The reports of this committee are returned to the Council of 
Ministers, the target ministry, and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. 
The directorates of the sectoral ministry itself addresses any problems highlighted by 
the audit, and necessary increases are forwarded to the Council of Ministers, which 
are then addressed through the same procedures. It is apparent that the KRG 
(Suleimaniyah) operates a much less obvious system of financial regulation, almost 
certainly due to the fact that the majority of revenue which passes through its system 
is budgeted and audited externally by UN agencies and NGOs. 85 
7.5.2.3 The Implementation Process 
The process of converting the plans and budget for governmental programmes to 
actual improvements in the physical fabric and/or living conditions of the society is 
initially easy to follow with a definite output at the end to measure against the 
requirements of the original programme. However, it is necessary to understand this 
process from within the administrative infrastructure, which includes analysing the 
84 Sources: MM 7, Erbil, (1), Doc. Nos. 3 (1639), 27 April 1997; 4 (2599), 23 June 1997; 5 (3749), 6 
July 1997; 6 (537), 6 July 1997; 7 (3186), 12 July 1997; MMT, Erbil, (2), Doc. Nos. 1 (5295), 30 
December 1997; 9 (353), 9 February 1998; 14 (937), 24 February 1998; 15 (1342), 24 March 1998. 
MHSA, Erbil, (3), Doc. Nos. 1 (1450), 18 May 1997; 2 (2678), 25 May 1997; 3 (2464), 12 June 1997; 
4 (3437), 23 June 1997. MHSA, Erbil, (4), Doc. Nos. 1 (2544), 15 June 1997; 2 (3598), 29 June 1997; 
3 (2201), 17 July 1997. MAI, Erbil, (5), Doc. Nos. 14,23 May 1997; 17 (3252), 2 August 1997; 18 
(4957), 25 August 1997. MAI, Erbil, (6), Doe. Nos. 5 (346), 23 December 1996; 6 (1752), 29 
December 1996; 7 (32), 7 January 1997; 9 (273), 20 January 1997; 14 (23), 1 July 1997; 25 (1296), 29 
September 1997; 33 (1477), 27 October 1997. MRD, Suleimaniyah, (1), Doc. Nos. 12 (1130), 17 
November 1997; 15 (1230), 17 December 1997. MILD, Suleimaniyah, (2), Doc. Nos. 4 (692), 16 
August 1997; 5 (1734), 19 August 1997; 6 (4611), 23 August 1997. MHSA, Suleimaniyah (4), Doc. 
No. 4 (4671), 25 August 1997. 
85 Sources: MMT, Erbil, (1), Doc. Nos. 10 (2671), 7 August 1997; 12 (4023), 25 August 1997; 13 
(4123), 28 August 1997; 14 (4192), 3 September 1997; 15,23 November 1997. MMT, Erbil, (2), Doc. 
No. 13 (685), 14 February 1998. MHSA, Erbil, (3), Doc. No. 6 (4294), 31 July 1997. MHSA, Erbil, 
(4), Doc. No. 5 (220), 2 September 1997. MAI, Erbil, (6), Doc. Nos. 8 (207), 20 January 1997; 9 
(273), 20 January 1997; 35 (1564), 10 November 1997. MMT, Suleimaniyah, (6), Doc. No. 6 (5739), 
19 August 1997. 
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mechanisms by which the local authorities -implement a policy/programme (whether 
by their own directorates / departments and staff, contracting out to private firms, or 
seeking the assistance of NGOs, for example), how the programme is assessed 
throughout the implementation period, and possible quality control procedures which 
may be taken. 
Figure 7.6 illustrates the generic implementation process. Once the budget and 
programme plan has been accepted, by the ministry concerned, then the Council of 
Ministers and Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, the ministry concerned and 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs forms a committee to oversee the 
implementation of the proposed programme, working alongside the equivalent audit 
committees. This committee is then responsible for identifying technical staff with 
the ministry and directorates, including those within governorate offices, and 
negotiating with local private contractors if expertise is required outside the regular 
capabilities of the ministerial structures. During and after implementation, the work 
is assessed by the implementation committee, and/or by bodies headed by the 
minister or deputy for particularly high profile programmes. In addition to this set of 
procedures, the KRGs are often asked to receive programmes started by NGOs or 
UN agencies. In such cases, the KRGs have usually been involved with the 
programme, normally during the implementation phase. The programmes 
implementation process studied of this type suggest that the KRG shadows the 
different phases of implementation and covers some of the costs of the programme. 
However, the later success of this enterprise in particular suffered apparently due to a 
lack of coordination between the administration and NGO concerned. 86 
86 Sources: MMT, Erbil, (1), Doc. Nos. 8 (3284), 20 July 1997; 11 (2708), 12 August 1997; 17,3 
November 1997; 18 (5500), 4 November 1997; 19 (5511), 4 November 1997. MMT, Erbil, (2), Doc. 
Nos. 13 (685), 14 February 1998; 16 (853), 28 March 1998; 17,28 March 1998. MHSA, Erbil, (2), 
Doc. Nos. 5 (2321), 26 July 1997; 6 (4294), 31 July 1997; 7 (1330), 25 October 1997; 8 (7013), 16 
November 1997. MHSA, Erbil, (2), Doc. Nos. 5 (220), 2 September 1997; 7 (398), 30 December 
1997. MAI, Erbil, (1), Doc. Nos. 7 (1579), 23 April 1997; 8 (383), 28 April 1997; 9 (389), 3 May 
1997; 12 (345), 12 May 1997; 14,23 May 1997; 16 (648), 3 July 1997. MAI, Erbil, (1), Doc. Nos. 11 
(502), 17 February 1997; 12 (239), 29 June 1997; 13 (40), 30 June 1997; 17 (837), 5 July 1997; 26 
(1303), 1 October 1997; 29,13 October 1997; 32, (1396), 15 October 1997. MRD, Suleimaniyah, (1), 
Doc. No. 13 (3371), 9 December 1997. MRD, Suleimaniyah, (2), Doc. Nos. 9 (57), 10 November 
1997; 10 (3407), 10 November 1997. MRD Suleimaniyah, (3), Doc. Nos. 2 (1206), 13 May 1997; 4 
(1344), 31 May 1997; 8 (1536), 25 June 1997. MMT (Suleimaniyah), (6), Doc. No. 6 (5739), 19 
August 1998. 
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7.5.3 Conclusion 
The decision-making process of ' the KRGs may be described as operating along 
identical precepts in both Erbil and Suleimaniyah, with its institutions and prescribed 
tenets governing the process rather than individuals. This largely disagrees with most 
analyses of Kurdish politics which see the political arena of the region being largely 
character-driven. Whilst this may be true in the party political sphere, within the 
administrative sphere, governmental officials do attempt to work as such rather than 
as individual politicians. There are some notable exceptions. Kosrat Rasoul has 
undoubtedly stamped his own personality on the KRG (Suleimaniyah), as has 
Nechervan Barzani in Erbil. However, the decision-making process of these 
administrations displays a significant degree of order, cohesion, and a limited but 
increasing amount of accountability. 
Differences in the decision-making process between the administrations of Erbil and 
Suleimaniyah are apparent. Within Suleimaniyah, the more fluid process of 
administration and the closeness of the PUK with the KRG are reflections of the 
financial constraints effecting Suleimaniyah and Darbandikhan caused by 
geopolitical and geo-economic disadvantages. This has resulted in a system which 
has had to adapt to targeting specific areas and sectors of hardship with the assistance 
of the PUK's party system to identify problems. Within Erbil, the KRG benefits from 
a significantly more substantial, if still fragile, income derived from the KDP 
customs points at Ibrahim Khalil. The effect of this has been to increasingly allow the 
KDP to separate itself from the KRG, and for the KRG to be less dependent upon UN 
agencies and NGO programmes. 
However, both administrations exhibit serious weaknesses in terms of the ability to 
plan for the longer term, primarily due to a shortage of data and the fact that there is 
no Ministry of Planning or formalised planning institution within either structure. 
These problems are compounded by the fact that the implementation of the oil-for- 
food deal (SCR 986) encourages little forethought in planning and UN agencies 
simply require the local authorities to provide them with `shopping lists', which are 
then submitted to the GOI as part of the distribution plan. The result of these 
dynamics is two administrations which are characterised by inefficiency and, at 
times, a lack of professionalism. There are increasing moves to rectify these 
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problems, with Kosrat Rasoul heading an initiative to centralise all ministerial 
planning departments, and with Sami Abdul Rahman investigating the possibilities of 
establishing a central planning authority, but such institutions would be dependent 
upon enduring political stability and the normalization of revenue inputs. 87 
Furthermore, the establishment of a planning authority may indicate the 
reinforcement of a longer-term development plan for the Iraqi Kurdish region, which 
would create consternation in the neighbouring capitals. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The KRG has developed from being a unified organization at the beginning of the 
1990s to being divided into two separate systems 10 years later. However, rather than 
strength existing in unity, the opposite has proved to be the case. The joint system of 
the first and second cabinets brought together two political parties which are 
separated by the quest for power. To have them together in a power sharing situation 
worsened this rivalry. Furthermore, the joint system concerned neighbouring states, 
and not least the GOI, that the de facto state also possessed a structure of governance 
which had the potential, on paper, to promote the Kurdish national movement in a 
unified manner. This was highly unappealing for Turkey and Iran, as well as for Iraq 
itself. 
The result of the collapse into conflict in 1994 was a direct manifestation of this pair 
of internal and external stresses and strains. Subsequently, the divided system which 
emerged in the summer of 1996 has allowed the KDP and PUK to govern the region 
without the same aspects of internal competition, and without the same problems 
occurring through the antagonising of neighbours. However, geopolitical positioning 
has created an uneven input of revenue into the two systems, and a different set of 
international responses towards the two areas, resulting in the KRGs of Erbil and 
Suleimaniyah exhibiting different relationships with regard to the dominant political 
party. 
These problems have made the task of administering Iraqi Kurdistan somewhat 
difficult. The KRGs are currently enjoying their longest period of administration 
$' Interviews with Nawshirwan Mustafa, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999; Sami Abdul Rahman, 2 
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without being overturned by the impact of interfactional fighting, and have at last 
been able to target increasingly the populace of the region. This fact has certainly not 
been lost on astute observers. Aziz Mohammad, the highly respected ex-leader of the 
KSP observed that "the KRG has had some successes, but it should be realised that it 
has been in existence for nearly a generation. What it has achieved is simply not 
enough. s88 
Whether the root of the problem of this lack of achievement may be found within the 
KDP and PUK, or in the actions of neighbouring states is an interesting point of 
debate. However, it is apparent that the longer there is stability in Iraqi Kurdistan, the 
more successful the KRGs will become. Jalal Talabani, who is quite open about the 
inefficiencies of the KRG, blames both sets of dynamics for unsettling the business 
of administration, but still believes the KRG to be successful, and particularly since 
1996: "Despite regional hostility and regrettable internal conflict, our fledgling 
administration has proven remarkably successful. " 89 
The sentiments of Massoud Barzani prove to be similar. In a response to questions 
regarding the performance of the KRG, he stated that: 
"As far as services go, there is no doubt that so far its [the KRG] 
performance is less than what we aspire for. However, to be fair, we 
have to observe with appreciation the continuing and rapid 
development .... the important thing is that we 
have a strong 
political and practical will to provide the people with a safe life and 
good services. "90 
Current initiatives to bring the two regions back under a unified administration 
should bethought through both with the lessons of history, and an understanding of 
the operating procedures of the KRGs, kept in mind. There is a definite yearning for 
a unified administration, at least in public, from both the KDP and PUK 91 However, 
the question has to be asked as to whether the parties truly want this, and, perhaps 
more importantly, is it beneficial in the longer term? Jalal Talabani has been quoted 
February 2000. 
8S Interview with Aziz Mohammad, Erbil, 19 August 1999. 
89 Speech of Jalal Talabani, 9 November 1999, to Plenary Session of the 2first 
Congress of the 
Socialist International in Paris. 
90 Al-Zaman, newspaper, 26 October 2000, Barzani Interview, by Sa'd aI-Bazzaz. 91 Interviews with Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, Suleimaniyah, 10 August 1999; 
Sarni Abdul Rahman, 
Salahadin, 29 August 1999. 
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as offering the premiership of a new joint cabinet to Nechervan Barzani, but to 
achieve this, elections will have to take place and the KDP and PUK will have to 
normalize relations with each other to a much greater degree than is currently being 
undertaken. Furthermore, each side appears to be reinforcing its ties to the KRG in its 
own area, with the KDP forming the new fourth cabinet under the leadership of 
Nechervan, and the PUK undertaking local elections, in which it won a handsome 
majority. It is extremely difficult firstly to imagine these two parties putting into 
action their intentions to unify, and even more difficult to imagine them mutually 
accepting a system which would have one party in government, the other in 
opposition. Aziz Mohammad again noted that: 
"Our leadership does not want unity and they do everything to be 
separate. They may say that they want unity, but the manner in which 
they want it makes it mutually unacceptable. The leadership of the 
PUK and KDP wants full control of any unified body. Neither party 
s9 wants to be the second party in opposition. 2 
Perhaps in the longer term, Iraqi Kurdistan will again benefit from the establishment 
of a unified system of governance. However, in the shorter term, if history is to be a 
guide, it is difficult to envisage a more damaging solution to the Kurdish problem in 
Iraq, particularly when the current divided system has shown itself to be reasonably 
successful at maintaining some semblance of peace and stability in a region more 
used to violence and political instability. 
92 Interview with Aziz Mohammad, Erbil, 19 August 1999. 
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Conclusion 
Iraqi Kurdistan may be characterised as a small, land-locked entity which exists in 
one of the most geopolitically tense of regions. As well as suffering from serious 
external geopolitical pressures caused by the national interests of neighbouring states, 
the Iraqi Kurds also have serious internal problems, with the Iraqi Kurdish political 
system possessing parties which are often in conflict with each other (and, indeed, 
with themselves) and display deep-rooted antipathies which have all to often resulted 
in a decline into conflict. The problem which this thesis has sought to address is to 
identify a model for the continued peaceful political development of the Iraqi 
Kurdish region, taking into account both external and internal parameters, ensuring a 
continued and effective administration. 
After nearly ten years of existing without the direct interference of the central GOI, 
the people of Iraqi Kurdistan may now be realising the beginnings of the 
establishment of a stable, indigenous, system of government with aspirations of 
democratic ideals and tendencies if not, as yet, realities. Whether by design or 
accident, the political and administrative system of the region has developed into a 
structure which displays a modicum of stability, albeit through a cumbersome 
division of power and inefficient administrative structure, and limited multi-party 
involvement. The characteristics of the political system can be seen to have its roots 
in the decades of political development before the 1990s, and, possibly, in the 
inherent qualities of the peoples of Iraqi Kurdistan. In turn, the characteristics of the 
administrative system have been shown to be influenced greatly by the party political 
system and its internal dynamics, combined with the functional need of administering 
a region in a geopolitical flashpoint. 
Particularly since 1991, the major political parties of the KDP and PUK have been 
forced to acknowledge the necessity to encourage more democratic procedures and 
actions in order to gain the support of the international community for their plight. 
This is combined with the need for the party leaders to preserve their own power 
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base, both. within the party and within the region at large. There is therefore a delicate 
balance in existence between the need to be seen to be promoting democratic, civil 
ideals, and undertaking those measures which will preserve the current levels of elite 
accommodation. 
The system which, in my opinion, was inadvertently stumbled upon in the aftermath 
of the ferocious fighting of 1994-1995, and the subsequent invasion of Erbil by the 
KDP supported by the GOI in August 1996, can be seen to satisfy many of the 
requirements of promoting the development of the administrative system and civil 
society, along with the preservation of power by creating a geographic variant of a 
consociational political and administrative system, with the main protagonists, the 
KDP and PUK, being divided between Erbil and Suleimaniyah. The development of 
the separate administrations has not been straightforward, with political 
considerations haunting many of the actions of both administrations. However, and 
especially since 1999, the increasing efficiency of both administrations is apparent, 
with technocrats appearing at many high levels, and with political motivators of both 
parties dominating the direction taken by the administrations, with Nechervan 
Barzani and Sami Abdul Rahman in Erbil, and Jalal Talabani, Kosrat Rasoul and, 
increasingly, Nawshirwan Mustafa in Suleimaniyah. 
The impact of the UN SCR 986 series of resolutions on the development of the 
administration has been immense. They have, in effect, taken a great task away from 
the fledgling administrations by ensuring that the population of the region is fed and 
is provided with basic provisions. This has freed considerable resources for the 
KRGs. The oil-for-food programme has also supported the administrations in a 
technical sense, with UN agencies being forced to assist and collaborate with the 
offices of the Kurdish `local authorities' (the UN is unable to call them collectively 
the KRG due to its relation with the GOI) and implement large-scale humanitarian 
projects through the relevant technical ministry, thereby supporting its staff and 
activities. This is a particularly welcome dynamic for the PUK-dominated 
administration, which does not enjoy the same internal revenue as the KDP- 
dominated administration. . 
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The current interpretation and hoped implementation of the Washington Agreement 
of 1998, which is attempting to draw both of these parties together is, in effect, 
ignoring this delicate balance which has been achieved by the Kurds themselves, and 
could, in fact, produce a critical mass of bitterly opposed politicians in the capital 
city of Erbil. This is highly unfortunate, as the Washington Agreement offers many 
possibilities, with elections only being one of many. Both political parties contend 
that, if the current situation continues, then elections should occur. However, I 
contend that more time is needed to ensure that the administrations are increasingly 
secure in terms of separation from the dominant political party, that problems over 
internal revenues are resolved, and that the major parties themselves are given the 
opportunity to resolve their own internal tensions. The PUK in particular has serious 
internal stresses which have to be resolved regarding the leadership structure of the 
party. Within the KDP, the current major destablising issue is centred upon the 
management of the KDP's relationship with the PUK and other smaller parties, 
including the Islamist groups. Furthermore, the union of the KDP and PUK in Erbil 
within a recognisable coalition government has failed previously, and the 
neighbouring powers, notably Iraq, Iran and Turkey, have consistently displayed 
their desire and ability to destabilise such an initiative. Again, time is needed to 
resolve these volatile issues. However, the reunion of the administration, and the 
political system, at this time would endanger the progress made particularly since 
1996. 
The problems of unification can be traced to internal political and external 
geopolitical reasons. With regard to those problems of internal politics, the KDP and 
PUK still portray inherent differences in their respective approach to politics and the 
resolution of the Kurdish issue. The PUK is still the most radical of the two parties, 
particularly with regard to its off-on relationships with the central G0I and with Iran, 
and the KDP has consistenly showed its ability to resort to any measure in order to 
preserve its political and military position within the region, and particularly against 
the PUK. Furthermore, the different political styles of the parties which have been a 
common feature in the analyses of Kurdish political history are still apparent. The 
position of the Barzanis in the KDP is still predominant, although I disagree with 
those who consider Massoud to be tribal dictator over those persons who have 
received his partronage. Similarly, the criticisms often thrown at the PUK, including 
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their apparently chaotic decision-making process, are often valid, but one should be 
aware of the political development and history of the organization, and that what may 
be occurring is a Kurdish approach to collective decision-making, rather than mob- 
rule, as is often assumed to be the case. However, the existence of these fundamental 
differences certainly make it more problematic to bring together the two 
organizations into a cooperative, and trustful, arrangement of governance. 
With regard to the geopolitical involvement of foreign powers, Iraqi Kurdistan may 
be seen to be increasingly the geopolitical centre of the Middle East. With the tension 
between Iran and Turkey remaining high, these states continue to play out their 
rivalries through their proxies in Iraqi Kurdistan, which are currently the KDP for 
Turkey and the PUK for Iran, although these allegiances are rarely stable. Obviously, 
Iraq is heavily involved in the affairs of the region, as are a host of other Middle 
Eastern and foreign powers. The Iraqi Kurdish region in particular has the ability to 
act as a pivotal region in the Middle East, with the ability- to impact upon the affairs 
of several countries. The key to this geopolitical dynamic remains the domestic 
instability of Iraqi Kurdistan. As far as neighbouring states in particular are 
concerned, the existence of a unified, democratically elected government in Iraqi 
Kurdistan is proof of an increasingly stable, institutionalised Iraqi Kurdistan. This is 
reason enough for them to actively promote the destabilization of the region, as 
happened in 1994 and 1996, particularly as these states fear that Iraqi Kurdish 
democratic successes may attract the attention of states such as the US which may 
support the increased development of such a government. The result, therefore, in 
1994 was a concerted effort by neighbouring states to divide the unified government 
in any way politically or militarily possible. 
The solution to this problem, as seen in the evidence supplied in this thesis, is to 
therefore keep the administrative and political system, in the short-term, divided. 
Such a division is beneficial for several reasons, but perhaps, most significantly, it 
removes the overt legitimacy of the indigenous government, thereby quelling the 
anxiety of neighbouring states, reducing the supposed need for them to become 
involved in the destabilization of the Iraqi Kurdish region. The division also allows 
the two major parties of the KDP and PUK to resolve their differences whilst 
preserving their own power bases in the short-term. - 
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As stated earlier, the Washington Agreement offers many possibilities, with elections 
only being one. It is apparent that the tenets of the agreement acknowledge these 
dangerous dynamics and do allow for a progressive rapproachement to take place. 
However, in my field experience, it is apparent that many parties see the issue of 
elections as the overriding concern, and it would be a difficult task to encourage the 
gradual promotion of a unified political system, both to the Iraqi Kurdish population 
in general, and the political parties in particular. 
It is therefore forwarded that such increased unification could be achieved in a more 
technically orientated manner, under a consociational approach of elite 
accommodation, with the focus being more on the coordination of the activities of 
the separated local authorities, rather than on more public grand political statements 
involving elections. Currently, the Iraqi Kurdish region is tense, but enjoying its third 
year without serious internal. fighting. This, in my opinion, is a function of the 
geographic-consociational system apparent since 1996 in particular, and it is within 
this system that a more peaceful political development may be found. 
As has been seen, Iraqi Kurdistan may be characterised as being a laboratory for 
theories of political science and international relations. Its position at the centre of 
the geopolitical conundrum of the Middle East has resulted in its continuing 
precarious political development. The problem of internal political rivalries 
combined with external geopolitical agendas has meant that the Kurds remain the 
largest nation without a state. This may not change. However, the people of Iraqi 
Kurdistan will only enjoy stability and freedom from conflict, whether in their own 
state or within the confines of others, once their politicians and states supposedly 
supportive to their cause pursue a route which acknowledges that a balance has to be 
achieved between the internal needs and external forces affecting this tragic region. 
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Appendix 1: Population Statistics 
Population Figures for Rural Areas and Collective Settlements 
Table A1: 1 Rural Population Figures: Erbil Governorate' 
Name of 
Qaza 
Name of 
Nahiya 
No. of 
villages 
Total 
population 
Population 
under 
5 years 
Population 
under 
5 years % 
Zebar Sherwanmazin 23 3555 544 15 
Barzan 26 6329 791 12 
Mergasur 73 10474 1640 16 
TOTAL 122 20358 2975 15 
Soran Sidakan 127 11775 2003 17 
Khalifan 63 19430 3351 17 
Diana 40 18830 2768 15 
Rawanduz 44 11428 1560 14 
TOTAL 274 61463 9682 
. 16 
Choman Hajiomaran 16 4397 691 16 
Galala 88 24481 4337 18 
TOTAL 104 28878 5028 17 
Shaglawa Hareer 70 17364 2734 16 
Salahaddin 77 20461 3337 16 
Hiran 32 8169 1324 16 
TOTAL 179 45994 7395 16 
Erbil Khabat 36 18241 4426 24 
district 
Ainkawa 62 27028 5014 19 
Qushtapa 52 7385 1272 17 
TOTAL 150 52654 10712 20 
Koisenjaq Koisenjaq c. 46 8971 1629 18 
Shorish 32 4539 693 15 
Taq Taq 49 14818 2936 20 
TOTAL 127 28328 5258 19 
TOTAL 956 237,675 41,050 17 
Source: Figures from Ministry of Reconstruction and Development (Kurdistan Regional 
Government) Village Survey 1997 (Erbil). 
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Table A1: 2 Rural Population Figures: Dohuk Governorate2 
Name of Name of No. of Total Population Population 
Qaza Nahiya villages population under under 
5 years 5 years % 
Zakho Sendy 2 656 97 15 
Rezgary 19 3164 645 20 
Gully 35 3679 645 18 
TOTAL 56 7499 1387 18 
Ameady Barwary 58 16013 2590 16 
Nerwa Rekan 33 6850 1459 21 
Ameady 15 3085 442 14 
Sarsenk 84 15906 2846 19 
TOTAL 190 41854 7337 18 
Sumail Sulaivany 28 3591 745 21 
Sumail 27 5902 1026 17 
TOTAL 55 9493 1771 19 
Dohuk Dosky 41 8531 1266 15 
district 
Zawita 46 5317 764 14 
Dohuk c. 7 14860 2787 19 
TOTAL 94 28708 4817 17 
Shekhan Atrosh 39 5277 850 16 
Qasrok 58 11048 1930 17 
TOTAL 97 16325 2780 17 
Akrea Nahla 72 16507 2754 17 
Akrea 16 8663 1485 17 
Bardarash 79 47564 9190 19 
Gerdaseen 93 31225 5621 18 
Sorchy 43 9832 2022 21 
TOTAL 303 113791 21072 19 
TOTAL 795 217670 39164 18 
2 Source: Figures from Ministry of Reconstruction and Development (Kurdistan Regional 
Government) Village Survey 1997 (Erbil). 
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Table A1: 3 Rural Population Figures: Suleimaniyah Governorate; 
Name of Qaza Name of No. of Total Population Population 
Nahiya villages population under under 
5 years 5 years % 
Ranyah Chwarqürna 
Betwata 
TOTAL 
68 
27 
95 
18828 
10945 
29773 
3121 
2249 
5370 
17 
21 
18 
Qaladiza Pishdar Centre 92 23528 3731 16 
Hero 103 28694 4416 15 
TOTAL 195 52222 8147 16 
Dokan Chinaran 33 8509 1528 18 
Bingird 46 8380 1412 17 
Surdash 73 13053 1709 13 
TOTAL 152 29942 4649 16 
Chwarta Seewail 66 7958 1000 13 
Mawat 86 14212 1811 13 
Sruchik 53 10009 1439 14 
Chwarta 96 13206 1837 14 
TOTAL 301 45385 6087 13 
Penjween Penjween 58 11390 2169 19 
Garmik 76 14672 2097 14 
TOTAL 134 26062 4266 16 
Sulei. District Arbat 57 7537 1342 18 
Bazian 30 4506 747 17 
Sarchinar 74 9295 1391 15 
Qaradagh 83 11395 1617 14 
TOTAL 244 32733 5097 16 
Halabja Khurmal 38 10259 1655 16 
Saidsadiq 47 22038 3192 14 
Biara 24 583Z 806 14 
Seerwan 82 11675 2010 17 
TOTAL 191 49804 7633 15 
TOTAL 1,302 265,921 41,249 16 
3 Source: Figures from Directorate of Reconstruction (Ministry of Reconstruction and Development, 
Kurdistan Regional Government (Suleimaniyah)) Village Survey 1997. 
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Table A1: 4 Rural Population Figures: Darbandikhan Governorate4 
Name of Qaza Name of No. of Total Population Population 
Nahiya villages population under under 
5 years 5 years % 
Chamchamal Aghalar 62 11562 1836 16 
Chamchamal 52 6175 1010 16 
Sangaw 92 8927 1111 12 
Qadir Karam 27 2972 458 15 
Showan 27 6255 1056 17 
TOTAL 260 35891 5471 15 
Darbandikhan Zaraen 34 4785 953 20 
Darbandikhan 24 6213 703 11 
TOTAL 58 10998 1656' 15 
Kalar Maidan 41 9941 1651 17 
Qurato 40 5520 854 15 
Tilako 82 9750 1530 16 
Pebaz 74 9559 1683 18 
Kalar 24 9743 1464 15 
TOTAL 261 44513 7182 16 
Kifri Sarqala 35 4981 926 19 
Nawjul 22 2426 379 16 
TOTAL 57 7407 1305 18 
TOTAL 636 98,809 15,604 16 
Table A1: 5 Collective Settlement Population Figures: Erbil Governorates 
Settlement 
Name 
Year of 
Construction 
Predominant Tribe(s) Relocated 
in the Collective Settlement 
Total Population 
of Settlement 
Diana 1978 Balakayati, Bradost, Gardi, Barzani, Muhajir 10573 
Galala 1981 Balakayati 4044 
Hareer 1978 Mzury, Sherwany, Balakayati 7280 
Basirma 1988 Harky, Alana, Khoshnaw, Khailany, Rost, 5613 
Balakayati 
Bastora 1977 Surchy, Goran, Khoshnaw, Balakayati 6114 
Tobzawa 1987 Shamamk, Shwan, Salay, Qaraj, Kandinawa, 16500 
Shekhbzeny 
° Source: Figures from Directorate of Reconstruction (Ministry of Reconstruction and Development, 
Kurdistan Regional Government (Suleimaniyah)) Village Survey 1997. 
Source: Durham University Policy Planning Unit, Collective Settlement Survey, Summer 1998, in 
collaboration with Ministry of Reconstruction And Development (Erbil) and Directorate of Statistics 
(Suleimaniyah). 
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Kawr 1987 Surchy, Qaraj, Shamamk, Qaladiza 10000 
Gosik 
New 1988 Sian, Gardy, Galaly, Nanakaly, Kakay 5200 
Khabat 
Shakholan 1990 Mizury, Harky, Binjy, Sherwany 2843 
Kani 1974 Surchy, Akraea, Goran, Harky 2793 
Qirjala 
Sebeeran 1977 Balak, Baradosty, Sherwany, Harky 2300 
Jideeda 1987 Qaladizi, Salay, Shekhbzeny 2000 
Zab 
Barhushtir 1989 Shwan, Akraea, Sharazur, Qaladiza 210 
Bahirka 1978 Barzany, Harky, Baradost 6400 
Shawes 1977 Khoshnaw, Balakayati, Goran 6000 
Mala 1979 Khoshnaw, Balakayati 4587 
Omer 
Peerzin 1977 Khoshnaw, Balakayati 4533 
Jazhnikan 1988 Zebary, Rekany, Narwami, Gully, Sendy, 476 
Mizury 
Girdachal 1988 Halabja, Sendy, Showan, Zebary, Guly 150 
Qushtapa 1978 Mizury, Barzany, Harky, Bradost 8063 
Daratoo 1988 Qaladiza, Erbil area, Showan 30000 
Binaslawa 1987 Luk, Showan, Nalia, Jabary, Mantik, 29939 
Topzawa 
Kasnazan 1977 Baradosty 12200 
Total 177,818 
Table A1: 6 Collective Settlement Population Figures: Dohuk Governorate6 
Settlement 
Name 
Year of 
Construction 
Predominant Tribe(s) Relocated 
in the Collective Settlement 
Total Population 
of Settlement 
Darkar Ajam 1976 Barwary, Sendy 5050 
Hizawa 1976 Barwary 3954 
Bersive 1976 Barwary 3919 
Girik Sindi 1976 Sendy 1200 
Sufla 
6 Source: Durham University Policy Planning Unit, Collective Settlement Survey, Summer 1998, in 
collaboration with Ministry of Reconstruction and Development (Erbil) and Directorate of Statistics 
(Suleimaniyah). 
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Tilkabar 1976 Sendy, Barwary 10000 
Cham Kurk 1976 Musa Rashy, Kochar, Dosky 1600 
Derabon 1976 Pizhdin 1360 
Feshkaboor 1976 Musa Rashy, Sendy 1180 
Bakirman 1976 Sendy, Gully, Shrenkhy 1050 
Khilekh 1976 Sendy, Ziuky, Musyrash 850 
Qara wila 1976 Pzhdin, Rezgary 275 
Batofa 1976 Barwary, Gully 10583 
Qidish 1978 Barwary, Gully 5700 
Begova 1976 Nerway, Barwary, Dosky 4480 
Sheladzey 1977 Dosky Zhory, Rekany 13700 
Deralook 1977 Rekany, Nerwayi 9300 
Siry Be 1977 Dosky Zhory, Rekany 8050 
Kany 1977 Nerwa Rekan 5200 
Azadi 1992 Dosky Zhory 800 
Mansooria 1975 Kochar, Masihi, Sulaivany, Barwary 15400 
(Miserky) 
Batail 1975 Sulaivany, Dosky, Barwary 1924 
Bastke 1975 Sulaivany, Dosky 1604 
Girsheen 1975 Sulaivany, Dosky, Miran, Barwary 1443 
Kharab dem 1975 Sulaivany 1416 
Ismail Ava 1975 Sulaivany 1266 
Kelik 1975 Sulaivany 1240 
Bawarde 1975 Sulaivany 1150 
Bajid Kandal 1975 Hawery 522 
Khanky 1987 Dinay, Hawry, Shingary, Arab, 13299 
Sendy 
Sharya 1987 Dinany, Faidy, Hawry 7900 
Miqbla 1976 Dosky Zhoru, Barwary Zhoru 1935 
(camp) 
Marona 1975 Zedik, Mizuri, Dosky, Kochar, 1703 
Barwary 
Giery Gawre 1988 Kochar, Sulaivany 1324 
Miqbla 1975 Sulaivany, Mizuri 560 
Bagerat 1976 Nerwa Rekan 6350 
Kuret 1977 Balakaiaty 4400 
Gavana 
Ba'adry 1975 Hawery, Simoqy 6550 
Kalakchin 1975 Goran 17315 
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Qasrok 1976 Mizury, Kochar, Sulaivany 9200 
Chira 1976 Goran, Govay, Zebary 8350 
Girbeesh 1986 Zebary 301 
Azadi-1 1987 Teary 750 
Total 194,153 
Table A1: 7 Collective Settlement Population Figures: Suleimaniyah 
Governorate' 
Settlement Year of Predominant Tribe(s) Relocated Total Population 
Name Construction in the Collective Settlement of Settlement 
Haji Awa 1988 Pishdary, Merga 35000 
Sharushyan 1977 Ako, Sharoshy 11500 
Ranyah 1979 Ako 5721 
Choman 1983 Balak 2975 
Shkarta 1987 Khoshnaw 6685 
Tuasoran 1978 Ako 450 
Zharawa 1978 Nuradeeny 416 
Bastasen 1978 Mangur 200 
Pemalk 1978 Nuradeeny 14300 
Piramagrun 1988 Jaf, Qaraways 17118 
Baryka 1987 Jaf 10500 
Arbat 1977 Jaf 7164 
Bazyan Asri 1987 Manmi, Hamawand 30715 
Baynjan 1988 Kafroshi, Hamawand 12000 
Allahi 1976 Mirawli, Shenaki 3650 
Taynal 1976 Shynakayati 2351 
Gopala 1976 Kafroshi, Hamawand 2156 
Bazian-1 1989 Pishdary 504 
Bazian-2 1989 Pishdary 13 
Raparin 1976 Ismail Uzery 4970 
Tasluja 1975 Ismail Uzery, Mirawli 4300 
Khurmal 1978 Haruni, Hawrami 4600 
New Halabja 1988 Rokhzadi, Mekayli, Galali, 31200 
Hawrami 
Source: Durham University Policy Planning Unit, Collective Settlement Survey, Summer 1998, in 
collaboration with Ministry of Reconstruction and Development (Erbil) and Directorate of Statistics 
(Suleimaniyah). 
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Shanadari 1978 Zangana, Jabari 553 
Seerwan 1978 Hawrami, Garmiany, Nauroly, 1957 
Shamerani 
Zamaqi 1978 Hawrami, Shamerani, Nauroly, 1060 
Anab 1978 Hawrami, Shamerani, Hawari 6590 
Total 218648 
Table A1: 8 Collective Settlement Population Figures: Darbandikhan 
Governorate° 
Settlement Name year of 
Predominant Tribe(s) Relocated Total Population 
Construction in the Collective Settlement of Settlement 
Shorish (Sangaw, 1987 Jaf, Zangana 
Qara Hanjeer) 
16000 
Takya 1975-1978 Showan, Pishder, Qalasewka 15800 
Piryari 1987 Jaf, Zangana, Shekhan, Jabari 12376 
Qadir Karam 1987 Zangana, Shekhan, Jabari, 10561 
Qalasewka 
Zarayan 1978 Tauguzi, Hozibawa, Sherabayani 10085 
Nasir 1985 Jaf 5000 
Smud 1987 Jaf, Zangana, Dawda, Shekhan, 19946 
Zand 
Total 89,768 
e Source: Durham University Policy Planning Unit, Collective Settlement Survey, Summer 1998, in 
collaboration with Ministry of Reconstruction and Development (Erbil) and Directorate of Statistics 
(Suleimaniyah). 
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Appendix 2: Key Agreements Between Parties 
The Text of the 11 March Agreement of 1970 Between the KDP and GO[1 
1. The Kurdish language shall be, alongside the Arabic language, the official 
language in areas with a Kurdish majority; and will be the language of instruction 
in those areas and taught throughout Iraq as a second language. 
2. Kurds will participate fully in government, including senior and sensitive posts I 
the cabinet and the army. 
3. Kurdish education and culture will be enforced. 
4. All officials in Kurdish majority areas shall be Kurds or at least Kurdish 
speaking. 
5. Kurds shall be free to establish student, youth, womens' and teachers' 
organizations of their own. 
6. Funds will be set aside for the development of Kurdistan. 
7. Pensions and assistance will be provided for the families of martyrs and others 
stricken by poverty, unemployment or homelessness. 
8. Kurds and Arabs will be restored to their former place of habitation. 
9. The Agrarian reform will be implemented. 
10. The Constitution will be amended to read `the Iraqi people is made up of two 
nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. ' 
11. The broadcasting station and heavy weapons will be returned to the Government. 
12. A Kurd shall be one of the vice-presidents. 
13. The Governorates (Provincial)Law shall be amended in a manner conforming 
with the substance of this declaration. 
14. Unification of areas with a Kurdish majority as a self-governing unit. 
15. The Kurdish people shall share in the legislative power in a manner proportionate 
to its population in Iraq. 
1 Source: Short and McDermott, 1975, The Kurds, Appendix 1. 
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The Washin! ton Agreement of 1998 Between the KDP and PUK 
September 17,1998 
Reaffirmation of Previous Achievements 
On behalf of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK), we thank Secretary Albright and the US government for facilitating a series 
of amicable and productive meetings here in Washington over the past several days. 
We appreciate their efforts in helping to bring us back together and to assist us in 
creating a framework for future cooperation. The meetings have been a major step 
forward towards a full and lasting reconciliation, which will provide new hope to the 
Kurds, Turkomen, and Assyrians and Chaldeans of the Iraqi Kurdistan region of Iraq. 
Both parties also welcome the continuing engagement of the governments of Turkey 
and the United Kingdom in the peace and reconciliation process. We wish to 
recognize the irreplaceable role our separate consultations in Ankara and London 
played in making these talks a success. 
In Washington, we have discussed ways to improve the regional administration of the 
three northern provinces and to settle long-standing political differences within the 
context of the Ankara Accords of October 1996. We have reached several important 
areas of agreement on how to implement those accords. 
We affirm the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq. The three northern provinces of 
Dohuk, Irbil and Sulemaniyah are part of the Iraqi state. Both the KDP and the PUK 
unequivocally accept the recognized international boundaries of Iraq. Both parties are 
committed to preventing violations of the borders by terrorists or others. 
Both parties will *endeavor to create a united, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq that 
would ensure the political and human rights of Kurdish people in Iraq and of all 
Iraqis on a political basis decided by all the Iraqi people. Both parties aspire that Iraq 
be reformed on a federative basis that would maintain the nation's unity and 
territorial integrity. We understand that the U. S. respects such aspirations for all the 
Iraqi people. 
Both parties condemn internal fighting and pledge to refrain from resorting to 
violence to settle differences or seeking outside intervention against each other. We 
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will endeavour to bring to justice those who violate the peace, whatever their 
political affiliation or motivation. 
Both parties also agree that Iraq must comply with all relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions, including the human rights provisions of Resolution 688. 
To help ensure a peaceful environment for reconciliation, we will intensify our 
arrangements to respect the cease fire, facilitate the free movement of citizens and 
refrain from negative press statements. 
Transition Phase 
We have agreed to enhance the Higher Coordination Committee (HCC) to ensure 
that the humanitarian requirements of the people of the Iraqi Kurdistan region are 
met and their human and political rights are fulfilled. The decisions of the HCC will 
be by the unanimous consent of its members. 
The HCC will prepare for a full reconciliation between the parties, including 
normalizing the situation in Irbil, Sulemaniyah and Dohuk; re-establishing a unified 
administration and assembly based on the results of the 1992 elections; providing 
exclusive control of all revenues to the regional administration; and organizing new 
regional elections. 
The HCC will enhance coordination and cooperation among local public service 
ministries that serve the needs of the people throughout the Iraqi Kurdistan region. 
The parties will ensure that these ministries receive adequate revenue for their 
operation. The KDP acknowledges that, revenue differences will require a steady 
flow of funds for humanitarian services from the current KDP area to the current 
PUK area. 
The HCC will establish a process to help repatriate everyone who had to leave their 
homes in the three northern provinces as a result of the prior conflict between the 
parties, and to restore their property or compensate them for their losses. 
The HCC will ensure that both parties cooperate to prevent violations of the Turkish 
and Iranian borders. It will establish reasonable screening procedures to control the 
flow of people across these borders and prohibit the movement of terrorists. Both 
parties, working with the HCC, will deny sanctuary to the Kurdistan Workers Party 
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(PKK) throughout the Iraqi Kurdistan region . They will ensure that there are no 
PKK bases within this area. They will prevent the PKK from destabilizing and 
undermining the peace or from violating the Turkish border. 
The HCC will endeavor to form an interim joint regional government within the next 
three months to be ratified by the regional assembly. 
Unified Administration 
Within three months of its re-formation, the Assembly will meet at its building in 
Irbil, with subsequent meetings there or in Sulemaniyah or Dohuk. The members of 
the this interim assembly will be those individuals who were elected to the 
parliament in 1992. 
The first meeting of the interim assembly will be within three months. After the 
assembly is established, it must authorize all subsequent decisions of the HCC and/or 
the interim regional government. 
The interim assembly may decide to add additional functions to the operations of the 
HCC, including unifying relations with the international community. 
To provide a safeguard for regional elections and to help normalize the status of Irbil, 
Dohuk and Sulemaniyah, the HCC and the assembly may establish a joint PUK- 
KDP-Turkomen-Assyrian security force. The new regional government may 
subsequently choose to take further measures to unify peshmerga (militia) command 
structures. 
After the regional elections described below, the interim assembly will be replaced 
by a new regional assembly. This regional assembly will form a new regional 
government based*on the voting strength of each party in the assembly. 
When the regional -government has been formed, the HCC will be dissolved 
automatically. The term of the regional assembly, the regional gouernment will be 
three years. 
Revenue Sharing 
Until the new interim joint regional government is established, a steady flow of funds 
for public service ministries will be directed from the current KDP area into the 
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current PUK area, due to revenue differences. The HCC, in consultation with the 
existing ministries of taxation and finance, is responsible for the apportionment of 
revenues throughout the region. 
When the interim joint government is established, it will become responsible for the 
collection and distribution of all revenues. 
After the election of a new regional assembly, a single Ministry of Revenue and 
Taxation will have exclusive responsibility for collecting all revenues, including 
taxes and customs duties. The funds collected will be at the disposal of the regional 
government for uses authorized by the regional assembly. 
Status of Irbil, Dohuk and Sulemaniyah 
The interim assembly and the HCC will address the normalization of Irbil, Dohuk, 
Sulemaniyah and other cities. The HCC may call on international mediation 
regarding this issue, if it deems it expedient. 
The status of these cities must be normalized to a sufficient degree that free and fair 
elections can be held. 
Elections 
The interim assembly and the HCC will be responsible for organizing free and fair 
elections for a new regional assembly, to take place no later than siX months after the 
formation of the interim assembly. 
The composition of the new regional assembly will be based on the best available 
statistical data on the population of the three northern governorates and the 
distribution of ethnic and religious groups there. Seats will be set aside for the 
Kurdish, Turkomen, and Assyrian and Chaldean communities. 
If possible, the interim assembly and the HCC, working with the international 
community, will conduct a census of the area in order to establish an electoral 
register. If international assistance is not available in time, the interim assembly and 
the HCC will conduct a census on their own, or--making reference to existing data - 
they will construct a best estimate of the population in consultation with outside 
experts. 
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The interim assembly and the HCC will also invite international election monitors to 
assist both in the election itself and in training local monitors. 
Situation in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region 
UN Security Council Resolution 688 noted the severe repression of the Iraqi people, 
particularly the Kurdish people in Iraq. The potential for repression has not eased 
since 1.991, when the resolution was passed. It is worth noting that in the past year 
the UN Special Rapporteur for Iraq reported finding strong evidence of hundreds of 
summary executions in Iraqi prisons and a continuation by the regime of the policy 
of expelling Kurds and Turkomen from Kirkuk and other cities. This policy amounts 
to ethnic cleansing of Iraqi Kurds and Turkomen, with their lands and property 
appropriated by the government for disbursement to ethnic Arabs. Many of the new 
arrivals participate in this scheme only because of government intimidation. 
In light of this continued threat, we owe a debt of thanks to the international 
community for assisting with our humanitarian needs and in preventing a repeat of 
the tragic events of 1991 and the horrific Anfal campaigns of 1987 and 1988: 
The United Nations special program of "oil-for-food" for the Iraqi Kurdistatn region 
has eased the humanitarian condition of the people. We welcome the support of the 
international community for the continuation of this program, with its specific 
allotment to the 'Iraqi Kurdistan region, and hope that, in the near future, a liaison 
office for the region can be established at ECOSOC headquarters to better coordinate 
the provision of the aid. We also hope that, in the event that benefits from the "oil- 
for-food" program are suspended due to unilateral action by the government of Iraq, 
the UN will address the continuing economic needs of Iraqi Kurdistan and the plight 
of the people there. 
The United States, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom through 
Operation Northern Watch have helped to protect the area. We call upon them and 
the- rest of the international community to continue to exercise vigilance to protect 
and secure the Iraqi Kurdish region. 
The many non-governmental organizations that operate in the three northern 
provinces have diminished our isolation and helped us in countless ways. 
330 
Appendix 2 
Future Leader-to-Leader Meetings 
The President of the KDP and the Secretary General of the PUK will meet at least 
every two months inside or outside Iraqi Kurdistan at mutually acceptable sites. 
Pending the agreement of governments, we hope to hold the first such meeting in 
Ankara and a subsequent meeting in London. 
The Ankara meeting would include discussions on our joint resolve to eliminate 
terrorism by establishing stronger safeguards for Iraq's borders. The London meeting 
may explore further details concerning the status of Irbil, Dohuk and Sulemaniyah, 
and help establish a mechanism for the conduct of free and fair elections. 
Jalal Talabani 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. 
Massoud Barzani 
Kurdistan Democratic Party. 
Witness: C. David Welsh 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Near East Affairs Bureau 
Department of State, Washington D. C. 
Washington D. C. 
September 17,1998 
Timetable: 
On or before: 
October 1: 
The KDP begins to extend appropriate financial assistance on monthly basis to the 
public service ministries in the PUK areas. 
October 15: 
Timeline for repatriation of persons displaced by the former conflict. Agreement on 
restoration of property or compensation by responsible parties. 
Beginning 
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November: 
Joint consultations with the Government of Turkey. 
November 1: 
Coordination and Cooperation of humanitarian ministries complete. 
Revenues contributed by KDP to the ministries flowing from KDP areas to PUK 
areas. 
November 15: 
Progress report on repatriation, unification of ministries and revenue sharing. 
January I: 
First meeting of the interim assembly. 
March 1: 
Interim Joint Government establishes a plan to normalize Irbil, Dohuk and 
Sulemaniyah. 
April 1: 
Interim Joint Government establishes a plan for the organization of elections. 
July 1: Regional elections. 
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Appendix 3: Party Lists 
Table A3: 1 The Central Committee of the KDP (Eleventh Congress)) 
Name Additional Office Government Office 
Massoud Barzani President 
Ali Abdullah Deputy President 
Sami Abdul Rahman Head of Political Bureau 
Nechervan Barzani Political Bureau steering committee Deputy Prime Minister. 
Arif Taifour Political Bureau steering committee 
Shawkat Sheikh Yazdeen Political Bureau Minister of Finance 
Azzaddin Barwari Political Bureau, Dohuk Branch (1) 
Fadhil Merani (Mutni) Political Bureau Minister of Interior 
Falakadin Kakai Political Bureau Minister of Culture 
Hoshyar Zebari Political Bureau 
Jawher Namiq Salim Political Bureau Speaker of KNA 
Roj Nuri Shawaise Political Bureau Prime Minister 
Jerjees Hassan Political Bureau Minister of Education 
Za'een (Rafiq) Ali Political Bureau Minister of Peshmerga 
Bruska Nuri Shawaise Adviser to Barzani 
Sa'ad Abdullah Head of Erbil Branch (2) 
Omar Botani Damascus representative 
Salah Delo Head of Kirkuk Branch (3) 
Massoud Salayi Central Office of Organization 
Abu Shareen Head of Baghdad Branch (5) 
Ali Sinjari 
Mohammad Kadir 
Nidhmadin Gilli 
Omer Othman Head of Soran Branch (10) 
Sayed Kaka 
Akram Mantiq Head of Qala Diza Branch (11) 
Kamal Chawshin Head of Suleimaniyah Branch (4) 
Darwesh Abdulla- 
Qadr Qadr Head of Aqra Branch (9) 
Ramzi Sheban Central Office of Finance 
Abdulla Agreen 
Karim Sinjari Deputy Head of KDP Intelligence 
Franso Hariri Governor of Erbil, MP 
Jalal Faili 
Mohammad Mahmoud 
Kamal Kirkuki Head of USA & Canada Branch (7) 
Kadir Jabari Minister of Justice 
D. N. Ghafour 
Barzan Khalid 
Nuri Hama All Head of Halabja Branch (12) 
1 Interview with Sa'ad Abdullah, Erbil, 9 September 1999. 
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Table A3: 2 The Central Committee of the KDP (Twelfth Congress)2 
Name Additional Office Government Office 
Massoud Barzani President 
All Abdullah Deputy-President 
Nechervan Barzani Political Bureau Prime Minister 
Masrour Massoud Barzani Political Bureau 
Shawkat Sheikh Yazdeen Political Bureau Cabinet Minister 
Fadhil Merani Political Bureau Minister of Interior 
Roj Nuri Shawaise Political Bureau Speaker of KNA 
Hoshyar Zebari Political Bureau 
Sami Abdul Rahman Political Bureau Deputy Prime Minister 
Jawher Namiq Salim Head of Political Bureau 
Azad Berwari Political Bureau 
Karim Sinjari Deputy-Head KDP Intelligence 
Nuri Hama All 
Arif Taifour 
Za'em All Minister of Peshmerga 
Saleh Delo 
Ramzi Shaban 
Omer Botani 
Sharam Anmedi 
Jamal Mortaq 
Kamal Kirkuki 
Sarbaz Hawrami 
Franso Hariri 
Omer Othman 
Bruska Nuri Shawaise 
Safeen Muhsin Dizayee 
Qadr Qadr 
Izaddin Berwari 
Sa'ad Abdullah 
Mahmoud Malaqadr 
Head of Erbil Branch (2) 
Adviser to Barzani 
Minister of Agriculture 
Jerjees Hassan 
2 Interview with Sa'ad Abdullah, Erbil, 9 September 1999. 
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Table A3: 3 The Leadership Office of the PUK - 1999 
Name AdditiongI Office Government Office 
Jalal Talabani Secretary General 
Qosrat Rasul Political Bureau steering committee Prime Minister 
Fu'ad Massoum Political Bureau, Overseas Branch 
Kamal Fu'ad Political Bureau steering committee 
Barham Salih US representative 
Mulazim Omer Political Bureau Minister of Finance 
Omer Sa'id Ali Political Bureau, Suleimaniyah Branch 
Ihmad Ahmed Political Bureau Minister of Power 
Arsalan Baez Political Bureau 
Omer Fattah Political Bureau steering committee, 
Deputy Head of Zenyari 
Jabar Farman Political Bureau steering committee, 
Deputy Head of Peshmerga 
Feyeradun Abdul Khadir Political Bureau 
Khadir Haji Ali Political Bureau 
Mohammad Tawfiq Political Bureau 
Dara Sheikh Nuri Political Bureau 
Omer Abdullah Political Bureau steering committee 
Abu Bakr Khoshnaw 
Shawkat Haji Mushir 
Mustafa Sa'id Khadir 
Mustafa Chaw Rash 
Kurdo Qasim 
Bahraz Galali 
Mulla Bakhtier 
Salar Aziz 
Mohammad Shakeri 
Sa'adi Ahmed Pira 
Adil Murad 
Adnan Mufti 
Chato Howezi 
Shertle Howezi 
Arif Rushdi 
Sa'adun Faheli 
Shakawahn Abbas 
Azad Jundiani 
Adnan Hama Mina 
Baroj Galali 
Hazim Yousifi 
Othman Haji Mahmoud 
Jalal Jawher 
Minister of Finance 
Minister of 
Municipalities 
Abdelkarim Haji 
Head of Sharazur Branch (9) 
Head of Raniyah Branch (6) 
Deputy Head of Democratic 
Organizations 
Head of Kirkuk Branch (2) 
Deputy Head of Foreign Relations 
Deputy Head of Media Office 
Head of Erbil Branch (3) 
Head of Soran Branch (5) 
Head of Garmian Branch (8) 
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Appendix 4: Election Results and KNA Representatives 
Table A4: 1 The Results of the 1992 Elections - 
KDP Figures from High Committee Lists' 
Province Number of votes 
KDP PASOK KPDP ICP IMK Inds. PUK Invalid 
Dohuk 168,683 1,983 6,051 1,546 3,874 49 15,184 982 
Erbil 152,143 8,883 2,101 11,047 11,092 184 148,352 2,025 
Suleimaniyah 92,449 11,978 1,118 5,693 29,334 213 207,168 1,211 
Darbandikhan 24,604 2,038 663 2,837 4,808 55 53,129 506 
Total 437,879 24,882 9,903 21,123 49,108 501 423,833 4,724 
Percentage 45.05 2.56 1.02 2.17 5.05 0.05 43.61 0.49 
Total no. of votes 971,953 
Total no. of valid votes 967,229 
Table A4: 2 Christian Minority Lists 
Province Number of votes 
ADM. DC KAD KCU Invalid Total 
Dohuk 5,555 _ 
181 241 . 1,841 59 7,877 
Erbil 900 347 1,855 880 29 4,011 
Suleimaniyah 83 9 38 36 0 166 
Darbandikhan 5 0 0 0 0 5 
Total 6,543 537 2,134 2,757 88 12,059 
Percentage 54.26 4.45 17.70 22.86 0.73 100 
Total no. of valid votes 11,971 
Hoff, et. a!., 1992, p. 13, quoting High Committee lists. 
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Table A4: 3 Proportional Redistribution of Votes to KDP and PUK Lists (KDP) 
Party Number of votes 
is` Count % Redistributed % Total % 
KDP 437,879 45.05 53,689 50.88 491,477 50.8 
PUK 423,833 43.61 51,899 49.18 475,732 49.2 
Total 861,712 88.66 105,518 100.06 967,229 100 
Table A4: 4 Figures Forwarded by the PUK 
Party List No. Number of votes 
Valid votes 
KDP 1 428,339 44.52 
PUK 7 423,682 44.03 
IMK 5 49,073 3.10 
PASOK 2 24,867 2.58 
ICP 4 21,106 2.19 
KPDP 3 9,902 1.03 
Inds. 6 500 --- 
No. of invalid votes 4702 
Total no. of valid votes 957,469 
Table A4: 5 Proportional Redistribution of Votes to KDP and PUK Lists (PUK) 
Party 
1" Count % 
Number of votes 
Redistributed % Total % 
KDP 
PUK 
428,339 
423,682 
44.52 
-44.03 
53,012 
52,435 
50.27 
49.73 
481,351 
476,118 
50.27 
49.73 
Total 852,021 88.55 105,448 100 957,469 100 
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Table A4: 6 The Members of the Kurdistan National Assembly, 1992 
Kurdistan Democratic Party Block 
1. Abrahim Saeed Muhammad 
2. Idris Hadi Saleh 
3. Azad Fatah Rashid Meeran 
4. Ahmed Salar Abdul-Wahid 
S. Ahmed Ali Omer 
6. Akbir Haeeda Musa 
7. Akram Eazat Najeeb 
8. Barzan Khalid Aziz 
9. Jaefar Sheikh Ali Abdul-Aziz 
10. Aameel Abdi Sindi 
11. Aawhar Ahmed Shawaz Galali 
12. Jawher Namiq Salim 
13. Hassan Hussein Bafri 
14. Hama Najim Hama Faraj Jaf 
15. Hamid Salim Meeran 
16. Khaeeri Ali Bag Yazid 
17. Dr. Roj Nuri Shawaise 
18. Sa'eed Muhammad Sa'eed Hirari 
19. Safar Muhammad Hussein Doski 
20. Salim Ali Huji Maio 
21. Shfeeka Fake Abdul Allah 
22. Sherwan Nasifi Al-Haydari 
23. Mala Talal Saeed Korani 
24. Salahadin Abrahim Dalo 
25. Adnan Hussamaddin Al-Nagishbandi 
26. Afaf Othman Al-Naqishbandi 
27. Fadhil Rauf Jakzi 
28. Farham Abdul-Allah Agha Al-Sharfani 
29. Firsan Ahmed Abdul-Allah 
30. Franso Toma Kanon Al-Hariri 
31. Fallakaddin Sabir Kakai 
32. Fawziya Azaddin Rashid 
33. Kasim Muhammad Kasim 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Block 
Abu Bakir Haji Safar Ghulam 
Ahmed Abu-Bakir Hassan Barmami 
Ahmed Tahir Ahmed Al-Naqishbandi 
Arsalan Bayez Ismail 
Ayad Haji Namiq Majid Bakal 
Parakhan Mahmoud Abdul-Kadir 
Jalal Jawher Aziz 
Jalal Shafiq Ali 
Hassan Hameed Rahim (Rustam) 
Hassan Kanobi Khithir Bilbas 
Hassan Abdul Karim Barzinji 
Hussein Arif Abdul-Rahman 
Khasro Gul Muhammad 
Hassan Ahmed Abdul Kuwestani 
Sa'adi Ahmed Muhammad Pira 
Sa'adi All Khan Abdel Sleevani 
Salam Karim Khan Muhammad Khalifa 
Sirwan Muhammad Nuro 
Shawkat Haji Mushir Muhammad 
Sheeko Fayk Abdul-Allah Bekas 
Salahadin Abdul-Hamid Abdul-Allah 
Salahadin Muhammad Hassan Hafid 
Taha Muhammad Taha Mula 
Tariq Muhammad Saeed Jambaz 
Abdullah Rasoul All (Qosrat) 
Abdullah Haji Abrahim Abdullah 
Abdul-Khalid Muhammad Rashid Zangana 
Abdul Karim Kaka Hamma Abdul Karim 
Ezaddin Mustafa Rasoul 
All Abdullah Ahmed 
All Rasoul Rustam 
Omer Sayid All Hussein 
Omer Abdulallah Muhammad 
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34. Qais Dywali Saeed AI-Doski Kadir Aziz Hama Amin 
35. Kanabi Aziz Ahmed Dizayee Kadir Mamand Babakir Agha 
36. Mamun Mir. Mohammad Brifkani Kamal Abrahim Faraj Shali 
37. Sheikh Muhsin Khalid Mufti Kamal Jalal Ghareeb 
38. Muhsin Salah AI-Katani 
39. Muhammad Mawlud Amin Mawlud 
40. Mala Muhammad Taliir Zaeen Al-Adeen 
41. Muhammad Saeed Ahmed Al-y-kubi 
42. Mala Muhammad Shareef Tahir Al-Doski 
43. Muhammad Abdul-Kadir Ahmed 
44. Mala Mohammad Fandi Deershawe 
45. Mamand Muhammad Amin Babakir 
46. Nihad Nuraddin Rashid 
47. Mala Hadi Khithee Chokha 
48. Wrya Ahmed Muhammad Amin 
49. Yahya Mohammad Al-Barzinji 
50. Younis Mohammad Salim Rozbiyani 
Kamal Abdul Karim Fuad 
Galawez Abdul Jabar Mafeed Jabari 
Muhammad Amin Abdul-Hakim 
Muhammad Tawfiq Hama Rahim 
Muhammad Fadhil Aziz Kaftan 
Muhammad Fuad Massoum Khadir 
Mustafa Kadir Mustafa 
Mathir Ali Mustafa Kakayee 
Noshirwan Fuad Maruf Masti 
Najmaddin Aziz Ismail (Salar) 
Nazad Ahmed Aziz Agha 
Nahla Muhammad Saad-Al-Allah 
Hero Abrahim Ahmed 
The Assyrian Democratic Movement Block 
1. Younidan Yousif Kana 
2. Shamil Binyamin 
3. Francis Yousif Shaba 
4. Akram Ashur Odish 
The United Christian List 
1. Sarkis Agha-Jan Ma Mindo 
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Appendix 6: Selected Ministry Records of the 
Kurdistan Regional Governments 
Kurdistan Regional Government, Erbil 
Programme 1: Ministry of Municipalities and Tourism 
Halabja Street Project, Erbil 
1. Presidency of Erbil Municipality to MoMT. 26 March 1997 (2475). Propose 
project, provided fieldwork to support proposal. 
2. Presidency of Erbil Municipalities (Technical Department). 23 April 1997. Form 
preliminary budget. 
3. MoMT (GD of Planning) to Council of Ministers (GD Planning). 27 April 1997 
(1639). Subject: Request project. 
4. Council of Ministers (Divan) to MoFEA. 23 June 1997 (2599). Discussion of 
project and agreement on spending Copied to MoMT. 
5. MoFEA. 6 July 1997 (3749). Allocation of funds (548,000 OID). 
6. MoFEA (GD of Finance) to Kurdistan Regional Bank. 6 July 1997 (537). Subject: 
Funding, according to 2599. 
7. MoMT (GD of Planning) to GD Municipality. 12 July 1997 (3186). Subject: 
Funding notification. 
8. MoMT (GD Planning). 20 July 1997 (3284). Subject: Ministerial Order. 
Formation of Implementation Committee. Copied to Council of Ministers; 
MoFEA; Governorate of Erbil; Ministers Office; GD Finance; GD Municipality; 
GD Planning; Presidency of Erbil Municipality. 
9. Ministry Project Committee. 2 August 1997. Budget for implementing Halabja 
Street project. 
10. MoMT (GD Municipality, D of Planning) to Presidency of Erbil Municipality. 7 
August 1997 (2671). Subject: Recommendation of Audit team members. 
11. MoMT (GD Municipality, D of Planning). 12 August 1997 (2708). Subject: 
Implementation Order. Moving staff to Halabja Street Project. Copied to GD 
Planning. 
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12. MoMT (GD Planning) Ministerial Order. 25 August 1997 (4023). Decision to 
form a committee to evaluate and audit the budget of the project. Composed of 
three engineers. Copied to Ministers Office; Deputy Ministers Office; GD 
Municipality; GD Planning; GD Finance. 
13. Ministry Project Audit Committee meeting. 28 August 1997 (4123). Discussion of 
the budget and market prices. 
14. MoMT (GD Finance) to MoFEA (GD Finance). 3 September 1997 (4192). 
Subject: Defence of funding increases. Copied to GD of Municipalities; GD 
Planning; GD Finance. 
15. Ministry Project Committee Budget audited by MoFEA. 23 November 1997 
(4023). 
16. MoFEA to Presidency of Erbil Municipality. 29 November 1997 (7607). Subject: 
Granting of funding (157,635 OID). 
17. MoMT (GD Planning). 3 November 1997. Visited Halabja Street. 
18. MoMT (GD Planning) to Central Laboratory of Erbil. 4 November 1997 (5500). 
Subject: Request testing of tarmacadam for project. Copied to Presidency of Erbil 
(don't pave the streets); Implementation Committee. 
19. MoMT(GD Planning) to GD Municipality. 4 November 1997 (5511). Subject: 
Note on visit to Halabja Street. Copied to GD of Planning. 
20. MoFEA (GD of Finance and Public Spending) to Kurdistan Regional Bank. 29 
November 1997 (7607). Subject: Release of funds to the MoMT (Erbil 
Presidency). Copied to Council of Ministers; MoMT; Presidency of Erbil 
Municipality; Rafeedain Bank; GD Planning; GD Finance 
21. GD of Planning (MoMT) to GD of Municipality. 8 December 1997 (6146). 
Subject: Funding. Notification of funding. Copied to Minister's Office; GD of 
finance; GD of Planning. 
Programme 2: Ministry of Municipalities and Toursim, Erbil 
General Directorate of Water and Sewerage 
Artesian Well Programme, Erbil City. 
I. GDWS to MoMT to MoFEA; 30 December 1997 (5295) requesting funding for 
programme. 
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2. Residents of Kurdistan Quarter of Erbil to Technical Department of DWS(E). 15 
January 1998. Complaint of lack of water to 500 families. (Includes petition). 
3. DWS(E)poss. and rights tö Presidency of Erbil Municipality; 19 January 1998. 
Informing of proposal. 
4. DWS(E) to Presidency of Erbil Municipality (Planning); 20 January 1998 (196). 
Proposal for location of well. 
5. Presidency of Erbil Municipality (Planning) to DWS(E); 21 January 1998 (302). 
Response to proposal, rejected by municipality. Copied to planning dept. and 
Dept. Planning. 
6. DWS(E) to GDEducation(E); 24 January 1998. Notification on location near to 
school. Copied to tech. dept.; project engineer. 
7. DWS(E) tech. dept. to DWS(E); 25 January 1998 (242). Defence of well location 
and request for permission to proceed. 
8. GDEducation(E)buildingsto DWS(E); 2 February 1998 (1428). Agreement to 
DWS digging outside school. Copied to planning, building. 
9. DWS(E)poss. and rights to GDWS. 9 February 1998 (353). Note to GDWS that 
DWS(E) approached MoFEA for funds. Copied to tech. dept.; accounts; audit; 
possession and rights. 
10. Contractor to DWS(E); 10 February 1998. Proposal from well-digging department 
MoAI. 
11. WDD(MoAI) to MoMT. 10 February 1998 (97). Details of proposal and 
equipment. Copied to DWS(E) technical dept.; DWS(E) accounts; follow-up. 
12. WDD(planning) to DWS(E) accounts; 10 February 1998 (98). The cost of the 
wells, agreeing with doc. 97. Copied to DWS(E) technical dept.; planning and 
follow-up; accounts; general well file. 
13. DGWS to DWS(E) Accounts; 14 February 1998. Evaluation from contractors to 
audit. (685). Copied to DWS(E). 
14. MoFEA to MoMT; 24 February 1998 agreeing to supply funds. (937). 
15. GDWS (accounts) to DWS Erbil, 24 March 1998. Supplying 17,200 OID for 
implementing work. Referenced to budget of 1998. (1342). 
Copied to GD of Planning MoMT, Finance MoMT. Signed Nihad Izzadin Al- 
Alim, GDWS. 
16. DWS (Erbil) to contractor; 28 March 1998 (853). Signed Azad Dizai, DWS(E). 
Copied to: Technical Department; Audit; Follow-up; 
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17. Contract signed between Well-digging department of MoAI and DWS(E). 28 
March -1 April 1998. 
Programme 3: Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
General Directorate of Health 
Renovation of Operating Theatre in Martyr Mulazim 
Karim Hospital, Salahadin 
1. MoHSA (Office of General Management) to MoFEA. 18 May 1997 (1450). 
Subject: Presentation of surveys with budgets. Copied to GDHErbil. 
2. MoFEA to Council of Ministers. 25 May 1997 (2/10/2678). Subject: Presentation 
of request to CoM. Copied to MoHSA (GDHErbil). 
3. CoM to MoFEA. 12 June 1997 (2464). Subject: Agreement on funds. Copied to 
GDHErb1; CoM; Erbil Treasury. 
4. MoFEA (GD Finance) to MoHSA (GD Accounting). 23 June 1997 (20/10/3437). 
Subject: Notification of agreement on funding (539,580 OID). 
5. MoHSA (GMO) to GDHErbi1.26 July 1997 (2321). Subject: Request for details 
of programme of work from Minister. 
6. MoHSA (GMO). 31 July 1997 (4294). Subject: Administrative Order no. 2/2/2. 
Decision to form a committee, according to 3437 and 2321, to oversee the 
renovation project. Copied to Erbil Treasury. 
7. MoHSA. 25 October 1997 (1330). Subject: Administrative Order. Completion of 
project. Composed of members of engineering department. Copied to MoHSA; 
Dept. Eng. 
8. MoHSA (GDHErbil). 16 November 1997 (7013). Subject: Administrative Order. 
Completion of work and identification of hand-over committee. 
Programme 4: Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
General Directorate of Health 
Renovation of Erbil Juvenile Jail 
I. CoM to MoFEA. 15 June 1997 (2544). Release of funds to MoHSA. 
2. MoFEA to MoHSA (Accounts). 29 June 1997 (2/10/3598). Subject: Funding work 
according to survey results (927,410 OID). 
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3. General Management of Social Reform to MoHSA. 17 July 1997 (2201). Subject: 
request for increased funds. 
4. MoHSA (GMO) to General Management of Social Reform. 14 August 1997 
(2589). Subject: Agreement on increase of funds. 
5. MoHSA (Social Reforms Office). 2 September 1997 (220). Subject: 
Administrative Order 220. Decision made to form a committee to oversee the 
renovation programme. Copied to MoHSA; Erbil Treasury. 
6. MoFEA. 5 November 1997 (1/10/7009). Subject: Order no. 181. Addition to 
budget of MoHSA. 
7. MoHSA. 30 December 1997 (398). Establishment of committee. First field trip to 
Erbil juvenile jail. Copied to MoHSA; Juvenile Rehabilitation Department. 
Programme 5: Ministry of Agriculture & Irrigation (Erbil) 
General Directorate of Irrigation and Dams 
Eski Kelek Project 
1. D I&D to Erbil Governorate (Flood Committee), 17 November 1993 (8090). 
Subject: Informing of change of river conditions due to quarrying on Zab. 
2. D I&D to GD I&D(E), 29 November 1993 (8383). Subject: Request to build flood 
protection, plans provided by engineers. 
3. GD I&D to D I&D, 1 December 1993 (6958). Subject: Request to downsize 
requirements of 8383. 
4. D I&D to GD I&D, 6 December 1993 (8547). Subject: Notification of flood in 
Taqtaq. 
5. GD I&D to D I&D, 20 December 1993 (73.17). Subject: Reply to notification of 
flood in Taqtaq and provisional plans for flood defence. 
6. GD I&D to Governor, 9 August 1994 (479). Subject: Request for assistance to be 
provided to Erbil Flood Committee from Council of Ministers to build 3 levels of 
flood protection at Erbil, Kelek and Taqtaq (budgets provided of 138,000 OID), 
and asking for illegal quarrying to be stopped as it threatens Eski Kelek Dam. 
7. Council of Ministers, 23 April 1997 (1579). Subject: Requesting formation of 
committee. 
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8. GD I&D to Governorate Flood Committee, 28 April 1997 (383). Subject: Request 
appointment of flood engineer. Appointment of Flood Committee according to 
PM's request of 1579 
9. D Implementation of GD I&D, 3 May 1997 (389). Subject: Management Order. 
Formation of cubit committee to censor instruments. 
10. GD I&D, 6 May 1997 (409). Subject: Management Order, commencement of 
repairing dams. 
11. D Implementation of GD I&D to MoPI, 6 May 1997 (411). Subject: Request for 
fuel for digging machines. 
12. D Implementation of GD I&D to Governorate Flood Committee, 12 May 1997 
(345). Subject: Nearing completion of work but require a bulldozer and need 
Governor to obtain it from Erbil Municipality. 
13. Governorate (Locality Engineers), 14 May 1997 (1352). Subject: Management 
Order. Appointment of engineer to implement flood protection programme on 
Zab. 
14. GD I&D to Governor, 23 May 1997. Subject: Notification of completion, 
provision of budget. 
15. D Implementation of GD I&D, 1 June 1997 (49). Subject: Management Order, 
Notification of completed work. 
16. GD I&D to MoAI (Minister's Bureau), 3 July 1997 (648). Subject: Notification of 
successful completion of work under budget. 
17. Council of Ministers (Planning) to MoFEA, 2 August 1997 (3252). Subject: 
Spending 364,887 OID on soil dams on Zab River from MoAI budget. 
18. MoFEA (GD Finance) to Rafidain Bank, 25 August 1997 (4957). Subject: Release 
of 1,622,250 OID (budget provided) from MoAI. 
Programme 6: Ministry of Agriculture & Irrigation (Erbil) 
General Directorate of Livestock 
Establishment of Livestock Centre in Erbil 
1. D Vet and Livestock to GD Vets and Livestock, 4 November 1996 (352). Subject: 
Request of supply of land. 
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2. MoAI (GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Minister's Bureau), 6 November 1996 
(204). Subject: Request of supply of land to HDI. H. Copied to GD, D of Planning, 
Legal Affairs. 
3. Ministerial visit to NGO (HDI. H) cow breeding programme, 30 November 1996. 
4. MoAI (GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Minister's Bureau), 4 December 1996 
(328). Subject: Positioning of new project. Copied to Research Directorate, GD 
Agr. Services, D of vets, D of Livestock. 
5. MoAI (D of Planning of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (D of Accounts), 23 
December 1996 (346). Subject: Request for 65,000 OID to be released from 
MoFEA. 
6. MoAI (GD accounts) to MoFEA (GD Finance), 29 December 1996 (1752). 
Subject: Request for 655,000 OID from budget of GD Vets & Livestock. 
7. MoFEA (GD Finance) to Cabinet Planning Department, 7 January 1997 (32). 
Subject: Requesting final decision on MoAI programme. 
8. MoAI (D of Audit of GD Divan) to MoAI (GD Vets & Livestock), 20 January 
1997 (207). Subject: Approval of Minister to 328. Requesting the formation of a 
committee to oversee spending. Copied to D of Audit and D of Accounts. 
9. Council of Ministers (Planning) to MoFEA, 20 January 1997 (273). Subject: 
Notification to release funds (500,000 OID) from MoAI according to the audit at 
convenience. 
10. Council of Ministers (Planning) to MoAI (Accounts), 29 January 1997 (372). 
Subject: Notification of release of funds. 
11. MoAI (NGO relations) to GD Vets & Livestock, 17 February 1997 (502). Subject: 
Minutes of meeting with HDI. H. Copied to Ministry of Humanitarian Aid and 
Cooperation, Deputy Minister's Office, GD Agr. Services, D Planning. 
12. HDI. H to GD Vets & Livestock, 29 June 1997 (239). Subject: Invitation to view 
project. 
13. HDI. H to MoAI (Minister's Bureau), 30 June 1997 (40). Subject: Draft of 
cooperation protocol. 
14. MoFEA to Council of Ministers (Planning), 1 July 1997 (23). Subject: Request for 
information to release funds. 
15. GD Vets & Livestock to HDI. H, 2 July 1997. Subject: Questions about 
programme. 
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16. HDI. H to GD Vets & Livestock, 3 July 1997 (241). Subject: Clarification of 
points of 2 July. 
17. MoAI (D of Livestock of OD Vets & Livestock) to HDI. H, 5 July 1997 (837). 
Subject: Request for more information. 
18. MoAI (D of Livestock of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Relations Committee), 
12 July 1997. Subject: Private letter regarding negotiations. 
19. MoAI (D of Livestock of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Relations Committee), 
3 August 1997 (10). Subject: Annex to official letter of 12 July. 
20. MoAI (D of Planning of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Minister's Bureau), 12 
July 1997 (8). Subject: Request for information. 
21. MoAI (D of Planning of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI, 13 July 1997 (886). 
Subject: Request contact with Ministry of Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation 
regarding more information about HDI. H. 
22. MoAI (D of Livestock of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Relations Committee), 
12 August 1997 (1016). Subject: Minutes of meeting. 
23. Prime Ministerial Decision to MoAI, 23 September 1997. Subject: Order to 
receive programme from HDI. H. 
24. MoAI (D of Livestock of GD Vets & Livestock) to GD, 28 September 1997 
(1283). Subject: Requests for clarification of costs and request for land. 
25. MoAI (Accounts, GD Vets & Livestock) to GD Divan, 29 September 1997 
(1296). Subject: Request to inform MoFEA of need for 100,000 OID for fodder 
and barley. 
26. MoAI (D of Administration of GD Vets & Livestock), 1 October 1997 (1303). 
Subject: Administrative Order. Notification of formation of a committee 
according to PM's and M's instructions. 
27. MoAI (D of Livestock of GD Vets & Livestock) to HDI. H, 8. October 1997 
(1353). Subject: Negotiation of contract. 
28. MoAI (D of Livestock of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Minister's Adviser), 8 
October 1997 (1352). Subject: Information regarding land provision. 
29. MoAI (Minister's Bureau) to MoAI (D of Livestock of GD Vets & Livestock), 13 
October 1997. Subject: Discussion on handover. 
30. MoAI (D of Livestock of GD Vets & Livestock) to UNICEF, 14 October 1997 
(1395). Subject: Request for pumps to provide water to agricultural land to supply 
fodder. 
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31. MoAI (D of Livestock of GD Vets & Livestock) to D of General Education and 
Teaching, 14 October 1997 (1389). Subject: Request for list showing numbers of 
children to supply milk and eggs to at school. Copied to D of Planning, D of 
Livestock. 
32. MoAI (D of Livestock of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Minister's Bureau), 15 
October 1997 (1396). Subject: Information to Minister regarding hand-over of 
programme. 
33. MoAI (D of Accounts of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (special office), 27 
October 1997 (1477). Subject: Request for more money to be put to MoFEA. 
34. MoAI (Minister's Bureau) to GD Vets & Livestock, 27 October 1997 (3881). 
Subject: Agreement on budget. Replying to 1396. 
35. MoAI (D of Accounts-of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Minister's Bureau), 10 
November 1997 (1564). Subject: Information regarding meeting. 
36. MoAI (D of Accounts of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI, 12 November 1997 
(1570). Subject: Review of budget (1,156,567 OID). 
37. MoAI (D of Planning of GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Legal Affairs), 16 
November 1997 (1581). Subject: Review of contract. 
38. MoAI (Adviser's Bureau) to MoAI (GD Vets & Livestock), 14 May 1998. 
Subject: Provision of report on Livestock Project. 
39. MoAI (GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (Adviser's Bureau), 18 June 1998 (1158). 
Subject: Reply to report. Copied to Minister's Bureau, Deputy's Bureau, D of 
Planning, D of vets, D of Livestock. 
40. MoAI (D of Planning and Pursuance) to MoAI (GD Vets & Livestock), 17 June 
1998 (2184). Subject: Recommendations and instructions from seeing draft of 
1158. 
41. MoAI (GD Vets & Livestock) to MoAI (D of Planning and Pursuance), 20 June 
1998 (1218). Subject: Reply to 2184. Copied to Minister's Bureau, Deputies 
Bureau, Adviser's Bureau, D of vets., D of Livestock, D of Planning. 
Kurdistan Regional Government, Suleimaniyah 
Programme 1: Ministry of Reconstruction and Development- 
(Suleimaniyah) 
Directorate of Reconstruction and Development 
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Sheney Village Water Project (Qala Diza) 
1. MORAD (GDRD, DRD(S)) to GDRD, 30 July 1996 (1423). Subject: 
Implementation of Sheney water project. Provision of survey, and request for 
approval of named implementation committee. Copied to: Suleimaniyah Treasury 
(although money supplied by Mam Jalal), Water Dept. of DRD, DRD accounts. 
2. Director, DRD (S) to Jalal Talabani, 2 July 1996. Subject: Preparation complete 
for implementation of project. Now awaiting sum of 84,087 OlD from Mam Jalal. 
3. MORAD (GDRD, DRD(S)) to UNICEF(S), 30 July 1996. Subject: Proposal of 
DRD(S). Agreement on implementation of project, supply of materials. 
4. DRD(S) Water to GDRD, 11 August 1996 (1553). Subject: Request for car tires 
for vehicle transporting building materials. Copied to technical department, water, 
mechanics, accountants. 
5. DRD(S) to Suleimaniyah Governor, 24 February 1997 (535). Subject: Reporting 
theft of pipes from village. 
6. Suleimaniyah Governorate to Pishdar Mudir al-Nahiya '(Water Directorate), 16 
March 1997 (446). Subject: Investigation into stolen water pipes from Sheney. 
Copied to Rapareen Centre No. 8 of PUK; DRD(S). 
7. DRD(S) to UNICEF(S), 14 September 1997 (203). Subject: Report to UNICEF 
regarding theft of pipes. 
8. UNICEF(S) to DRD(S), 16 September 1997 (053). Subject: Acknowledgement of 
203 and note that material should have been guarded [even though it was KDP 
looting]. 
9. DRD(S) to MORAD, 13 October 1997 (2742). Subject: Notification of progress. 
10. DRD(S), 15 October 1997. Subject: Agreement of contractor, Mr. Khalid. Handed 
over all pipes and fittings. 
11. DRD (Water), 14 November 1997. Subject: Notification of good work. 
12. MORAD (Diwan) to DRD(S), 17 November 1997 (1130). Subject: Notification of 
funds. 
13. MORAD (GDRD, DRD(S)), 9 December 1997 (3371). Subject: Administrative 
Order. Hiring of vehicle at 5,000 OID per month for implementation committee. 
Copied to Personnel; accounts, DWS. 
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14. GDRD, DRD(S) to MORAD, 9 December 1997 (3397). Subject: Completion of 
project, seeking to spend 30,000 OID on further projects. Copied to: technical 
dept.; water; accountants. 
15. MORAD (Divan) to DRD(S), 17 December 1997 (1230). Subject: Granting of 
extra funds. 
16. MORAD (GDRD, DRD(S), personnel), 22 December 1997 (3525). Subject: 
Administrative Order. Note of approval of 1230 to spend an extra 30,000 OID. 
20,000 OID on statistics, 10,000 OID on water project. Copied to GDRD; 
personnel; accountancy. 
17. MORAD (GDRD, DRD(S)), 25 December 1997 (3563). Subject: Administrative 
Order. Vehicle contract extension. 
18. DRD(S), 25 December 1997 (3565). Subject: Administrative Order. From 
MORAD (Diwan) 1130, decided to award bonuses to 2 engineers. 
19. Sheney spring owners, n. d. Subject: A Treaty. Those villagers who own the 
springs of Chawra Biley offer them to the people of the village and will not raise 
any problems. 
Programme 2: Ministry of Reconstruction and Development 
(Suleimaniyah) 
Construction of Zerinok Health Centre 
1. Zerinok Anjuman to Minister of Reconstruction and Development, n. d. Subject: 
Requesting construction of a camp. 
2. Above letter redirected to DRD(S). 
3. DRD(S) to MORAD, n. d. Subject: Notes on survey of Zerinok with DH(S), to 
assess the house correctly (for use as a health'. centre). 
4. MORAD to Council of Ministers, 16 August 1997 (692). Subject: Requesting 
funds for Zerinok. 
5. Council of Ministers (Kosrat) to MoFEA, 19 August 1997 (1734). Subject: 
Securing of funds for MORAD for Zerinok (28,230 OID). Copied to MORAD. 
6. MOFEA(GDF) to MORAD, 23 August 1997 (4611). Subject: Agreed to supply 
funds (from deputy-minister). Copied to Council of Ministers; Treasury of 
Suleimaniyah. 
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7. MORAD (Diwan) to DRD(S), 25 August 1997 (738). Subject: Notification of 
agreement on funds for Zerinok. Permission to commence work. 
8. DRD(S) (technical dept. ) to MORAD, 2 October 1997 (2603). Subject: 
Completion of survey of health centre buildings. 
9. DH(S)(engineering) to DRD(S), 10 November 1997 (57). Subject: Request for 
names of staff. 
10. DRD(S) (Buildings), 10 November 1997 (3407). Subject: Administrative Order. 
Notification of supervising 
Programme 4: Ministry of Reconstruction and Development 
(Suleimaniyah) 
General Directorate of Reconstruction and Development 
Directorate of Reconstruction and Development 
(Suleimaniyah) 
Jeshana Village Sanitation Project (Sarchinar) 
1. Jeshana Village to DRD(S), n. d.; Subject: Petition for watsan project. 
2. DRD(S) (Water), 13 May 1997 (1206). Subject: Administrative Order. 
Formalization of working relationship between DRD(S)Water and PWJ. 
3. DRD(S), 28 May 1997 (1341). Subject: Administrative Order. Commencement 
with water project with aid of PWJ. 
4. DRD(S) (Water), 31 May 1997 (1344). Subject: Administrative Order. Naming 
manager of programme. 
5. DRD(S) (Water) to PWJ, 15 June 1997 (1447). Subject: Provision of report. 
6. Jeshana Villager to DRD(S), 20 June 1997. Subject: Donating water pool to the 
project. 
7. Contract between villager and village regarding use of water source 
8. DRD(S) to PWJ, 25 June 1997 (1536). Subject: Defence of quality of work by 
DRD(S) for PWJ at Jeshana. 
Programme 5: Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Suleimaniyah) 
General Directorate of Health 
Reconstruction of Chwarta General Hospital 
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1. MoHSA (GDHSul(finance)) to MoFEA. 25 December 1996 (5880). Subject: 
Provision of assessment of the reconstruction needs of Chwarta Hospital. Request 
of funds (31,500 OID). 
2. MoFEA (GD Finance) to MoHSA (GDHSu1). 22 February 1997 (452). Subject: 
Agreement on funds. Copied to Directorate of Suleimaniyah Treasury. 
Programme 6: Ministry of Municipalities and Tourism (Suleimaniyah) 
Directorate of Water and Sanitation 
Wolloba and Sheikh Abbas Water Project 
1. Outbreak of diarrhoea at Wolloba primary school. 
2. MoHSA, Suleimaniyah Health Office Dept. of health protection, 21 July 1997. 
Subject: biological and chemical examination of water. 
3. Wolloba primary school to DWS, 26 July 1997 (231). Subject: Pupil's health. 
1570 pupils drinking substandard water. 
4. DWS to SCF, 26 July 1997. Subject: Proposal for funding. 
5. SCF agree, 17 August 1997. SCF contribute US$ 47,025. 
6. DWA (technical dept. ) to MMT (GDWS), 19 August 1998 (5739). Subject: 
Implementation of Wolloba and Sheikh Abbas water project after agreement with 
SCF. Appointed oversight committee. Copied to MMT (GD Plan). 
Programme 7: Ministry of Agriculture & Irrigation (Suleimaniyah) 
Purchase of Saplings for Koysinjaq 
1. MoAI (D of Woodlands and Orchards of GD Services & AA) to MoFEA (GD 
Finance), 5 April 1997 (480). Subject: Requesting approval to spend 5000 OID for 
GDA Erbil to buy saplings. Copied to Minister's Bureau, GD Services & AA, 
GDA Erbil. 
2. Supplier to GDA Erbil, 20 April 1997 (477). Subject: Invoice for 5000 saplings. 
3. MoFEA (GD Finance) to MoAI (GD Services & AA), 28 April 1997 (1729). 
Subject: Approval of 480. Copied to Directorate Erbil Treasury. 
4. MoAI (D of Accounts of GD Divan) to GDA Erbil, 29 April 1997 (594). Subject: 
Notification of approval of funds. Copied to Directorate Erbil Treasury. 
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5. GDA Erbil to supplier, 30 April 1997. Subject: Settling of invoice.. 
6. Erbil Treasury to GDA Erbil, 4 August 1997 (65). Subject: Release of funds. 
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7.3.91 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, PUKradio reports 
uprising in Suleimaniyah. SWB ME/1016; 9.03.91. 
8.3.91 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, PUK radio lists 
"liberated" towns and areas. SWB ME/1017; 11.03.91. 
3.4.91 Republic of Iraq Radio, Baghdad, Official Statement Says State's 
Authorityhas been Restored in Northern Iraq; SWB ME/1038; 5.4.91. 
17.6.91 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, Bartani Gives 
Details of Iraqi-Kurdish Agreement on Autonomy and Democracy. 
SWB ME/1102; 19.6.91 
9.9.91 Agence France Presse, Paris, Senior Kurdish source says autonomy 
talks have reached a "dead end". SWB ME/1173; 10.10.91. 
9.10.91 Voice of the* People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, PUK Radio 
Reports on Cease Fire Agreement with Baghdad. SWB ME/1200; 
11.10.91. 
23.1.92 Voice of Rebellious -Iraq, Salahadin, Kurdistan Front Asks 
Observers to Attend Elections. in Northern Iraq. SWB ME/1288; 
27.1.92. 
10.5.92 Voice of Rebellious Iraq, Salahadin, Kurdish Party Leaders Agree 
on Cooperation During Elections. SWB ME/1378; 12.5.92. 
21.5.92 Agence France Press, Paris, Kurdish Leaders Hold Talks on 
Coalition to Share Power. SWB ME/1387; 22.5.92. 
26.5.92 Voice of Unification, Salahadin, Kurdish Parties vow to Cooperate 
Despite Alleged Rigging of Elections. SWB ME/1392; 28.5.92. 
8.7.92 Agence France Press, Paris, Objectives of Kurdish Cabinet Outlined 
by Chairman Fu'ad Ma'sum. SWB ME/1429; 10.7.92. 
27.11.92 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Salahadin, Kurdistan Afinisteria! 
Council Establishes Court ofAppeal. SWB ME/1551; 30.11.92. 
26.4.93 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Salahadin, Kurdish Parliament 
Announces Formation of New Government. SWB ME/1674; 28.4.93. 
21.12.93 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Salahadin, Law Forming 
Presidential Council. SWB ME/1880; 24.12.93. 
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"Large-Scale " Offensive. SWB ME/2694; 19.8.96. 
22.8.96 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, PUKSays that it is 
not it but the KDP Which is Receiving Support from Iran. SWB 
ME/2699; 24.8.96. 
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22.8.96 Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Salahadin, KDP Radio Says PUK 
Receiving Iranian Support in Return for Help Against KDPI. SWB 
ME/2699; 24.8.96. 
6.9.96 Radio Monte Carlo, Paris, KDP Official Says Arrangement with 
Baghdad was for "Limited Period". SWB ME/2712; 9.6.96. 
8.9.96 Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Salahadin, KDP Radio Announces 
'Liberation ' of Koysinjaq. SWB ME/2713; 10.9.96. 
9.9.96 Iraqi TV, Baghdad, Suleimaniyah KDP Sends Saddam Husayn 
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9.9.96 Islamic Republic News Agency, Tehran, Iranian News Agency 
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10.9.96 Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Salahadin, KDP Radio Reports 
Darbandikhan and Kirr Captured. SWB ME/2715; 12.9.96. 
16.9.96 Al-Hayat, London, KDP Leader Barzani Comments on Conflict with 
PUK, Ties with Government. SWB ME/2720; 18.9.96. 
16.9.96 Islamic Republic News Agency, Tehran, PUK Radio Begins 
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16.9.96 Islamic Republic News Agency, Tehran, PUK Calls on Iraqi Kurds 
to Unite, Drive Out 'Mercenaries. SWB ME/2720; 18.9.96. 
16.9.96 Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Salahadin, Kurdish Parliament 
Nominated Prime Minister of Kurdistan Region. SWB ME/2720; 
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22.9.96 Milliyet, Istanbul, Talabani Says PUK Does Not Recognise New 
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23.9.96 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, PUK Forces 
Reportedly Repulse 'Large Scale' KDP Attack. SWB ME/2726; 
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26.9.96 Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Salahadin, New Government Announced 
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13.10.96 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, PUK Radio 
Announces Recapture ofSuleimaniyah. SWB ME/2743; 15.10.96. 
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14.10.96 Radio Monte Carlo, Paris, PUK Recaptures Suleimaniyah. SWB 
ME/2742; 14.10.96. 
27.1.97 Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Salahadin, XOP Says PUK Appointment 
of iVew Ministers Has "No Legal Grounds". SWB ME/2829; 27.1.97. 
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13.10.97 Radio Monte Carlo, Paris, KDP official says fighting started by 
PUK. SWB ME/3050; 15.10.97. 
13.10.97 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Suleimaniyah, PUK radio gives 
details of 13`h October clashes with KDP. SWB ME/3050; 15.10.97. 
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